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Prologue 
  
Scenario One 
I was busy tying a hook to my fishing line, just after we had arrived at the ‘dinner camp’ 
from which we would disperse along the river for the day, fishing and hunting.  It was a 
great winter’s morning, and we’d already shot a wallaby to roast.  After I had taken the 
animal off the back of the truck, and the older children and a couple of the women had 
unloaded a blanket or two, then the billies, tea, sugar and flour, they got busy collecting 
firewood. The younger ones were shouting and yelling as if they’d just been let out of gaol.  
I peered over the top of my glasses, the better to see the fine monofilament as I tried to 
complete the half-blood knot at the hook, when Kathy’s urgent voice penetrated my 
concentration. 
Aɲiy!! 
Well, that wasn’t me. I wasn’t an ‘old man’.  Not yet. No grey hairs showed at my 
temples even.  I looked about, and couldn’t see Kathy’s husband.  Now he is an old man. 
Grey headed, too.  Must be ten or fifteen years between them.  He was here a minute ago. 
Probably gone to the river bank.  Bother this super limp nylon!  Argh!!  Lost it again! 
Aɲiy!!! 
More urgency this time, just as I was getting the end of the line through the loop.  Over 
the top of my glasses I could see her coming closer.  Why is she looking intensely at me 
like that?  She calls me ‘father’, not ‘husband’.  Where’s old Arthur?  He’s her ‘old man’ if 
anyone is.  Can’t she tell the difference between us? 
Aɲiy!!!!! 
Not just more intense, but quite bellicose.  And close, now.  Still looking straight at ME.  
Why, I wonder? 
Abm aneŋand inaŋ?  Odo̯ŋ inaŋ ey?  
Abm inaŋ *matches ayin, al ̯ iɲanaγ? 
‘What’s the matter with you?  Are you deaf? 
Where are the matches to light the fire?’ 
I just don’t get this.  Why am I in the dog-house?  Better be gracious until I work it out. 
Iyaŋ, wuwaŋ, ruraŋ afar ambuŋan.  Abmbin̯d ̯. 
‘Yes, daughter, my wife brought them — they’re in the dilly-bag.’ 
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Satisfied, but not mollified, she moves away to the fire to put a match under it.  I’m an 
old man??  I demand a re-count!!  There can’t be three years between Kathy and me. 
Something’s going on here I haven’t twigged to yet. 
Scenario Two 
Our first child!  A close ‘older sister’ had demanded the right to name her — og ilbmb 
‘bitter water’, she had said — just like her own name.  The family sat together having 
morning tea in a quiet but relaxed mood in the shade under the big mango tree outside the 
house.  Elaine held the baby Leanne, just four months old now.  Another sister — fictively 
even closer — Elizabeth, sat contentedly smoking her ‘stubby’ pipe, the stem long since 
broken off.  Our work had been pushed aside to make way on the table for tea and coffee 
and a plate of biscuits.  It was a relaxed and companionable gathering. 
The inevitable happened, after the manner of babies not yet toilet trained.  Elaine went 
inside for a fresh nappy, while I took the precious bundle, and I showed off my burgeoning 
skills in Oykangand: 
Mmm — arŋg ambuŋ, — mm — ebmoŋ ikir il. 
‘Hmm.  Our child has — er — urinated.’ 
Elizabeth sat up as if shot.  ‘You can’t say that!  That’s bad manners!  That’s your own 
daughter!  You gotta say “adneʀeŋand”; you can’t say that “ebmoŋ” word!!’  She was 
clearly incensed, muttering to herself darkly in Oykangand I couldn’t catch.  
And I had tried so hard!  I felt deflated.  What had I done wrong?  What’s adneʀeŋand, 
I wonder?  I’ll wait a bit until she’s less distressed, and ask her. 
Scenario Three 
While my wife was folding washing in the room adjoining, I was trying out my 
language skills again on Elizabeth, my Oykangand sister and family friend.  We were 
sitting at the table in the caravan, file cards scattered between us for my easy reference, on 
a comfortable winter’s morning that nevertheless encouraged us to stay out of the wind.  
I was trying desperately to recount in a coherent fashion what had happened on a 
hunting trip at the weekend: 
Abm ay .. ibaʀ igur .. er .. aŋkinaγ. 
‘I .. went southward .. hunting.’ 
Adn-iduʀaγ igur .. uy aŋkinaγ  *No!  ikinaγ. 
‘(I) went to Adniduragh to hunt — No! — catch fish.’ 
Elizabeth grunted her approval at my correction. 
Er ... abm ay ewal .. er .. in̯ amaʀ   ̶  in̯ amaʀ awin ̯d ̯ inan ̯. 
‘Ah, I saw a ... black snake ... a black snake sitting on the road.’ 
Elizabeth roared with laughter. She laughed and laughed. Helplessly. She rocked 
backwards and forwards in great gales of laughter. 
A gamut of emotions roared through me in speedy succession:  ‘What’s so funny?  Why 
is she cracking up like that?  What have I missed?’ then ‘I was only trying hard!  It’s not 
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fair to make a joke of it!  I was doing my best!’ and then ‘The insensitive old stinker! I’m 
angry at being the unwitting butt of her joke!  What a hide!’ then finally ‘I might as well as 
relax ... she’s enjoying herself, and it’s real laughter, not malicious, so it can’t be too bad!’ 
and I joined in. 
Tears running down her ample cheeks, and still laughing, half choking, Elizabeth 
managed to get out  
‘Yeah?  That snake was sitting cross-legged on the road, eh?’ 
and I saw the joke. Aboriginal people sit cross-legged — something a snake obviously 
can’t do!  So I learned that snakes lie on the road, and birds stand in trees, and Elaine 
joined in the laughter over morning tea when we stopped for a break. 
But it took a day or two for my bruised ego to heal. 
Scenario Four 
It had been a very poor year.  The annual monsoonal ‘Wet’ early in the year had only 
been an insignificant ‘Damp’.  The floodwaters that the Oykangand rely upon to fill the 
lagoons, flush out the creeks, and flood the plains had been a dismal failure.  The water had 
reached some of the lagoons, but there had been very little flooding, and a lot of 
watercourses had remained dry. Vegetation was stressed, and animal populations 
diminished.  
There were concerns about bush food supplies.  September had already seen the mighty 
Mitchell River dwindle to a trickle at Shalfo Crossing, and we camped for convenience on 
the sand where other years we would have drowned.  My brother Frank and his wife 
Maisie slept under a mosquito net with little Vicki; Elaine and I had Leanne with us — the 
two girls about the same age.  But the fishing was miserable; the flour and other supplies 
that the two families had brought were diminishing faster than was safe. It would be a pity, 
but we might have to go back to the settlement again for food.  
Frank and I walked downstream to where there was deeper water — the upper reaches 
of the tidal water and the limit of Oykangand country — and we fished the deepest holes. 
The haunts of the barramundi and the sooty grunter — mainstays of freshwater fishing — 
were abandoned.  Even the catfish had departed.  Along the bank from time to time we 
passed fish or tortoise skeletons picked apart by the hawks and crows.  
I cast the ‘foolproof’ lure until my arm was about to drop off — no result.  The local 
fish can’t have read the magazine advertising for that lure, obviously. Frank carried his 
spears, but they were all still dry; he hadn’t seen a thing.  Then under a river ti-tree 
overhanging the dark water appeared the gently moving tail of a barramundi. Frank had to 
point it out to me, of course. A member of the perch family, the barramundi, lates 
calcarifer, is highly prized both as a sporting species and a fish for the table.  Fillets can be 
cut to leave all the bones behind, and yield only the crisp white flesh.  Freshly fried, it’s 
delicious.  My mouth watered at the thought. 
With the accomplished skill that I had come to respect in him, Frank maneuvered into 
position with his woomera and spear in the confined space. A flash of bare wood and a 
violent ‘swoosh’ of water, then a sizable fish of about three kilos was wriggling in its death 
throes, pinned by the sharpened barbs at the end of the haft.  Frank pulled it in and opened 
the conversation: 
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Alγar  oŋgol! 
‘Must be no-good!’  
Ey!  Udnam ambiy oŋgol!! 
‘Hey!  It must be fat!’  
My knife flashed for a second in his hand, and the fish lay, gutted, on the dry grass of 
the bank.  He peered at it.  
Alγar id̯n ̯an.  Udnam aʀem.  
‘Really no-good.  No fat at all.’  
I’d met this problem before.  The Oykangand will not eat any game or fish that lacks 
fat. Each species has its own tell-tale body fat, and the Oykangand know just exactly where 
to look for it.  Pigs, wallabies, turkeys, kangaroos and water-birds are all treated alike.  
Fish are fat only if the tell-tale oil floats to the surface when the body cavity is opened in 
the water.  If there is no fat at the appropriate body site, the carcass will be left.  Before 
leaving it, the tail or neck would be broken — I could never work out why, and had never 
felt free to ask.  
But a barramundi?  Oh, no!  Surely not!  
Frank flipped the fish’s guts out onto the grass and broke its tail with the one swift 
movement.  Then he quickly tied it through the gills with a lath from the ti-tree to a limb 
overhanging the water.  He picked up his spears and prepared to move on, as I plucked up 
courage:  
Abm aneγ inaŋ arodan aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯? 
‘Why do you hang it up like that?’  
Enoŋg udnam ambiy oŋgol.  
‘The next one’s got to be fat.’  
??? 
And it was! 
*********** 
The confusion and uncertainty generated in the mind of the researcher from outside the 
Oykangand culture is evident in these scenarios, all of which actually occurred in the 
periods of fieldwork supporting this report.  The use of ‘old man’ as a term of respect is 
treated in Chapter 4.  The inappropriateness of a man directly mentioning his mother’s, 
sisters’ or daughters’ bodily functions and excreta without showing deference by use of the 
‘respect’ vocabulary is shown in Chapter 6.  The third scenario is self-explanatory, but it 
illustrates the difference in world view and the expression of that world view in the 
Oykangand language.  The final cameo is a mirror image of the previous one, illustrating a 
different behavioural pattern — rather than a linguistic one — emanating from values that 
are not shared between the society of the researcher and that of his fishing colleague. All 
four are intended to provide something of the human dimension of the following study. 
 
 
1  
1 Language and kinship 
  
... linguistic study inevitably leads us into the study of all the subjects 
covered by Ethnographic field-work.  (Malinowski 1923:302) 
A beginning 
This study addresses how social structures determine aspects of the use of their 
language among members of an Aboriginal speech community.  
That the speakers of any language are capable of producing grammatically adequate 
utterances is of course taken for granted.  It is also generally accepted that in Aboriginal 
contexts the interpretation of those utterances — the social meaning of them — depends 
more than anything else on kinship.  This conclusion is borne out both in the relevant 
literature and in this study.  It can be safely assumed that such rules of interpretation are as 
complex and as pervasive as the grammatical ones have been shown to be.  If so, then — 
conversely — kinship structures will be illuminated, if not revealed, by such a study of 
language use as is entered upon here. 
The principal direction of this study then is to explore the extent to which the social 
appropriateness and relevance of a grammatically correct utterance in the language both 
depends upon, and hence reveals patterns of, kinship.  The kin relation being addressed, the 
kin being referenced (if any), and the social realities that may obtain between either of 
these and the speaker bear upon the production, and therefore on the interpretation, of 
speech events.  In pursuing this direction, certain unusual features of Oykangand kinship 
will be elucidated. 
The language under discussion is Kunjen — or, more properly — the Oykangand 
dialect of Kunjen.  Since it is better known in the technical literature as Kunjen — 
Oykangand being the predominant and best surviving member of this linguistic group — 
and since this is how it is referred to locally by others, it is the name I have chosen to 
include secondarily in the title. But the speakers of the dialect who still survive 
differentiate themselves from speakers of the other dialects of Kunjen by use of the phrase 
uw oykaNand (lit. ‘speech lagoon-from’); they describe their language in terms of the 
landscape of their origins.  To that geography they themselves can relate most readily: the 
annual flooding of the Mitchell River that rises five hundred and more kilometers to the 
east in the Great Dividing Range flushes the lagoons remaining in the otherwise dry 
watercourses, breaches the banks of the creeks, and creates of the flat, almost featureless 
plains of western Cape York Peninsula a vast sea of swirling muddy water that subsides 
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again to leave the rich food resources of the river and its lagoons and swamps (see Map 2, 
Chapter 2).  Since the river spawns many distributaries and flooded creeks, over perhaps 
100 km of width, the area of their occupation offers many such lagoons, some of which dry 
up entirely in the almost rainless course of that half of the calendar year from April to 
October, but many remain sources of water, food, and materiel until the next flooding. The 
river and its associated lagoons on the geologically ancient western plains of Cape York 
Peninsula are not only the major landscape feature but are the source of life and sustenance 
there. As the Oykangand have often said to me in recognition of the significance of that 
flooding to themselves as a people:  ‘Them floodwaters bin bring us.’  It is by the term 
Oykangand that I refer to these people; their language is Uw Oykangand.  The Oykangand 
manifest some rare, if not unique, variations on the theme of Kariera kinship in Australia 
that will be exposed during the following study. 
Oykangand society suffered not only from the intensive contact with European 
Australian pastoralists and missionaries from the late nineteenth century onwards, but also 
from what were clearly internal changes, too.  For instance, the Oykangand section system 
had fallen into disuse between the time of Sharp’s fieldwork in the 1930s and the 
beginning of my research in the 1960s, and their moiety structures were also by then in 
terminal decline. It is unlikely that these losses were primarily the result of external factors, 
since an earlier, more intense contact with tribes further to the south failed to destroy those 
same structures (Chapter 8).  Despite this decline in historic social patterns, it was still 
possible to trace with assurance the customs and practices of earlier times through the 
genealogical data and through the linguistic conventions still observed or recalled. 
Although the Oykangand kinship system falls basically into the category of the Kariera 
type, it departs from the classical form of that type in important ways.  This study shows 
for example that while sister exchange is possible, it is certainly not the norm, and nowhere 
near as frequent as [Radcliffe-]Brown (1913) found in his original analysis of the Kariera 
(as Chapter 3 discloses). The study also reveals a most unusual traditional pattern: the 
prescribed marriage of a man with a woman in the category of his father’s sister’s 
daughter.  At the same time, the mother’s brother’s daughter is held in the most rigid 
pattern of avoidance of any of his kin — mother-in-law included.  This unusual pattern of 
social behaviour finds its correlation in conventions of language use conspicuous in the 
analysis offered here (Chapter 5).  
This primary distinctive of Oykangand social life — marriage with a father’s sister’s 
daughter — also has corelates in other unusual behavioural patterns.  For example, the 
Oykangand have developed mechanisms for perpetuating both betrothals and avoidance 
relationships through successive generations. Significant patterns of behaviour and 
responsibility are therefore reproduced once they first appear in a preceding generation 
(Chapter 5). Again, the Oykangand have also instituted a conventionalised form of 
obscenity which embraces not only the bilateral jesting between members of the same sex, 
but between a person and his/her spouse’s opposite-sex sibling.  To this spouse’s sibling is 
attributed the social gender of the spouse, so that for example a man jokes obscenely with 
his wife’s brother, and treats him as though he were a woman (Chapters 5 and 6).   
Perhaps the most unusual of the social interactions into which the Oykangand enter is 
the use of the obm taboo/curse.  (The [borrowed] English term ‘taboo’ hardly translates the 
usage, because of the agency and volition evident in the speaker performing the obm 
speech act, better associated with the concept of ‘curse’ — hence my usage of the more 
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complex, if clumsy, term.)  The primary meaning of the word obm is ‘poison’, and would 
in this strict sense be applied to snakes or inedible plants. But by extension it applies to 
‘socially forbidden, taboo, negatively sanctioned’.  So because a man cannot ever accept 
food, water and even firewood from his own daughter or his own sister, these are regarded 
as obm by him.  During funerary observations, certain foods are obm to the mourners, but 
the prohibitions are gradually eased, except in the case of the deceased’s spouse, who may 
observe them for years.  Further, food or other small belongings can be alienated from their 
owner by a kinsman in the right relationship through the latter’s declaration that the item is 
obm (to the owner) by means of the utterance of an appropriate formula. But under certain 
circumstances, the food or goods in question can be protected against this alienation by 
appeal to other factors.  These include notably the requirements of funerary observation 
(Chapters 6 and 7), and the history of the acquisition of the item (Chapter 6). 
Underlying certain social conventions is the principal of matriliny.  Although patrilineal 
connections with land, totems and ritual responsibilities is conspicuous, considerations of 
the ‘mother’s side’ reaches deeply into certain traditions: the perpetuation of avoidance, 
and funerary obligations (Chapters 5 and 8). 
In order to explore these matters, this study begins by expounding the details of 
Oykangand kinship structures (Chapter 5) and their linguistic correlates.  Although the 
matter of funerary practice is not treated until Chapter 7, and it has implications for an 
understanding of the obm curse, the latter is included in the more natural context of 
Chapter 6, along with swearing and obscene bilateral joking routines.  Chapter 8 shows 
that, however significant names and naming are to the Oykangand, kinship terms take 
precedence over personal names in a conspicuous fashion in Oykangand discourses. 
Throughout the entire range of these issues runs the principle of sex: social versus 
actual gender, actual sexual engagement, sex physiology, and sex symbolism. It is a 
persavive theme, treated not salaciously but honestly and openly, in Oykangand life. It is a 
major organising principle behind the kinship system, and there it is reflected in many 
aspects of daily Oykangand interactions — from its practice and physical pleasure to 
marriage and childbearing, through funerary observances, the obm curse, obscene joking, 
and swearing.  The reader should not be offended if I treat this subject as frankly as the 
Oykangand do; their uninhibited enjoyment of obscene joking as verbal art has been 
obvious from their responses to it. 
In one sense this is now a historical work: beyond the close of the twentieth century the 
speech community under study regrettably no longer uses its language or observes its 
social traditions in the fashion described here.  All the major contributors of language data 
to this study are now dead, and few reliable speakers survive.  Patterns of alliance are less 
strictly observed.  My use of the present tense, rather than the past, is intended to be read 
as an historic present. 
Equally, not all the language data were recorded in situ. Some material on which this 
discussion is based has resulted from reconstructions of actual speech events by speakers 
of the language and from the results of formal interviews about such events.  Other 
material was recorded as it occurred.  At several points the research resulted in no further 
clarification of issues under enquiry simply because memories had failed, experience was 
lacking, uncertainty prevailed, or agreement was only tentative among remaining speakers 
of the language.  Nevertheless, this study represents an attempt to record, preserve, and 
offer an initial analysis of how the ‘stuff of language’ was shaped by the social realities of 
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kinship confronting its speakers. These remaining linguistic data now give the most 
manifest evidence of the disappearing social structures of Oykangand tradition. 
The data on which the study is based was amassed during a total of about seven years of 
field residence — broken into periods of varying duration — spent since mid-1964 while 
living with Oykangand people, largely at Kowanyama near the western coast of Cape York 
Peninsula.  During those years I took many pages of notes, hundreds of hours of taped 
stories and anecdotes, and hundreds of photographs.  I compiled and updated genealogies. 
With various Oykangand speakers I flew by plane and helicopter over their country, hunted 
over their estates on foot, and drove over their traditional preserves.  A number of papers, 
and two monographs were produced (see under ‘Sommer’ in the bibliography) and these 
analyses substantially inform this study by providing the necessary linguistic details of Uw 
Oykangand.  Despite these formal records, however, it has been the daily round, with its 
funerary observations, fights, arguments and cursing, hunting and fishing ventures, shared 
meals and ‘dinner camps’, bouts of laughter and joking, visits to traditional country, and 
desultory discussions around campfires at night that provided much of the catalytic data for 
this analysis.  As I have already remarked, some of those events were reconstructed later 
for the tape recorder or recalled for further discussion both at Kowanyama and also in 
Townsville.  
The resulting description is not always formal and impersonal; I have allowed the 
heuristic of my own learning experiences to appear from time to time — as the Prologue 
attests! — and I enter, as a limited participant observer, both directly and indirectly into the 
anecdotes and stories that illuminate the analysis here presented.  
The study itself is organised in the following way: 
Chapter 2 explores the place of the Kunjen (Oykangand) in the anthropological and 
linguistic literature, the relevance of certain anthropological constructs to the argument, 
and some of the commonalities that Kunjen (Oykangand) shares with other Aboriginal 
groups, especially those of Cape York Peninsula. This is followed by a more theoretical 
chapter providing a survey of the literature on Kariera kinship, and by Chapter 4 on the 
methodology and philosophical orientation of this research. Chapter 5 begins the 
examination of the data, by reviewing Oykangand kinship and its more immediate 
linguistic correlates. Chapter 6 takes up issues raised in the preceding one: the respect 
vocabulary, obscene joking, and how to place — and how to avoid the implications of — 
the obm taboo/curse on resources.  Chapter 7 continues the kinship focus with an account 
of death and its linguistic repercussions, while Chapter 8 takes up the matter of names and 
naming — of places, people, species and social entities.  
Chapter 9 is a conclusion and summary of the whole. 
Appendix 1 contains the keys to the linguistic abbreviations and summaries and also a 
repeat of the kinship diagrams, and is intended as a ready reference for the reader to these 
mechanics of description. A bookmark inserted at this point would doubtless serve the 
reader well. 
Appendix 2 contains a number of annotated texts or excerpts.  The purpose of these is to 
show that the claims of Chapters 5 to 8 are attested in free, unstructured, continuous speech 
from a variety of speakers.  
Now linguists delight to present long, dull, and over-abundantly exemplified samples of 
speech, with the conviction that the reader is as thrilled with their intricacy as the 
transcriber. The temptation is not lost on this author, either.  But it is the annotations to 
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those texts that relate to the analyses of Chapters 5 to 8 which allow the reader to establish 
for him/herself, beyond reasonable doubt, the central claims of this study: the 
appropriateness and acceptability of utterances in the Oykangand language illuminate and 
explicate the issues of kinship on which their correct interpretation depends. 
 
6 
2 Introducing the Oykangand 
  
... ethnography ... always involves long-term association with some group, to 
some extent in their own territory, with the purpose of learning from them 
their ways of doing things and [of] viewing reality.   (Agar 1980:6) 
Location and neighbours 
To locate the Oykangand in space is a relatively straightforward matter; Map 2 shows 
— at an admittedly small scale — their traditional country (or aggregation of clan estates), 
which corresponds reasonably well with what Roth recorded (1899 and 1910; Map 1).  
They occupied the lower reaches of the Mitchell River and its surrounds down to a little 
below the limit of salt water at the junction of the Alice River.1  Eastwards, they occupied 
the River up to about Dunbar Station. This is close to where Roth (1910, map) placed them 
as the ‘Koko Wangar’; Parry-Okeden’s 1897 Report has ‘Koka Wangar’. It was these 
writers’ ethnography that is probably faulty at this point; I very much doubt that they ever 
actually heard this term from the Oykangand themselves.  (They probably did not record 
these data independently; it is likely that Parry-Okeden depended on Roth. See the 
former’s remarks on page 17 of his 1897 Report.)  ‘Koko/a’ is a reflex of Proto Paman 
*kuuku ‘speech, language’ (Hale 1964, 1976) and is not correctly Kunjen at all, where the 
reflex would be oγ or uw, depending on dialect. ‘Koko’ and ‘Gugu’ are recorded as typical 
of the language names along the east coast of the Peninsula.  Their second word is properly 
a compound: ew aŋkaʀ and means ‘mouth ache’ in Uw Oykangand or Ogh Undjan; the 
language has some very difficult consonant sequences that must have bewildered their 
neighbours, and this is the name I was first given for the language in 1964. They also had 
names given them by the speakers of other languages:  Koko Mirandang by the Kok Kaber, 
for example. The form of the name that they cite — not perhaps independently — is 
therefore anomalous. 
Roth’s contemporary, R.H. Mathews, includes them in his catalogue of section names; 
he remarks:  
The country watered by the Lower Mitchell, Alice, Coleman, and other rivers is 
inhabitied by the Koonjan, Goonamon and several friendly tribes possessing four 
intermarrying divisions and matriarchal descent ... (1899:110). 
                                                                                                                                                    
1  The Oykangand must have been a politically or numerically dominant group in order to hold the rich 
area of resources along the main River against other claimants — a fact perhaps reflected in the longer 
survival of this language and its speakers than its cogeners such as Ogh Undjan, Kawarrangg and 
perhaps even Olgol. 
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The section names are then listed.  The ‘Koonjan’ also score a mention in his article on 
marriage and descent in the following year: 
The same divisional system, but with different names for the sections, extends from 
Cape York southerly till it adjoins the Koonjan and other tribes, who use the four 
divisions reported by me in Table No. 3, contained in a paper contributed to this 
Society in 1899.  The equivalence of the four sections of the Koonjan, Warkeemon, 
Goothanto, Mykoolon and Kogai communities may be tabulated as follows: 
(1900:135) 
The four section names are spelled very slightly differently this time, but are clearly 
intended to refer to the same entities. 
The name ‘Kunjen’ by which the present ‘freshwater’ groups are socially labelled 
probably comes from a corruption of Ogh Undjan oγ uɲan, which is the name by which 
the southern neighbours of the Oykangand refer to themselves.  Sharp (1939:439 fn.) notes 
that ‘Koonjan’, as recorded by Mathews (1899:110, above) was in his time ‘a popular 
pidgin name’ for the Ogh Undjan (his Okundjain) and that his own earlier (1933–34) 
identification of ‘Koko Wanggara’ (he was apparently another victim of ew aŋkaʀ!) for the 
‘Oikand’ was in error, but that ‘Koonjan’ was a ‘term applied to them by their neighbours, 
and now by themselves.’  
By the time this research was undertaken, the term ‘Kunjen’ (and this spelling) was 
applied generally to speakers of those languages inland from the western coast of the 
Peninsula, from which the initial consonant of each word had been lost.  This phonological 
feature serves to define the group which internally also maintained coherent social and 
ritual ties; in 1969 I referred to it as the Central Paman sub-group of languages. 
The other members of the Kunjen group well known at Kowanyama — the Anglican 
Church’s Mitchell River Mission station of earlier years — are the Olgol and the 
Kawarrangg (oγ awarrangg). The Olgol — not to be confused with the Ulkulu around 
Ebagoola, although these were also ‘Kunjen’ — were the Alice River people, and the 
Kawarrangg were from the Mitchell River just below the Palmer.  In 1884, Edward 
Palmer, who had taken up the lease of Gamboola Station, wrote of the Koko-minni — 
which if not actually Kawarrangg was a dialect rather close to it (Sommer 1969:4–5). 
Palmer also recorded section names and population details, and his became the first known 
study of these people; with them the western ‘Kunjen’ comprise the bulk of the Central 
Paman subgroup of languages (Sommer 1969:50–58). The Oykangand represent a 
successful southern and western geographic expansion of this group from within the centre 
of the Peninsula (which has been reconstructed as the location of their origins [Sommer 
1972a]).  While the salt water tides reach into their country at the end of the Dry season 
(October to December), they are not exploiters of the marine environment, and maintain a 
proud orientation to the og uland — the annual flooding of the Mitchell River which 
refreshed their freshwater lagoons, refilled their creeks and spread out onto the plains, 
making the course of the river a complex maze that is for a short time many kilometers 
wide. 
While the Oykangand shared a vocabulary structure, certain matters of syntax, and the 
phonological character of their Central Paman cogeners, they also shared linguistic features 
of other Peninsular languages. Hale (1964, 1976) could thus include them in his 
reconstruction of the Paman group covering much of the Peninsula. In the same way, but 
rather less formally provable, the Oykangand share many of their social conventions with 
other Peninsular groups (Sharp 1939 for example shows the minimal range of totemic 
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conventions in respect of moieties, sections and individuals; McConnel 1938 establishes a 
similar level of conformity in social organisation).  
The Oykangand and the character of this study 
To locate the Oykangand in the social and linguistic literature on Aboriginal life in 
Cape York Peninsula, and to expound the direction taken by this study, is a rather more 
complicated task, and one that will be addressed at some length in the remainder of this 
chapter.  It will be necessary to explore what has been recorded about the Oykangand, and 
to summarise what features of Aboriginal life recorded about their neighbours apply also to 
them. In those instances where there is little richness in these external details it will be 
necessary to stretch geographically even further afield for comparative material to inform 
the description of issues needing address later.  
Essentially this is a study of an ethnographic nature.  It describes the sociolinguistics of 
the Oykangand as an Aboriginal population of Cape York Peninsula.  Unlike that of Sutton 
(1978), the principal thrust of which is with the sociology of language use, this study 
engages more with how communicative events are shaped by the realities surrounding the 
speaker in his/her social environment.  The distinction between these two discrete areas of 
sociolinguistics has been well described by Fishman, Hartig and Haynes in a troika of 
papers in the 1980 Annual Review of Applied Linguistics under the rubric of 
‘sociolinguistics’.  Hartig (1980:175) proposes that ‘macrosociolinguistics has to do with 
the language situation within a given polity and also with the differences and similarities 
between the language situation in that polity and the language situation in any other 
polity.’ The domain here is the ‘polity’: aggregates of humans identifying (including 
perhaps linguistically) as a coherent social entity.  Sutton’s 1978 thesis on a community 
speaking a Wik dialect conforms principally — though not exclusively — to this model.  
One advantage of pursuing the route chosen here over that of the macrosociolinguistic 
direction is that the data are not yet significantly adjusted to conform to post-contact social 
patterns and perceptions.  Peninsular post-contact polities, on the other hand, have suffered 
more than a century of disruption. An elicitation of matters of traditional populations,  
their composition, demography and ritual character frequently invokes a process of 
reconstruction by community participants — evident from Native Title research 
undertaken by the author in other Penisular communities.  The aging memories from which 
those past social realities must be recalled are also prone to error.2  Moreover, the data are 
subject to political manipulation; language data are much less subject to this. A speaker 
cannot as readily distort language behaviour.  The societal bases of macrosociolinguistic 
data are therefore more amenable to revisionist amendments than is microsociolinguistics. 
A definiton of microsociolinguistics, on the other hand, is offered in Hayne’s 
paraphrase of Cooper’s statements (1980:115): ‘microsociolinguistics is the study of 
particular features of language in societal interaction ... .’  The domain is therefore the 
speaker and his/her hearers.  The linguistic features might include, Haynes reminds us,  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
2 This was the point of my contribution to the Hercus and Sutton volume, 1986. Like most humans, 
Aboriginal people edit history to their own advantage. 
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matters of syntax, phonology, lexicon or discourse strategies or even of behaviour towards 
language. In this study, what will concern us most are lexicon, discourse strategies and 
behaviour towards language.  The syntax (Sommer 1972b) and phonology (Sommer 1969) 
of Oykangand have been described in a traditional fashion, and are available to inform this 
study. In the lexicon, I will be concerned with choices of terms and their definition, and 
how these reflect meaningful social concepts. Discourse strategies, dependent on kin 
relations, determine the bulk of these choices.  And attitudes towards language — its use 
and non-use (such as socially determined linguistic and proximal avoidance) — will also 
appear. 
The connection that is being maintained between language and society in this case is 
that the social categories of kinship, each discretely labelled or tagged in the lexicon, 
determine more than any other factor the appropriateness of an Oykangand utterance.  In 
other words, a speaker’s communicative competence (Hymes introduced the term 
informally as early as 1966, but see Gumperz and Hymes [1972]) in the language entails 
some metric by which s/he responds — according to age, gender, relative birth order, 
kinship term or genealogical proximity — to those who are his interlocutors and/or third-
party referents.  Add to this metric a means of factoring in social realities such as alliances 
and adoptions, deaths and disputes, friendships and marital infidelities, and the result is 
that a socially acceptable utterance conforms to parameters very different from those that 
govern English. Certain topics, such a body parts/functions and sexual proclivities are 
under less restraint; matters to do with death are under greater restraint. ‘Rich points’ 
(Agar 1994:100–106) of the language and culture emerge from this study, such as the use 
of obm ‘poison’ and oɲat ‘widow’ that are quite different from the usage of those terms 
of English. 
The first matter of concern is then the kinship system of the Oykangand, which follows 
a general Kariera pattern.  The Kariera structure is one that will be explored theoretically 
more fully in the next chapter; for the moment, the concern is with the direction and intent 
of an earlier study of Kunjen kinship. 
Donald Crimm and Kunjen kinship 
Donald Crimm’s 1973 thesis on Changes in kin-term usage in the Aboriginal 
community at Mitchell River Mission, Northern Queensland is, as far as I know, the only 
study that addresses Kunjen kinship (even partially) since the Second World War.  A brief 
statement of less than a hundred pages, it is effectively reduced to less than half that length 
by introducing marginally relevant historical considerations. Crimm’s method was to show 
to his 51 respondents the photographs of 456 local kinsmen and to tabulate their kin term 
responses to these in both a vernacular language and in English.  Since there were three 
major vernacular languages spoken at the Mission (as it was until 1967 before becoming 
Kowanyama) he chose respondents evenly from all three groups. The work was undertaken 
in 1961 and 1962 — a matter of just two years before it was concluded that the languages 
of the Mission were not viable as Bible translation media, since they were even then in 
sharp decline.  
Crimm’s point was that the referents of kinship terms were being altered by this 
language loss, and this constituted the rationale for his research.  His claim was that the 
kinship terms were being simplified in the English speech of younger people from a more 
Introducing the Oykangand     11 
 
complex set of traditional vernacular forms — use of which was also being eroded. The 
methodology was rigorous enough in conception, but weak at the data collection point and 
at the interpretive level. The appropriateness of the many younger people that he 
interviewed to speak about any traditional matter without at least the guidance of an elder, 
for example, is never raised as an issue. 
It is also worth asking ‘What would have been the response by any of the older people 
at being confronted with a photograph of a “poison cousin” or mother-in-law?’  These are 
categories of kin that a man should never speak to or even see closely enough to identify. 
Crimm does not discuss whether he took any precautions against this happening.  Would 
he have had seriously interpretable answers?  Or prevarication?  Or just avoidance? 
Crimm (1973:62) remarks that:  
It seemed to me that virtually all studies of kinship terminology had assumed that 
each and every informant carries an identical map of the terminology around in his 
head, or, at least, that discernible differences among informants would be trivial and 
unimportant.  One of the side issues in this research was to be the testing of this 
assumption. 
But he then fails to comprehend that while the generalised cognitive map of society is (and 
perhaps even must be) the same, each individual’s specific social map may be entirely 
different — even for siblings. So that mapping the terminology onto the social realities 
facing the individual is, even without the process of language translation, a research 
activity that required a rather more sophisticated approach. 
A major gap in the elicitation pattern was Crimm’s failure to discover reciprocals.  
Crimm notes (p.60) that ‘several informants offered additional information, or terms, 
genealogical relationships or other background matters. ... Two informants gave rather 
extensive information concerning the purported parentage of various individuals, as well as 
on current and past sexual liaisons; this was of some help later on in the task of accounting 
for variations in usage.’  Information on these aspects of community life would not only be 
‘of some help’ but in my experience entirely crucial to understanding the issues. 
Information of this order would illuminate community antagonisms, grudges, liaisons, 
wrong marriages, family support and the effect that these might have on objective data. It 
is a matter of some disappointment that Crimm’s unstructured ethnographic interviews 
were so limited. 
The criticisms of Crimm’s methodology at this point can be focused on a single live 
example: TZ carries the Z name, from her mother’s first marriage, and her sociological 
paternity is thereby well defined, since she was brought up in the Z family. But her 
physiological paternity is through a father in the E family, who called her mother ‘sister’, 
and most senior members of the community are aware of this incest, as indeed she was 
herself. How then would TZ answer these questions? Would she (as a girl; some of 
Crimm’s respondents were only eight years of age) be consistent to either an E or to a Z 
family orientation in her answers?  In assessing her relationship to a person A, who was 
closer to E than to Z, would the route to the relationship be calculated through Z or through 
E?  Would she even be aware enough of remoter kin to place them correctly?  Crimm’s 
weak grasp of the genealogical realities of the community would preclude even an 
awareness of the problem. 
There are also failures of analysis.  Examining the Kunjen kinship terms of page 68a, 
we find that Crimm failed to recognise that his (ab)mabmiŋ ‘male and female of ego’s 
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father’s father’s generation’ is glossed identically with his jajiŋ. This suggests that he 
recorded either a synonym from another dialect, or made an error of analysis.  In fact both 
forms are Oykangand:  the former denotes ego’s FF and MM, while the latter refers to one’s 
MF and FM.  His njəlare ‘female cross cousin, wife, wife’s sister’ is a form from the Olgol 
dialect, which varies from standard Kunjen (Oykangand) (u)ruraŋ at this point. Crimm 
failed to establish that his informant for these kin terms was not giving him forms against 
which the Oykangand community at large might be legitimately assessed because of the 
source of the form in Olgol.  The data may therefore have been irreparably skewed.  
It should be noted that Crimm also differentiates (p.63) between Kunjen speakers and 
those of ‘Koko Merandaingen’, which is simply a Kok Kaber appellation for the same 
language.  
In the 456 responses from each of 51 respondents, it strikes the informed reader that 
there was no Kunjen reciprocal of ‘wife’, namely ‘husband’: (o)ʀoʀaŋ in the Oykangand 
data. Its analogue does however appear in the Kok Kaber list.  Whether his informants 
used the word or not, enquiry ought to have been made of the Kunjen community over the 
term for this conspicuously lacking category. Its absence from the elicited list might then 
be the basis for further enquiry. 
Not surprisingly, Crimm stated (p.62) that ‘This enterprise came close to being an 
unqualified failure.’ The parameters were nicely controlled at the level of referents’ 
identities, but totally inadequate where societal and personal considerations were 
concerned. All in all, then, Crimm’s study lacks strength.  Probably the most illuminating 
points are found in two comments in his final chapter of Discussion and conclusion.  Here 
he makes admissions and concessions over the form of the data, and over his results: 
The first conclusion of note (p.76) is that ‘my genealogical data were incomplete, and ... 
I remained in ignorance of many of the marriage and descent relationships, especially 
among the older people. ... although I have slightly over half of the natives on one 
genealogy or another, I was still unable to account for much of the interview data by 
demonstrable genealogical connections.’  This error has been avoided in the present study. 
A full and relatively complete genealogical register has been maintained on the entire 
community; in Kunjen since 1965, and for Kok Kaber and Yir Yoront (by John Taylor) up 
to 1973. It was last updated in mid-1997, but to preserve it against modern influences, only 
the earlier data will be taken into account. 
It is consequently possible to assert that the understandings of relationships that are 
explored by means of the genealogical charts of Chapter 6 are entirely secure.  While these 
have been slightly ‘fictionalised’ by means of altering the initials or names of those 
concerned, in order to obscure their identity, these diagrams depend upon actual cases of 
kinship and alliance in the present or recent Oykangand community. 
The second of Crimm’s comments (p.76) is that ‘most pairs of individuals who are not 
closely related can and do trace their relation to one another in more than one way, and that 
situational considerations play a large part in determining which kin term is used.’ In 
attestation of this statement, he himself gives a case of an alliance which changed usage. I 
explore this issue more fully in Chapter 5.  Fully understood, this admission negates much 
of Crimm’s data.  If for example a person A can trace a kinship relationship to Z through 
either family K or family Q, s/he may choose a ‘route’ through Q over that via K simply 
because — although ‘shorter’ or ‘more direct’ — that through K invokes memories of a 
personal grudge or a fight or a broken romantic affair or other personal trauma. On the 
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other hand, A’s sibling, B, may choose the route through K because of some ritual or 
friendly connection there.  The siblings A and B could therefore manifest different kinship 
terminology towards the same person.  
An enquiry into the usage of kinship terms by A and B is not therefore going to reveal 
‘changes’ in the system, but will be an index of failure to penetrate the functioning of that 
system. 
It is to be regretted that, with all the resources available to him under the Mission 
administration, and with the opportunity to incisively enter into traditional community life 
and interaction before the later disruption of them by Cyclone Dora in early 1963, Crimm 
failed to penetrate kinship issues there so dismally.  My present study could have been the 
richer, and uncertain points unambiguously clarified, had that opportunity been seized and 
the issues industriously pursued. The great promise held by Crimm’s data and approach 
could perhaps now be best realised by a re-evaluation and re-analysis following more 
rigorous accounts of local kinship systems. 
The use of kinship terms and personal names 
The most conspicuous initial evidence for the existence of an elaborated kinship system 
in a given speech community is linguistic.  The newcomer to any society that has a kinship 
system as pervasive and elaborate as those in Australia is immediately struck by the 
reference made to another person, or to other persons, in terms that are not immediately 
transparent.  Reference to a third party by a kinship term which cannot be taken literally as 
indicating a biological relationship is one of the first indicators – for example, a ‘sister’ 
who is sixty years older than the speaker, and a ‘son’ in the same age-bracket, or a 
‘mother’ who is not yet menstruating. This is one of the first clues with which the 
newcomer might be presented. A certain amount of consequent confusion in the mind of 
the unsophisticated newcomer is inevitable. 
Or perhaps the most indicative feature will be several sets of relatives each subsumed 
under a group or section name, opposed to that which an interlocutor claims for him/ 
herself.  The social relevance of these novel lexical labels will not be immediately apparent 
to the naive observer at all. 
The ethnographic fact is that reference of a third party by a speaker to his/her 
interlocutor depends on kinship and other factors in determining the appropriate form of 
the reference. A personal name may not be entirely ruled out, or it may be used as a 
reference point in concert with a kinship term to identify that party, but it may be that only 
a kinship term or section name is required instead.  It is in the fact that personal names are 
suppleted by social categories, status terms and nicknames that the consideration of these 
two apparently discrete areas of study is required in tandem. 
In Australia, for perhaps the first century after initial European contact, the principal 
concern of even the most culturally sensitive writers was with the names and operation of 
section systems, and with the implications of elaborated kinship systems.  R.H. Mathews is 
representative of a generation of scholars, extending even to beyond that first century, 
whose preoccupation was with section system names and the social patterns that they 
exposed (e.g. his 1898, 1899 and 1900 papers).  On the other hand, A.W. Howitt — his 
contemporary — spent his energies in the field of interpreting kinship structures, 
particularly in the idiom of the ‘group marriage’ concept. His obsession with the 
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philosophical orientation of Spencerian social evolution blinded him to both legitimate 
conclusions and the collection of critical data from now extinct social systems (e.g. Howitt 
1884, 1904). Spencer himself, with his Irish colleague, Gillen, were of course deeply 
involved in research that was similarly conditioned by their preconceptions. 
Nevertheless, it was no accident that the principal data on which these scholars called 
were the lexical labels (often very poorly transcribed) for kin terms and (sub-)sections of 
whatever tribe they were dealing with. 
Of about the same era can be dated the fascination with Australian totemism that led to 
Frazer’s (1887) work, and to Freud’s (1913) interpretation of it. Sharp’s more rigorous 
1937 PhD thesis can be seen as both the culmination of this interest and the termination of 
it, in a truly scientific enquiry. 
The initial ‘pre-scientific’ recording slowly receded in the early years of the present 
century, to be overtaken by more rigorous fieldwork and critical analysis by better trained 
observers. Among the foremost of these early figures must be reckoned A.R. [Radcliffe-] 
Brown, whose 1913 article on three tribes of Western Australia marked a new and healthy 
departure in the field of kinship studies, culminating in his 1930–31 contributions to the 
journal Oceania.  In the 1920s A.P. Elkin began his long and prolific career, bringing both 
rigour and sympathetic imagination to what was developing as a significant field of 
anthropological enquiry. His publications in the early 1930s and his 1938 overview of 
Aboriginal life for the layman must be regarded as some of his best work. 
The field of kinship studies remained a fertile and fruitful one until the end of the 1970s, 
and to account for all the scholars in that period who studied details and thrashed out 
analyses and concepts is beyond this brief summary. The purpose of this latter is simply to 
place into context the late arrival of field workers — or better, anthropologists with 
linguistic sensitivities — on the scene of this intellectual activity. 
Apart from reference to kinship categories (the vernacular names for which tended to be 
overused by authors as criteria of authenticity) and to (sub-)section names, few 
explorations of the impact of these entities on other aspects of language were attempted. 
Not surprisingly, those few that do appear in the literature emanate from workers who 
spent the necessary years of exposure to the totality of Aboriginal life to be aware of the 
linguistic implications of these social systems.  Historically, the first period of research in 
Cape York Peninsula is represented solely by W.E. Roth at the turn of the century. Then 
there was a flurry of activity in this sub-field in the 1930s, which was not revived until the 
mid-1960s. This resurgence of interest lasted until the early 1980s, when the volume edited 
by Heath, Merlan and Rumsey appeared (1982), but it apparently did little to catalyse 
further activity.  Part of the problem has been the evaporation of research funds from both 
universities and Aboriginal Studies agencies, and the more immediate pragmatic need to 
explore issues of land tenure and economies based on that tenure.  
Roth’s relevant output is contained in two chapters on Social and individual 
nomenclature; one appeared as Chapter III of his Ethnological studies among the North-
west-central Queensland Aborigines in 1897, and the other, long after his departure from 
Australia, as Bulletin No. 18 of the Records of the Australian Museum, Sydney, in 1910. 
The two are at first sight very different in content and approach. 
The contents of Chapter III deal in the first instance with names and naming.  For the 
north west Queensland groups Roth provides an impressive set of name types for just about 
every possible situation.  Interpreted into a modern idiom, these include ‘tribal’ orientation, 
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moiety name, section name, kinship categories, close kin terms, personal names and status 
terms. The chapter ends with a speculative interpretation of the section systems of the area. 
By contrast, the first half of Bulletin No. 18 deals with ‘tribal’ names and areas to the 
north and east of Roth’s earlier study, and only in the latter half returns again to moieties, 
sections, status terms and so on. Less organised and complete in itself than the earlier 
compilation, it nevertheless refers at several points to it, and provides the same details over 
a wider area of country, so that the two were clearly intended to be complementary. A 
tantalising but brief section on ethnoclassification closes the Bulletin. 
 
Map 2:  The estates of the Oykangand along the Mitchell River 
(Adapted from the Reader’s Digest Atlas of Australia; scale approx 1:1,000,000.) 
Roth had little training in recording languages, and while Dixon (pers. comm.) has 
expressed the view that, over time, his transcriptions improved, they still remained less 
than ideal. He did not let this inability distract him from attempting to record a vast 
quantity of lexical material from a significant catalogue of languages, and these two 
chapters are rich in linguistic data.  Roth lacked however the theoretical sophistication to 
attempt any serious analysis of them, and so remained essentially a taxonomist, recording 
endless variants until he too wearied of them: 
And so I could go on throughout all the areas of North Queensland over which I have 
wandered, but such details would only render this work too cumbersome, and are not 
of sufficient importance for publication, suffice it to know that they exist (1910:105). 
One is left with the impression that with just a little more insight and energy, this could 
have been developed into a significant study of Aboriginal expressions of identity at a time 
before major disruption to traditional patterns forever altered them. By 1910, however, 
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Roth was no longer in Australia, and no doubt had other matters to occupy his mind. Many 
of the issues he raised were to remain untouched for another twenty years or more. 
In the era of the 1930s, the first significant published work was that of C.W.M. Hart, 
whose ‘Personal names among the Tiwi’ appeared in the third issue of the very first 
volume of the journal Oceania (1930–31:280–290). A brief summary and expansion of this 
appeared in The Tiwi of North Australia, co-authored with A.R. Pilling and published in 
1960. 
An unusual feature of Tiwi naming is that an individual may have perhaps as many as 
five names, each one available for use as a term of address or reference (1930–31:280), 
because male siblings of both the father and mother have the right to bestow a name. 
Unlike other communities, each name is unique; it is never shared, nor re-used. The 
consequence of pukumani (=taboo) at death means that the deceased’s name and its near 
homonyms are forever abandoned. Not only so, but the names he bestowed are also 
prohibited.  (In the Hart and Pilling volume [1960:21] it is pointed out that this prohibition 
was usually only temporary in those cases of adult issue whose names were already too 
well established.) The widow in Tiwi society is immediately remarried, and the new 
husband is in turn able to bestow a new set of names on the otherwise now (possibly) 
nameless children of that woman. Tiwi names are gender specific, with distinctive 
morphologies: the suffix -miri indicates the name of a male; -mo that of a female. Hart 
(1930–31) shows how certain names are coined, and lists ‘initiation-grade names’ as well 
as ‘age-grade names’ (status terms). 
Although this is intriguing ethnography, Tiwi practice — including its matriliny and 
immediate remarriage of mature females — is somewhat out of the pattern of mainland 
Aboriginal traditions, and quite remote from the customs of Cape York Peninsula. What 
the Hart article effectively established, however, was the union of kinship studies with 
research on naming traditions that could not be lightly ignored (as Dousset 1997 has 
recently restated). Most scholars in the succeeding decades followed Hart’s lead in 
integrating kinship and names research.  
The preponderance of subsequent studies from this era relate to north Queensland. 
Thomson, whose fieldwork in 1928, 1929, and 1932–33 in north Queensland supplied 
the material for a rich article on The joking relationship and organized obscenity in North 
Queensland (1935) chose to publish his material largely overseas. A number of his 
observations of Ompela behaviour are noteworthy because they establish that parallel 
practices in Oykangand are not merely aberrations or irregularities, but features of 
sociolinguistic behaviour common to the region.  
For example, Thomson (1935:465ff.) discusses the fact that verbal references to certain 
personal bodily functions are inappropriate in the presence of ‘a mixed company’ of 
kinsmen of various categories (though he does not specify which ones).  The Oykangand 
require use of a special ‘avoidance vocabulary’ which they term Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy before — 
and about — a man’s mother, daughter, and those of his father’s sisters to whom he can 
speak. Hence Elizabeth’s offence at my faux pas in Scenario Two of the Prologue. 
Oykangand, like Ompela, also has a tidy circumlocution to indicate ‘male’ or ‘female’ in 
polite conversation (p.467); ‘female’ also depending on the yamstick, ‘male’ on the 
woomera (Chapters 7 and 8). 
There is nothing in my data to suggest that the names of the long dead (p.467ff.) are 
used as expletives, but there is record of the dead being sworn at and of the use of such a 
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name in obscene joking (Chapters 5 and 6). Its derisive use can also trigger a fight 
(Chapter 7). 
I owe to Thomson (1935:469ff.) an impetus towards the basic analysis of obscene 
language exemplified in Chapters 5 and 6. Taunts and insults comprise verbal acts of 
aybmoγ amban ‘goading’ or arousing to anger, and are typically obscene references to the 
offending party which cannot be tolerated without redress. ‘Licenced’ obscenity on the 
other hand is a humorous feature of certain kinship relations, according to personality and 
preference.  Linguistically, the two types of speech act are normally differentiated by both 
content and context.  Typically, organised obscenity occurs between members of the same 
sex, and examples of such exchanges appear in Chapters 5 and 6. The Oykangand share 
this use of language with the Ompela, Koko Ya’o and Wik Monkan tribes of Thomson’s 
study.  Even the tripartite distinction between those few ambivalent utterances — ones that 
can be either jocular or insulting — and those that are either only goading on the one hand, 
or alternatively only humorous on the other, was observed by Thomson.  He also provided 
insights into the concomitant use of practical jokes (p.477) and the ritualisation of obscene 
exchanges with a closing ‘Ech! in a hoarse voice’ which was ‘repeated after each fresh 
sally’ (p.479) much like the Oykangand [ayi:ˀ ] in Chapter 6. 
Perhaps the most significant of Thomson’s observations however is the report of a 
‘mother-in-law’ language, or vocabulary replacement, required of speakers in the presence 
of certain kin — typically a WM, hence the name of this speech style.  In Chapters 5 and 6 
this phenomenon is shown to apply in slightly different terms with the Oykangand, as 
mentioned above in respect of Scenario Two.  Dixon (1971) makes use of the mother-in-
law register of vocabulary replacement in proposing a method of semantic description from 
data derived from the Djirbal language.  
The general tenor of Thomson’s Summary (p.488–489) is also appropriate to the 
Oykangand.  While there is considerable coincidence between Thomson’s findings and 
those of this study, there are nevertheless points of difference. I have no record of any 
formulaic utterance or behaviour to atone for a social offence over misused obscenities or 
accidentally uttering the name of one recently dead (8. below), or of its more frequent 
occurence on ceremonial occasions (7.). Lack of these observations are probably due to 
limitations in the available data. There is no clear distinction in the Oykangand evidence 
on which to base the differentiation of two types of obscenity (compare 10. below with 
Obscene joking and verbal abuse in Chapter 6). Further, Thomson’s wording of 11. 
overstates what I understand to be the case between, for example, a person and his/her 
same-sex classificatory grandparent in the Oykangand tradition. His conclusions — 
necessarily abbreviated a little — are as follows: 
1.  Swearing and obscenity is of frequent occurence among the natives of Cape 
York Peninsula. 
2.  It is not employed in a loose or haphazard manner, but with restraint; it is of 
several different types, each of which fulfils a sociological function. 
3.  Swearing and obscenity is employed deliberately as a taunt to goad an enemy to 
fight. ... 
4.  In addition to this unorganisd type of swearing there is an organized type of 
behaviour falling under a definite social sanction, in which license in language 
and behaviour, of a set and stereotyped form, is obligatory. 
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5.  In each of the tribes discussed ... this takes the form of a joking relationship...in 
which ... individuals who stand in a certain relationship ... jest or ... exchange 
obscene remarks. 
6.  The behavior within this joking relationship is regulated by kinship. ... ‘it makes 
everybody happy,’ and is carried on in camp, in the presence of the group. 
7.  This ritual aspect of the joking relationship ... reaches a maximum on ceremonial 
occasions, i.e., when social sentiments are expressed... 
8.  Furthermore, any departure from the customary norm of behavior, even if 
inadvertantly committed, is a ritual offence and must be followed by ritual 
purification. 
9.  The behaviour customary under the joking relationship is of two distinct types, 
characterised ... as [either]... ‘play excrement-for’ and ... ‘play penis-for’. 
10.  The greatest license permitted in each case is between individuals two 
generations removed.  Moreover, it is permitted between individuals who stand 
in a classificatory and not in an actual relationship with one another. 
11.  In the joking relationship ... the obligatory behavior consists of a reversal of the 
customary pattern, normally of severe restraint, appropriate to the relationship. 
12.  This [11.] is ... shown ... when, through an irregular marriage, an incompatibility 
results. 
Although published over a decade later, Thomson’s Names and naming in the Wik 
Mongkan tribe (1946) appears to be derived from the same fieldwork as his earlier article, 
and may be seen as a companion article to his Fatherhood in the Wik Mongkan tribe which 
was published in 1936.  If Thomson had been writing of the Oykangand, the first sentences 
of his article on names would have been equally true: 
Very little has been recorded of the derivation and use of personal names among the 
Australian aborigines. This is due to two main factors. The first is that among 
Australian natives, names may be derived from, or linked with, totems or totemic 
objects which are often either sacred or are not discussed freely in the presence of the 
uninitiated; and secondly, names are closely associated with the social personality, 
and in consequence are surrounded by customs of avoidance. Again, kinship terms, 
which express reciprocal relationships, or special terms which emphasise the social 
condition of the individual in relation to society, are normally used as terms of 
address instead of personal names (p.157). 
Because of the general prohibition on the public use of personal names of the living, 
and their substitution by kinship terms, the study of names and naming is complementary 
to that of kinship, if only for its relevance to those occasions when a personal name can be 
used. In common with most of Australia, it can never be used of the recently dead: 
A further factor is that at certain times, particularly when any person died whose 
name is derived from a totem, his name, and all other names belonging to the same 
totem, may go into eclipse for long periods. On Cape York Peninsula, this period 
may extend to years, and the use of these names is not restored until the final ‘rite of 
separation’ which marks the end of the mourning ritual has been completed 
(Thomson 1936:157). 
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Equally, other passages illuminate Oykangand norms just as Thomson describes the 
Wik Mongkan: 
In the Wik Mongkan Tribe, as with most Australian natives, the giving of names and 
the way in which they are used, is very different from the practice among civilised 
people. Unlike the custom of more advanced peoples, personal names are almost 
never used as terms of address except in the case of young children. Instead, kinship 
terms, called nämp kämpän (nämp, name, kämpän, friend, clansman), with their 
reciprocals, which express relationship, and which serve to classify and group 
relatives together on the basis of social obligations and to lay down patterns of 
behaviour, are used p.158). 
Nicknames are also invoked ... 
As the name indicates, (nämp, name, yann, nothing), these are merely nicknames, 
and are generally given playfully. They owe their origin to physical peculiarities, 
including disabilities, deformities, mannerisms or other characteristics; and since 
they are not derived from totems and are not sacred they are used freely as terms of 
address, without restraint — except for the normal avoidance pattern towards 
relatives of certain orders, which is laid down by the kinship system. Among these 
nämp yann are such names as “yängän wäkk” — hair (like) grass — for an old 
woman with lank, straight hair like grass (1936:159). 
... and appear to be used in all the tribes of the Peninsula: 
... the people of Cape York [Peninsula] feel no embarrassment, and take no offence at 
the use of nicknames as terms of address, even when these refer publicly to physical 
disabilities which we would consider it rude or embarrassing to mention  (1936:159). 
Thomson also discusses the origins of personal names at some length: 
The Derivation of Personal Names from Clan Totems 
... 
… all personal names in this tribe are derived either directly from totems or from 
attributes of totems. 
... The language used in the derivation of these names is often idiomatic or obscure, 
so that the literal translation of a name may not give the real clue to its meaning. 
... Just as the possession of a common totem furnished the bond, the basis of 
solidarity, between members of a clan, so the names which are derived from these 
totems, link the members of the clan, and when the ... people sit down together they 
say ... ‘we of the same name’  (1936:159–160). 
The Wik Mongkan share with the Oykangand a formulaic means of avoidance of the 
name of the dead (p.163 and in Chapter 7 of this study) and also the special relationship 
established by the sharing of a name (p.163ff. and Chapter 8). 
Thomson’s posthumous Kinship and behaviour in North Queensland, edited and 
annotated by Hal Scheffler — himself a significant figure in Australian anthropology — 
appeared only in 1972, but was mentioned in a footnote to Thomson’s 1946 article, 
suggesting that it had at least embryonic existence even then. This later work attests even 
more emphatically the legitimate place that Oykangand occupies in the matrix of 
Peninsular societies.  Parallels with Oykangand observations can be found on almost every 
page. 
Although longer than any of his previous articles, Kinship and behaviour is all too 
short, and yet is remarkably dense in its detail. Thomson takes the Ompela, the Wik 
Mongkan, the Tjungundji and the Wutati in turn, and illuminates our understanding of how 
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kin are classified, how kinship affects behaviour, and what referents are available in the 
language outside kin terms.  Although these groups are well to the north of the Oykangand, 
and fall into other language sub-groups, the linguistic and social behaviour that Thomson 
describes is not at serious variance from the practices general to the Kunjen. The following 
lists some of these shared characteristics: 
• most have moieties, but not the Wik Mongkan (p.1; see also Chapter 8 of this 
study). 
• marriage is regulated solely by kinship (p.3); class systems are absent (p.1). 
• ‘close’ and ‘distant’ kin are differentiated formally by lexical labels (p.3, 4). 
• betrothal is practiced (p.6). 
• changes in kinship designation follow a betrothal or marriage (p.8). 
• nicknames (p.9) and special status terms [pregnant woman, old man, bereaved 
older sibling, etc.] (p.10, 23) are widely used. 
• joking (p.14, 21) and taboo relationships (p.14) are entered into by appropriate 
kin. 
On the other hand, the Oykangand appear to have lost, or perhaps never developed, the 
categorial differentiation of the first ascending generation that is common among the 
groups that Thomson studied. For example, the Ompela have the following six term 
scheme: 
 pinya FB+, FZ+ mukka MB+, MZ+ 
 pipi F, FB- papa M, MZ- 
 pima FZ- kala MB- 
Oykangand has cognates of pinya (FZ), pipi (F) and kala (MB), plus a reflex of Proto 
Paman *ngama (M).  Differential age is not systemically recognised. 
From the era of Thomson’s original work in the early 1930s, emanates the one 
contribution from W.E.H. Stanner to this survey: Aboriginal modes of address and 
reference in the north-west of the Northern Territory. As the title establishes, he does not 
address a north Queensland tradition, but a Northern Territory one. Stanner nevertheless 
begins with what is by now a familiar theme: 
The ethnographer among Australian Aboriginal tribes has to become familiar with an 
intricate system of ways of addressing and referring to persons before his work can 
proceed smoothly. There are many conventions to be observed, a breach of some of 
which may only be a solecism, but of others a deep affront (1936–37:300). 
He then lists the eleven forms of reference he recorded: 
  (1)  personal names 
  (2) nicknames 
  (3)  terms of kinship relation 
  (4)  terms of age-status 
  (5)  terms of social status 
  (6)  possibly secret names 
  (7)  terms of membership of social divisions 
  (8)  circumlocutory terms which themselves fall into several subgroups 
  (9)  metaphorical terms 
(10)  signs 
(11)  expletives. 
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His list echoes Roth’s, with the exception that Roth dealt elsewhere with signs and 
expletives.  But the usage of these also parallels that of the Oykangand who of course lived 
in a very different area of the country. For example, Stanner remarks that ‘Perhaps the 
strongest of these conventions are those associated with personal names which, broadly 
speaking, are not used as terms of direct address’ (1936–37:300).  Further, the explanation 
that ‘Names are not symbols so much as verbal projections of an identity which is well 
known in the flesh (p.301)’ also rings true for the Oykangand, as far as can be ascertained. 
The two most prolific writers, and important contributors to north Queensland 
ethnography after Roth, were R. Lauriston Sharp, and Ursula H. McConnel — 
contemporaries of the late 1920s and early 30s, and in a sense rivals for the anthropological 
stage.  Of the two, Sharp addressed the concerns of this study much more than McConnel. 
His 1937 doctoral thesis, a depth study of the Yir Yoront — who were neighbours of the 
Oykangand to the north west — was never published, but his field materials gathered in the 
years 1933, 1934 and 1935 are reflected in a number of papers, and also in a classic 
general survey of totemism and social organisation centred on the west coast of Cape York 
Peninsula, but extending well into the rest of the state (1939). 
Sharp’s argument in his thesis is that totems are the socio-psychological link between 
the unchanging reality of the physical world, including its landforms and species and even 
experiences on the one hand, and the ever-changing society of mankind that populates that 
world on the other. Totems re-associate ‘each individual member of the lineage throughout 
successive overlapping generations (1939:52)’ with some ‘perdurable element’ of the 
physical and psychological world that member occupies. His argument bears on the 
personal names of people, which result from this general coincidence of lineage (through 
the estate group) and conception site (the latter being the spirit centre from which a child is 
believed to have originated in the landscape).  People are thus known by their conception 
site name (though it does not appear that the Yir Yoront carried this as far as the 
Oykangand do), and by a name or names derived from their totemic connections. In 
Sharp’s analysis, it is the myth in which the deeds (and misdeeds) of the totemic hero are 
preserved that bridges the gap between the totem, the country and the lineage by ‘inventing 
and maintaining mythical ancestors or beings’ (1939:62–63) which are associated with all 
of these.  
Sharp aspires to a close-knit, integrated account of kinship and land tenure by recourse 
to a careful analysis of Yir Yoront totemism.  
His kinship studies required him to posit five generational levels through three descent 
lines, which he elaborated to five descent lines before presenting these in a chart (1933–
34:413). Like Thomson, Sharp associated specific traits of behaviour with each kinship 
dyad, but recognised that there were ‘individual variations’ which departed from the 
‘“social pressure” theory which would make every savage a slave whose actions are rigidly 
bound by inescapable folkways or mores (p.94)’. Sharp’s analysis of the kinship material 
provides not only terms of reference, but vocatives, bereaved terms, and gestural terms, 
and his awareness of the place of language leads him to echo Thomson in the remark that 
children learn ‘to differentiate between the obscenities proper to masculine swearing and 
those used only by women’ (p.103). Names valid during childhood are replaced in 
adolescence (p.178) — a practice that, if the Oykangand ever followed, had disappeared 
long before this present study could be undertaken. 
It is difficult to imagine that, given the sophistication and depth of Sharp’s analysis of 
Yir Yoront life, he might have overlooked the connection between the use of a place name 
22     Chapter 2 
 
as a personal name, and its identity with that person’s conception site. The Oykangand 
certainly observed that equivalence, yet Sharp’s description gives no indication that the Yir 
Yoront did: 
Of ego’s several names, only a nickname and a name which is also a definite place 
name may be used freely by others. When one of ego’s names is a place name, the 
country so named is always associated with ego, and this country is naturally the first 
one to be thought of in connection with ego, since ego is constantly being referred to 
by this name in public  (p.222). 
The Oykangand are referred to as the Ai-kand (p.8) in Sharp’s thesis, where they are 
identified with Roth’s ‘Koko Wangara’, and as the ‘Oikand’ in Sharp’s 1939 survey of 
Tribes and totemism in North Eastern Australia.  Published in two parts of the journal 
Oceania, this survey includes a treatment of the ‘Olkol’ type of social organisation in the 
second part, embracing the following groups (p.439): 
62.  Koko mini 
63.  Olkol 
64.  Oikand 
65.  Okundjain 
66.  Ok angkol 
67.  Okaurang 
These are all now recognised as members of the Central Paman subgroup on solely 
linguistic grounds (Sommer 1969:50ff.).  It would appear that in this area at least, social 
and linguistic classifications largely coincide. Sharp characterises (p.439) this type as 
having 
named patrilineal moieties 
strongly developed totemic patterns 
four named sections (that are only indirectly totemic) 
local patrilineal clans responsible for ancestor cult and localised totemic control rites. 
There were difficulties with validating aspects of Sharp’s characterisation of 
Oykangand sections that are discussed further in Chapter 8. 
The moieties that Sharp named above could be still traced in the early 1960s; they have 
since disappeared. He noted that ‘each of the moieties has its own particular totems ...’ 
(1939:443) and that moiety totems are not killed except in a ritualised prelude to a 
‘ceremonial mock combat’ (p.443). The ‘formal wrestling between siblings of the same 
moiety’ (p.443) is the topic of a conversation between Oykangand elders in Appendix 2. 
Termed abmban ̯d ̯aŋ, they claim to have never witnessed this ritual wrestling, and speculate 
with evident nostalgia on what might once have happened. 
‘Personal names are derived from one or more of the multiple clan totems or in many 
instances from the place names of particular clan countries’ Sharp stated (1939:445), and 
again raises the doubt that he succeeded in understanding the local Aboriginal tradition of 
conception sites.  From the evidence of his article, Sharp appears to have been confused in 
his attempt to penetrate the spirit life.  The words cited, such as ant ‘child, offspring’, and 
amaŋ ‘mother, great’, are clearly misunderstandings; on the other hand akŋera ‘ghost’ and 
the adjectival at ̯at ̯ ‘ancestral, heroic, (hence) great’ are entirely appropriate (p.446ff.). 
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Ursula H. McConnel travelled the north largely on horseback in 1927–28 and again in 
1934, and from these trips compiled a total of sixteen technical papers that, with the 
seventeen that Thomson wrote, and seven from Sharp (including his thesis) form the 
backbone of ethnographic scholarship for this area that was contemporary with Aboriginal 
practice. 
McConnel wrote the description of Wik Mungkan kinship — in the journal Oceania 
(1939–40) — which triggered off such an intense debate about ‘downward spirals’ of 
marriage.  Thomson contributed to the ethnographic literature at this point, too, but every 
contemporary anthropologist with any claim to standing as a theorist put in an oar also. 
The debate was still raging on when John von Sturmer compiled his massive 1978 PhD 
thesis on economy, territoriality and totemism among the Wik of western Cape York 
Peninsula. McKnight (1971) was one of the few who bothered to undertake field research; 
most others were content to analyse and re-analyse McConnel’s materials, including 
Radcliffe-Brown and Needham.  McConnel’s concentration was on these northern groups, 
their cults and mythologies, but the one observation that informs this study is her 
conviction that the kinship patterns even there were essentially of a Kariera type (1939–40: 
456).  
The ethnographic silence that then descended lasted a quarter of a century — no doubt 
triggered by the aftermath of the Great Depression and the Second World War.  In 1961 
Ken Hale undertook field research among the language groups of Cape York Peninsula and 
in 1964 he showed these languages, labelled ‘aberrant’ and ‘un-Australian’ by less careful 
scholarship, to be related in rather simple ways to a common ancestor, which he termed 
‘Proto Paman’.  Hale had anthropological training, and was an accomplished linguist not 
only of a sound theoretical orientation, but was a natural language learner also.  
In 1966 Hale wrote a brief paper on the impact of kinship considerations on the 
pronouns of Lardil (the language of Mornington Island in the Gulf of Carpentaria) and of 
Aranda (a central Australian language).  Hale re-introduced the terms ‘harmonic’ (used by 
Radcliffe-Brown) to describe a kinsman in ego’s own and alternate generations and 
‘disharmonic’ to define one in his father’s or his father’s alternate generations. He also 
calls on the concept of agnatic kin to come to an analysis of non-singular pronouns. For 
example, in Lardil, the subject form for ‘you-dual’ is ki-ri if the addressees are harmonic, 
nyi-:nki if disharmonic.  Arandic is even more complex, with a third paradigm called into 
play if the actors are not ‘exhaustively agnatic’. Hence the equivalent terms would be  
aŋ-at ̯ir (you-dual harmonic agnatic), mpil-ak (you-dual non-harmonic agnatic), and  
mpil-an̯t ̯ (you-dual non-agnatic). 
This article, and most of the contributors to Heath, Merlan and Rumsey’s (hence HMR) 
volume sixteen years later, share a significant characteristic:  they are principally analyses 
of formal linguistic systems (such as paradigms and structures) which depend on 
sociological parameters for their explication. Without denying the evident scholarship of 
Hale and the contributors to the HMR volume (1982), these papers address largely one 
aspect of sociolinguistic variation. It is of course desirable, even important, that the 
reflection of kinship parameters be demonstrated in the formal structures of linguistic 
apparatus available to speakers of various languages.  This establishes if nothing else the 
impossibility of separating ‘language’ and ‘culture’ studies without doing violence to both; 
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neither a ‘kinship analysis’ nor a ‘linguistic analysis’ would be complete3 without the sort 
of detail that these scholars assemble from various sources.  But on the other hand, with 
certain significant exceptions, neither are these essays analyses of language in use; they are 
studies of culturally conditioned linguistic systems. 
Now it is perhaps inevitable that when linguists turn — as linguists — to analyses of 
culturally determined language use that they should be most comfortable with the exposure 
of formal systems such as pronouns and verbal aspect paradigms. But it must be pointed 
out that such analyses do comprise only one direction appropriate to studies in the 
ethnography of communication. It is not the social strategies and constraints on verbal 
communications that are being disclosed, but the linguistic coinage by which respect is 
paid to certain culturally relevant concepts.  Both are relevant.  But this distinction allows 
some of the HMR material to be passed over without the close examination that it would 
otherwise warrant. 
A rather more germane contribution was that in which Hale explored a semantic 
strategy exposed in a secret men’s language used by the Warlbiri (1971). Warlbiri initiated 
men are taught a semantically ‘upside down’ language called tjiliwiri; each principal 
lexical element is replaced by its logical opposite: 
Thus, for example, if a tjiliwiri speaker intends to convey the meaning ‘I am sitting 
on the ground’, he replaces ‘I’ with ‘(an)other’, ‘sit’ with ‘stand’, and ‘ground’ with 
‘sky’  (p.473). 
The tjiliwiri material illustrates the Aboriginal understanding of antonymy with the 
oppositions that are taught to the novices, and that are presumably productive. Some of 
these oppositions are culturally determined, and have to be explicitly learned, such as that 
of ‘dog’ (domesticated, hence tame and living in close association with humans) and ‘crest 
tailed marsupial mouse’ (presumably wild, and difficult to see, much less catch). 
Nevertheless, this is a study of language-in-use, and is of a different order from the 1966 
article. 
But of all the literature that engages the socially defined use of language, none 
approaches the present study as closely as Haviland’s (1979a) Guugu Yimidhirr brother-in-
law language, and its restatement for undergraduate sociolinguistics students in the same 
year as How to talk to your brother-in-law in Guugu Yimidhirr (1979b). Haviland is 
himself very much aware of the difference between linguistic descriptions of special 
languages of avoidance and how they relate to ‘everyday’ lexicon, or to Hale’s tjiliwiri, 
and of the use of the ‘avoidance language as a speech “register”, a sensitive and expressive 
index of social relationships’ (Haviland 1979a:365). Not surprisingly, Haviland is an 
ethnographer first and a linguist second. 
Beginning with a consideration of ‘mother-in-law’ avoidance and the concomitant 
vocabulary replacements, Haviland redirects our attention to other kin, and begins a more 
detailed exploration of behaviour towards a brother-in-law, i.e., a man’s wife’s brother. 
Unlike the Oykangand, this speech form was not given a label among the Guugu 
Yimidhirr.  It has a restricted lexicon, and Haviland shows that just one or two ‘brother-in-
                                                                                                                                                    
3  The differentiation of cultural studies from language ones is of course entirely appropriate when only a 
restricted aspect of the one or the other is in focus, and to this end anthropology and linguistics have 
each developed independent constructs, theories, and models; the point here is that neither can provide 
complete accounts without consideration of the other discipline. 
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law’ (hence: ‘b-i-l’) terms convey the sense of several concomitant ‘everyday’ terms. But 
most importantly, Haviland shows that the use of this register was governed by a cline, or 
gradient of ‘stringency’, such that the following kin represent a descreasing order of 
requirement: 
WM  
WF  
WB 
and the following might also invoke this register as a ‘special sign of respect and 
politeness’ (p.379): 
FZ  
MB   
MBS. 
On the other hand, Haviland reports a tradition of obscene joking (and genital play) 
parallel to that observed by Thomson, but now largely in disuse. A man may use this 
speech register with FF and MF or SC and DC.  It can also be used with a WB, making the 
WB the locus both of ‘b-i-l’ respect and of obscene joking — perhaps being at the 
intersection of two clines: one of respect, and one of familiarity, depending on the social 
context. The obscene joking is necessarily very public; the politeness register is more 
appropriate to more intimate settings. 
Although lacking rich exemplification from actual speech events, Haviland’s is far and 
away the most interesting and insightful of the contributions to the literature on the 
ethnography of communication in an Australian Aboriginal context. There is a 
sophisticated analysis of the data, a cautious presentation of what is essentially a 
reconstruction from the memories of older speakers, and a solid anchor in the philosophical 
considerations concerning ‘b-i-l’ register usage.  Haviland has done much to inform the 
present study and its direction. 
In 1980 Heath produced the first of a massive selection of materials on Nunggubuyu, 
whose speakers occupied estates on the west coast of the Gulf of Carpentaria. In the 
section of his Nunggubuyu myths and ethnographic texts on kinship, social relations, and 
naming practices are a number of relevant texts, with interlinear glosses and translations. 
These texts deal with some of the issues addressed in this study, but are essentially of 
Nunggubuyu people describing their culture and practices, much as an Oykangand speaks 
of the use of obm in Chapter 6.  Heath annotates these where necessary, but does not  
offer a formal analysis or interpretation. The topics of interest include avoidance of a 
mother-in-law, brother-sister avoidance, name bestowal, and nicknames. 
Heath followed this with the co-edited volume (HMR 1982) referred to above. His 
introductory essay is a truly excellent summary of the field, with an orderly explanation of 
the necessary terms and concepts, and a review of the contributions to the volume, 
including his own. But, as remarked above, the contents typically — though not 
exclusively — address linguistic analyses of materials that require sometimes highly 
sophisticated understandings of local cultural practices, especially kinship structures.  The 
bulk of each of the articles Alpher, Hale, Heath, Koch, Merlan and Nash, and that of the 
joint contribution by Merlan and Heath, fall into this category.  The papers by Rumsey and 
Sutton are of a different order.  Rumsey examines the social functions of Gun-gunma, the 
‘m-i-l’ language of ‘everyday’ Bunaba, and provides a sample conversation as a case study 
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in the communication strategies involved in the use of that register.  It provides a closer 
parallel to this present work than any of the others in the volume, and Rumsey provides a 
sensitive analysis.  Sutton’s contribution is — like his 1987 thesis — again more in the 
domain of macrosociolinguistics, and examines how the ‘inherently contradictory’ goals of 
power and autonomy are worked out through speech etiquette governed by kinship 
obligations often at odds with these goals. 
A significant theoretical issue is raised by both McConvell and Laughren in their 
papers: that of ‘triangular’ or ‘tri-relational’ terms. Given that three persons, A, B and C, 
are correctly married into the system, and bear appropriate (sub-)section identities, then 
any one of them, knowing his/her relationship to his/her interlocutor, can reference the 
third by either one of them being the propositus (or datum point) for that third person. This 
phenomenon of ‘triangular’ terms is well attested, and marks a significant advance in the 
documentation of Australian kinship systems. The work of Laughren and McConvell 
builds on a tentative paper by O’Grady and Mooney in 1973 for Nyangumarda, and 
establishes that, at least in the west, the phenomenon is not merely an anomaly or an 
aberration.   
Laughren makes the point that ‘if two relationships are known, then the third can be 
deduced.’  In his introduction Heath (1982:11) puts the matter succinctly thus:  
These are terms which simultaneously relate the designated referent to the speaker 
and to another person, commonly the addressee, so that the three (rather than just 
one) relationships are indexed by a single term (speaker-referent, addressee-referent, 
speaker-addressee), though usually any two of these relationships make the third 
predictable.  [italics mine – BAS] 
It is a necessary condition on those three relationships that they are entirely regular, i.e., 
in conformity with the system. It will be shown later that the Oykangand also have ‘tri-
relational’ terms of a sort, but these are called upon explicitly only when for one reason or 
another the third relationship cannot be deduced from the other two.  Such terms therefore 
fall into a class of adjustments to the regular kinship categories, but — like the Warlpiri 
reported by Laughren, and the Gurindji of McConvell — these terms are derived lexically 
from stems quite distinct from those regular categories, and the system is defective in not 
specifying all triangular possibilities. (It is of course possible that there has been 
metamorphosis of function in the history of a sub-system of forms [which in turn have 
themselves also changed through time].  Perhaps Proto Australian had but a unary scheme 
of ‘triangular’ terms with some specific application — according to either the Central 
Australian, or Cape York Peninsular, or some similar model.) 
The high quality of scholarship in the HMR papers should not be disguised by the 
conclusion that they are more concerned with linguistic forms than with anthropological 
ones. They are valuable contributions to the literature of sociolinguistics, but with the 
exception of Rumsey’s paper, they do not comprise ‘ethnographies of communication’ 
after the same genre as Haviland or Thomson. 
Of some disappointment is the fact that there has not been any significant sequel to this 
volume; it did not catalyse a series of subsequent studies that might broaden or lengthen 
the tradition reactivated by its publication. One of the co-editors, Merlan (personal 
communication), could not by the turn of the century readily recall anything of subsequent 
significance in the field; Garde’s 1996 thesis is a possible exception, but it has not had 
wide exposure. 
Introducing the Oykangand     27 
 
The exception to this statement is a volume of papers published in 1993 essentially for 
the undergraduate student in linguistics or for the interested layman, entitled Language and 
culture in Aboriginal Australia, edited by Michael Walsh and Colin Yallop. Of particular 
interest is Barry Alpher’s Out-of-the-ordinary ways of using a language, which provides 
just a smattering of data on Uw Oykangand and its ‘respect register’, Uw Ibmbandhiy, in 
elucidating — amongst other things — what respect and its linguistic correlate might 
entail. There are simplifications and restrictions of data inevitable in presenting such a 
compilation, and as it was never intended to be a report of ground-breaking research, this 
volume is mentioned only to complete the record.  More material in the tradition of HMR 
is still awaited with scholarly interest. 
 
 
28 
3 Theoretical matters I: 
The Kariera kinship model 
  
How do you know when you’ve reviewed enough literature?  In these days of 
the information explosion it’s when you’re exhausted, confused, and can no 
longer see straight.   (Agar 1980:11) 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the Kariera kinship system, which is the pattern that I argue is observed 
in Oykangand, will be explored through the literature.  This is necessary to establish the 
scholarly antecedents and validity of the system of kinship on which the following 
discussions hang.  Its also demonstrates both the relevance of such a system to Cape York 
Peninsula generally, and, at the same time, accounts for the fact that various other schemes 
have been proposed for Oykangand’s near neighbours.  
The Kariera kinship system of the Oykangand 
According to Berndt and Berndt (1964:77), Radcliffe-Brown (1930–31) suggested that 
there were fifty or so kinship schemes recorded in Australia.  He reduced these to just one, 
with systematic sub-types.  Although Elkin is said to have accepted that there was a certain 
homogeneity about all of these, this reductio ad absurdum was surgery far too radical for 
him, and in his popular book (1938:61ff.), he lists five types.  A number of this order — 
between three and five — appears to have far more general acceptance (as for example, in 
Radcliffe-Brown’s own later work [1951], Maddock [1974] and Turner [1980]); Berndt 
and Berndt (1964) accept Elkin’s analysis with the modification that the Aranda and 
Aluridja types are not differentiated. The Berndts summarise the resultant four types 
according to the following marriage rules:  
• Kariera:  bilateral cross cousin marriage (i.e., a man marries his MBD or FZD)  
• Karadjeri:  unilateral cross cousin marriage (MBD)  
• Aranda/Aluridja:  second cross cousin marriage (MMBDD/MMBSD)  
• Ungarinyin:  no cross cousin marriage:  a man’s partner is his FMBSD.  
Berndt and Berndt (1964:77) attribute to Elkin the observation that there are as many 
variations on these types as there are languages, each one ‘associated with variations in 
marriage rules and social behaviour’ attached to the various kin categories. Among these 
principal types the Kariera system was almost universally seen as one around which 
variety was expressed in different cultural/linguistic environments. 
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Despite Fox’s assertions (1967:245) that the Kariera system is one of ‘great simplicity’ 
and ‘the most elementary of elementary systems’, it has been the subject of long and 
involved debate, analysis, and discussion among anthropologists since [Radcliffe-]Brown 
described it in some detail (along with his analysis of two other Western Australian tribal 
groups) in 1913. The Kariera — Kariara, as Tindale (1974:244) more correctly insists; 
Kariyarra (McConvell, pers. comm.) more correctly again — were located just north of the 
western most point of the continent near Carnarvon, Western Australia, and were a people 
of the littoral, closely related to the Indjibandi (Tindale 1974:244).  After describing their 
estates, lifestyle and general organisation, [Radcliffe-]Brown provides marriage rules and 
genealogical tables, together with an account of the functions of terms within the system 
(see Figure 3.1).  
It was Radcliffe-Brown who imposed the term ‘Kariera’ on a four section system by 
virtue of his rigorous analysis of their system, despite its earlier recognition as a common 
pattern in the literature.  Needham (1974) traces a ‘simple’ four-section system through 
early Australian ethnographies, and claims that Radcliffe-Brown not only knew of such a 
system, but that it earlier had another, well accepted name: ‘Kamilaroi.’  Such a system 
had been described even in Western Australia as early as Grey (1840) and by a significant 
number of other writers previously in New South Wales.  It is unthinkable that a scholar of 
Radcliffe-Brown’s standing would be unaware of R.H. Mathews’ 1895 paper: ‘The 
Kamilaroi class system of the Australian Aborigines’.  Although this concentrates — as the 
title suggests — on an account of the class systems, its implication for kinship studies is 
abundantly clear.  In the area of Radcliffe-Brown’s ‘discovery’, both Withnell (1901, 1902, 
1903) and Clement (1899, 1904) had published brief accounts. Radcliffe-Brown 
(1913:143) disparaged the reliability of Withnell’s pamphlet, but the evidence that 
Needham accumulated establishes that the Kariera type of social system was already 
widely known, widely distributed across the continent, and that Radcliffe-Brown was 
entirely cognisant of it.  Needham nevertheless betrays a heavy weight of sour grapes. 
In fact, the marriage system of the Kariyarra tribe itself has been shown recently to be 
more complex than Radcliffe-Brown described (Goodenough 1970; Shapiro 1979, 1981). 
The term ‘Kariera’ must therefore be treated as a label for an idealisation or 
characterisation of a kinship system which may not in fact apply to the Kariyarra, but does 
apply to a wide range of tribes, particularly in the east. 
In such a system, four sections may be recognised; [Radcliffe]-Brown penetrates 
beyond these, and does not view them as the primary regulator of marriage, but rather as 
elaborations of the kinship system.  
The marriage rule of the Kariera is simplicity itself: a man may marry a woman who is his ñuba, 
but he may marry no one else. Thus we may say that in the Kariera tribe marriage is regulated 
by relationship, and by relationship alone.  (1913:155; emphasis mine – BAS) 
Scheffler, both in his (n.d.) paper and his editorial comment on Thomson (1972:37) 
concurs. Goodenough (1970:134) concludes that, if this is true, then ‘we can treat Kariera 
terminology as we would any other that extends only two generations distant from EGO’. 
Fox (1967:247) also agrees: ‘Thus a “Kariera” type of terminology can occur in the 
absence of bands, clans, sections, etc., as long as a rule of “cross-cousin marriage” or 
“sister exchange” is ideally followed [italics mine – BAS].’  The consequence of dismissing 
consideration of the sections from analysis of the kinship system is a significant matter of 
debate, as will be shown later.  
30     Chapter 3 
 
But both Fox and Goodenough appear to maintain that marriage is the principal social 
function being regulated by kinship — sections or no — without recognising that other 
social functions have any great significance, or that other social behaviour is implicated.  
Berndt and Berndt (1964:78) remark on Elkin’s contrary view, and to his contribution to 
scholarship through the conviction that kinship is firmly embedded in a matrix of territorial 
tenure, economic cooperation, linguistic identity, status — ritual and familial, totemic and 
ceremonial — and what these all mean to more general social behaviour.  Hiatt (1965) 
goes even further in attempting to release the study of kinship from its bondage to marriage 
rules.  He claims that without any alternative conventions of wealth and objects of value 
for exchange, women are the coin of investment and return in an Aboriginal society.  
Although they do not manifest a Kariera system of kinship, his general observation is that, 
for the Gidjingali, and doubtless for other tribes 
the marriage market is...seen as neither a machine for smoothly circulating brides and 
generating social solidarity, nor as a social field divided into two opposed moieties or 
into eight, sixteen or some other number of kin categories.  Rather it is an arena in 
which every man has limited assets (principally nieces) with which to satisfy diverse 
claims on him for wives, and to achieve certain objectives for himself (brides and 
allies)  (1965:x).  
Hiatt in fact raises two matters that are equally significant, or even more so, than the 
quest for wives: firstly, there is the personal prestige and influence that a man may attain to 
by manipulating the currency of his culture — which happens to be women — in his own 
favour.  This may result in hegemony in ritual or religious matters, claims to deceased or 
uncertain estates, and the authority to impose obligations on others for food, materiel, or 
support over contentious issues. This hegemony may in turn — or perhaps better, in 
circular fashion — bestow further advantages in securing another acceptable sexual 
partner, childbearer, and contributor to familial economic security, but this is not its 
primary advantage. 
Secondly, Hiatt reminds us that the kinship system, with its various appurtenances, such 
as sections, sub-sections and terminological differentiations, is not a ‘machine’ — it does 
not have the stringency or mechanical inflexibility that Fox demands of it such that certain 
principles are ‘rigorously followed’ (1967:247).  Rather, the kinship system is in itself part 
of the monopoly board on which a man’s ‘limited assets’ are staked, and — according to 
skill, insight or influence — through which valued dividends are yielded. It just so happens 
that the investments are paid in the same coin as is marriage, namely marriage partners. 
The point of Hiatt’s book is this: there is enough ‘slack’ in the system, caused by run-
away wives, the death of marriage partners or promised spouses, refusal by women to 
accept a passive role in their marriage arrangements, anger felt by bachelors at a 
marriageable woman taken by a man already married, and the changing politics of 
Aboriginal clan life — to say nothing of personal sexual preferences — to allow the 
development of strategies to satisfy needs for a marriage partner outside the formal system 
of kinship.  Hiatt’s purpose is to show how the complex kinship system of the Gidjingali is 
not simply a behavioural straitjacket, but a non-level playing field in the game of personal 
advantage and social status — his word ‘arena’ is an entirely appropriate description. 
What we are exploring then are the rules of the game played according to the Kariera 
system. 
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The Kariera system typically requires the recognition of two descent lines through five 
generational levels, making it the simplest of the four systems that Elkin represents  
as those basic to Australian kinship.  The number of terms reported by [Radcliffe-]Brown 
(beginning with the second ascending generation and working downwards) is  
4: 4: 4+: 4: 2.  Two of the four terms in the second ascending generation apply to the 
second descending generation, so that for some grandparent/grandchild pairs, the same 
term is used reciprocally (see Figure 3.1). 
In EGO’s own generation, there are terms for H, W, WB and HZ. These exhaust the linear 
possibilities of alliance. But older brothers and older sisters are differentiated from their 
younger siblings, expanding the number of terms required at this level (hence ‘4+’ above). 
Fox (1967:246) argues that a total of eight named categories are all that are required to 
logically differentiate all the relevant kin in EGO’s own and adjacent generations, with one 
— a ninth — term accommodating also the remaining grandparent and grandchild 
generations.  He remarks ‘This would constitute a rock-bottom minimum set of distinctions 
for significant categories of kin in such a system, if the basis of the distinctions is truly the 
“alliance” criterion; that is, if the system of terms really does sort out “marriageable” and 
“unmarriageable”.’  Such a mathematically reductionist system has not been found, and 
this alone indicates that marriage is not the sole raison d’être of the system; it has other 
implications, as suggested above.  
But a consideration of Kariera type systems reveals that the number of categorial terms 
is very variable. Typically the grandparent and grandchild will use the same term 
reciprocally, but this is not universal, and the Oykangand have different terms — though 
etymologically from the same source. 
The number of differentiations effected in any system raises the issue of polysemy: 
When does a term have more than one denotatum in such a system?  A glance at 
[Radcliffe-]Brown’s Kariera genealogy, reproduced as Figure 3.1, shows that Maeli 
applies to a man’s FF and to his SS and SD, while Tami is appropriate to his MF and to his 
DS and DD.  One would expect more symmetry in the system, such that Kabali, FF and 
Kandari, MM were also denotative of the second descending generation, but this is not the 
case.  Nevertheless the data illuminate a significant problem: when is a system exhibiting 
polysemy, and when have ‘merging rules’ been applied?  
Lounsbury (1969) limits ‘merging’ rules (p.221) to those which reduce a same-sex 
sibling to ZERO; i.e. FB => F, MZF => MF, etc.  It might however equally be proposed that 
a FS is a B, or a MD is a Z, (in effect, Lounsbury’s Half-sibling rule, p.221) since the same 
principle is at stake (in which case it could be argued that B and Z are redundant 
categories). Admitting the latter case, such ‘merging rules’ are distinct from polysemy, 
where the same term is applied to two different categories of kin that are structurally 
differentiated by the system.  For example, the instances of Tami and Kabali in [Radcliffe-] 
Brown’s Kariera system are — between the second ascending and second descending 
generation — cases of polysemy. The use of these terms between a DS and a DD, or 
between a SS and a SD, as polysemy, is therefore of a different order from the merging 
rules of Lounsbury.   
A difficulty at this point turns on the use of a word such as ‘structure’ in reference to 
kinship.  It perilously approaches the claim of immutable social reality in constructs such 
as Figure 3.1.  This position I would want to avoid, despite [Radcliffe-]Brown’s use of the 
phrase ‘a concrete form’ to describe kinship this way.  That there is some reality there — 
expressed specifically by later anthropologists rejecting the ‘group marriage’ position of 
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Spencerian evolution — is clear enough.  Many a recent writer has taken pains to point out 
that members of such societies clearly distinguish between ‘actual’ or ‘close’ and ‘distant’ 
kin in the same category, for the simple reason that such a distinction is real to them. They 
themselves recognise the biological basis of their kinship terminology, and this proposition 
is no longer seriously in doubt among scholars.  [Radcliffe-]Brown (1913:150) himself laid 
this point to rest, one would have thought, with his own words:  
Thus, although a given person applies the name mama to a large number of 
individuals, if he is asked “Who is your mama?” he immediately replies by giving the 
name of his actual father, unless his own father died during his infancy, in which case 
he gives the name of his foster father.  
 
Table 1:  Male speaking 
 
 MAELI    =    Kabali TAMI          =      Kandari 
 Father’s  Father’s Mother’s    Mother’s 
  father  mother  father     mother 
  
 
 
   MAMA   =   Nganga KAGA      =      Toa 
   Father Mother    Mother’s  Father’s 
     brother   sister 
 
 
 
    KAJA     =     Nuba   KUMBALI     =     Turdu 
     or   Mother’s Mother’s  or 
   MARGARA   brother’s brother’s Mari 
 Brother    daughter   son   Sister 
 
 
 
  MAINGA    =    Ngaraia KULING      =      Kundal 
 son       Sister’s Sister’s Daughter 
           daughter   son 
 
 
 
  MAELI    =     Tami TAMI           =      Maeli 
  Son’s  Daughter’s Daughter’s  Son’s 
   son     daughter   son daughter 
Figure 3.1:  The Kariera system as recorded by [Radcliffe-]Brown (1913:152) 
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A third type of adjustment is evident in [Radcliffe-]Brown’s material (1913:154). He 
accounts for it in these terms:  
It may happen that a man B is by genealogy the “father” of a man A, but is younger 
than A. In such a case A calls B not “father,” but “son,” and B calls A “father,” 
although by genealogy he is his “son.” The same thing may occur in the case of a 
kaga, a nganga, or a toa.  In one case I found three men, A, B, and C, aged about 65, 
63, and 60, respectively.  The father of A and C, who were brothers, was the “elder 
brother” of B, and therefore, both A and C were, by genealogy, the “sons” of B. He 
called C his “son,” but as A was older than himself, he called him not “son,” but 
“father,” thus reversing the genealogical relation.  
In other words, a person in the category of ‘son’ is elevated (by a transformation) to that 
of ‘father’ if older than EGO, and a person in the category of ‘father’ is assigned to that of 
‘son’ if younger than EGO. Such ‘categorial readjustments’ (cf. Lounsbury’s [1969:220–
221] ‘skewing’ rule) on the basis of relative age or generational level appear in one form or 
another regularly in the literature.  The Oykangand however recognise an amaŋar kokaŋ as 
a mother’s older sister, and show greater respect for such a person than a classificatory 
mother usually commands, but there are no other terminological, structural or behavioural 
consequences.  Other societies have categorial readjustments based on relative age in the 
first ascending generation, such as the Wik Mungkan and Ompela (Thomson 1946, 1955; 
Sharp 1939), and these have further implications for both kin terms and behaviour.  
The issue is further complicated by kinsmen who fall logically outside the five 
generational levels of the system. [Radcliffe-]Brown (1913:154) raised this point, and 
showed how the Kariera dealt with it:  
There are in the Kariera tribe no terms for relatives in the third ascending or the third 
descending generations. I was able in a few cases to obtain the name of a man’s 
father’s father’s father.  When I asked what term would be applied to this relative I 
was told that he would be mainga (son).  In the same way I was told that a father’s 
father’s mother would be ngaraia.  I do not think that these terms were ever actually 
used. 
Goodenough reports that Reid (1967) had the audacity to suggest that the categorial 
adjustment described by [Radcliffe-]Brown is incorrect, and that instead of FFF => S the 
assignment should actually be FFF => F.  Because of a ‘too limited enquiry’ on [Radcliffe]-
Brown’s part, he reported an error. Maybury-Lewis (1967:488) also expressed a withering 
criticism both of [Radcliffe-]Brown’s field observations and his analysis at this point.  
Scheffler (n.d.) argues that [Radcliffe]-Brown’s data are ‘puzzling’, but ‘the major 
structural features of the system stand out clearly from R-B’s data’ (p.47).  The Oykangand 
data, and most of the material from Cape York Peninsula adduced by Thomson, Sharp, and 
McConnel, support the adequacy of [Radcliffe]-Brown’s observations.  In a different form, 
the FFF => S issue is the point from which later (in Chapter 5) we begin to explore 
Oykangand kinship within the Kariera framework.  In the latter case it was the reciprocal 
of the FFF — a SSS — which drew the mechanics of the system to my attention.  Like the 
Kariera proper, the Oykangand have ‘no terms for relatives in the third ascending or the 
third descending generations’ ([Radcliffe-]Brown 1913:154). They deal with the problem 
by reassigning such kinsmen to categories within the five-level system.  
Another feature of the system as initially described is sister exchange. Two men in the 
appropriate relationship — kumbali — may exchange sisters, since the system allows — it 
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actually prescribes — bilateral cross cousin marriage.  Such an arrangement is, among the 
Kariera, highly preferred; [Radcliffe-]Brown (1913:156) comments:  
In the genealogies collected by me I found that in nearly every case where such a 
marriage was possible it had taken place.   
One might speculate, then why is this not the preferred mode among the Oykangand?  
The answer is, I suspect, in two salient facts: firstly, that while bilateral cross cousin 
marriage is nevertheless the norm, it is disrupted by the proscription against marriage with 
an actual MBD.  The genealogies show that marriage with an actual FZD is permissible, but 
not with one’s own MBD.  This — despite its unusual character, which is the converse of 
the Australian norm — imposes a limit on the extent of sister exchanges.  Secondly, Taylor 
(1984: Chapter 3) has shown that marriages among the Thaayorre — north western 
neighbours of the Oykangand — are concluded so as to normatively circulate wives among 
the clans of the language community.  So clan A promises wives to clan B, clan B to clan 
C, etc., and clan Z to clan A again.  The Oykangand probably shared this strategy, which 
would be at odds with the pattern of clan A giving wives to clan B, and Clan B giving 
others back to clan A, in a binary system in which true ‘sister exchange’ would be visible. 
Despite its alleged simplicity, analysis of the Kariera kinship system has drawn the 
attention of some outstanding figures in the field of anthropological research. Most prefer 
to deal with the ‘original’ Kariera data of [Radcliffe-]Brown (1913), occasionally 
complaining about perceived deficiencies in his data or analysis. Some on the other hand 
prefer to deal with other groups exhibiting a four section, five generational level system of 
categories from neighbours of the Kariera still accessible to research.  What is surprising is 
the variety in these analyses, each with a different perspective on the operation of the 
system. 
Keesing (1975) chooses the Kariera to illuminate principles of kinship and marriage in 
what is basically a textbook on social structures. He begins with the recognition of the four 
sections, and how these appear to regulate marriage, and goes on to claim that 
The Kariera system can be analyzed to show beautifully consistent and all-embracing 
fit between the section system, marriage rule, and kinship terminology (see, e.g., 
Romney and Epling 1958). This requires that a few troublesome details be swept 
under the carpet, and that a few convenient missing pieces be supplied (Scheffler, 
n.d.). It also ignores some comparative evidence. There are Australian tribes that 
have Kariera-like kinship terms but have no section system (or a quite different 
section system). There are tribes that have similar kinship classification but forbid 
marriage with first cousins, hence ruling out sister-exchange as a consistent pattern  
(1975:82). 
He concludes that the section system was not an elaboration of the kinship system so 
much as a simplification of it: 
The section terms simplify the system because to act appropriately to a person from 
another horde, perhaps a stranger, you do not have to know geneaological 
relatedness; you only need to know what section he or she belongs to.  For Australian 
tribesmen, who often spend part of their lives travelling on “walkabout” far from 
home, such a scheme was a great invention (1975:82). 
The scheme also opened up the range of remoter marriage partners in the second 
descending, and second ascending, generations. The section system equated a marriageable 
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cousin both with a classificatory grandmother and with a granddaughter by labelling both 
with the same section name. 
Romney and Epling (1958) offered a componential analysis of the Kariera system 
largely from the point of view of its sections. Two variables — moiety membership, and 
odd-even alternation of generation — were advanced to sufficiently define the system. But 
Goodenough (1970:131ff.) argued that this was inadequate, since ‘the terms for “son” and 
“daughter”, which are the same for [both] male and female ego, cut across section and 
moiety lines’ (p.133). A componential analysis, Goodenough claimed, went beyond the 
male and female ego (which would reduce the system to essentially a limitation on 
marriage) to all the categories of the system.  His analysis of the components of the system, 
and their referents, then follows, with the less than satisfactory conclusion that 
Several different analyses are possible, involving the selection of different 
discriminant variables as criteria of classification (1970:139). 
and 
We also have a choice ...  (p.140). 
But there is no doubt in Goodeneough’s mind that the section system is, in effect, an 
accretion on the kinship system: 
The analysis shows that sections are not necessary for understanding the kinship 
terminology. It can be understood in terms of various applications of the elemental 
ideas of odd/even, imbalance/balance, or asymmetry/symmetry (however one wishes 
to phrase it) in relation to generation, sex differences, and marital ties. The Kariera 
also had named sections, and the kinship terminology for any ego distributes neatly 
according to section from the point of view of his or her sex.  To ask whether the 
Kariera thought of it in terms of odd or even or in terms of section membership 
assumes erroneously that people have only one model for understanding something, 
and only one way of thinking about it. The Kariera probably conceived of it in both 
ways (1970:141). 
Turner (1980) shows that there may have been other conceptualisations of Kariera 
kinship among its practitioners. He defines the Kariera system as ‘direct exchange 
renewable in consecutive generations’ and requires recognition of only two parameters: 
moieties, and ‘brotherhoods’ of clans (a concept which he defines). In this 
conceptualisation he follows Radcliffe-Brown and Scheffler (1978) in recognising two 
principal kinship sub-types in Australia, dependent on whether acceptable marriage 
partners are found among first cross cousins (as Kariera) or second cross cousins (as 
Aranda). The Kariera system attempts to achieve, according to Turner (1980:35), 
‘considerable organic solidarity at the local level through intermarriage with just one other 
group in consecutive generations’ [emphasis mine – BAS].  The pattern of sister exchange 
is therefore seen by Turner as one depending on the circulation of women between only 
two groups or ‘brotherhoods’ as he calls them. The Thaayorre pattern of ‘asymmetrical 
alliances’ through circulation of women exogamously with respect to the clan, but 
endogamously with respect to a confederation or nation of clans, would be incompatible 
with true sister exchange, but Turner’s model otherwise accommodates the Thaayorre data.  
Keesing discusses the significant cases of asymmetrical alliance in the literature and 
concludes that  
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The picture that has emerged is of systems far more complex and dynamic than 
“marrying in a circle” would suggest.  These societies are usually composed of small 
localised patrilineages. It is these lineages that serve as “alliance groups” in the 
marriage system. ... marriage becomes an instrument of political negotiation and 
status. A few marriages in each generation may serve to maintain the political status 
of lineages. Other marriages are less important and in some societies need not 
necessarily conform to the marriage rule.’  (1975:84–85). 
In an undated paper that appears to have had wide circulation in the early 1970s, (and is 
in addition cited by Keesing 1975, above) but which does not appear to have been formally 
published, Scheffler makes a fine-grained study of the Kariera system as reported by 
Radcliffe-Brown, and remarks 
There is no other Australian system of kin classification which has attracted more 
attention or for which more numerous and different interpretations have been 
proposed. I think we can be relatively certain, however, that it is not a particularly 
well documented system, that probably there is much more we could and should 
know about this system of kin classification before we might want to be wholly 
confident of any structural interpretation we might want to put upon it  (p.1). 
and 
I hope to demonstate that Kariera-like systems of kin classification are not dependent 
on such social structural features as moieties, section systems and bilateral cross 
cousin marriage.  Of course, they are not structurally inconsistent or incompatible 
with such features of social structure, but neither are they dependent on them  (p.2). 
A careful and considered analysis of the major literature on Kariera-like systems 
follows, including examination of Kenneth Hale’s manuscript material on Nyamal and 
Ngaluma, groups closely related on linguistic grounds to the Kariera and which illuminate 
probable features of its operation. 
In a subsequent discussion of kinship systems, Scheffler (1978) comes to an analysis 
which, quite aside from viewing kinship from an entirely different perspective, informs a 
matter of interest in the Cape York Peninsular area very directly.  Research reports by 
Thomson, Sharp and McConnel have defined kinship schemes for different Peninsular 
groups in terms quite distinct from the Kariera type that the Oykangand manifest. But 
Scheffler’s analysis minimises these differences by showing that they reflect only 
relatively insignificant differences in the ordering of, or conditions on, rules.  
Rather than the usual ‘lines-of-descent’ and ‘generational-levels’ analysis, Scheffler 
begins with a minimal system necessary to the definition of the classificatory terms of the 
system.  He then calls upon ‘equivalence rules’ (cf. Lounsbury’s ‘merging rules’, above) to 
describe the conditions under which a given system operates.  For example, the rule which 
equates a FB with a F, and a MZ with a M is given a name, and a place in the ordering of 
other rules.  The result is that two apparently different systems may be shown to diverge 
only in respect of the ordering of two rules, or the absence of a rule, or even the 
subordination of a rule to some other rule, in the schema of rules which defines each 
system.  It may rarely be necessary to additionally postulate an ad hoc condition (e.g. the 
‘self-reciprocal’ rule of the Pitjantjara, p.106 — a system which is analysed as having only 
three other rules) or an idiosyncratic rule, to account for all the data, but a catalogue of 
about a dozen regular rules account for the rich variation of Australian kinship structures. 
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For his Kariera-like case Scheffler chooses another tribe of northern Australia, the 
Mari’ngar, over the Kariera proper, and the respective equivalence rules — seven of them 
— are listed (p.145).  He then deals (p.150ff.) with the controversial Wik Mungkan and 
Ompela schemes over which Thomson, McConnel and McKnight agonised, as simple 
variants of the Kariera system, sharing the same basic rules but differing only in rule 
details. On page 286 he goes on to list the Yir Yoront rules, redefining the system that 
Sharp (1933−34) reported and remarking that ‘the Yir Yoront ... system of kin 
classification ... [is], at base, [a] Kariera-like system on which the AGA rule has been 
imposed.  (The AGA — ‘alternate-generation agnates’ — rule is formulated as FF → B; or 
♂SCh → ♂Sb. This is read as equating a father’s father with a brother, and conversely, a 
man’s son’s child as his sibling, too.) Yir Yoront and Wik Mungkan share also the G+3 rule 
as a subordinate equivalence. 
The rules described by Scheffler as applying to the Mari’ngar can be shown to be 
equally relevant to the Oykangand. He lists seven rules, the last of which is ordered to 
follow the others. Using his own labels, but simplfying the expression of the rules 
somewhat, these equivalences are: 
1.  Half-sibling-merging rule (Lounsbury’s [1969:221] influence is evident here): 
 PC → Sb 
where P = parent, C = child, Sb = sibling 
to be read as ‘the child of anyone classified as a parent is classified as a sibling’. 
2.  Stepkin-merging rule: 
 PSp → P;  
 SpC → C 
where Sp = spouse 
to be read as ‘a parent’s spouse (who is not also a parent) is structurally equivalent to a 
parent’ and conversely ‘a spouse’s child is classified with one’s own child.’ 
3.  Same-sex sibling-merging rule: 
 PSb → P; 
 SbC → C 
where Sb = sibling 
to be read as ‘a parent’s same-sex sibling is classified with that parent’ and conversely 
‘a sibling’s child is structurally equivalent to one’s own child.’ 
4.  Parallel-cross neutralisation rule: 
 PPSB → PP 
to be read as ‘a parent’s parent’s opposite-sex sibling is equivalent to a parent’s 
parent’s same-sex sibling’ and conversely, ‘the child of one’s same-sex child is 
equivalent to the child of one’s sibling’s same-sex child.’ 
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5.  Parallel-cross status-extension rule: 
This is easier — if still lengthy — to state in words than to formulate as a 
transformation: ‘a father’s cross cousin is structurally equivalent to a mother’s sibling’ 
and equally ‘a mother’s cross cousin is classified with a father’s sibling.’  The rule 
also has its converses: ‘a male cross cousin’s child is structurally equivalent to one’s 
sister’s child’ and ‘a female cross cousin’s child is classified with one’s brother’s 
child.’ 
6.  Cross-stepkin rule: 
 ♀BW → HZ; 
 ♂ZH → WB 
These converses amount to ‘an opposite-sex sibling’s spouse is classified the same as 
a spouse’s opposite-sex sibling.’ 
These six rules must apply before the seventh one; they are unordered except in this 
one respect. 
7.  Spouse-equation rule: 
This implies a large range of spouse equivalences (Scheffler 1978:145) but can be 
simply stated: ‘a spouse is a cross cousin.’ 
Checking these against the structures of Figures 5.2a and 5.2b shows that Scheffler has 
captured all the critical equivalences of the Oykangand system. We are left in no doubt that 
the Kariera system applies in the Oykangand case. 
The conclusion drawn from his highly involved and mathematical, but carefully precise, 
analysis is that although the near neighbours of the Oykangand — the Yir Yoront, Wik 
Mungkan and Ompela — appear at first blush to have very different kinship schemes, in 
fact they differ only in minor ways within essentially the same rule schema. Simple 
additions to their respective rule schemas mask with their consequentially superficial 
distinctions the underlyimg identity of sets of crucial equivalences.  
Scheffler’s conclusions are therefore significant. What they mean is that the claim made 
for the Oykangand, namely that they have a Kariera-type kinship structure, is no longer out 
of place regionally in the Peninsular area among what appear at first sight to be vastly 
different kinship schemes. Rather, Oykangand is placed within a matrix of interesting 
Kariera variants, manifesting an intriguing departure in its own right, as Chapter 5 shows.  
If Goodenough’s contention (above) — tantamount to Fox’s assertion that ‘a “Kariera” 
type of terminology can occur in the absence of bands, clans, sections, etc.’ — holds true, 
then neither is it inappropriate that the Oykangand have dispensed with sections from such 
a system, as Chapters 5 and 8 discuss. 
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Frames of reference 
  
The process [of ethnographic research] is dialectic, not linear. Such a simple 
statement, so important in capturing a key aspect of doing ethnography. An 
anthropologist should have said it long ago.  (Agar 1980:9) 
Introduction 
This study came about in the first place because I found myself profoundly dissatisfied 
with the traditional concerns of theoretical linguistics. I experienced a frustration and 
discontent with the limitations of the discipline in which I had been trained. Agar 
(1994:49ff.) describes these limits as ‘the circle in the field’ — an analogy based on the 
well-cropped circle in the grass made by a tethered goat or horse.  Such linguistic devices 
as Uw Oykangand EQUI-NP deletion or phonological markedness or hierachies of semantic 
features were simply too remote from the social realities that I saw its speakers addressing. 
Although there is a formal phonology of Oykangand (Sommer 1969) and a summary 
grammar (Sommer 1972b) and both fulfil a necessary function, I was well aware that these 
failed abysmally to describe with any completeness how its speakers used that language. 
Sample texts could only be hopelessly inadequate indices of usage; a dictionary seemed a 
quite soulless expression of the very human issues involved.  There had to be an informed 
ethnographic component in any satisfactory account. 
An event many years ago served to underscore my dissatisfaction: an Oykangand lady 
died to whom I had been expected to relate as ‘grandson’; she was fictively my 
classificatory grandmother (MM). I joined in the mourning for her — she was a lovely 
person, prematurely deceased, and I grieved along with many others. But in doing so I was 
roundly taken to task for the inappropriate use of the day-to-day Oykangand language I 
was otherwise handling with some success. I was confused because the two bereaved 
sisters of this woman were to be addressed by me as marriageable cousins, FZD, but I could 
not even employ the usual kinship terms towards them under these circumstances. By her 
death my lack of sociolinguistic proficiency — skills in language use that were determined 
by socially relevant parameters in the community — had been grossly revealed, and I was 
at a complete loss.  
Historically, my intellectual frustration and dissatisfaction with the modes of descriptive 
linguistics was assuaged, during the 1970s and 1980s, by an emerging literature, initiated 
largely by scholars from anthropological disciplines. 
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I was impressed by reading accounts of language use recorded by scholars such as Agar 
(1973), Bauman and Sherzer (1982), Blount (1975a), Brukman (1975), Frake (1964, 1969, 
1975), Haviland (1979a and b), Sanchez (1975), Spradley and Mann (1975) and others. 
The field to which they contributed became known as the ‘ethnography of 
communication’; part of the broad enterprise subsumed under the general rubric of 
sociolinguistics. Hymes (1971) described a speaker’s necessary skills (such as these 
scholars reported) as communicative competence, and the term gained wide usage. By this 
phrase he subsumed that sum of social, cultural and linguistic knowledge a speaker was 
required to exercise in order to speak appropriately, judiciously, and with etiquette (terms 
from Geertz 1960), in all those social situations s/he might expect to encounter. Entering a 
Yakan house (Frake 1975), or asking for a drink in Subanun (Frake 1964) or entering into 
discussion with fellow Luo speakers over matters of genealogy (Blount 1975a) clearly 
required sophisticated understandings of more than the phonology and syntax of a 
language. Agar’s (1973) Ripping and running — with its superb formal methodology — 
established that a drug sub-culture within the English-speaking community had developed 
its own communication norms, verbal associations and speech values.  It broadened the 
pioneering work undertaken by Labov (1972) and the contributors to Kochmann (1972) in 
the field of Black English with its distinctive rules and modes and meanings, and was 
followed by Spradley and Mann’s (1975) equally rigorous and insightful The cocktail 
waitress, which explored the unique communicative demands on female employees in that 
male dominated milieu. 
These exciting and innovative works provided a scholarly impetus to the sort of 
descriptive task that confronted me in the Kunjen data.  So the intellectual orientation of 
this study has been moulded by a tradition of scholarship that has arisen and found robust 
expression only in the last quarter of a century.  
The writings of Michael H. Agar are seen as more recent articulations of that tradition. 
They provide the basic framework on which this study depends. His viewpoint is 
nevertheless one that derives from a breakdown in both theoretical linguistics and 
anthropology as each attempted to cope with data of the other in a systematic fashion, 
beginning about twenty five years ago.  Agar — and later, Bauman — go even further than 
the modest position of Blount and Sanches (1977) when they said:  
While we agree that language behaviour must be viewed within the larger dimensions 
of society, we do not accept a uniformly sharp cleavage between language and 
society. Language is fundamentally social behaviour, and what were previously 
discussed as social correlates of language are conceptual distinctions and usually 
culturally specific (1977:3). 
and  
The recognition that language is social behaviour and that social meaning is a proper 
subject of study has required a crisp distinction between referential elements of 
meaning and social meaning (1977:4). 
Agar would argue that there is really no possible cleavage between culture and 
language, and later it will be shown that Bauman would claim that solely referential or 
propositional meaning in verbal communication is probably never realised in fact anyway. 
It is the problem of dealing with language data that are clearly dependent on socially 
relevant parameters outside the tradition of European languages that is the crucial 
theoretical issue of this study. 
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The work of Michael H. Agar 
Amidst the ethnographic literature on language use which inspired the beginnings of 
this present research in the early 1970s was Michael H. Agar’s (1973) Ripping and 
running: a formal ethnography of heroin addiction to which I refer above.  Agar formally 
reconstructed the life and language of drug addicts by having inmates at a rehabilitation 
centre act out various exchanges pertinent to the successive events necessary between first 
’making a hit’ or successfully managing a heroin injection, and securing a subsequent ’hit’, 
including various sub-themes, such as carrying ‘the works’, being ‘ripped off’, ‘OD-ing’ 
and ‘getting busted’.  The tape recordings of these exchanges were then passed to other 
inmates for their assessment of the conversations as valid or otherwise to the junkies’ 
experience. 
Phrases were then lifted out of these exchanges, and yet other ex-addicts were asked to 
complete sentences appropriately from the partial utterance. The data were then analysed 
to construct a model of the addict’s world. Although reference was made to standard 
practices of ‘participant observation’ in ethnographic research on the one hand, and 
Charles Fillmore’s ’case’ theory of language on the other, Agar was even then marching to 
the beat of a different drummer; he was attempting to find avenues by which to integrate 
our understandings of language and culture outside a Whorfian or neo-Whorfian model. 
What was appealing was the formal elegance and rigour of the method. 
Despite the appealing precision of this methodology, it was — after a brief trial attempt 
— deemed unsuitable to the Oykangand situation. It was not a mode of enquiry that the 
Oykangand found comfortable — although there was a great willingness, even enjoyment, 
shown when re-enactment or acting out a role was involved, and very useful material 
resulted from such dramatics. It was found that re-enactments of certain event — even well 
into the past — would in interviews recall or invoke in the language helper those emotional 
responses that were dominant at each original event, so that care was necessary not to 
regenerate tensions or conflicts in the community by the methodology of research. This 
factor inhibited the research into, for example, the actual language of insult and abuse, 
except as reported from bystanders.  These reconstructions were invariably sanitised for 
the researcher, and regretfully discarded as being of little value. 
So that it was found to be more efficient and productive to settle instead on a given 
topic — the events following a recent death or fight or camp episode proved to be typically 
fertile experiences — and to have Oykangand speakers explain or re-enact the sequence of 
events, the roles, the norms and expectations, and the terms required. While the Kok Kaber 
bias of one of the interviewees caused problems over the interpretation of funerary 
formulae, four other Oykangand speakers ultimately provided the data necessary to correct 
the distortion.  
In his 1994 book, Language shock: understanding the culture of conversation Agar 
presents a parable. It is certainly not a Gricean contribution to the study of the modes of 
conversation. It does not treat ‘turn taking’ or ‘relevance’. Neither is the style of 
presentation that typically associated with the expression of a formal theoretical position to 
be carefully and rigorously assessed by academic peers. It is rather a free-flowing, personal 
narrative that examines Agar’s own (basically European) linguistic and cultural 
experiences, and shows that the current formal theories of language and anthropology 
don’t cope with them. His intention is to erase for us what he perceives as ‘the artificial 
distinction’ between language and culture, and provide an impetus towards insightful 
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understanding at the expense of sophisticated theoretical modelling. Agar is in fact 
bringing to bear readily understandable personal research and meaningful anecdotal 
experiences to demonstrate that theories of language and culture should be more 
effectively integrated — after the fact.  His presentation is programmatic and conceptual, 
rather than fully worked out with all the constructs rigorously defined and logically 
presented. It is nevertheless a compelling book, evoking the uncomfortable response that 
‘He’s right!’ despite this lack of formalisms.  
In terms of approach, Agar urges a sequence of three activities:  
• fieldwork, or active enquiry at the point of a breakdown in understanding 
• a comparative perspective, based on the notion that there are universals of 
human behaviour, and 
• a holistic viewpoint in effecting the explanation/account. 
Agar presents the concept of the frame — given his earlier work, a term rather 
obviously assimilated from the ’case frame’ of Charles Fillmore (1968). As I will show 
later, it has been borrowed as a label or as a working concept from a generation of other 
scholars in the social sciences, including Schutz (1970) On phenomenology and social 
relations, Bateson (1972) Steps to an ecology of the mind, and Goffman’s well known 
1974 Frame analysis. Just as Fillmore proposes that the actors or entities relevant to 
expressing a given proposition in language each have a role with respect to the verb of the 
sentence, so Agar would seek a frame containing all the pertinent features of linguistic and 
cultural behaviour relevant to a particular style of acceptable discourse.  These features he 
does not attempt to formally catalogue or to list after the fashion of Hymes (1971), but 
rather to simply illustrate that there is a large cultural range of features that make up 
appropriate frames.  
Agar claims that frames are most obviously required in describing and resolving rich 
points of the language and culture. Rich points are those observed instances of verbal 
behaviour that require the understanding of their frames (or interacting sets of cultural and 
linguistic conditions) before a newcomer or researcher can understand or explain their 
complexity. It is the rich point that comes to the attention of the newcomer or researcher as 
not being immediately transparent to his/her experience; the frame is that set of conditions 
that must be marshalled before the rich point is intellectually and behaviourally accessible.  
A rich point in the language and culture is thus perceived as one at which expectations 
of behaviour based on other cultural and linguistic orientations or experiences (his/her 
‘default frames’) leave the learner/researcher intellectually floundering — as I was myself 
in the cases described by the Prologue. Scollon, reviewing Agar’s book, puts his position 
nicely with the summary that 
You start with a set of frames or default settings; and when you encounter people 
with different default values, you construct a frame with those differences  
(1995:563). 
Agar’s premise is that there is much in common among the languages and cultures of 
the world, and these provide a mechanism by which to access the unknowns of a new 
languaculture (Agar’s term for the interacting linguistic and cultural system). But these 
unknowns, these rich points, crop up in such ways that the naive observer cannot enter into 
them as a participant without specifically learning the rules. They are like the ’highly 
marked’ features of the sound systems of languages observed by Chomsky and Halle 
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(1968), and their rules have to be specifically acquired, unlike the more general 
‘unmarked’ language behaviour that might characterise ‘everyday’ linguistic behaviour. 
Agar applies the same sort of concept to rich points of his languaculture. 
Charles Frake’s How to ask for a drink in Subanun (1964), and his How to enter a 
Yakan house (1975) are therefore the expositions of rich points of those respective 
languacultures.  On the other hand, it is perhaps the case that — reversing these examples 
— asking for a drink in Yakan, or entering a Subanun house are cultural and linguistic 
activities that may be (but we are not specifically told) ‘unmarked’, ‘less marked’ or 
perhaps even entirely without special frames being called upon.  They could well fall into 
Agar’s category of ‘similar experiences’ with their ‘default frames’ that characterise the 
‘human universals’ that are the basis from which entering the ‘rich point’ becomes 
logically and conceptually possible. 
Philosophically, Agar’s position can be summarised in these terms: 
Firstly, that in many cases there is a unity in behaviour comprising linguistic and 
cultural issues that cannot be teased apart; he uses the term languaculture to designate that 
essential unity.  It is the languaculture of a given community that evinces highly ’marked’ 
rich points that evoke frames of cultural and linguistic features/conditions necessary to 
their character. Behaviour consonant with these frames diverges from the normative, 
anticipated canons that are ‘unmarked’ in the universals of human behaviour; these 
divergences are not always consciously explicable by the ‘native’. For example, Agar 
shows that even the concept of a ‘date’ (p.17–18) in American culture is not one that is 
readily expounded to the enquiring foreigner; he suggests that it has to be experienced in 
order to perceive its role within the complex character of American social interactions 
between the sexes and of mating rituals. 
Secondly, that without shared cultural and linguistic experiences, boundaries of 
languacultures can never be crossed. That they can be bridged at all suggests that there is 
much common ground of ‘universals’ or ‘default values’ to frames in human 
languacultures.  The issue here is the ultimate transparency of rich points. 
Agar’s concern is for better understanding through personal interactions with members 
of other languacultures as much as with a theoretical framework for treating these. Yet 
there will always be, it seems, elements of language and culture that are not reducible to 
absolute rules or principles — features that are not entirely transparent even to members of 
the speech community. Appropriate use and interpretation of European French tu/vous 
(Agar’s Austrian German Du/Sie, p.18–19) causes great angst even to users of those 
languages. At the conclusion of examining this rich point in a seminar class Agar remarks: 
Each of the students had several stories. They told them with passion.  It turned into a 
linguistic group therapy group. I imagined — it never happened, but it wasn’t 
difficult to picture — that at any moment they were all going to fall from their chairs, 
crying and pounding the floor with their fists, and scream ‘God, please free us from 
this pronominal system that causes so many traumas and crises in our lives!’ 
A simple pronominal distinction between ‘singular’ and ‘plural’ exists in many of the 
world’s languages. This offers a point of entry into the rich point concerned here. But a 
mere distinction in pronominal number provides no immediate clue as to the complexity of 
the rich point at issue here; it does allow the beginnings of research to be initiated — even 
though the resulting frame may fail to rigorously define usage, even by native speakers. 
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Rich points may then have, in the ultimate, the possibility of ‘fuzzy borders’ that defy 
precise resolution. 
Finally, Agar’s approach is heuristic. It is directed wholly towards appropriating an 
insightful understanding of the rich points of a given languaculture, without becoming 
bogged down in theoretical apparatus. The resolution of such conflicts in determining 
social values is described by Agar as a process of MAR: mistake, awareness, repair 
(p.242ff.).  The requirement of repair is summarised in the ‘fieldwork, comparison, holistic 
view’ troika mentioned earlier.  The resulting understandings of a given languaculture may 
be theoretically deficient and even imprecise, but Agar is determined about the fact that a 
’Theoretically confused understanding is better than missing the point in a theoretically 
elegant way’ (p.86).  
What of the theoretical apparatus required?  Agar states that ‘... the kinds of frames you 
build to solve the problem will depend on which [of your] expectations need changing 
[emphasis mine – BAS]’ (p.161). Nevertheless, only little guidance is given about what 
might properly belong in a frame, what form it might take, or how it might be expressed.  
In the chapter entitled Speech acts lumber and paint Agar exposes a heuristic device in 
‘Garfinkling’ — deliberately ’blowing’ (ignoring the content of) a frame to determine the 
effect one or other parameter has on the reception of an utterance.  But before an element 
in a frame can be deliberately removed or ignored in order to assess its relevance to the 
frame, it has to be first identified. (Agar gives the example of ignoring certain rules of 
telephone conversation in English.) 
His approach to frames and their contents is never at all taxonomic. There is 
sympathetic mention of Hymes’ SPEAKING acronym, but nothing approaching it is 
advanced by Agar:  no list of parameters, no catalogue of content, no ‘working details’ of 
the model, no sequence of ordered rules or principles.  Agar is not constructing a theory; he 
is urging upon us a methodology.  He is demonstrating that a novel approach is necessary 
because of the conspicuous lacunae that become apparent when beginning with current 
theories.  This is, if anything, the principal weakness in his approach.  The heuristics are in 
place, but little else.  
Agar remarks that ‘culture starts when you realize that you’ve got a problem with 
language, and the problem has to do with who you are’ (p.19).  He is not maintaining, 
much less advocating, a totally culture-free ethnographic research program on the part of 
the enquirer; ‘Culture has to do with who you are’ is repeated as a separate paragraph on 
page 21 of the book.  But his point is that while it is true that ‘Culture is something those 
people have ... it’s more than that.  It’s also something that happens to you when you 
encounter them ... When you deal with them, culture turns personal. ... it’s what happens to 
you when you encounter differences, become aware of something in yourself, and work to 
figure out why the differences appeared’ (p.20).  Much later, he remarks ‘Culture happens 
to you when differences, rich points, inspire awareness of old frames and construction of 
new ones.  But the differences arise within what we usually think of as languacultures ... as 
well as between them’ (p.196). Despite his post-modern idiom, Agar is making a real 
point. Cultural differences emerge most conspicuously within the frames one might 
construct to account for rich points at which the individual intellectually and emotionally 
baulks in dealing with other languacultures (even with that of heroin addicts in our ’own’ 
society).  This is the process by which they are brought into sharpest focus, even to the 
most impartial researcher. 
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To summarise: Agar has provided field workers in language and culture with a 
provocative challenge: to explore what really happens, and what is really relevant, in 
linguistic exchanges that encode experiences and values not immediately decodable by the 
naive hearer. He has legitimately challenged both the linguistic and anthropological 
establishment, but without providing a formally elaborated theoretical position, complete 
with detailed models or relationships between carefully fashioned constructs.  
Although Agar’s Language shock (1994) is the latest and fullest statement of his 
position, much of the same flavour — and more details — are found in his earlier Speaking 
of ethnography (1986).  This is written more for the student or practitioner of ethnography, 
and is couched in more conventional academic terms. The examples, the argument, and 
even the literature references are more formally assembled. 
In the early part of this 1986 book Agar argues that the traditional concerns of 
anthropology and ethnography have become stereotyped, and bound by theoretical 
concerns to the point that — despite attempts at redress — they constitute a rigid ‘received 
view’ of the discipline.  This mind-set mediates research funding and governs publication, 
but the profession is made uncomfortably aware from time to time of the need to ‘address 
the gap between the received view and the study of how ordinary folks accomplish their 
everyday lives’ (1986:13).  Agar advocates instead an ethnography defined by Spradley 
(1980) as one of ‘grounded theory’; the latter is in fact voicing a similar complaint to that 
of Agar: 
Much social science research has been directed towards the task of testing formal 
theories. One alternative to such theories, and a strategy that reduces ethnocentrism, 
is the development of theories grounded in empirical data of cultural description, 
what Glaser and Strauss (1967) have called “grounded theory”. Ethnography offers 
an excellent strategy for discovering grounded theory  (p.15). 
After a brief discussion on the ways in which ethnographies are the function of the 
traditions that an ethnographer brings to each description, and on the consequent relativism 
of these, Agar comes to the view that ethnography ‘is interpretive, mediating two worlds 
[those of ethnographer and study community – BAS] through a third [that of the research 
community]’  (p.19). 
His second chapter explores the ethnographic process, and through it can be perceived 
something of the position that Agar represents: 
The first concept is that of breakdown, when the researcher’s assumption of coherence 
of behaviour in a community is violated (in practical terms, the ‘mistake’ of Agar’s MAR, 
above). Agar shows that, as a heuristic device, breakdown has a scholarly tradition 
supported by a number of earlier anthropologists. ‘A breakdown is a lack of fit between 
one’s encounter with a tradition and the schema-guided expectations by which one 
organises experience’ (p.21).  The next step is resolution.  Each tradition has a boundary or 
horizon to it. When the boundaries between two traditions meet and fuse, and those 
traditions can be seen to be no longer dissonant, then the breakdown between them is 
resolved.  This resolution is a process, mediated by language as the ‘public storehouse of 
tradition’ (p.21). Finally, there is coherence: ‘A coherent resolution will (1) show why it is 
better than other resolutions that can be imagined; (2) tie a particular resolution in with the 
broader knowledge that constitutes a tradition; and (3) clarify and enlighten, eliciting an 
“aha” reaction from the members of different traditions that make up the ethnographic 
encounter’ (p.22).  
46     Chapter 4 
 
Agar goes on to elaborate on the concept of coherence, pointing out that it ‘is achieved 
by giving an account of an act in terms of its relations to goals, frames in focus or both as 
they interelate in a plan. ... The act is coherent if it fits into a plan that we imagine it might 
have been part of, where plan is a cover term for an organisation of goals and frames’ 
(p.25).  Because the frame is related in this way to Agar’s understanding of coherence, and 
is cast alongside the plan, or model of action, we get a better understanding of its character. 
Citing Schutz (1970:130), Agar makes the comparison with some sort of linguistic model 
when he remarks that ‘Frames are generalized “knowledge structures” that have “empty 
places” and “variables” that are “filled in” with the details in particular instances of their 
use’ (p.24). 
His 1986 work also illuminates the role of similarities in the resolution of breakdowns. 
Agar points out that if there are no similarities, if there is no coincidence at all between two 
cultures and languages, then resolution is impossible: there is neither language to address 
the differences, nor shared experiences to found the resolution upon.  ‘They [similarities] 
are the ground against which the figure — the breakdown — appears and is resolved’ 
(p.40). Consequently Agar can speak confidently of ‘human universals’ such as ‘love, 
anger, fear, and happiness’ (p.40) and others as the experiential basis of life.  
The work of the ethnographer is to construct coherent schemas from ‘strips’, which are 
defined as bounded sequences of actions and utterances through which a person expresses 
the plans and frames of his/her life. 
A ... member [of the community] might articulate a complex schema that makes 
sense of a strip; that schema can then be incorporated wholesale into the 
ethnography.  An ethnographer might construct a schema based on bits and pieces [of 
strips] that he or she has heard and seen, with a dash of insight and intuition. At the 
other extreme, an ethnographer might draw on some theory to construct a schema 
that has nothing to do with anything group members ever said, even though it is 
linked in explicit ways with strips that they performed  (p.45). 
Frames from yet other scholarship 
Because Agar has declined to adequately define what he views as the content or 
structure of a frame, it is necessary to turn to the literature and examine what other scholars 
have said. Use of the term ‘frame’ to describe a set of conditions or constraints in the social 
sciences is hardly a recent innovation. Tannen (1993:15–16) traces its twentieth century 
origins to Sir Henry Head’s work and his 1920 Studies in neurology, demonstrating that it 
has subsequently had currency in at least the fields of ‘linguistics, artificial intelligence, 
cognitive psychology, social psychology, sociology, and anthropology’. Unfortunately the 
term is not used in the same sense by each of these disciplines, nor indeed uniformly by 
scholars in any one of them.  
Fillmore, the linguist whose The case for case (1968), was the classic statement on the 
‘case frames’ of verbs, clearly borrowed the concept from syntagmatic frames in structural 
linguistics. As the verb changes, so too does the shape of its permissible syntactic 
environment.  Optional elements of the frame allow for different structural outcomes in the 
sentence. While Fillmore applies the term to narrowly definable linguistic phenomena, 
‘frames’ normally imply rather more catholic inclusions when other social sciences are 
considered. 
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Minsky’s 1975 work in artificial intelligence allowed even less flexibility; coming from 
a field dominated by computer modelling, the AI frame is tightly structured and its content 
carefully typed, rather like the data dictionary definition for a database or the data types of 
a Pascal program. Tannen (1993) cites Charniak (1975:42), following Minsky, as assuming 
‘the frame to be a static data structure’ (emphasis mine – BAS).  Such an inflexibility and 
lack of dynamism in the concept of ‘frame’ precludes the speaker/participant from 
successfully negotiating new sociolinguistic situations, or even from learning new frames 
as the occasion — and Agar — demands (such as might be necessary to anyone as a result 
of, for example, taking out church membership, joining a nudist club, or being gaoled). 
What is more relevant is the concept as articulated in social psychology and 
sociolinguistics: Bartlett (1932:206, cited by Tannen 1993:16) argued that the individual 
calls on past experiences and their outcomes to navigate novel situations, such that s/he 
‘has an overmastering tendency simply to get a general impression of the whole, and, on 
the basis of this, ... construct the probable detail.’ The participant in a discourse approaches 
an engagement in it, therefore, with expectations of its constraints and options, as well as 
its outcomes, based on prior experiences, from which a model of such an engagement has 
been created. The term prototype has been used in this connection, more or less co-
extensively with frame. Tannen remarks that ‘the prototype, like the frame, refers to an 
expectation about the world, based on prior experience, against which new experiences are 
measured and interpreted’ (1993:17). Agar (1994:161), we have seen, spoke of the same 
thing: ‘the schema-guided expectations by which one organizes experience’. Tannen 
rightly insists that any model must permit modification or adjustment according to 
parameters beyond the prior experience of the participant: new sets of conditions or 
constraints, or as yet unexperienced combinations of these.  Tannen (1993:17) follows the 
view of recent scholars in AI that the creative, dynamic character of human cognition and 
conscious thought is called into play only when what Agar calls ‘Garfinkeling’ or ‘blowing 
the frame’ occurs: gross failure of the participant to access a frame appropriate to the social 
conditions. 
The television series Candid Camera usually depended on a form of intentional social 
or linguistic ‘Garfinkeling’. It showed participants — the ‘victims’ — dealing with 
deliberately distorted speech events and social situations. Their expectations remained 
unfulfilled — their normal dependence on recognising patterns of behaviour and 
interaction was rendered dysfunctional by these deliberate distortions.  
Chafe (1977a) elaborates on these processes as falling within three separate concepts: 
schema, frame and script. Determination of the schema allows the participant to identify 
the event before him/her. For example, the possibility of Agar’s (1994:102–103) Schmäh 
(which he establishes as a witty Viennese verbal put-down, typically amongst associates/ 
friends) being an appropriate frame would be identified from the social context and from 
the unusually pert opening sally — its schema. The Schmäh is however only one of several 
possible ‘frames’ open to the interlocutors. The scene (a term also used by Fillmore [1976] 
in a different sense) is now set for exploitation of the Schmäh, but the activation of the 
Schmäh frame depends on the recognition of the frame, and on the interlocutor(s) entering 
into it, i.e. following the script.  Chafe (1977:42) sees the frame as a concept encompassing 
the roles of participants and exchanges and utterances in the speech event, and not merely 
determining conditions; this response would, I take it, be part of his frame, but not of 
Goffman’s.  
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The frame, as Agar conceives it, appears to embrace part of what Chafe would want to 
regard as the schema, together with Chafe’s frame, with perhaps even something of his 
script, too.  As Tannen (1993) sees it, the critical essence of the frame is in the structured 
expectations that the participants share that certain outcomes of a situation are both 
possible and appropriate. These expectations are clearly constructed out of the past 
experiences of the participants, as suggested earlier.  It is Tannen’s concept of participant’s 
expectations [I have consciously italicised the word for emphasis throughout this entire 
section to draw attention to its appropriateness as a defining feature of the frame] through 
which the frame becomes conceptually accessible.  
Goffman devotes an entire volume to Frame analysis (1974).  He defines a frame in 
these terms: ‘I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with 
principles of organisation which govern events — at least social ones — and our subjective 
involvement in them; frame is a word I use to refer to such basic elements as I am able to 
identify. That is my definition of a frame’ (1974:10–11). Goffman is formal and 
exhaustive, dealing with topics such as misframing, frame ambiguity, frame anchoring, 
frame vulnerability and frame disputes. What is interesting about the entire volume, 
however, is that the frame is defined negatively, by showing what misunderstandings and 
social mishaps eventuate from frames being misconstrued between participants of the same 
(largely north American) culture.  A frame (generating certain expectations) in respect of 
one discourse participant is misread, or miscued, by another participant in assessing his/her 
expectations of that discourse, so that he/she is in fact responding to a different frame.  
Because the use of frame as a descriptive construct is not without its gross 
inconsistencies — both between scholars, and between disciplines — there is need to 
define it at least in some minimal fashion for this present study. I take the position that the 
participant in a verbal discourse comes to the speech event with sets of expectations 
(taking this cue from Tannen 1993, above, from Agar’s [1994:161]: ‘the schema-guided 
expectations by which one organises experience’, and from Goffman’s definition, above) 
that are triggered by aggregates of social and linguistic factors familiar to him/her from 
past situations and experiences. The parameters that trigger those expectations are to be 
found aggregated in frames, or discrete sets of social and linguistic conditions. So the 
frame is taken to be that which determines the expectations of gross discourse constraints 
and options available to the participants. In the process of learning — or, better, being 
socialised into — the language, the conventions of its use are established by experience, 
and called upon when the relevant contexts recur.  The miscueing that Goffman (1974) so 
thoroughly explores requires us to recognise that participants may each come to the same 
social situation with different frames, according to different learned conventions, or 
different appraisals of the context.  They may even come with competing frames, or — as 
the naive researcher approaching a ‘rich point’ in another languaculture — no compatible 
frame at all. 
Schank and Abelson (1977) describe a restaurant situation and its relevant scripts 
encompassing knowledge structures, but the very notion of restaurant itself evokes a 
scenario where certain sequential expectations are triggered: waiting to be asked to be 
seated, having the chair withdrawn and a napkin unfolded and placed, being offered the 
menu and told the specials or soup of the day, being asked about a drink or checking in a 
b.y.o., etc. Minsky (cited in Tannen 1993:19) shows that a birthday party can be treated in 
the same fashion; both are ‘stereotyped situations’ with well understood and predictable 
event sequences and outcomes.  These however imply organisation and structure, where 
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one frame impinges upon the next, that does not always appear to apply in the data of 
Oykangand exchanges.  Typically, these latter comprise much shorter cameos or scenarios 
which are structurally more ephemeral than anything as sustained and institutionalised as a 
birthday party. It would be interesting to analyse a camp corroboree in these terms, 
however, and effect a comparison of resulting forms. Who gets to take central stage as 
dancer, who supports his role, who claps, and who beats time each at various stages of the 
proceedings, would be a more adequate parallel to the birthday party than what is 
presented here.  The concern here is with rather less sustained activities. 
Consider the case of breaking the news about J’s death: I was asked, late one afternoon, 
if I would run our truck out to the stock camp and tell the camp members of J’s passing; I 
was to take H, my grandson, as a guide. J was a very old lady, and had no remaining close 
relations, so that a couple of men in the stock camp would be her closest kin in the 
consequent mourning.  We arrived just after dark, when the camp cook was about to dish 
up the evening meal.  The stock camp included my close brother, G, who was a notorious 
prankster and joker.  But it was obvious from our demeanour, and the time of our arrival, 
that this was no ordinary visit. We were there on ‘business’.  The men listened attentively 
while H broke the news, and were afterwards subdued and thoughtful.  The frame that they 
‘read’ in this case had to include at least the following (informal) parameters: 
male kinsmen close to a member of the camp 
unusual time for an arrival from the village at the camp 
subdued demeanour on our part 
initiative taken by the visitors in initiating serious talk 
Now suppose instead we had arrived late afternoon with a load of food supplies for the 
cook, and the camp was already back, resting after a long day in the saddle.  There would 
have been in any case an opportunity to ask why the stockmen couldn’t catch something to 
eat for themselves out in the bush, and almost certainly this would have led to a round of 
obscene joking between G and H, who were placed appropriately to engage in such talk. 
We might construct a frame (in accord with the description in Chapters 5 and 6) of these 
elements: 
male kinsmen close to a member of the camp 
leisure time slot 
relaxed demeanour of visitors — so serious initiative not taken  
   (leading to leg-pull about food) 
G and H in relationship for obscene joking 
readily available audience 
Once realised, the obscene joking between G and H would comprise a frame that the 
rest of the men would take into account in their frames — it would be inappropriate for 
anyone to interrupt the proceedings with any more mundane topic. 
Alternatively, we might have been conveying the news of the passing of G’s own wife. 
In this case, we would have emerged from the vehicle already wailing, and after falling on 
G, still wailing, and telling the news, would have wailed with the whole camp before 
taking G back to the village with us.  The frame might contain (according to Chapter 6): 
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male kinsmen close to a member of the camp 
unusual time for an arrival from the village 
visitors’ initial wailing as signal 
physical engagement with the bereaved man 
breaking bad news gently in a culturally respectful fashion 
Here, a ‘verbal’ behaviour — wailing — enters into a correct interpretation of the frame 
by the men in the camp.  Like the initiator of the Schmäh, with her ‘What you got in there, 
gold bars?’ this is one of the parameters that ‘set the scene’ for the communicative events 
that follow, and in that sense, actually begin definition of a series of appropriate frames, or 
set of expectations, among the camp stockmen.  They would ‘read’ the sets of conditions 
specified above, and construct a set of possible expectations, one of which would be 
confirmed by our continued conformity to that expectation as the discourse unfolded.  Note 
that the ‘social setting’ — that is, the identity and roles of the participants — remains 
constant throughout these sample ‘frames’, and it is the other parameters, such as 
demeanour, implicitly declared social function of the visit, and so on that actually define 
the frame, and allow the participants to establish realistic, predictable expectations of the 
outcome. 
Foreshadowed here is the role of kinship in determining the appropriate behavioural 
frame. 
Consider now the converse: the physical environment remains constant, but the social 
setting changes with the appearance and disappearance of participants. It was late 
afternoon at the end of a warm September day; I sat with friends in the shade outside 
Udnbar’s house: 
Two brothers, the wife of one of them (standing a little apart) and their classificatory ZD 
(a woman rather older than either men) seek shelter in the shade of a large mango tree. The 
presence of the older woman invoked the expected norm of reserved social and linguistic 
behaviour that was largely configured by her presence. There was rather polite 
conversation, avoiding contentious or suggestive topics, with the older woman taking a 
much more active role than the younger one, because of her age — in spite of her 
subordinate generational level. 
She then left, and her son, grandson to the two brothers, took her place — the frame 
now reflecting that fact.  There was a brief bout of obscene joking, with laughter shared by 
all present, though the wife did not of course contribute to the exchanges.  The brothers 
found themselves freer to discuss more personal matters, and plan a hunting trip with their 
grandson.  The older woman’s daughter then appeared, and — as a potential spouse to the 
unmarried brother — drew banter and some half serious flirting from him, supported by 
the wife of the other brother, from whom the granddaughter was seeking some rice for tea.  
To the casual observer it was all very relaxed and natural, but kinship clearly 
determined the social and linguistic behaviour of the participants in these exchanges — not 
the physical setting. 
Frame theory accounts for the observable data of these scenarios quite nicely. What 
each situation invokes is a set of expectations of appropriate and possible outcomes, the 
form of which depends on the personality, psychological state, and personal intentions of 
the participants. They act out an appropriate ‘drama’, or follow a ‘script’ commensurate 
with the various frames. They are not denied any volition or agency in the manifestation of 
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the discourse, but are merely constrained by the expectations that the frame imposes from 
past experience. 
This is an important point.  The frame does not determine the content of a discourse, but 
its type. The speakers in the discourse, or actors in the drama, retain control over the 
exchange-by-exchange course of the verbal events — events that are nevertheless 
commensurate with the frame.  By their recognition of the frame through its aggregate of 
conditions, it is possible for them to severally anticipate a certain discourse style with its 
associated verbal outcomes, but it is not possible to predict the precise verbal form of the 
discourse. That remains firmly the function of the personalities concerned, their 
physiological and psychological states, their determination to manipulate the speech event 
in their favour, and their goals or ambitions. Frames do not directly account for these 
factors. 
Goffman explores the concept of ‘frames within frames’ in among many other possible 
‘frame’ concepts (overlapping, competing, switching, etc.), and there are situations in 
which it would be elegant to conclude that a given frame is altered only by one parameter, 
itself governed by the inclusion of another frame.  For example, Tannen and Wallat (1993), 
in their account of a medical examination/interview, show that the female specialist 
‘switches frames’ between the child and its mother, addressing each in a particular way, 
and at one point managing to mix up her protocols, and speak to the mother as she might 
have done to the child.  The physical setting remains constant, and both mother and child 
are present as social entities during the entire examination, but the expectation of the 
specialist is to address each differently.  In other words, one might propose that the frame 
changes, according to addressee. But rather than proposing that there are two discrete 
frames for such a discourse (and its lapse), it is more economical to propose that an 
‘interlocutor’ frame resided inside or was embedded within the rest of the ‘examination’ 
frame, and that only this frame ‘switched’ in its value for the specialist, according to her 
expectation of appropriate speech to each of the addressees.  Two discrete frames here with 
substantially the same parameters explain less than one frame with constant values except 
where a second, included one, alters in its value. 
Such a construct also manages nicely certain Oykangand situations, too, especially in 
the lodging or repulsing of an obm taboo/curse (Chapters 6 and 9) or in accounting for 
obscene joking (Chapters 5 and 9).  But it could be taken rather further.  For example, the 
‘frame’ occupied by the speaker and his/her interlocutor might be reasonably seen as 
always being embedded within yet another ‘frame’ of the social and physical context of 
their exchanges. This would imply that the Tannen and Wallat material was normative, 
rather than exceptional. 
The difficulty with such a proposal is in determining the limits on ‘frames within 
frames’ on formal grounds. Since the 1970s linguists have pursued sometimes absurd 
iterations by which one abstract ‘sentence’ is claimed to be embedded in an innumerable 
succession of others, all equally abstract.  Is the iteration of frames to be unconstrained? It 
is difficult to conceive of what formal limit there might be to such a device as the 
embedded frame.  Both sentences and frames evoke the schoolboy ditty 
Big fleas have little fleas upon their backs to bite ‘em, 
And little fleas have smaller fleas, and so on, ad infinitum. 
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in that there must be some motivation for constraining an infinite structure of frames 
within frames, or sentences within sentences, beyond merely descriptive ingenuity. 
Linguistic material has structural evidence for sentence embedding in features such as 
relativization and subordination; evidence for frame embedding does not yet appear to 
always have the same structural motivation. 
Nevertheless the appeal of frame embedding cannot pass unnoticed, and — hopefully 
without abusing the concept — it will be one which is pursued again in Chapter 9 when the 
data and analyses are summarised. 
Further traditions of scholarship 
Another tradition of scholarship, which is related to that of Agar both in concept and in 
historical perspective, is that of Verbal art as performance — the title of a 1977 essay by 
Richard Bauman in a book of the same name. Bauman seeks to escape from the folklorist 
tradition of regarding text as the unit of analysis when divorced from the context and intent 
of the speaker.  His point is that such interpretations of text fail to address the issues arising 
from performance. Performance, insists Bauman, sets up ‘an interpretive frame within 
which the messages being communicated are to be understood, and that this frame 
contrasts with at least one other frame, the literal’ (p.9).  Because both Agar and Bauman 
(p.9) draw much from both Gregory Bateson (1972) and Erving Goffman (1974) it is to be 
expected that their respective concepts of the ‘frame’ have much in common.  
Bauman argues that beside the literal or propositional meaning of an utterance there are 
interpretations centring on insinuation, joking, imitation, translation, quotation, and so on 
— these being only ‘a very partial and unelaborated list’ (p.10).  He even goes so far as to 
suggest that ‘in spoken communication no such thing as naked literalness may actually 
exist’ [emphasis mine – BAS] (p.10), and cites confirming scholarship on this point.  If then 
all verbal communication is performance, and is not to be interpreted as being strictly 
literal, then how is it to be interpreted? The frame is advanced as providing the interpretive 
key. 
Goffman views the process by which a frame is invoked or changed as one of ‘keying’ 
to the performance.  Bateson words this idea differently: he claims that a characteristic of 
communicative exchanges is that they embody at various points instructions or cues as to 
how the propositional content is to be interpreted. ‘This communication about 
communication Bateson termed metacommunication ... In Bateson’s terms, “a frame is 
metacommunicative.  Any message which either explicitly or implicitly defines a frame, 
ipso facto gives the receiver instructions or aids in his attempt to understand the messages 
within the frame” (Bateson 1972:188)’ (Goffman 1974:15). Cues for decoding may 
therefore be inherent in the frame, and may include overt introductory formulae such as 
‘Did you hear the one about ...?’ or ‘An Englishman, a Scotsman and an Irishman fronted 
up to a bar, and ...’ or ‘Once upon a time ...’ or ‘Father God, we pray that ...’ or ‘I rise to 
refute the lies of the Honourable Member for ...’. In this fashion, the cue for Agar’s 
Schmäh in the opening sally (if the interlocutor chooses to so respond) was: ‘What you got 
in there (handbag), gold bars?’. 
Bauman is in effect disputing Agar’s implicit claim that there are ‘unmarked’ discourses 
readily available as starting points in the decoding of rich points.  The dispute bears on 
Oykangand data insofar as it will become obvious that for an Oykangand to speak to 
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anyone else, a frame appropriate to that interlocutor’s kinship category will always be 
engaged. And as Sharp (1933–34:419ff.) suggested, there is never total equality in such 
super-/sub-ordinate dyads. The expectations of the speaker and hearer are invoked by 
considerations of kinship, and kinship is never neutral. 
This ethnography 
Spradley’s Participant observation contains the following advice about writing an 
ethnography:  ‘Your thesis can be simply to show that cultural meaning systems are much 
more complex than we usually think’ (Spradley 1980:169).  Of course, academics all like 
to demonstrate that what were fondly thought to be unrelated facts or simple correlations 
are at some other level highly complex interactions or intricate systems. This study 
attempts to explore rather modestly the scope of the relevance of a well accepted artefact 
of Australian Aboriginal life — kinship — to the language of speakers of an Aboriginal 
language — Uw Oykangand. Two cultural meaning systems — language and kinship — 
are therefore in interaction.  The categories and sub-categories of the kinship system are 
maintained by linguistic labels on the one hand, but on the other, the demands of that 
system shape and limit utterances of the language. They are effectively interacting and 
mutually supportive systems of meaning. The contribution of this study is to an 
understanding of the breadth of the shaping and limitation effected by kinship, and to kin-
relevant social events, in just one unique Aboriginal context — that of the Oykangand. 
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5  Kinship and language I: 
Descent and alliance 
  
The task [of the ethnographer] is an impossible one. At best, an 
ethnography can only be partial.  (Agar 1980:41) 
Introduction 
The system of kin classification observed by the Oykangand is the most significant 
single determinant of appropriate social behaviour and language. Kinship — what the 
Oykangand term egŋg, and translate as ‘families’ — is at the same time both the most 
visible and yet the most covert feature of Oykangand life. Kinship is ethnographically 
visible because constant reference is made by the Oykangand to kin and kinsmen; it is 
opaque because even close brothers may not share the same map of social reality, and 
hence almost every individual has his/her own unique terminological — hence behavioural 
— interpretation of society. Kinship will be the focus of interest in these next three 
chapters as an account is given of the basic rules of Oykangand language use. 
In the earliest research into Oykangand linguistics it is not surprising that a few 
technical misidentifications (Sommer & Sommer 1967), and various social faux pas 
followed from failure to fully understand Oykangand kinship. (The Oykangand themselves 
find kinship an absorbing and constant source of discussion, debate and contention.)  In the 
intervening years the Oykangand have had time to correct and refine such views, so that 
these chapters — focused as they are on kin-governed linguistic behaviour — are now 
founded on a more adequate understanding.  These chapters are not, however, intended 
primarily as a theoretical treatise on Oykangand kinship, but as a basic descriptive 
statement.  Nevertheless, the conspicuous features of Oykangand kinship are clear enough 
to support the claim at the head of this chapter:  kinship, more than any other social factor, 
determines what is appropriate behaviour between any two members of Oykangand society 
— verbal behaviour included. Language therefore indexes kinship structures in a unique 
way. 
What kinship means to verbal behaviour — a beginning 
The Oykangand place strong negative sanctions on the use of personal names, as 
Chapter 8 will disclose.  One alternative — the use of a nick-name, additionally described 
in Chapter 8 — is often also proscribed, especially of a superordinate kinsman or person in 
an avoidance relationship (Chapter 6, and later in this chapter). The usual referent is  
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therefore a kinship term, whether addressing the hearer, or speaking of a third party. As a 
result, kin terms recur liberally in Oykangand conversations and anecdotes, as Appendix 2 
attests. A short extract will show the use of this strategy; the example is a particularly 
interesting one.  Because this account was recorded more than a quarter of a century ago, 
and most of the principal actors in the event are dead, it has not been possible for the 
survivors, even with help from younger speakers, to identify with certainty who might be 
the ubman.abmalγar referred to here: 
Elke-l il ubman.abmalγar ilg awand, il alandar-iy. 
return-PD 3sg.nom  grandson COM east.end 3sg.nom MB-AG 
“In̯ uŋgul enoŋgab in ̯d ̯ay ari-r ay iŋun. Uŋgul  
 animal there  ID=one.of.them kill-PD 1sg.nom 3sg.obj there 
ugŋgi-r ay iŋun. Ewa-l iŋun it ̯ur it ̯od ̯ amb 
leave-PD 1sg.nom  3sg.obj  see-PD 3sg.obj bubble there PRE 
il. Ulfi-r il.”  
3sg.nom die-PD 3sg.nom  
‘Uncle returned from the east with (our) grandson.  “I killed one of them there.  
 I left it there. I saw the bubbles from it.  It’s dead.”’ 
What this practice necessitates is that the hearer must be able to project him/herself into 
the viewpoint of the speaker.  That is to say, the hearer finds himself constantly sorting out 
his interlocutors’ kinship relations, such as ubman.abmalγar in the above account. The 
distressing fact in this case is that not only was the ubman.abmalγar unidentifiable as a 
person, but there was also later serious debate about what such a term now meant, without 
a satisfactory conclusion being reached (although some insights are reflected later in this 
chapter). 
So then, if, in a conversation beween two men, the speaker refers unexpectedly to his 
mother’s brother, alaŋar, the hearer must ask himself, ‘Of whom is he now speaking?’ 
Now the hearer may be in the relationship of — for example — father, ibaŋar, to the 
speaker. Consequently the third party so referenced is likely to be the hearer’s oʀaŋar or 
ulaŋar — categories of male cross cousin. Which of the dozen or more men in these 
categories is it likely to be?  The hearer mentally checks through the options. But perhaps 
— because of other factors discussed later in this chapter — there is an ‘apparent 
discrepancy’ of two generation levels introduced between the hearer and the third party, 
and he should instead be attempting to identify one of his aiŋar or grandfathers. Or 
perhaps the two generational difference makes the third party sub-ordinate, instead of 
super-ordinate; the speaker is therefore referring to the hearer’s grandson, arŋg.aƫalγ.  
Worse, perhaps a wrong marriage has thrown the kinship pattern into disorder at some 
point, and the alaŋar is the hearer’s classificatory nephew!  
To converse appropriately with another Oykangand, then, requires not only an ability to 
manipulate — with lightning speed — the calculus of Oykangand kinship, but a knowledge 
of the interlocutor’s affinal and other relationships to third parties not present. 
Occasionally in conversation one will hear a question such as  
Abm inaŋ iŋun “alalaŋ” arki-n, ey? 
person  2sg.nom 3sg.obj  MB follow-PRES Q 
‘You call him “uncle”, don’t you?’ 
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as the interlocutor seeks confirmation of what kinship parameters are relevant to a given 
reference. Oykangand people are often asking for clarification of such issues. One 
approach is to refer to someone — a fourth party — whose nickname they are free to use. 
For example: 
Ebaŋar Udnbaʀ-aŋ, ey? 
o.sister lame-GEN Q 
‘Limpy’s older sister, is it?’ 
More often than not the speaker will attempt to ensure clarification of the situation and 
avoid the possibility of interruption, by providing explanatory information.  In the extract 
that follows, comprising the opening sentences of an anecdote, the speaker employs 
appositive noun phrases: 
Uɲinaγ, el.eweweng, ay ina-n ̯, erk ad ̯en undam-ar. 
yesterday at.evening  1sg.nom sit-PG  place 1sg.poss E-LOC  
Il uŋgul adnim elke-l il, abm arfaʀ uŋgul il, 
3sg.nom there inside return-PD 3sg.nom person white there 3sg.nom 
abeʀ uŋgul il, oʀaŋar *Herbert-aŋ, elke-l il olon. 
woman there 3sg.nom wife   H-GEN return-PD 3sg.nom hither 
Umaγ alka-r il, elkon ̯t ̯elkon ̯t ̯ afa-r il. Adu̯n aŋaɲ 
inside call-PD 3sg.nom billycan get-PD 3sg.nom 1sg.obj not  
uw erge-l. 
word speak-PD 
‘I was sitting at my place yesterday evening.  She came back inside —  
that light-skinned person, that woman, Herbert’s wife — she came back  
here.  She called out (from) inside the house; she got the billycan, but she  
didn’t say anything to me.’ 
Notice however that such explanatory circumlocution involves yet further use of the 
kinship terminology of the Oykangand: ebaŋar udnbar-aŋ is ‘Limpy’s older sister’, and 
oʀaŋar *Herbert-aŋ is ‘Herbert’s wife’. In order to dispell any ambiguity over the 
discourse participant being directly referred to, the speaker calls on yet more kinship 
relations to establish that identity securely.  Knowledge of the kinship relations of the 
entire Oykangand community and of the kinship system it manifests are therefore essential 
to correct identification of each participant in a given discourse, since it is by kinship terms 
— perhaps keyed to a third party — that actors are normally identified by the speaker. 
An exception:  when kinship doesn’t count 
The phrase ‘social factor’ (in the last sentence of the Introduction, above) as a 
parameter governing speech was carefully chosen, because societal considerations such as 
kinship are not always paramount in determining linguistic behaviour.  It is perhaps good 
to recognise this at the outset, and justify the exceptions.  As required, kinship obligations 
can be set aside in favour of personal whim or need.  Physiological states — tiredness, pain 
or (less traditionally) drunkenness — may generate deviance from the observance of the 
‘acceptable’ rules of normative behaviour between kin. Psychological states such as desire, 
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avarice, revenge, or anguish can be responsible for social lapses, too. This does not deny 
the rule-governed nature of human behaviour but rather gives cognisance to the fact that 
rules can be ignored or broken — they are not in themselves ‘categorical imperatives’. 
They are susceptible to manipulation.  
Indeed, part of an actor’s knowledge of the ‘normative’ rules of his society must be an 
awareness of the consequences and implications of ignoring the rules. Hiatt (1965:75−126) 
illustrates quite clearly how that — despite an even more highly elaborated kinship system 
— Gidjingali men claim women as wives on sometimes tenuous grounds by manipulating 
the support of close kin. Rules are thus at the same time ignored on the one hand (in 
claiming a woman outside the norms of betrothal) and relied upon on the other (in 
assembling family support for the claim). The rules are therefore not a rigid behavioural 
straitjacket, but are open to interpretation and manipulation according to perceived 
personal advantages and one’s assessment of the consequences of ‘breaking’ the rules. In 
this respect the Oykangand conform to some probably universal constraints of behaviour 
associated with the human condition.  These constraints also apply to language. 
 
 Δ =  ο Δ = ο 
 M  Q N  S 
 
   ο 
 D 
Figure 5.1:  The immediate relationships of M and Q 
The principles involved can be seen in reference to a simple instance involving the 
woman Q and her husband M, who were already elderly people in our first encounter with 
the Oykangand in the early 1960s; both have long since passed away.  The man M had no 
immediate kin; Q had an actual brother, N, who with his wife, S, in turn had a large family, 
including a daughter, D. 
M and Q lived with other ‘pensioner’ folk in a communal cottage close to the hospital 
but more remote from the store, post office and administrative centre. This was 
nevertheless convenient, especially after Q had developed cataracts and was virtually 
blind, and so presented to the hospital from time to time with minor abrasions. The 
company of other old folk and the proximity of health care was a comfort to Q on those 
occasions when M had to pick up pension payments, purchase stores or visit kin. M was a 
respected elder, a fine old man, and he would sometimes take Q about the settlement, 
leading her along by a long ulgŋgul ‘fighting stick’, while the old lady heaped imprecatory 
abuse on him for allegedly leading her through the mud, sometimes even breaking into 
ritual ‘complaint’ chanting — aŋam — to vent her feelings.  Any prolonged ‘escape’ from 
her company by M (born c. 1898) for shopping or banking was claimed by Q (born c. 
1905) to be only a cloak for an amatory foray or occasion of lovers’ rendezvous on her 
husband’s part!  The appalling verbal abuse he suffered on his return caused intensive 
comment by their neighbours — most of it rather pointed. 
The conditions relevant to a situation like this can be stated with rough justice to the 
Oykangand as follows: 
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• Swearing has a jural function and its use must be regulated with this function 
in view. 
• Confrontation with a person who verbally abuses others excessively without 
just cause is normally swift and decisive. (A mother’s reaction to her adult 
daughter’s insulting public obscenities provided a case in point.) 
• Physical intervention by kin is avoided in marital (as well as familial) disputes 
unless grievous bodily harm is probable, though the moral support of kin is 
almost automatic. 
In this instance, Q constantly claimed jural redress for M’s alleged philandering, and 
appropriately resorted to aŋam and swearing.  The charge was preposterous, and Q knew 
it, but she saw this artifice as securing M’s continued fidelity, company and care.  Her kin 
— even her brother’s wife and daughter — ignored the issue, and offered neither moral nor 
physical support in confrontations. Indeed, relations between M and Q’s BDH, (D’s 
husband, also an old man) were entirely cordial. Neither they nor the neighbours 
confronted Q over her virulent abuse, since they recognised Q’s unhappy circumstances. 
They did however not refrain from caustic ‘stage whispers’ in her presence. 
The sole determinant of this behavioural pattern was Q’s blindness.  When sometime 
about 1976 Q’s cataracts were surgically treated, and glasses were prescribed so that a 
good measure of sight was regained, the entire performance ceased!  That is, when Q no 
longer felt the need to control M — whose affection and care was never in doubt to 
impartial observers — her swearing and use of aam ceased, and so too did neighbours’ 
comments. Q therefore knew to what lengths she could go in ‘breaking’ the rules. For 
example, to have broken the third of the above rules and to have physically assaulted the 
now frail M would have been counter-productive — assembling M’s remote kin in his 
support and possibly alienating him.  Since Q recognised that N and D were uninterested in 
her plight, her predicament would have been pathetic. What might have drawn her kin to 
her support would have been a confrontation by his kin or the immediate neighbours over 
her excessive abuse. 
A suspension of the regular rules governing normal communication in order to effect 
personal advantage or whim has been known to linguists for some time. An oft-cited 
instance in the literature is the reported conversation between a white policeman and a 
Negro doctor, in which the former deliberately and knowingly suspends certain rules of 
address in favour of others that denigrate the doctor (Ervin-Tripp 1969). But the policeman 
does not suspend all the rules of communication. The language is still recognisably 
English, with typically correct English morphology and syntax. What is at issue is its use. 
Just as the policeman would not dare to use derogatory language to the doctor as the 
latter’s patient, for example, so Q realised that as M’s partner she could not expect to 
escape without penalty the continued use of aŋam and swearing directed towards her 
husband now that she could see.  This behaviour consequently ceased; Q realised that it 
was now inappropriate. 
In the same way, Oykangand speakers can make judgments about the possible penalties 
they might incur for breaking communication rules in a way that cannot be reflected with 
any completeness here. They could weigh factors — such as blindness in the above case — 
against the normative limits of swearing and aŋam or even physical abuse, and make 
judgments on what can be reasonably tolerated by others without retribution. Such delicacy 
of judgment is not available to those of us who do not speak Oykangand natively. In the 
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rest of this study we shall have to content ourselves with most of the obvious rules, and 
generally disregard the issue of deviance from them or the penalties for wilfully breaking 
them. 
Oykangand kinship 
In its general features, and in its treatment of classificatory kin, the Oykangand system 
follows the general organisation of the Kariera, which is — as Chapter 3 established — 
recognised in the literature as a distinct type.  There it was shown that the classical Kariera 
system differentiates five generational levels, through which only two lines of descent need 
be recognised.  Four sections are maintained, and a feature of the system is ‘bilateral cross-
cousin marriage’ which defines a man’s spouse as a classificatory MBD or FZD. Sister 
exchange between men in different clans is desirable, if not the social norm. This 
possibility of exchange preserves a ‘bilateral symmetry’ in the system; a man gives his 
sister in marriage to a classificatory MBS or FZS, and receives that man’s sister in 
exchange.  
The Oykangand departed from this general type in three important respects: 
• The named section system and moieties (including knowledge of moiety 
totems) had fallen into disuse well before 1960, although the moiety totems 
were still recalled by the elderly. Neither names nor totemic affiliations still 
defined sections in any widely accepted fashion. (There is further discussion 
of this point in Chapter 8.) 
• The exchange by men who are classificatory cross-cousins of actual sisters in 
marriage is possible, but is certainly not normative.  (See later in this chapter.) 
• Marriage to certain first cross-cousins is negatively sanctioned. (See later in 
this chapter also.) 
Schematisations of Oykangand kinship are presented after the traditional fashion in 
Figures 5.2a and 5.2b.  These recognise the primary terminological distinctions.  As can be 
seen there, Oykangand kinship conforms to a general ‘Kariera’ pattern. Its unusual features 
do not annul its essential character, and its elaborations give it a unique flavour. 
A theory of Oykangand kinship 
The proposition advanced here is that despite their detail, Figures 5.2a and 5.2b in fact 
fail to offer complete characterisations of Oykangand kinship. They are, instead, 
abstractions, deduced by those of us who are ethnographers, but incapable of explaining 
the totality of kinship behaviour. For example, Figure 5.2a appears to support the claim 
that actual sister exchange is to be expected with high frequency among the Oykangand, 
whereas in reality it does not.  
Despite their limitations, alternative schemes to Figures 5.2a and 5.2b cannot be 
proposed without introducing meaningless repetitions and a loss of significant 
generalisations. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b are believed to represent a cognitive grid, or a 
conceptual framework, that is real enough in the minds of the Oykangand, but on which 
rules or adjustments operate to effect changes in the terms applied to actual kinsmen, 
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according to facts of alliance or descent as these are realised in society itself. These 
diagrams are more in the nature of mapping devices, therefore, than of maps; they 
represent only part of the totality of relevant constructs with which the Oykangand deal 
with social reality. They provide basic categories into which people can be placed, but 
finer detail and significant adjustments follow from issues of descent and alliance lived out 
by the individual’s closer kin. 
aiŋar 
 abmiŋar 
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 andaŋar uwaŋar 
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arŋg.aƫalγ 
 
  arŋg.abmalγ 
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Figure 5.2a:  Oykangand kinship from the perspective of a male EGO 
Key: 
abmiŋar FF, FFB, MM, MMZ, FMH, MFW 
aiŋar FM, FMZ, MF, MFB, FFW, MMH 
iɲaŋar FZ, MBW 
alaŋar MB, FZH 
ulaŋar WB, ZH 
andaŋar man’s female child, his sister’s male child 
uwaŋar woman’s female child, her brother’s male child 
arŋg.at ̯alγ man’s D’s child 
arŋg.abmalγ man’s S’s child 
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Figure 5.2b:  Oykangand kinship from the perspective of a female EGO 
Key: 
As above, but: 
oʀaŋar H, ZH 
ednaŋar HZ, BW 
arŋg.aƫalγ woman’s S’s child 
arŋg.abmalγ woman’s D’s child 
In addition: 
iɲaŋar.obm/.agŋun̯d ̯ ♂WM 
alaŋar.obm/.agŋun̯d ̯ ♂WF 
... etelm ... not close, somewhat remote. 
Behavioural correlates follow the assignment of a living member of Oykangand society 
to any given kinship category. Appropriate social and linguistic behaviour towards any 
other kinsman is thus determined by the category into which the total schema of rules place 
that kinsman, and by how immediate to EGO that kinsman is reckoned to be by real or 
imputed facts of descent and alliance. 
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Sharp (1933–34:419ff.) offers a further useful understanding of Aboriginal society in 
the use of the terms superordinate and subordinate.  He suggests that the member of a 
higher generation level is superordinate to a member of a lower level, males are 
superordinate to females, and the older person in a given generation level is superordinate 
to the younger one. ‘Subordinate’ is defined as the reciprocal of ‘superordinate’. 
‘Superordinate’ and ‘subordinate’ are then socially defined in terms of rights and privileges 
or responsibilities, according to the specific kinship relation involved in each case. It is not 
surprising that one of the parameters of appropriate behaviour defined this way is 
linguistic. Sharp’s framework will prove useful in further description of Oykangand 
kinship. 
The derivation of kin terms I 
Underlying such a typical kin term as ebaŋar ‘older sister’ (above; see also Figures 5.2a 
and 5.2b) is a root — in this instance eba-.  This root can be traced historically to the stem 
*yapa, as reconstructed by Hale (1964). The remainder of this word is made up of the 
nasal ŋ followed by ar.  This structure for such ‘neutral’ or referential kin terms is 
suggested by the analysis that follows, and is evident enough not to need explicit defence.  
A number of other reconstructed stems attest the analysis: 
Hale (1964)  Uw Oykangand root Term 
*ŋama /ama/ amaŋar ‘M’ 
*pipi /iba/ ibaŋar ‘F’ 
*pi:ɲa /iɲa/ iɲaŋar ‘FZ’ 
*kala /ala/ alaŋar ‘MB’ 
but of course not all Oykangand kin terms reflect reconstructible stems. While 
*kami /abmi/ abmiŋar  ‘FF, MM'  and 
*aƫi /ai/ aiar  ‘FM, MF' 
conform, the reciprocals of them do not; respectively 
arŋg.abmalγ ‘SS, SD'   and 
arŋg.aƫalγ ‘DS, DD' 
The set of primary kinship terms are completed by the addition of the terms 
uraŋar ‘W, BW’ andaŋar  ‘S, D’ 
oʀaŋar  ‘H, ZH’ uwaŋar  ‘ZS, ZD’1 
olaŋar ‘B+’ ulaŋar ‘WB’ 
akaŋar  ‘B-’ elaŋar ‘Z-’ 
ednaŋar ‘♀HZ’ 
where all these terms are derived linguisitically by the same rules, and socially from the 
perception of a male EGO, except for the very last of these.  The above terms as used by a 
woman are found in Figure 5.2b. 
                                                                                                                                                    
1  Alpher (in Heath 1982:25) proposes the reconstruction *ƫuwa with the general meaning of ‘woman’s 
Ch, man’s SiCh’. 
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The final -ar is a reflex of *wara ‘no good, ruined, spoiled’ (see also Sommer 1978). 
There is evidence for this claim: The neighbouring language, Ogh Undjan, has analogues 
in, for example, ant.en ̯d̯ ̯iŋ ‘son, daughter’ where ant is ‘child, youngster’ but en ̯d ̯iŋ also 
means ‘no good, etc.’.  Like the Ogh Undjan, Oykangand speakers use some kin terms in 
which the second element is not phonologically fused to the first. The principle involved in 
the use of -ar (explored briefly in Sommer and Sommer 1969; Sommer 1978) appears to be 
that one must deprecate one’s own kin, land and food resources in order to provoke no 
retaliation from jealous spirits, especially when on another clan’s country. Whatever its 
historical source, -ar has relevance not only to the primary ‘referential’ kin discussed in 
this section, but to other forms, sometimes as a separate word in a compound, hence 
uban.ar, ogen.ar, oyeʀ.ar and abmen.ar — all of which will be described later in this 
chapter.  
The ‘neutral’ or referential term is used in contexts where only an imputed genealogical 
connection is expressed without need for respect.  Hence 
in ̯ alwaŋar amaŋar 
meat  pied.goose mother 
is a phrase that is often heard in February and March, when the pied geese lay and tend 
eggs on their floating grass nests in the swamps. Here, amaŋar is used in a biological 
sense, without reference to offspring.  Similar ‘neutral’ or referential use has already been 
cited with reference to ebaŋar udnbaʀ-aŋ and oʀaŋar *Herbert-aŋ, above. 
From the underlying ‘neutral’ roots are derived also the respective ‘vocative’ or address 
forms. These are used primarily to attract the attention of a person, or to address him/her 
directly. The initial V(C(C)) syllable ($1) is reduplicated, and /ŋ/ reappears to close the 
final syllable of the word without the final -ar ; hence from /eba/ ‘Z+’ we have 
ebebaŋ! 
‘older sister!’ 
Often however, ‘vocative’ forms of kin terminology appear as separate utterances or as the 
first element of an utterance.  In this position, a rule operates to reduce the first of the 
identical syllables to a consonant 
VC0 => Ø /#____ CV, given $1 = $2  
(see also Sommer 1970). As a result of this rule, the more usual ‘vocative’ would be 
bebaŋ! 
By the same rules, ednaŋar ‘MBD’ becomes the vocative nednaŋ.  The derivation does 
not apply to abmalγ ‘SS, SD’ or aƫalγ ‘DD, DS’, which become respectively abmalγar(ay) 
and aƫalγar(ay). The root for ‘father’ behaves irregularly once more: the final vowel 
becomes i, to give bibiŋ and not *bibaŋ, or becomes alternatively — by suppletion — 
aiŋ. 
The referential term for ‘mother’ is often associated with the concept ‘big, great’, and in 
certain circumstances can be used as an adjective with this sense. Further, the vocative 
terms for ‘father’ and ‘father’s sister’ can refer respectively to male and female genitalia. 
So that a woman’s friend might ask (note the vocative usage of the kin term): 
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Niɲaŋ ayin er uwa-n̯ inaŋ? 
aunt   Q away give-PG  2sg.nom 
‘Did you have sex (with him)?’ 
and receive the answer 
Niɲaŋ aŋaɲ er uw ay 
aunt not away  give-PRES 1sg.nom 
‘No, I didn’t.’ 
or perhaps 
Bibiŋ er algŋa-nm alin ̯ 
father  away  carry-PG  1du(ex).nom 
‘Yes, we did.’ 
In such contexts the kinship terms bibiŋ and niɲaŋ stand for the regular body parts, od ̯ 
‘penis’ and idn ‘vagina’ respectively, which can alternatively enter into these constructions 
respectively as direct replacements. 
The vocative forms are also used as terms of reference when the referent is a very close 
member of the family — not necessarily only in the immediate family, but in one regarded 
as very close. The children of a mother’s actual sister or father’s own brother would fall 
into this category. The following text, part of Minnie’s lament in Appendix 2, demonstrates 
this use well. 
‘Mamaŋ, ololaŋ in ̯d ̯ay?’ 
 mother  o.brother  where.at? 
‘Mum, where’s my older brother?’ 
‘Lolaŋ *work aʀt-aʀti-n.’ 
 o.brother    work  REDUP-climb-E 
‘Your older brother’s working.’ 
‘kah!’ ‘ehˀhe’ 
all right  OK 
‘All right.’ ‘OK’ 
Note that in the first utterance, the vocative is used normatively in mamaŋ, and in 
reference to a close family member in ololaŋ.  Although (o)lolaŋ is the unmarked vocative 
form, it is used by both speakers — propositus and her interlocutor — as a referent. 
We will examine other derivatives of the primary kinship terms later in this chapter 
after significant other constructs are established. 
The ‘great grandson’ rule 
The simplest proof that the schema of Figures 5.2a and 5.2b fail to adequately 
characterise the Oykangand clansman’s knowledge of his kin was forced upon me some 
thirty years ago. My family and I were adopted into the Oykangand society at various 
appropriate points, and I found myself with a classificatory ‘son’, S, of advanced age and 
status, with whom I had considerable contact. His son was — predictably enough — my 
‘grandson’ SS, with whom I enjoyed a characteristically relaxed and informal relationship. 
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But the son’s son’s son was categorically my ‘father’, F.  This ‘father’ was a lad of eight or 
nine years whose behaviour contrasted strangely with that of his progenitors.  He would 
demand of me the most unlikely favours, and take the most outrageous liberties — a 
behavioural correlate of his superordinate status as much as of his impetuous youth. This 
lad — ‘logically’ my SSS — was assigned the status of F, since his categorial placement in 
a third descending (-3) generation would exclude him from the terminological system.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, [Radcliffe-]Brown (1913:154) discovered the same anomaly 
from the point of view of the SSS — the inversion of the present case — when he attempted 
to discover what term might apply to a FFF among the Kariera. But the implications for 
those kinsmen surrounding this adjustment were not explored. What happens to third 
parties accommodating this adjustment?  
The rule which takes care of persons who ‘logically’ belong outside the terminological 
system in generation levels >+2 or <-2 are illustrated by yet another case in Figure 5.3.  
+1 MB X  Δ  =  ο 
----------------------------- 
  0 EGO  ο  = Δ EGO 
----------------------------- 
-1 D  ο  =  Δ  C 
----------------------------- 
-2 DS G  Δ  =  ο 
----------------------------- 
-3 DSS  Δ  X 
 
Figure 5.3:  Artificial change of generation by the ‘great grandson’ rule 
In Figure 5.3, EGO has a ‘grandson’ G, related to EGO as a classificatory DS.  Now, this 
man, G, has a son X, but because EGO has no distinctive term for a DSS, he is assigned to 
the category of MB, alaŋar ‘uncle’.  As such, X can provide EGO with a wife. X’s position 
is established both terminologically and socially within the system by being ‘raised’ into it 
— as though there had been four generation levels ‘added’ to his status.  From X’s point of 
view, EGO is his FMF who has suffered the ‘loss’ of four-generation levels in status and is 
now a ZS, andaŋar ‘nephew’.  
The anomaly is best apparent from C’s point of view, where a ‘grandson’ may appear to 
give a wife to his ‘father’.  
Multiple applications of the rule that adjusts generation levels by 4 (the ‘great grandson’ 
rule) and that which effects a change of 2 in generation level (the ednaŋar/alaŋar rule 
discussed later) mean that apparent discrepancies of two generation levels appear 
frequently between licit marriage partners when referenced by a third party. These are 
tolerated, and there are further specific terms which adjust for such apparent discrepancies, 
but a difference of one level implies an incestuous relationship, i.e. one that is eg agulγ 
‘wrong-headed’.  This phenomenon has been noted for various kinship systems, and the 
term ‘harmonic’ (derived in the first instance from Radcliffe-Brown [1930–31] and revived 
by Hale [1966]) has been applied to alternating generations to explain this behaviour. 
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(The Oykangand insist that other groups, such as the neighbouring Yir-Yoront and Kok-
Kaber, deal with the above type of problem by quite different rules. I have made no 
enquiry into what these differences might be.  They would complicate inter-group marriage 
greatly, I suspect.) 
Linguistic adjustments to apparent generational discrepancies 
We now need to establish that these social facts are linguistically important, and so next 
address the sort of anomaly seen by C (Figure 5.3) and the problem of managing the 
apparent discrepancy of two generation levels. A different but real-life structure is 
represented in Figure 5.4: 
 
 ο  D C  Δ 
 
 Δ  F  ο  D  S  Δ   =  ο  P  Δ  L 
 
 =   ο  G K  ο   =   Δ  A   R  ο   = 
 
  Δ  E    ο  T 
Figure 5.4:  Linguistic adjustments to apparent discrepancies 
N.B.:  To represent marriages such as those of C with G, or L with R in the 
above diagram, a line is drawn from the marriage symbol (=) to that partner 
which, from the perspective being represented, is seen to be in another 
generation.  This convention will apply throughout the present study. 
Near the centre of the diagram, begin with K and G, who are close classificatory sisters. 
K’s mother, D is consequently superordinate to G, as G’s classificatory amaŋar ‘mother’.  
G is however married to C, whom D addresses as alaŋar ‘uncle’ (MB). Now in this 
situation, all actors adhere to the rules of direct address according to kinship category, and 
no accommodations are made directly with each other. That is to say, the woman D 
continues to address C as her MB, D’s term of reference for G is still ‘daughter’, and G is 
‘wife’ to her ‘husband’, C.  It is when reference is made between either C and D, or D and 
G to the third party — the remaining party of the C = G marriage — that adjustments have 
to be made.  
Assume for a moment that D wants to know from G the whereabouts of C. The woman 
D might appropriately ask of her sister, G: 
Uban.ar in ̯d ̯ay il? 
husband  where 3sg.nom 
‘Where’s your husband?’ 
Note that D does not use the ‘neutral reference’ term oʀaŋar ‘husband’ of C, nor does 
she ‘embarrass’ G with use of alaŋar ‘uncle’ (MB), appropriate from her own perspective. 
Instead, D is said by the Oykangand to ‘respect’ G by using the term uban.ar, typically 
appropriate to addressing the spouse of the interlocutor or speaker, where a generational 
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adjustment is called for.  D is in fact communicating something like ‘G, I’m not going to 
call you by a term which might imply publicly that you have taken an improper marriage 
partner, but neither am I free to bend my relationships to meet your circumstances.’ There 
is therefore both personal integrity and social respect in such usage. As the next chapter 
shows, a charge of failing to observe marriage customs is a highly inflammatory one, and 
is likely to precipitate a fight. 
G might respond with: 
Aɲiy uŋgul awaʀ igu-r il, onalgŋg-aγ. 
old.man  there  eastward  go-PD 3sg.nom  creek-AL 
‘(My/That) old man has gone upriver to the creek.’ 
or she may opt for a continuation of the politeness that D has expressed by again using the 
term uban.ar, rather than aɲiy.  
Consider further D’s daughter, K.  She might address C, and ask 
Uk ayin ad ̯un? 
tobacco Q 1sg.obj 
‘Have you any tobacco for me?’ 
and he might well reply to her 
Uban-g.ar-aγ ampayi-l inaŋ 
spouse-DAT-ar-DAT*  ask-IMP 2sg.nom 
‘Ask your sister (my wife).’ 
[*The concord of the Dative case marker here is rather unusual.] 
The referent in this case is K’s classificatory sister and C’s wife; K properly calls C 
aiŋar, or MF. Because she is addressing a kinsman with whom she feels entirely 
comfortable and at ease, not only is the request entirely natural, but there is no need for 
specific courtesies. 
Etiquette in this exchange applies when C, despite his superordinate status, in turn 
‘respects’ his wife, G, by referring to her as uban.ar. Even though it is his own spouse 
being referred to, C employs the ‘respect’ or ‘polite’ form uban.ar. The term can be 
therefore egocentric (as in the initial exchanges, above) or altercentric (as in the latter 
ones); the propositus can be either the speaker or his/her interlocutor. 
Typically, and certainly most frequently, the situation calling for such an adjustment 
term arises because of the ‘great grandson’ or other rule (such as the ‘change of generation 
rule’ discussed later) where the difference between one of the interlocutors and the referent 
is two generations, and involves a marriage union.  However, uban.ar can also apply to 
instances where there is only one generation difference. Consider the man F, on the very 
left of the diagram, and K’s husband, A. 
The marriage of K and A is, within the family perspective of K’s mother, D, and D’s 
brother S, entirely appropriate.  They agreed that A was a correct partner for their daughter 
K to marry.  But because of other alliances within the community, the marriage is not seen 
as regular by F (this situation is explored more fully in connection with Figure 5.17). This 
man, F, calls K his daughter, but his term for her spouse is oʀaŋar ‘husband, cross cousin.’ 
He therefore speaks to K about her husband, A, by using the term uban.ar. It would be also 
appropriate for him to use the earlier question 
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Uban.ar in ̯d ̯ay il? 
husband  where 3sg.nom 
‘Where’s your husband?’ 
The conditions on the use of uban.ar are awkward to state elegantly, but are fairly 
simple: where two parties to a conversation must refer to the spouse of one of them, who 
from the social perspective of the other is in an inappropriate category to enter into such a 
marriage, then either party may refer to that spouse as uban.ar.  The term can in fact be 
regarded as a politeness formula, both participants in the discourse able to recognise, and 
by use of uban.ar to avoid, the potential for social dysphoria or dissonance over an 
apparently irregular relationship. 
To confirm this analysis, we turn to the right side of the diagram of Figure 5.4. 
Although the marriage of L and R is also algal ‘straight’ or licit, it appears to be wrong 
from the perspective of K, because L, in a generation above, is married to a cross cousin  
in K’s own generation. Here again there are linguistic adjustments to be made to 
accommodate these social realities.  Speaking of L in conversation with R, K would have 
recourse again to uban.ar, but this would not be appropriate with, for example, T.  T is not 
a party to the marriage which K finds irregular.  In this case, she would use aen.ar which 
has the force of ‘I call him “uncle, MB” but you call him something else’. T would in fact 
refer to him as ‘father’.  
There is a defective set of adjustment terms predicated on this same basis: they are 
egocentric, and will be dealt with in more detail later.  The primary condition on the use of 
this parallel set of terms is that there is an adjustment to be made because the interlocutor 
is in a relationship which potentially raises dissonance with the speaker. The second 
condition on such usage is that the referent — the third person under discussion — should 
be closely related to one of the parties: the spouse in the instances of C, G and R, the father 
in T’s case.  
These forms are ‘triangular’ in one sense as used by McConvell and Laughren (in Heath 
1982), but there is a significant difference in their usage from that of the Gurindji:  they are 
employed in precisely those situations where the relationship of a third party cannot be 
predicted from any two known relationships extant between the three parties. They 
therefore have more than a mere referential value in their use, and probably invoke a 
parameter of politeness or respect not quite as obviously present in the forms recorded by 
McConvell and Laughren. 
It is consequently clear that the Oykangand speaker must not only know (or be able  
to reckon) his/her relationship to every other speaker, but also know how to adjust for 
aspects of his/her interlocutor’s social grid (mainly marriages) that from the speaker’s 
perspective are uncomfortable or irregular. He/she does so by avoiding direct reference  
to the referential terms (such as oʀaŋar ‘husband’ and uraŋar ‘wife’ in the first examples) 
and by substituting other terms, according to appropriate options which signal respect or 
politeness. Such social realities as generational discrepancies have therefore very immediate 
and significant linguistic consequences. Conversely, those linguistic consequences reflect 
socially significant realities. 
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Sister exchange 
Here is another case of a marriage alliance disturbing social behaviour, with consequent 
categorial and linguistic adjustments: 
 
 Δ  ο  ο  Δ  ο  ο 
 A M  N  B  E  G 
Figure 5.5:  The implications of sister exchange 
Consider the case of two families between which no prior betrothals have been effected; 
they are represented in Figure 5.5, which is based on a real-life situation. A, M, N are 
‘cross cousins’ remotely related (i.e. not related by immediate marriage alliances) to B,  
E, G. 
The initial kin terms applied between the various actors are as follows: 
• E, B and G each calls A oʀaŋar ‘husband’ 
• M, N, and A each calls E and G uraŋar ‘wife’ 
• M, N and A each calls B ulaŋar ‘wife’s brother’* 
• E, B and G each calls M and N ednaŋar ‘husband’s sister’* 
*In a later section it will be shown that there is an alternative interpretation 
to these terms.  
The siblings B, E, G see the parents of M, N, A as iɲaŋar.uw (lit. FZ + ‘speech’) and 
alaŋar.uw (lit. MB + ‘speech’); the parents of B, E, G are similarly addressed by M, N, A. 
This is not an unusual case; no alliances have been forged directly between the two 
families, and those alliances in the rest of society do not seriously bear on them.  The only 
asymmetrical factor is in the relationship of the mother of B, E, G, to that of A, M, N. In 
this case, we have 
• mother of B, E, G calls mother of A, M, N ednaŋar ‘husband’s sister’  
• mother of A, M, N calls mother of B, E, G uraŋar ‘wife’ 
which is simply a historical accident of the society, but which determines the initial 
terminological asymmetry above.  
Now suppose B were to claim N as wife, i.e. now B Δ = ο N. 
There may be some discussion about this, since no betrothal had been in effect, but 
perhaps B could argue that his contractual mother-in-law(s) had not produced a 
marriagable daughter for him, or that his ‘promise’ had died, or eloped with another man, 
or something.  In any case, the families concerned eventually accept the union. There is a 
specific verbal phrase, id ̯n ̯al ambe- which is limited to meaning ‘agree about an alliance’, 
that would be employed to describe the situation. As a consequence, B now takes N to 
wife, and addresses her as uraŋar not ednaŋar; she replies with oʀaŋar rather than ulaŋar 
— they are now ‘wife’ and ‘husband’ respectively. But in addition, there are also the 
consequent changes: 
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• E, B and G each now calls A ulaŋar ‘wife’s brother’ 
• M, N, and A each now calls E and G ednaŋar ‘husband’s sister’ 
• M, N and A each now calls B oʀaŋar ‘husband’ 
• E, B and G each now calls M and N uraŋar ‘wife’ 
That is, the whole paradigm of kin categories has changed!  It now represents, in this 
generation, what would have been the case from birth had N’s parents promised a daughter 
to B in a formal betrothal.  Alternatively, the terms for all concerned in this generation are 
now what would have applied had the mothers of B, M, N, and A, E, G originally stood in 
the reverse relationship. 
There is however no change in the behaviour between B and his new wife’s parents.  
His wife’s mother is not treated with the avoidance due to the mother of a betrothed wife. 
On the other hand, a contractual mother-in-law, or mother of a betrothed wife, is 
systemically different. There would have been at some point a formal ceremony (antiy 
arfin, lit. ‘dillybag hold’ or olgŋg orikin/at ̯an ‘dilly bag place.inside/tie’) also referred to as 
oneg arfin, lit. ‘nape hold’ (from the action of the betrothed husband).  In this event, the 
wife-taker, (in this case it would have been B), ritually bites the navel of his prospective 
wife, N, and has special triangular dilly bags, olgŋg, tied behind his head and on his arms 
by his future mother-in-law. She also swings the little tot around her future husband, 
saying iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯ ay, arŋg ad ̯en uwaŋan ay inun, ‘I am your mother-in-law; I’ll give 
you my daughter’.  He would stand with eyes closed, and downturned face in his cupped 
hands — adnduʀ odngen, el awiy ‘ears closed, and eyes too’, I was told — while she is 
now enlisted in the category iɲaŋar.obm, (lit. FZ + ‘poison’ or synonymously, 
iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯) and is prohibited from talking with him thereafter.  They are in fact both 
uw od ̯oŋ lit. ‘speech blunt’, or dumb.  He makes a gift of sugarbag — wild honey — to his 
prospective mother-in-law in a coolamon specially made for the purpose, and known as 
egŋ aʀa, lit. ‘food nest’.  The ceremony is then complete. 
This ritual event also creates a category of ‘poison grandmother’ of the promised girl’s 
MM.  This is the abm iɲaγ or ilimiɲƫ  [the second of these is possibly an Ogh Undjan 
equivalent term, but is well known to the Oykangand].  If still alive, it is this MM of the 
promised girl who actually hands her to her prospective husband, for the ritual biting of her 
navel, because the man and the girl’s mother are standing back-to-back, because they are 
not allowed to see each other or speak to each other.  Like the mother, the abm iɲaγ also 
wears a dilly bag, signifying that she too expects a share of the husband-to-be’s hunting 
success. 
But in the above case, because no such ritual had preceded the marriage, B is not so 
restricted in social or linguistic exchange with his mother-in-law, though N’s parents 
expect the traditional privileges of being wife-givers to him: receiving his gifts of food and 
so on. 
Returning to Figure 5.5, let us now suppose a romance develops between A and E, who 
in turn put pressure on their respective families for agreement to their union. They are 
seeking the structural equivalent of sister exchange. 
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We are considering then the union A Δ = ο E. 
Before the marriage of B and N they were oʀaŋar ‘husband’ and uraŋar ‘wife’, which 
they want to recognise again through marriage. But at this point, because  
B Δ = ο N, i.e. B has married N,  
they are ulaŋar ‘male cross cousin’ and ednaŋar ‘female cross cousin’, just as B and N had 
originally been to each other.  Now there could be a family row over this second marriage, 
because it entails the union of an ednaŋar with an ulaŋar (see First cousin marriage 
prohibitions in this chapter) in the context of a union very close to them. There is sure to 
be a great deal of discussion about the extent of further kinship adjustments among the 
siblings, or reversals of kin categories again among surviving family members, before the 
union is accepted. 
The point however is that ultimately, depending very much on the powers of persuasion, 
kin support, and personal charisma of the people concerned, this union could also gain 
acceptance. It is then known as erk oyelm (lit. ‘place/time in-return/opposite’). It is not 
that such actual sister exchange is the norm, or that it is tolerated without comment, 
because it clearly requires a lot of agreement to proposed adjustments to kinship 
categories.  Rather, it is accommodated by the system, despite the stresses it imposes. 
Despite the intricacy of these categorial changes, there are instances of actual sister 
exchange in the genealogies. Taxed about a case some years ago — which aroused no 
negative reaction from contemporary Oykangand — the father of one of the brother/sister 
pairs contended that such alliances were not known in traditional society, and upheld the 
validity of the ‘rule’, saying that the young people now took no account of the old customs. 
But in fact there is an unambiguous instance of sister exchange which antedates his own 
marriage, and of which he must have been fully aware.  The facts are represented in Figure 
5.6; L and M have clearly exchanged sisters.  
 
L  Δ =  ο  D  ο  N  M  Δ =   ο  A 
 
   ο  K    Δ  G 
 
     Δ  H 
Figure 5.6:  A case of sister exchange and the marriage of a man to a FZD 
There is however a much more ancient case of sister exchange than this even, attested in 
the early 1960s by one of the four persons directly involved — then the sole survivor, and 
a very old woman.  It involved not only sister exchange, but two illicit unions (although the 
families are not principally Oykangand): 
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 =  ο  ο    =    Δ 
 
 ο        M  ο   =   Δ  B D  ο  A  Δ 
 
 L  ο  Δ  Z 
 
 
  Δ  S 
Figure 5.7:  A case of illicit sister exchange 
The surviving participant, L, spoke at some length about the fights that went on over her 
alliance with the man A that she had once addressed as alaŋar MB.  While her union was 
childless, her brother’s was not, and several sons — including S — and a daughter were 
left to cope with adjustments to their categorial status.  This appears to have been effected 
largely, if not exclusively, through their mother, D, with the father’s relationships being 
generally ignored in effecting the alliances of their generation.  As a consequence, S and 
his siblings reckoned their descent from D, not from Z — despite the fact that B was a 
powerful community figure and ritual leader.  
If anything, Figure 5.7 demonstrates the lengths to which the system may be abused by 
those whose lives are purported to be regulated by it.  Sister exchange would appear to be 
difficult enough, but in the above case, it is compounded by the illicit character of the 
unions produced. 
To conclude, then: sister exchange is not seen as the ideal in Oykangand marriage 
customs. Neither on the other hand is it absolutely prohibited, but when it occurs it 
occasions adjustments to kin categories that require significant social processes of 
resolution that have linguistic consequences.  
In the first instance (Figure 5.6) the ‘rule’ has been manipulated to the advantage of A’s 
generation in providing otherwise inaccessible spouses, but G’s generation — as can be 
seen — is left to bear no serious consequences.  In the second case, (Figure 5.7) it is not 
sister exchange that generates the major repercussions for the next generation, but the illicit 
nature of the unions that Z’s offspring must deal with. 
Pertinent to those consequences are the roles of ulaŋar and ednaŋar in Oykangand 
social organisation, and the rules governing first cousin marriages. 
First cousin marriage prohibitions 
Figures 5.2a and 5.2b also imply that ‘bilateral cross cousin marriages’ are the norm for 
Oykangand society, and that a man’s actual MBD is just as eligible in marriage as is his 
actual FZD, since he refers to both, it would seem, by the same term uraŋar. This is 
emphatically not the case.  If in fact a man marries a woman he addressed as uraŋar, her 
parents are rarely as directly related to the man as actual FZ or actual MB (though see the 
man G of Figure 5.6 for such a case).  They are much more frequently classificatory rather 
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than actual FZs and MBs, traced to EGO more directly through his union with their daughter 
than by other ties of descent or alliance. And that alliance is usually established in advance 
by the ‘promise’ or betrothal system already briefly described. What are the constraints on 
effecting a first cousin marriage in Oykangand society? 
Thomson (1955) described ‘Two devices for the avoidance of first cousin marriages 
among the Australian Aborigines’.  Among the Ompela, prohibition is claimed to extend to 
marriages with both actual MBDs and actual FZDs. His Wik-Mongkan system has been 
more recently the subject of investigation by McKnight (1971) who re-examines both 
McConnel’s (1939–40) and Thomson’s accounts of Wik-Mungkan kinship, and who 
comments on the references to this group in the literature with the insight and 
understanding that only come from first-hand contact in fieldwork.  McKnight’s findings, 
including his general re-appraisal of McConnel’s analysis, are much more consonant with 
Oykangand practice.  Indeed, much of McConnel’s difficulty appears to revolve around her 
failure to penetrate the issues surrounding the prohibition of marriage with an actual FZD. 
If first cousin marriage is restricted in these other Cape York Peninsular societies, it would 
be reasonable to expect some form of constraint on it among the Oykangand. 
 
ο    =     Δ ο   =   Δ  ο    =    Δ 
iɲaŋar alaŋar amaŋar ibaŋar iɲaŋar alaŋar 
 uw uw obm obm 
 
  ο X  Δ =   ο 
ednaŋar obm  EGO uraŋar 
Figure 5.8:  The asymmetry of actual first cross cousin relationships 
Showing EGO and his female first cross cousins. The symbol ‘X’ indicates 
prohibition; ‘=’ denotes possible marriage.   
The Oykangand pattern is in fact illustrated in Figure 5.8.  A man can marry his actual 
FZD, to whom he extends the term uraŋar ‘wife, marriageable female cousin’, and who 
reciprocates to her MBS with oʀaŋar ‘husband, marriageable male cousin’.2  A relationship 
marked by use of these terms is one of ease and familiarity, of potential union in marriage, 
and the possibility of extra-marital sexual liaison without causing much outrage in 
Oykangand society at large. Towards the mother of any betrothed uraŋar ― including an 
actual FZ who has a marriageable daughter ― a man observes a careful ‘avoidance’ 
behaviour.  Only if an intermediary is unavailable will he address her, and then does so 
without facing her and by using special vocabulary (discussed in Chapter 6).  Perhaps he 
will address her dog or her yamstick instead. He refers to such FZ as his iɲaŋar.obm 
‘poison aunt’, and is defined by her as a DH andaŋar.obm ‘poison nephew’. 
                                                                                                                                                    
2  Heath (1982:7) remarks on this unusual reversal of the MBD norm, citing Elkin’s (1932:302–303) 
speculation that FZD marriage ‘would have the undesirable effect of making male Ego’s Fa also Ego’s 
WiMoBr (normally an avoidance relationship), while MoBrDa marriage posed no such problems of this 
kind.’  The Oykangand do not observe this avoidance; Figure 5.6 shows that G’s WMB was his actual 
F. 
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Towards his immediate kin on the mother’s side, behavioural patterns are more or less 
reversed. A man need exercise only minimal restraint towards his actual MBs and MBWs. 
With them he may plan and execute hunting or fishing ventures, and enjoy relatively free 
social intercourse. A public sexual liaison with an iɲanar.uw or MBW would however be as 
seriously viewed as one with any FZ, or iɲaŋar.obm, and of course a man would have to 
respect the generational superordination of such ‘aunts’ and their husbands.  With them he 
would be expected to share generously his hunting successes, and their care in illness or 
old age would be of some concern to him. 
But equally, he observes the strictest avoidance of all with their daughter/s.  He refers to 
these as ednaŋar.obm ‘poison cousins’, and by them is called an ulaŋar.obm in return. 
Both in terminology and in social behaviour a relationship of maximal social tension and 
strain is defined.  A man may not see, speak to, or even hear his ednaŋar.obm.  But it is 
upon her that the greater part of the avoidance strategies devolve.  She in turn may neither 
see, speak to nor hear her ulaŋar.obm but — being female, and hence in Sharp’s terms, 
subordinate — she is normally responsible for the stratagem by which the avoidance is 
effected.  One of our Oykangand ‘daughters’ ran pell-mell into the house, hands clapped 
over her ears, to avoid the presence of her ulaŋar.obm — an old man whose sight and 
hearing were deteriorating. His prolonged visit to us to dandle our Leanne, his ‘grand 
daughter’, caused the woman in question considerable frustration and distress, and she 
swore at him roundly after he had gone. The woman’s responsibilities in the behaviour 
loosely termed ‘avoidance’ is also linguistically evident.  For example, a man’s iɲaŋar.uw 
will use Uw Ilbmban̯d ̯iy ‘avoidance vocabulary’ to effect a polite request, but despite her 
status in a superordinate generational level, there is no circumstance appropriate to a 
reciprocal use of Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy by him.  
A man’s behaviour to his actual MBD is therefore distinct from that towards an actual 
FZD. Only the latter are marriageable. In this respect the Oykangand appear to have 
reversed the pattern of the Wik-Mungkan (McConnel 1939–40) and Thaayor (Taylor 1984) 
in which the actual FZD is avoided, and the MBD is a potential spouse. 
The ‘change of generation’ rule 
The relationship defined above by reciprocal use of ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm further 
entails what Thomson termed an ‘artificial change of generation’ (1955:40).  In the case of 
his Ompela, Thomson describes the situation thus: 
Ngami, although her classificatory (as distinct from actual) sisters are cross cousins 
(and potential wives) to me, is said to be ‘like a mother’ and is transferred, from the 
standpoint of her own immediate relations only, to the mother’s (the first ascending) 
generation. This means that the children of ngami, instead of being ‘son’ and 
‘daughter’ to me, now become my ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ ... 
Thomson is in effect claiming that a rule operates, such that a female first ‘cousin’ 
(MBD or FZD) — Ompela ŋami — is assigned the status of ‘mother’, and her children 
become EGO’s ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’. She nevertheless marries a man EGO regards as a 
‘brother’. The marriage between a classificatory ‘brother’ and a ‘mother’ is normally 
intolerable, and resolution of the anomaly is sought in the recognition of a joking 
relationship between the two.  
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Oykangand society, on the other hand, circumvents such potential conflict by effecting 
a generation transformation over two levels, rather than the one as in Ompela.  The result 
of the rule’s application is best gauged by reference to Figure 5.9, where EGO is a woman 
in avoidance relation with her actual FZS. 
alaŋar.uw 
+1   Δ  ο Δ     =    ο Δ  =  ο 
      alaŋar. amaŋar ianar.uw ibaŋar  amaŋar 
obm 
 
  0  =   Δ   ulaŋar.obm  Δ  =   ο  EGO 
 
-1      Δ  ο  Δ  ο 
Figure 5.9:  An ‘Artificial change of generation’ in Oykangand 
The children of a ♀ EGO (right) address EGO’s ulaŋar.obm as ibaŋar.obm; 
EGO addresses the children of her ulaŋar.obm as alaŋar (MB) and amaŋar (M). 
Within EGO’s own generational level there are no linguistic or social consequences to 
the transformation. The consequences are noted only when the ulaŋar.obm and 
ednaŋar.obm respectively have progeny. The children of the female EGO in Figure 5.9 
recognise the avoidance relation between their mother and her FZS by referring to him as 
their ibaŋar.obm ‘poison father’. Socially there appear to be no constraints on this 
relationship; an ibaŋar.obm is treated no differently from any other classificatory ibaŋar. 
(The differentiation of the two is necessary to the perpetuation of avoidance and the 
generation of special reference terms, and in funerary practice, as will be seen later.) 
But an artificial change of generation can now be observed between EGO and her FZSS 
and FZSD.  These would normally be her ‘son’ and ‘daughter’ respectively — uwaŋar and 
andaŋar — but because of the avoidance relationship, they become in turn EGO’s alaŋar 
‘uncle’ and amaŋar ‘mother’.  That is, the rule effects the following specific categorial 
changes, given the conditions of Figure 5.9: 
FZSS => MB 
FZSD => M 
Because these effect a transformation ‘raising’ kin from EGO’s descending generation  
(-1) to her ascending generation (+1) there are no anomalies in the system to be corrected 
by the recognition of ‘joking relationships’ (as in Ompela) or other introduced social 
artifices. As suggested earlier, an apparent ‘error in perspective’ of 2 in the generational 
level of partners in a marriage union is tolerated, and raises no difficulties.  For example, a 
man may well find his classificatory daughter legally wed to a man to whom he extends the 
term alaŋar MB. Their children he regards as ‘cousins’, without ever extending to the 
classificatory daughter any term that recognises her membership in an ascending 
generation.  Rules of first cousin relationships introduce these apparent anomalies, as does 
the rule concerning a fourth generation level, discussed above. 
76     Chapter 5 
 
Avoidance ad infinitum 
Although avoidance between such an ednaŋar/ulaŋar pair is absolute, there is a sense in 
which this relationship functions as a marriage. Consider the situation schematised in 
Figure 5.10, which is adapted from relationships among recently living and contemporary 
members of Oykangand society.  
       ο    =    Δ  Z A  ο    =    Δ  Q 
  Δ   =   ο  C      <-------------> E  Δ  ο  G   =   Δ 
Δ   =   ο  K <--------------------------------------> J  Δ  ο   =   Δ 
ο  I     <--------------------------------------------------------------------->  Y   Δ 
(Avoidance is marked  <------------>) 
Figure 5.10:  The perpetuation of avoidance 
To follow this complicated kinship diagram, begin with the man, E. He stands in 
edaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm relation to his consanguineal MBD, C.  
Now consider the next generation. 
K, who is the daughter of C, refers to the man E as her ibaŋar.obm or ‘poison father’, 
but to his sister G she uses the term iaŋar.uw, FZ.  That is to say this relationship is 
defined just as though E and C were in fact married (which is emphatically not the case). In 
predictable consequence, C’s daughter K, and G’s son J are in ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm 
avoidance. 
In the next descending generation, the avoidance appears between K’s daughter I and 
J’s sister’s son Y. In this — or perhaps the next — generation, descendants may not be 
able to trace their genealogies back historically to the ‘original’ pair A and Z, who in effect 
generated the entire avoidance pattern described here.  But the pattern is perpetuated in the 
recognition of the (sub-)category ibaŋar.obm by the direct female descendants of Z. But it 
is the male members of the female line from A who are so affected. So that once an 
ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm avoidance pair appears, the avoidance is perpetuated through 
two matrilines.  It affects the female members of one matriline (Z’s) and the male members 
of the other (A’s).  It cannot continue through a patriline, because of the rule effecting the 
‘artificial change of generation’ described above. 
In Oykangand society, a person — male or female — enters into a relatively limited 
number of ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm relationships. The largest number of kin avoided by 
virtue of this relationship by any one person in my data is eight — the least number is two. 
Outside an ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm relationship, all ‘cross cousins’ of the opposite sex 
are — at least theoretically — marriageable. 
In summary, then, both social sanctions and terminology differentiate a man’s  
actual MBD from his actual FZD. Rules assign an actual MBD to a terminologically  
and socially distinct category, ednaŋar.obm. Classificatory MBD and FZD are otherwise 
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indistinguishable.  The mechanism by which avoidance is perpetuated is the recognition by 
that woman of iɲaŋar.uw and ibaŋar.obm sibling categories. The woman’s own mother 
would be in avoidance relationship with that ibaŋar.obm and the woman herself will avoid 
the son of an iaŋar.uw.  Linguistic terminology, and consequent linguistic behaviour, are 
once more entailed by the social realities of the kinship system. 
Adoption 
The social category with which a man can most easily relax, and enjoy the least 
restricted social privileges, is that of ‘brother’; a grandfather, FF, is treated only little 
differently. The ‘closer’ the ‘brother’, the more free and uninhibited the behaviour between 
them.  It is nevertheless a ‘brother’ who usually marries an ednaŋar.obm. This fact causes 
some distance to enter into the relationship between such ‘brothers’, and allows less social 
intercourse between them, as the brother’s wife — the ednaŋar.obm — must still be totally 
avoided.  Out of respect for the strain imposed on them both, the man might choose to have 
fewer dealings with that ‘brother’ who marries his ednaŋar.obm. 
An interesting case — one of several — where informal ‘adoption’ of a ‘brother’ into 
another’s family is cited as a factor in resolving a social problem (including that of 
ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm avoidance), illuminates its relevance to subsequent alliances. 
Examine Figure 5.11a, and consider the situation. 
The men C and H were already classificatory ‘brothers’ when H entered C’s hearth 
group to be adopted, or as the Oykangand translate edngan.amba-, ‘grown up’ by C’s 
father.  This established a very close bond between C and H throughout their lives.  Now C 
had a first cross cousin avoidance relationship with E — that is, they comprised an 
ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm pair. E’s first husband was P, by whom she bore several children 
(including the daughter, A).  P was C’s aiŋar.  But P died early, and E re-married H, from 
which union several more children were born. 
 
 
 
H  Δ   =   E  ο   =   Δ      P  Δ  C   =   ο  G 
 
 A  o   = D  Δ    =    o  N 
 
 =   Δ  B  ο  L  ο  O  Δ  M 
 
 =    W  Δ  ο  S 
 
 ο  Z 
C’s initial perspective. 
Figure 5.11a:  Adoption and the perpetuation of betrothals I 
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C’s family then negotiated a betrothal for him with A’s daughter, L. Now against  
this marriage contract stood the rule-governed assignment of C to the category of 
ibaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯ by A, following her mother’s recognition of a first cross cousin avoidance 
relationship with C.  This was set aside because the family argued that E was properly P’s 
wife, not H’s, and that the relationship established by H’s adoption into C’s family was of 
higher significance.  In other words, H’s claim on C as ‘brother’ was stronger than E’s 
claim on him as ‘husband’; she was to be reckoned primarily by C as P’s wife. The new 
situation is better represented by Figure 5.11b. 
As a result, we see that two factors were taken into account: firstly, the powerful bond 
between the ‘brothers’, and secondly, the force of ‘adoption’. These were enough to 
persuade E and her family to accept E’s re-assignment to the generation of C’s 
grandparents’, allowing A the role of iɲaŋar.agŋun̯d ̯, WM, and C’s access to L as uraŋar 
‘wife’.  It was noted by those explaining these events that C continued to behave towards E 
as he would properly treat an ednaŋar.obm, despite the betrothal contract established 
through her daughter, A. 
H  Δ   =   ο   =  Δ   P 
 E 
 A  ο  = 
=  Δ  B L  ο  (=)  C  Δ  =  ο  G 
=   Δ  W S  ο (=) D  Δ  =  ο  N 
Z  ο (=)  Δ  M  ο  O 
C’s new perspective. 
Figure 5.11b:  Adoption and the perpetuation of betrothals II 
Another relevant case of interest devolved around the keen desire of R and H to have 
their union accepted in the community (Figure 5.12). The man, R, was son of J by the 
woman P, but J as father took no part in the boy’s upbringing.  Instead, P established a 
liaison with B, which was itself illicit, but which was finally accepted in the community. B 
brought the child up, and so had the status of adoptive ‘father’ to him.  
J   Δ  =  ο  = =   Δ  E D  ο  =  Δ  L 
  P 
 R  Δ  B   Δ  ο  H 
Figure 5.12:  Adoption versus physiological paternity 
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But B was of the same generation as H, and very closely related to her. The trouble 
came from Hs parents, D and L, who argued, in effect, that the sociological paternity 
established by B over R through adoption was more significant than the physiological 
paternity of J, who nevertheless stood in the correct relationship to provide a husband  
for H. 
The union was opposed by them over almost a decade, while the couple continued to 
beget children and show a determined affection for one another. The confrontation abated 
first to a grudging acceptance on the part of D (her husband L having died), and finally to a 
grateful acceptance of their help and support in her old age.  
The point of this example is that D and L forcefully but ineffectually argued the 
ascendancy of the adoptive relationship between B and R, over the physiological paternity 
of J. In other words, the social reality established by adoption was both for them and  
many close kin more significant than the biological reality. The remaining Oykangand 
community however, were willing to set aside adoption only after the passage of 
considerable time. 
For this reason, some Oykangand are threatened by confrontation with what is clearly 
their genetic heritage, and retreat defensively to their social orientation, maintaining with 
some heat that the social father they recognise is also the respective genitor.  Establishing a 
genetically accurate genealogy of these clans therefore becomes a very delicate and 
complex matter. In practical and legal terms, since adoption is such a powerful social 
force, the reality established by a sociological genealogy is more appropriate to 
determining traditions of land tenure and use, while occasionally names or imputed 
conception sites reflect nevertheless a different paternity. 
There is the potential in this for considerable turmoil over Native Title matters. 
Betrothal ad infinitum 
Figure 5.11b also illuminates a parallel to Figure 5.10, where a socially defined 
relationship — the ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm pair — is perpetuated indefinitely. In the case 
of Figure 5.11b, however, it is betrothal that is perpetuated, and not avoidance, and the 
relevant parameters are patrilines, not matrilines. Consider the relevant participants: 
C never did, in fact, cohabit with L; instead, a marriage was consummated with G, and 
while L has so far remained childless, a son, D, was born to C and G. L’s brother B 
however fathered S, a daughter that found herself in automatic betrothal to D.  In the same 
way, S’s brother’s daughter, Z, would find herself betrothed to D’s son, M.  
As a consequence of these imputed betrothals, that never require ceremonial 
confirmation, other linguistic and social consequences follow: N addresses L as 
iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯, WM, and F extends the same term to S. 
A further comparison with Figure 5.11b is illuminating.  Figure 5.10 shows a mirror 
image of what happens there, where avoidance is perpetuated through two matrilines, 
affecting the male members of one, and the females of the other.  Here, betrothal can be 
traced directly through the male members of one patriline, and indirectly through the 
females of a second one.  
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‘Male wives’ and ‘female husbands’ 
The discussion on the perpetuation of avoidance in connection with both Figure 5.8 and 
Figure 5.10b above invites an interesting analysis; namely, that because avoidance 
responsibilities are transmitted as though an ednaŋar/ulaŋar pair were reckoned as married, 
such is indeed a fact.  Turning back to Figure 5.10, it is seen that the avoidance between K 
and J is explained if C and E are reckoned as married. K is thus J’s MBD.  The system 
works economically and simply on this assumption, but has an important defect: every 
evidence supports an ednaŋar being regarded as a man’s ‘husband’ even though she is a 
female.  And a male ulaŋar appears to be a woman’s ‘wife’.  These are the English terms 
that the Oykangand themselves use to explain these categories.  (These in turn invoke the 
anthropological literature on gender reversal which began perhaps with Radcliffe-Brown’s 
[1924] analysis of the role of the mother’s brother in Africa and in the Pacific, and which 
has exploded exponentially in recent years.  In the Radcliffe-Brown essay, the MB is seen 
as a ‘male mother’, the FZ as a ‘female father’.) 
Now it is possible to see how a ‘male wife’ or ‘female husband’ could be understood in 
Oykangand society from the relationships of Figure 5.13. 
  ♂ ♀ 
 ο  Δ  Δ =  ο  ο  Δ 
 E  Y  Q   P  G  K 
Figure 5.13:  Male wives and female husbands 
The man Q has married P, to whom he always referred to as uraŋar ‘wife’ by virtue of 
earlier betrothal.  As a consequence of that fact, P’s sister, G, receives the same term of 
address, and also regards him as oʀaŋar ‘husband’.  Now K is the brother of P and G — in 
the same lineage and generation, but male rather than female.  The man Q recognises this 
fact by calling K his ulaŋar or a ‘male wife’, while K reciprocates with oʀaŋar ‘husband’.  
The ‘female husband’ comes about in the same fashion. P and G both regard E as being 
a ‘husband’ — like Y and Q — though in fact E is biologically a female. They extend to 
her the term ednaŋar, or ‘female husband’. Reciprocally, P and G represent (actual or 
potential) ‘wives’ for E’s brothers Q and Y to bring into the lineage, so these are both 
uraŋar — ‘wife’ — to Q, Y and E alike.  
Men can therefore enter into socially distinct relationships with other men of the same 
generational level through a marriage, according to two categories: WB ulaŋar and ZH 
oʀaŋar.  The WB is the one regarded as a ‘male wife’, and in similar fashion a woman’s HZ 
is a ‘female husband’, ednaŋar, and her BW is a ‘wife’, an uraŋar.  Note that Figures 5.2a,b 
do not adequately characterise this distinction between BW and HZ. 
There is more to the matter than these somewhat quaint English translations of 
Oykangand terminology. Return for a moment to a consideration of Figure 5.13. The 
relationship between the women P and E is an ednaŋar/uraŋar one, and certain behaviour 
is appropriate to it.  In particular, it calls for public joking of an obscene nature on P’s part. 
The intriguing feature of the obscenity is that E is treated by P as though she were a male. 
The ednaŋar E, might have the following ascribed to her: 
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(1) od ̯ alγar ‘penis no good’ 
 od ̯ of aʀem/aŋkaʀ ‘penis greedy without/ache’ 3 
 alal amay inin ‘scrotum big yours’ 
 od ̯ ednb idnban ‘penis itch too.much’ 
 od ̯ alkan ulfinam ‘penis erect dead’ (i.e. flacid). 
It is inappropriate for E to reciprocate; if the jibes grow wearisome, E can terminate 
them by simply reminding P of ‘your brother’.  E only needs to say either akaŋar inin or 
olaŋar inin ‘younger/older brother yours’ or the name of K, and P must desist. The fact is 
of course that E would have married a man who is a classificatory or actual ‘brother’ to P, 
and who would be expected to keep an unruly ‘sister’ in place. Not only so, but if P 
married E’s actual brother, by way of a sister exchange, then E would be in a position to 
tease P in this same fashion.   
As a recompense for what appears to be a loss of entertainment, P may exact some 
small courtesy of E — frequently food or drink — prior to continuing to talk together less 
roisterously.  Oykangand advisers commented that in the above situation E must ‘pay’ for 
depriving P of her ‘fun’.  
There is a strong element of entertainment in these exchanges, and the obscene 
comments are the more effective and less inhibited before a large, appreciative audience. It 
would be overstating the case to claim that this verbal behaviour is mandatory — it is more 
correct to say it is permissible, and even expected, if leisure permits. But it must of 
necessity be public, rather than private, behaviour. 
Unilateral obscene joking is observable in this formalised fashion only between 
members who are biologically of the same sex.  The male analogue of the above is found 
in the ulaŋar/oʀaŋar relationship, where the same factors apply, even to reckoning the 
ulaŋar as female, and to the social device for ceasing the jibes. Acceptable remarks include 
the following; some are analogues of the set above: 
(2) idn of aʀem/aŋkaʀ  ‘vagina greedy without/ache’ 
 idn ednb idnban ‘vagina itch too.much’ 
 idn algaʀ ilg ‘vagina worm with (i.e., it itches)’ 
 idn ataγaʀ inin ‘vagina dry yours’ 
 idn ew afaʀ amay ‘vagina hole light (ID=labia?) big’. 
Outside the convention of joking, the obscenities of (1) above are of course more usually 
applied to persons who are biologically men, just as those of (2) refer to women, but 
obscenity and insult deserve separate treatment in the next chapter. 
The derivation of kin terms II 
Before leaving the matter of kin terms and categories, with their respective social and 
linguistic correlates of behaviour, the paradigm of kin terms needs to be rounded out, and 
the derivation of these further terms needs to be described.  
                                                                                                                                                    
3 The word aŋkaʀ here is the same as that incorporated into an alternative name for the language; see 
Chapter 2. 
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In the Prologue (Scenario One) is recorded some of my initial confusion over the term 
aɲiy ‘old man’. This, and its analogue onpoʀ ‘old woman’, is a polite term of both 
vocative address and reference for persons who are superordinate (in Sharp’s [1933–34] 
terms) to the speaker. The Prologue example is typical of vocative use; the second 
language example following Figure 5.4 shows referential use. Age is not the principal 
determinate of such usage; it is usually the hearer’s membership in a superordinate 
generational level. 
The term ugŋguw (that has already been encountered as a synonym of uw, lit. ‘speech’) 
has a converse in agŋun ̯d,̯ which has the force of obm when suffixed to appropriate kin 
terms.  So then iɲaŋar.obm and iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯ are equivalent terms, just as iɲaŋar.ugŋguw  
and iɲaŋar.uw are. Of these alternates, those with uw and obm, appear to be more 
colloquial. 
In earlier discussion the term uban.ar was introduced to cover that situation where 
reference was made to a third party who was married to one interlocutor, but which stood 
in an awkward relationship for such a marriage to be recognised by the other. These 
additional ‘adjustment’ terms complement a set of semantic extension of those categories 
found in Figures 5.2a and 5.2b, as distinct from ‘respect’ forms.  
Before considering these, it is interesting to note how the Oykangand themselves deal 
— lexically — with kinship as a discourse topic.  The verb stem iki-, usually ‘throw, void, 
eject’ is recruited to mean ‘address’; in assessing kinship ties or tracing descent, arki- 
‘follow’ is the correct term. The concept of ‘close’ kin is expressed by egŋg ulgulgal 
‘family close.REDUP’, while remoter kin are just that: egŋg odndoŋg ‘family distant’.  If 
you choose to observe the rules of descent and alliance strictly, and avoid making 
accommodations or adjustments that might make future alliances easier, then you have an 
ef eʀɲ ‘tongue hard’. One Oykangand described this as being ‘strong against your in-
laws’; the verb in̯d ̯al ambe- ‘agree (about an alliance, or kinship issues)’ could not then 
apply.  But perhaps you were not consulted over some adjustment or other; then you could 
exonerate yourself by saying abm ay argoγ ‘I don’t know/wasn’t consulted (about that 
matter).’  Or your response to a question of kinship might perhaps be abm egŋg oŋgol arin 
en ̯ il (lit. ‘person relation might which.way indeed s/he’) which translates rather freely as ‘I 
have no idea how s/he relates to people’. 
A development of the basic roots of the kin terms is found in ‘polite’ or ‘respect’ 
reference. Given a root such as eba ‘older sister’, the polite form is completed with the 
suffix -ʀɲar, hence ebaʀɲar.  The suffix -ʀɲar applies to most terms for EGO’s 
generation, and for the first descending generation; those for superordinate generations are 
suffixed with -nd.ar. For example, there is elaʀɲar ‘younger sister’ and uwaʀɲar 
‘sister’s son, daughter’; but note amand.ar ‘mother’ and iɲand.ar ‘father’s sister’. 
Exceptions are uʀɲar ‘wife’, iandar and aen(d)ar (not *ibandar) ‘father’ and oʀan.ar 
(not *oʀaʀɲar) ‘husband’.  
The paradigm consists of the following. 
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Table 5.1:  The respect forms of Uw Oykaŋand 
Reference term Kinship categories Respect term 
ebaŋar Z+ ebaʀɲar 
olaŋar B+ olaʀɲar 
akaŋar B- akaʀɲar 
elaŋar Z- elaʀɲar 
uwaŋar ♂S, ♀S uwaʀɲar 
andaŋar ♀D, ♂D andaʀɲar 
uraŋar W uʀɲar 
oʀaŋar H oʀan.ar 
amaŋar M, MZ amand.ar 
ibaŋar F, FB aen(d)ar 
iɲaŋar FZ, MBW iand.ar 
alaŋar MB, FZH aland.ar 
arŋg.abmalγ ♂SChild, ♀DChild abmalγ.ar 
arŋg.aƫalγ ♂DChild, ♀SChild aƫalγ.ar 
abmiŋar FF, MM abmind.ar 
aƫalγar FM, MF [not recorded] 
Usage can apply to both the hearer (or interlocutor) and a third party, and can be either 
referential or vocative; the propositus is typically EGO.  For example, in the oral text by 
Lawrence Dunbar about gathering the eggs laid by the pied goose from the swamps during 
the Wet season, he turns to me during the recording and speaks to me, using the term 
akaʀɲar ‘younger brother’ (see Appendix 2, Geese eggs: Version II).  In another text, his 
wife speaks to a close classificatory daughter, using the polite uwaʀɲ as a vocative: 
Awaʀ igu-n-aγ ay, uwaʀɲ, iand.ar alin ̯. 
eastward  go-E-PRP 1sg.nom daughter  father 1du(ex).nom 
‘I’m going up this way, girl, with my father.’ 
This example introduces the second paradigm of kin terms, with typically — but not 
exclusively — the propositus being EGO once more, except in the one case of uban.ar that 
was introduced earlier.  This term, as was seen earlier, has the force of ‘the licit spouse of 
one of us that is in inappropriate relationship to the other’.  But the other terms in this set, 
also evident from the use of aen.ar in that earlier discussion, depend on identity of the 
84     Chapter 5 
 
propositus with EGO.  Hence, in the above case, iand.ar reflects the speaker’s relationship 
with the referent, not her interlocutor’s.  Even though the three parties are ‘properly’ 
married ― that is, with no traceable irregularities in relationships between linking kin — 
the fact that there is an apparent discrepancy of two generations (after the ‘harmonic’ 
principle enunciated by Hale [1966] following Radcliffe-Brown [1930–31]) which requires 
the use of this set of ‘adjustment’ respect forms, and not the set described immediately 
above. In discussion of this point, one speaker berated me quite forcefully, giving in 
explanation: 
Egŋg!! ‘Alaŋar inin, uŋgud̯ igu-r il, ow!’ 
kin  uncle.MB 2sg.poss  there go-PD 3sg.nom 
Aŋaɲ erge-n̯! ‘Alaŋar in ̯d ̯ay il?’ Aŋaɲ!! 
NEG speak-PG   uncle.MB  where  3sg.nom NEG 
‘Abm aen.ar’ elbe-ŋan. ‘Aen.ar uŋgul igu-r il.’ 
 person uncle.MB  tell-IFUT  uncle.MB there  go-PD  3sg.nom 
Lulaŋ! ‘Aen.ar uŋgul igu-r il.' 
cousin!  uncle.MB there  go-PD 3sg.nom 
Aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ elbe-n ad ̯un! 
like.that speak-PRES  1sg.obj 
‘(He’s a) kinsman!!  Hey!  Don’t say “Your alaŋar’s gone there!!”  or  
”Where’s alaŋar ?”  No!!  Say “aen.ar !”  “Aen.ar’s gone there.”  
Cousin!  “Aen.ar’s gone there.”  Speak to me like that!’  
The point was that this speaker, as my ednaŋar, would address my MB as ‘father’. It was 
therefore inappropriate for me to ask her where my MB was by use of the neutral reference 
term, alaŋar; the term aen.ar was the correct one, because it ‘respected’ a difference in 
our perspectives on him.  
The following occurred quite naturally during enquiries on this subject: 
Iand.ar-ay uk uwa-l il ad ̯un. 
father-AG smoke  give-PD  3sg.nom  1sg.obj 
‘My father gave me a smoke.’ 
There are two phonological oddities attached to this set of terms: the first is that a d is 
optionally part of the stem, and usually in place if the .ar is missing, or has a suffix, as 
iand.ar-ay above. In addition, when a case postposition is added, the final .ar can be 
deleted. So, in Lawrence Dunbar’s reminiscences about his new gun, the form aland-aγ, 
MB-DAT (from aland MB) is found. The Agentive postposition for kin terms is normatively 
-an, and applies if the .ar is missing. 
Il aen.ar-an alka-r ad ̯un “Abm in ̯d ̯ay, ey?” 
3sg.nom  uncle.MB-AG  call-PD 1sg.obj   person  where.at  Q 
‘My uncle called out to me, “Where is he/it?”‘ 
The same truncation of .ar can apparently occur in the vocative, hence aland.ay! has 
also been recorded. 
It is admitted that the use of these ‘polite’ or ‘respect’ terms — as well as the following 
‘adjustment’ ones — was disappearing when the research into them had just begun, and the 
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experience of contemporary Oykangand is not immediate enough for their use to be 
recalled with consistency and accuracy beyond this point. It is possible that there was 
earlier specificity in the use of them that has been lost. A clue that this is in fact the case 
appears in my note concerning the polite term for a woman’s husband, oʀen.ar. The 
Oykangand speaker who was advising me at the time mentioned that a MM or FF should 
use the form oʀand.ar-ay.  I never heard this in use.  The paradigm is, if valid at all, clearly 
defective, since no Oykangand would accept, for example, *ednand.ar.  There are issues 
surrounding these terms that are unlikely now ever to be satisfactorily resolved. 
In the case of a person’s FF or MM there appear to be two acceptable forms: abmen.ar 
and abmind.ar.  No difference in usage could be elicited for these, except that — like the 
terms for ‘father’ — the second form of each pair was that which accepted the -ay suffix 
above.  There appears to be no other vocative form for these categories of kin. 
There are several other forms.  The conditions on their use, outlined above, also hold for 
these further terms.  
If I were to ask 
Ogen.ar in ̯d ̯ay il? 
M where  3sg.nom 
it would be interpreted as meaning ‘Where is (your/my) M/MB?’ The traditional lady 
giving her advice at this point commented on the latter case that “You can’t say ‘mamaŋ’; 
that’s agul (rude, lit. ‘wrong’).” Another informant thought that it must be an ‘older 
mother’ (i.e. superordinate to actual M) relation in that category to whom reference is 
made. This person would also be spoken of as amaŋ.kokaŋ. Traditional Oykangand 
translate this term as ‘big mother’. 
The reciprocal term is olom.ar. That is, it is used by the partner of a M or a MB to refer 
to a child of the latter.  So a man’s actual MB may be asked by his spouse 
Olom.ar  in ̯d ̯ay il? 
S/D  where  3sg.nom 
Normally olom.ar is not appropriate to the answer, only the neutral kin term uwaŋar. 
It was claimed that one term in this set, oyeʀ.ar, is only used by women — typically by 
the ednaŋar.obm when referring to her ulaŋar.obm in front of her children, and by them 
when speaking to her of him — for he is ibaŋar.agŋun̯d ̯ to them. The following ocurred in 
a natural context: 
*Motor.car  oyeʀ.ar-aŋ ewa-l ay it ̯od ̯. 
                                 -GEN  see-PD  1sg.nom  there 
‘I saw (your/my) poison cousin’s motor car there.’ 
The set of recorded terms in the corpus of data are 
uban.ar spouse; W or H 
aen.ar uncle; MB, FZH 
olom.ar woman’s child, man’s sister’s child:  andaŋar 
abmen.ar aunt; FZ, MBW 
aand.ar father ? F 
oyeʀ.ar ‘poison’ father, ibaŋar.obm 
ogen.ar mother, M 
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but this may not be complete; the paradigm was falling into rapid disuse when the research 
was undertaken. 
Once again, the final .ar can sometimes be deleted from these special forms, and in 
natural text, olom, oyeʀ, and uban have appeared; ogen has not been attested, but this may 
be an accidental omission, rather than a systematic restriction. 
Special kin terms for cases of bereavement will be dealt with in Chapter 7. 
Body parts and kin terms 
Prompted by some interesting work on gestural forms for kinship terms by Peter Sutton 
(seminar hand-out) for the Yir-Yoront (based on Sharp’s unpublished 1937 PhD thesis), 
and John Taylor’s interpretation of Thaayore gestures (pers. comm.), an attempt was made 
to enquire into Oykangand practice.  It was alleged by older Oykangand that those skilled 
in sign language could cause fits of laughter in onlookers by signing rude commentary on 
people and events, even when handcuffed for court proceedings and appearing to scratch 
themselves, look fearful, or seem dejected.  From this it would seem then that much more 
than mere kin terms could be effectively signed. The knowledge of this tradition of signing 
was said to have largely disappeared, and it has not been pursued. 
But the point being made by Sutton and Taylor is that for the groups they investigated, 
direct reference forms (the ‘neutral’ forms, above) are more specific than vocative forms, 
which are reduced further to a subset of bereaved forms, and reduced further again to 
gestural signs.  A more straightforward pattern holds in general terms for the verbal forms 
of Oykangand, given certain caveats.  For example, direct reference terms are in one-to-
one correspondence with vocatives, without any reduction in the inventory, as seen above 
in the sections on deriving kin terms.  Bereaved kin terms are dealt with in the next 
chapter, and again there appears to be no significant reduction in the inventory. 
The Oykangand recognise several body parts which represent kin. These however 
depend upon the context: dancing is different from sneezing, and signing is different again. 
This matter was not pursued exhaustively, but the elicited list includes shin (akal : B+, B-, 
Z+, Z-, SS, SD, FF), the biceps (ubmbal : F, FZ, S, D), the acromion process (at.elfal : FM, MF, 
ZSS, ZSD), the breast (afum : M, MB, ZS, ZD), the thigh (ubman : W, WB, H), and the scapula 
(egŋgal : MM, ZDS, ZDD).  In addition, one’s M and MB can be signed by okan ‘forehead’ 
or el.at̯ ‘eye lid’, a B+ by erbm ‘rib’, and one’s ulaŋar by the hip, erkaʀ.  The Oykangand 
system is not as tidy as those reported for its neighbours, but it does appear to have been 
more flexible and more contextualised. 
In addition, the Oykangand attach special significance to sneezing, and to nervous 
muscular reactions (id̯n ̯an.iɲi- lit. ‘body run’ or id̯n ̯an.ita̯ta̯- lit. ‘body biting’; both 
popularly translated ‘beef jumping’).  The kin associated with that body part are believed 
to be doing something of significance to the subject of the experience.  In the following 
example it is the muscles of the calf of the leg — those closest to the shin (akal) — that are 
affected, and the subject reacts with the utterance 
Odnd aŋg iɲi-n; oŋgol en ̯ aɲilg il, aɲiy! 
leg this run-PRES must perhaps  sick 3sg.nom o.man 
‘(My) leg is jumping; maybe that old man’s sick!’ 
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referring to an older brother (though akal has been replaced here by odnd). Such 
premonitions are attached to that person’s imminent arrival or doing something for the 
subject — making a promised spear or securing a desired end for him/her — as well as 
their possible sickness. 
These body parts, as well as those above, can be slapped in the presence of a kinsman of 
the appropriate category who suddenly sneezes.  Helping me with enquiry into this issue 
was an Oykangand woman who related to me as uraŋar, W. Just as she was explaining that 
it was like Anglo Australians saying ‘God bless you!’ when someone sneezed, I 
inadvertently did so. She slapped her thigh — appropriate to her status as uraŋar — and 
said emphatically with a laugh ‘Like that, now!’. 
If the speaker him/herself sneezes, it is believed to be because someone is speaking of 
him/her by name: 
Owa oγoŋ erne-l ay, oŋgol ukal an ̯=ul 
sneeze  indeed rise-PD  1sg.nom must.be  name  who?=AG 
en ̯ afa-n il ad ̯un. 
indeed  fetch-PRES 3sg.nom 1sg.obj 
‘If I sneeze, it’s because someone must be saying my name.’ 
Abm oŋgol elb-elbe-nm edn ad ̯un. 
person  must.be  REDUP-tell-PG  3pl.nom 1sg.obj 
‘Someone must be talking about me.’ 
It is said that the right side of the body — whether affected muscularly, or indicated by 
signing — reflects a closer relative than the left side.  
The relevant body part is held or touched by women more often than by men, 
particularly in dancing (to indicate relationship to the male dancer in the lead) or at 
mourning for a death (for the same reason). Variations have been remarked upon: one 
woman did not hold her breasts for the categories that would be appropriate (M, MB, ZS, 
ZD), but instead folds her arms under the breasts and lifts them slightly. It made a 
remarkable and attractive change in the profile of her slight figure.  Possible responses to 
these variations could be both positive or negative; the Oykangand woman (above) helping 
me with these enquiries warmly approved of the above with the (English) words, ‘I like 
that style’.  She admitted that others didn’t. 
Living with the system 
In arguing towards the resolution of a dispute over some kinship issue, the words ulgal 
‘close’ and odndoŋg ‘distant’ are often heard — the metaphor of geographical space being 
applied to kinship relations, as mentioned earlier.  Other terms are etelm, translated as ‘not 
too close’ or ‘little bit far away’ and elmon ‘quiet, tame’ to describe behaviour before 
certain kin, especially those to whom the word agŋun ̯d ̯ or obm might apply — although 
elmon is not a spatial term, but one applied to dogs or snakes which are not obmbay or 
‘aggressive, cheeky’.  
Distance is measured in the number of affinal relationships (or ‘linking kin’) that 
separate an individual and the second party referenced.  The algorithm for calculating this 
‘genealogical distance’ takes into account both actual and promised marriages, as the 
following will show: 
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Figure 5.15:  Close and distant kin 
Consider the social context of Figure 5.15 from the perspective of the man, N, relating 
to the boy, F. (This closely represents an actual Oykangand extended family.) Now F 
appears to be related to N as a MBWZSDS, on a generational level apparently two below his 
own, with the calculation effected through the persons D, C, G, H, L and P. So one would 
expect that N would refer to F as a ‘grandson’, a son’s son, arŋg.abmalγ. 
This does not happen, because the woman E — on the right of Figure 5.15 — had been 
promised to C in marriage.  Now although this union was never consummated (because C 
married G instead, and there was a vast age difference — in any case E found a partner 
elsewhere) the algorithm for reckoning kinship requires that this betrothal be treated as a 
marriage.  Therefore the most direct route for calculating the relationship between N and F 
is thus through this betrothal-union of C and E.  E is the boy’s aunt, his father’s sister, FZ. 
So C is F’s FZH, and N relates to F as his MBWBS — a much simpler route that makes F a 
younger brother or akaŋar of N. 
Where a relationship to another party can be established by alternative routes (and 
especially where no one such route is significantly more valid than any other) it is often 
possible to maintain that a route that offers a more favourable outcome — access to a wife, 
or wife for a kinsman — is to be preferred over those yielding less amenable results. 
Especially if there is an apparent or real ‘wrong head’ marriage in one of these calculus 
chains, the computation of a relationship can be distorted to the advantage of a persuasive 
individual. 
In an argument over such ‘routes’ by which relationships might be expressed, the 
accusation might be aired that egŋg odndoŋg ‘distant kin’ had been chosen rather than 
egŋg ulgulgal ‘close kin’ to arrive at a certain conclusion. Charges that the proponent 
doesn’t call anyone kinsman — the usual phrase is egŋg aʀ ubmbal-ubmbamaγ — or that 
his relations were ‘blunt’ or even non-existent — egŋg od ̯oŋ or egŋg aʀem — could then 
be expected.  He or she might then be likened to the dingo, the image of which is an animal 
without sexual conscience.  There is no doubt, however, that whether such accusations are 
brought or not, the strategy of ‘editing’ or manipulating the reckoning of linking kin was 
one of those manoeuvres by which a favoured outcome — typically a union — might be 
secured. 
In Figure 5.7 it was shown that sister exchange had taken place between two men who 
stood in an inappropriate relationship: that of father and son.  The diagram is re-presented 
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and extended now as Figure 5.7a in order to show some of the further problems to which 
this gave rise.  The siblings of S, we have noted, derived their social orientations from the 
mother, D, rather than their father, Z, making them categorially of the same generation as 
he was.  It was never revealed what these adjustments entailed. 
=   ο  ο   =   Δ 
 
 ο   =   Δ  B D  ο A  Δ 
 
 L  ο  Δ  Z 
 
   
E  ο    <-------------------------->   Δ  S 
 
 ο  M 
Figure 5.7a:  The case of illicit sister exchange; extended 
On the other hand, the daughter of E spoke freely of her family involvement. Her 
mother, the woman E, had called D ‘aunt’, FZ, and because she was iɲaŋar.uw, D’s son, S, 
was in avoidance relationship with E according to the pattern of perpetuation of avoidance 
discussed in connection with Figure 5.10.  From the perspective of E, D had married not an 
appropriate ‘uncle’ — an alaŋar — but a grandfather, an aiŋar, since he, Z, was in this 
case regarded as a generation above, rather than below, his wife, D.  D sought to normalise 
this illict relationship by having E now call her abmiŋar, the appropriate partner of a 
legitimate aiŋar, according to Figure 5.2a.  This adjustment was acceptable enough to E’s 
family, but there was still the problem of her son, S.  Despite this agreement, E maintained 
her ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm avoidance relationship with S, and consequently her 
daughter M retained a relationship of ibaŋar.obm towards S. The outcome then was that 
the adjustments effected by D were really only temporary, being overtaken by a more 
significant social observation in the ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm avoidance relationship.  E 
and M chose to take a stance of ef eʀɲ — adherence to the strict protocols of descent; they 
could have conveniently taken a softer option, and dispensed with the implications of the 
ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm relationship, but did not.  
A system of adjustments 
In Chapter 3 I cited Fox’s (1967:247) assertion that ‘a “Kariera” type of terminology 
can occur in the absence of bands, clans, sections, etc., as long as a rule of “cross-cousin 
marriage” or “sister exchange” is ideally followed [italics mine – BAS].’ It should by now 
be obvious that the Oykangand have a Kariera-like system of kinship that is now without 
moieties or sections, and yet ‘cross cousin marriage’ is certainly not ‘ideally followed.’ 
Quite the reverse.  The Oykangand would not then appear to meet Fox’s criterion for a true 
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Kariera system. The ‘adjustment’ terms, such as uban.ar, aen.ar, oyeʀ.ar and olom.ar 
were necessary only because the system was not ‘ideally followed’ with respect to 
marriage partners. The very function of these terms then was to effect conventionalised 
verbal adjustment for situations where protocols demanded that the kinship relations of 
neither the speaker nor the hearer should be compromised, yet that both parties should 
observe deference to the other. 
The secure paradigm of adjustment terms has been tabulated earlier.  Another of these 
terms — as discussed at the beginning of this chapter — is understood only sketchily. It 
was mentioned that one of these terms, ubman.aƫalγar, could not be applied to anyone 
known to have taken part in the events of the narrative (a hunting story) and that there was 
an opacity about its use.  The corpus contains just one reported dialogue which shows the 
usage: 
  =   oJ 
⎢ 
/ 
⎢ 
 ΔR 
⎢ 
⁄ 
⎢ 
 οP 
Figure 5.16:  The category of ubman.aƫalγar ‘grandson’ 
The woman J is close classificatory mother of R; R, in turn, is ibaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯ ‘poison 
father’, to P, a granddaughter of J.  J asks of R: 
Uk ad ̯en ayin? 
tobacco  1sg.poss Q  
‘Have you any smokes for me?’ 
but R replies 
Aŋaɲ oŋgol en ̯ ubman.aƫalγar afa-nm. 
NEG    perhaps  indeed  granddaughter fetch-PG  
‘No. Maybe your granddaughter has some.’ 
If R were not ibaŋar.agŋun̯d ̯to P, the correct term would have been arŋg.ar. It is clear 
that the system of adjustment terms was once more precisely understood and consistently 
used than was the case when this research was carried out. 
I have called this sub-system — including ubman.aƫalγar, above — one of ‘adjustment’ 
terms, for want of a better term. It is maintained simply because of the frequency with 
which it was called upon to manage the intricacies of relationships that developed, and had 
to be maintained and recognised, in Oykangand society.  It was defective in the sense that 
not all ‘neutral’ kin terms required an ‘adjustment’ analogue: ‘older brother’ and ‘wife’ for 
example. But to demonstrate that there was need for such a sub-system, Figure 5.17 
illustrates the frequency with which alliances failed to meet Fox’s criteria.  This diagram 
represents living, or only recently deceased, members of Oykangand society at the time of 
our first contact in the early 1960s. It resulted from my research attempts to resolve my 
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confusion over why I addressed my regular language adviser by the term ‘daughter’, but 
her husband by the term ‘cousin’. Their marriage was regarded as entirely regular, 
however.  What I found is summarised in this Figure. 
The man C, on level 5 at the left of the chart, had a sister D.  The man A, who became 
D’s first husband (she had three) had been called ‘father’ by C, and this called for the first 
adjustment; C used the term uban.ar to deal with it. The children of D were never 
addressed as his siblings however; he followed his sister in calling them andaŋar and 
uwaŋar.  
The man S had a close classificatory brother, F, who with his wife E had strong Ogh 
Undjan connections.  They, like him, are found on level 6 of the diagram. 
This eldest son of D — S — married a woman who was of A’s generation: properly a 
‘grandmother’.  This woman, M, was addressed by the immediate family as if she had been 
S’s cross cousin; she was admitted to the immediate family on level 6 without 
terminological adjustment because of her earlier kinship category. 
The father of this woman, M — the man T — was regarded within the family as the WF 
of S, but this of course meant some adjustments for A, the father of S. 
From the perspective of S, at level 5 of the diagram, the sister of L, namely B, was 
recognised as his WMZ.  When the woman B married J, their son, H, was S’s oʀaŋar, or 
cross cousin.  Now H’s mother, B, wanted him to marry back into an Ogh Undjan family, 
and so she argued for K, the daughter of F and E, to be recognised as a legitimate wife for 
H.  This meant that her husband, J, instead of being a grandfather to K, was recognised as a 
MB, who could give her a husband. 
 Level 
 L   ο B  ο  =  Δ  J 1 
  = H  Δ  = 2 
 T   Δ   =  3 
  Δ  A  ο  M 4 
Δ  C D  ο  =  ο  “B” 5 
 S  Δ  = F  Δ  =  ο  E 6 
  ο  K 7 
Figure 5.17:  A system of adjustments 
On the other hand, T had himself married a grandmother, L an Ogh Undjan woman, 
who had a sister B.  As anticipated, both L and B had powerful Ogh Undjan connections. 
In S’s family, L was simply recruited as his WM, and the immediate family otherwise 
ignored the matter.  
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So K was regarded by S as a daughter because of the immediacy of his relationship with 
F as a brother.  But K’s husband, H, was a cousin, son of his WMZ.  S did not make the 
adjustment demanded of E and F by B.  Rather, B’s connection to S remained that of a 
sister to his WM, the woman L, and hence — as B’s son — H was a cousin who had 
married a daughter, K. 
Prior to marriage with H, the woman K had called his father, J, ‘father’ also. 
So that at every turn in this complex family there would have been kinsmen — 
including the peripheral ones not all represented directly here — faced with adjustments of 
one sort or another.  But for every adjustment that is agreed upon and accepted within the 
close family, a near kinsman has the option of accepting the settlement, or refusing it. If 
s/he refuses it, takes a stance of ef erɲ, chooses to disregard the new arrangements, and 
proceeds with an alliance independently, then even more adjustments may be called for. 
Take, for example, the case described by Figure 5.18, where adoption failed to take 
precedence (although this family is not centrally Oykangand, informed opinion was that 
the same rules would have applied).  The man P was adopted into the family of R, and they 
related as brothers.  The exact antecedents of P are not known; it appears that he was left 
orphaned.  Both P and R had daughters, namely A and B.  These would have related as 
sisters, being parallel cousins.  Each of these then had a child: B had a daughter, N, A a 
son, T.  This couple then married, despite a great outcry that they were brother and sister, 
because of the adoption of P into R’s family.  Whatever the reality of P’s lineage, society 
had accepted the adoption because A and B were recognised as sisters.  Because of N and 
T’s intransigent stance on their union, it was finally accepted, but not without some 
uncomfortable adjustments. 
P  Δ  Δ  R 
A  ο  ο  B 
T  Δ =  ο  N 
Figure 5.18:  The manipulated failure of the adoption principle 
The kinship system is therefore anything but a fixed game plan, which is rigorously 
followed, but a very flexible map on which the classification of a complex set of entities 
can be manipulated to personal advantage, depending on adroit social skills, historical 
accidents, personal prestige and determination.  To accommodate the inevitable confusion, 
the Oykangand have introduced, and maintained until the entire scheme began to collapse, 
a ‘triangular’ sub-system of terms that allowed both speaker and hearer to preserve their 
dignity and integrity in coping with the frequent distortions of the ideal Kariera system in 
their society. 
Kunjen kinship is therefore not an inviolable social grid, immutably fixed at birth, but is 
a malleable, flexible game plan capable of yielding personal rewards to the bold or socially 
adroit operator. Community acceptance of challenges to its norms — usually based on 
earlier, irregular relationships — depends on the strength of the family concerned, the 
personal charisma and persuasiveness of the individual, and the obligations that can be 
called on to secure accord with his/her wishes.  
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Where a family recognises that one of its members has been the father of a love-child 
that is nevertheless claimed by another family with rights or claims over the mother, 
reference to it may be made by the first group as arŋg abmir ‘child stole’. Such ‘stolen 
children’ (distinct from the political category of a ‘stolen generation’) can be issues around 
which contention, dispute and subsequent further manipulation of social realities occur. 
In more modern times, a woman may use her pregnancy to claim that a man, favoured 
for a husband, was the father — whether this is true or not — in order to summon 
community pressure for the man to marry her or keep her. Probably the same stratagem 
was employed in earlier times too, though cases are not available for enquiry. 
The term egŋg, which was met in the opening paragraph of this chapter, and was 
translated there as ‘families’ more precisely means ‘close kinsmen, patriline’ and is 
doubtless derived from an earlier word *ƫaŋka.  Reflexes of this form appear in compounds 
and idioms, such as abm ew egŋg ‘a person who is always smiling’ and egŋg.aʀe- ‘laugh’. 
The phrase egŋg agul is used in opprobrium of those who insist on marriage or sexual 
relationships that are unconvincing in their social acceptability within the system. 
Generally however egŋg carries with it the connotation of support, intimacy, comfort, and 
social ease, if not actual happiness.  Your egŋg determine your initial status, your identity, 
your language, your social standing, and your claims to desirable marriage partners.  
Summary 
In this chapter, the focus of attention has been on how one’s kinship — egŋg — is 
sustained despite social changes, and how these changes in turn impact on appropriate 
language use. 
This chapter is therefore pivotal to the argument that kinship determines linguistic 
behaviour, and is therefore revealed by it.  Chapter 5 not only explores how the facts of 
descent and alliance, as they develop and change within Oykangand society, determine 
behaviour — and especially linguistic behaviour — but provides the kinship framework for 
the following chapters.  While kinship diagrams such as Figures 5.2a and 5.2b represent an 
ordering of the principal categories of the Oykangand system, these models are better 
regarded as conceptual tools for mapping that society, than as maps per se. Behavioural 
norms apply to kinsmen placed into each of the named categories, as moderated by how 
close or distant a given kinsman is reckoned to be. 
But the system is not static, and it is open to manipulation and exploitation by those 
enterprising and adroit enough to negotiate personal rewards or advantage from it. Such 
successes in turn require that others adjust kinship categories and linguistic behaviour 
accordingly. Any model for dealing with the linguistic behaviour of such a society must 
therefore reflect this dynamic.   
Three unusual features of Cape York Peninsular kinship have been exposed in this 
exploration of Oykangand: 
The first two appear to be logically connected; perhaps the third is also: The first is the 
marriage of a man with an actual FZD. An actual MBD is on the other hand the most 
absolutely avoided of all kinsmen in the Oykangand social domain — and this is the 
second of those features.  This reversal of the normative pattern of alliance general to Cape 
York Peninsula is entirely inexplicable, but is unambiguously attested by the genealogical 
and linguistic data. Equally unusual is the avoidance expressed towards a cross cousin 
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being more stringent a social prohibition even than that towards a man’s mother-in-law. 
Somehow, these two characteristics of Oykangand kinship must be seen as artefacts of the 
one structural difference that has introduced them, but just exactly what that mechanism is, 
remains unclear. 
The third unexpected feature of the system is the underlying matriliny inherent in the 
perpetuation of avoidance. Again, perhaps this is a function of the same structural 
aberration as is responsible for FZD marriage and ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm avoidance. 
The principle of matriliny re-emerges when the behaviour at death is examined, and the 
abm efaʀ are identified in Chapter 6, but again, this may be only a manifestation of the 
same structural features as has determined those other unique characteristics. 
Approaching these social problems from the perspective of language use has however 
exposed those patterns for further analysis and debate. 
95 
6 Kinship and language II: 
Disrespect, respect and the  
Obm curse 
  
Apparent disrespect:  obscene joking 
Having introduced the subject of obscene joking in the previous chapter as an aspect of 
certain kinship governed verbal behaviour, it can now be more completely placed in an 
Oykangand perspective: it represents an apparently conventionalised linguistic disrespect 
or familiarity towards the target kinsman, as distinct from the respect or avoidance required 
in interaction with other kin.  Generally the obscene remarks refer to physical features, and 
directly or indirectly to sexual proclivities.  Kin pairs of the same sex, involving a woman 
with her ednaŋar, or a man with his ulaŋar, or a grandparent (abmiŋar, aiŋar) with 
grandchild (arŋg.abmalγ, arŋg.aƫalγ), generate behaviour which includes joking, pranks, 
obscenities, and snatching at the genitals or pubic hair. Some members of Oykangand 
society rarely (if ever) indulge in such behaviour, or perhaps only do so with a select one 
or two of a much larger number of kin in the approved relationships. It is very much a 
personal matter, and the appropriateness of the circumstances have a large part in 
prompting an exchange.  Leisure time is most frequently the venue for this behaviour, and 
the lull between rounds of dancing, or in more modern times at the canteen or cinema, 
affords good opportunities, with an appreciative audience ready to encourage with 
attention or laughter. 
Between certain personalities in the appropriate kin categories there can evolve a 
tradition of obscenity which gathers something of a reputation. Both men and women 
advisers volunteered names of pairs of jokers who could be relied upon to ‘make you dead 
laugh’. One of these male kin pairs recorded eight and a half minutes of conversation, 
interesting for two unexpected linguistic features.  The first was that when neither could 
keep a straight face any longer, they each would break into laughter, then nod to one 
another simultaneously saying 
[ a::yíˀ ] 
before beginning the next round of outrageous obscenity.  This is the most highly ritualised 
linguistic exchange encountered in Oykangand, depending as it does on phonological 
features extra-systematic to the language. 
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The second unusual feature of the discourse was its subject matter. There are consistent 
references to sexual exhibitionism, impotence, change of sex, physical oddities of 
genitalia, masturbation, sexual excitation by unusual means and — most surprising of all 
— reference to persons now deceased who had reputations for sexual performance. A brief 
extract from the conversation, comprising two ‘rounds’ of joking — a linguistic 
conglomerate of two vernaculars (Oykangand [OYK], with its ‘respect’ vocabulary [UI], 
Kok Kaber [KBR]) and English — illustrates the point: 
C: Abm inaŋ in ̯d ̯od ̯ ade-l? 
 person 2sg.nom where  arrived-PD 
 OYK 
B: La yiparɲant igu-nm ay. 
 there south.side-EL go-PG 1sg.nom 
 KBR OYK 
C: Abm aneγ igu-nm inaŋ? 
 person what.for? go-PG  2sg.nom 
 OYK 
B: Amban.ant agŋga-nm 
 vagina seek-PG 
 UI OYK 
C: Oyber agŋga-n igu-nm inaŋ! 
 love.potion seek-PRES  go-PG 2sg.nom 
 OYK 
B: Ya!  ‘Fiddler’! 
B&C: a::yíˀ 
[several seconds relaxed silence as C puffed on his pipe; then ...] 
C: Pa ke kale-y pat ̯ kambaʀiy it ̯om ibaʀ. ak udn. 
person NEG go-IMP place no.good that south  let lie 
KBR OYK 
B:  Pa yukar kala-wiɲ ŋan ̯d ̯uw! 
person  merely go-PG 1sg.nom 
KBR 
C: ŋan ̯d ̯ir ŋokona-wi! od ̯.ef.iyan.erbe-n̯ ur ambiy 
IDIOM=masturbate-PG IDIOM=masturbate-PG 2pl.nom PRE 
           KBR OYK 
B: An̯uŋ il? 
whose 3sg.nom 
OYK 
C:  Malcolm — Abmbad ̯aŋan? od ̯.eƫ.almbuyaŋg! 
 IDIOM=what.name? IDIOM=what a great prick 
OYK 
B & C: a::yíˀ 
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Translation: 
C:  ‘Where have you been?’ 
B:  ‘I went down the south side [of the river] there.’ 
C:  ‘What [on earth] for?’ 
B:  ‘I was looking for sex.’ 
C:  ‘Looking for a love potion, more likely!*’ 
B:  ‘[You’re a ] dirty old man!’ 
B & C: a::yíˀ 
 *[C is suggesting that B couldn’t find a lover on his own merits without the 
aid of artificial means of attraction.] 
[break] 
C:  ‘Don’t go there!  That place down south is no good!  Leave off!’ 
B:  ‘I was just going about!’ 
C:  ‘Masturbating!  You lot were masturbating!’ 
B:  ‘Who’s that (with)?’ 
C:  ‘What’s his name?  Malcolm!**  What a great prick!’ 
B & C: a::yíˀ 
 **[Malcolm is B’s deceased FB+; C cannot instantly recall Malcolm’s ‘bush 
name’, but even use of the English name of the dead would normally be 
offensive. The suggestion here is that B had retreated to his clan estate, and 
that B had met there with Malcolm to masturbate. C is maintaining his earlier 
assertion that B couldn’t find a female sexual partner.] 
There is a pattern in these exchanges, evident in the entire discourse, which is also 
general to the above sample. To some extent, the younger man, B, acts as a ‘fall-guy’ or 
‘straight man’ to the older man, C, who takes the initiative more often in opening a new 
round of joking, gives commands, asks questions, and makes accusations. The younger 
man attempts to embarrass the older one by feigning ignorance or maintaining a moral 
rectitude in the face of these outrageous claims. The contrast is not a marked one, nor is it 
obtrusive, but it is general, and probably reflects the superordinate status of the older man, 
even in what is assumed to be an egalitarian activity. 
As with the unilateral obscenities expressed towards a same-sex sibling of one’s own 
spouse, seen in the last chapter, bilateral joking depends upon an audience — it is a public, 
never a private, event. But while the audience may include a sibling, a parent, an 
offspring’s spouse, or an offspring of the opposite sex, they should not become intrusive or 
conspicuous to the participants.  Obscene joking would bring ‘shame’ on such relatives say 
the Oykangand. There would be no such difficulty with same-sex analogues of these 
kinsmen, though upon some — a DH or a MB, for example — there is a prohibition against 
joining in, or against laughing at the performance. 
My linguistic adviser at the time — a woman of considerable intelligence who assisted 
me to transcribe the conversation — was only mildly amused by the above exchanges 
between C and B.  She let it be known that in her opinion women could do much better 
than these attempts, and implied that a topic not broached by men — homosexual 
encounter — was not beyond them. Opportunities to record such discussions were pursued 
without success, but two women — including her — later did agree to record a 
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conversation of comparable hilarity and obscene reference. It is of quite a different order, 
being largely personal reminiscences over amatory adventures, spiced by occasional 
personal remarks over their own or their partners’ sexual appetites or performance. That 
text is reproduced in Appendix 2.  Women’s obscenities parallel to the men’s style were 
said to lack any formula such as the men’s [a::yíˀ], and the observed material gives no 
evidence of such a convention. On the other hand, snatching at the genitals, and obscene 
remarks — even rather more personal ones — were part of the behaviour observed 
between women. 
Facility at verbal repartee such as is exemplified by phrases in the earlier chapter and in 
the example above is admired and respected in the community, and some speakers gain the 
status of local celebrities for their performances. 
Between kin who are relatively ‘remote’ — i.e. egŋg.odndoŋg ‘families distant’, and 
who are therefore unable to trace any direct consanguineal ties — and who do not stand in 
a relationship requiring respect or avoidance, a close friendship may develop around 
obscene joking.  Instances brought to my attention include an old man and a much younger 
man who were classificatory brothers, two sisters each with a woman less than twelve 
years older whom they referred to as ednaŋar ‘cousin (FZD)’, and an exceptional instance 
of two half-sisters together. All but the latter were not ‘close’ kinsmen, and all kin were 
‘harmonic’ in Hale’s sense. The loss of a joking ‘mate’ of this sort by death or marriage 
and subsequent removal elsewhere is regarded as a very serious one, and speakers will 
volunteer their grief and loneliness at such an event:  
Abm ay abm al ̯uγ aʀem ay ugŋal. 
person 1sg.nom person  mate  without  1sg.nom now 
‘As for me, I’ve got no mate now.’ 
Obscene joking and verbal abuse 
The Oykangand are able to employ some phrases in both jocular and abusive contexts, 
but other expressions belong clearly in either one context or the other. Part of their 
knowledge of the language is that of categorising correctly each possible expression. 
Thomson (1955) makes the observation that for Ompela, also, usage of such phrases is 
governed by similar considerations.  The Oykangand might, for example, say of a man   
od ̯ armbil amay ilg 
penis tumescent(?) big with 
as either an insult centred on his sexual appetite or as a compliment to his sexual prowess. 
The apparent ambiguity would be resolved by intonation, social setting, the kin relation 
obtaining between the speakers, and so on.  On the other hand, the phrase 
alal onmon idnban 
scrotum eggs too.much 
(ID = testicles) 
is only a joke — and would be spoken in joking contexts — while the slightly distinct 
alal afaγar idnban 
scrotum fine.pieces too.much 
is a serious insult, and would be restricted to occasions of interpersonal tension.  
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Women are the subject of similar expressions; compare the ambivalent phrase above 
with 
idn armbil amay ilg 
Vagina tumescent(?) big with 
and with the joking 
idn ew.afaʀ amay 
vagina  orifice  big 
or the innocuous sally of 
idn alγal aʀ.egŋgelegŋgemaγ 
vagina  love IDIOM=never.satisfied 
with the insulting 
idn ow.eʀƫ 
vagina  matter/pus. 
While sexual proclivities are the commonest topic for insult, physical oddities — real or 
imputed — also comprise a fair proportion of offensive remarks.  Just a few, such as 
adn.ew.afar albman ilg 
ID = anus hair with 
can be jocular as well, but most are abusive: 
afum ebmborŋ ‘breast long’ 
adn erk.ew elŋgon ‘excrement hole stink’ 
adn amay ‘excrement big’ 
odnd olbmban ‘legs thin’. 
Where sexual irresponsibility is the issue causing the abusive outburst, not only are the 
above insults appropriate, but new possibilities are available to the aggrieved. These 
include insults framed around failure to respect kinship obligations or sanctions: 
egŋg aʀem ‘family/relations without’ 
egŋg od ̯oŋ ‘family/relations dumb’ 
egg aʀ ubmbalubmbamaγ ‘not call anyone kinsman’. 
The claimed breach of social norms — ignoring kinship-imposed obligations — is a 
popular one when a sexual offence is alleged to have been committed. While the above 
insults depend on egŋg ‘kinsman, relation’, or more abstractly ‘family, relationship’, others 
(as below) comprise the claimed abuse of a specific kin (a), likeness to an animal (b), or 
the term agulγ ‘wrong (especially of real breaches of kinship)’ as in (c). Animals are 
appropriate here because these are perceived as ignoring the constraints of kinship. Pet 
dogs are often taken into the kinship system on a fictive basis, and great amusement can 
result from the sight of dogs who are in the ‘wrong relationship’ publicly mating. The 
dingo is regarded as particularly irresponsible. 
(a) idn amaŋar ayin eɲan ‘vagina mother Q copulate?’ 
 idn olaŋaraγ ayin uw ‘vagina to o.brother Q give?’ 
[Note that these are in the form of rhetorical questions.] 
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(b) aʀ ud alγaʀ inaŋ ‘like dingo you’ 
 ud ayin eɲan? ‘dog Q copulate?’ (‘do you copulate like a dog?’) 
(other appropriate animals: horse, bullock, in̯ amaʀ  ‘brown snake’). 
(c) eg.agulγ ‘wrong head’ 
 idn agulγ abuʀ ‘vagina wrong obsessed’. 
Two other ideas are popular:  confusion, as expressed by tangling or twisting (‘just like 
worms together’ volunteered one native speaker) and identification with the ugly and 
lascivious frog of Oykangand mythology, which is much more than the mere animal 
references of (b) above. 
od ̯alγa1γ ilg ‘penis worm with’ 
abm an ̯t̯alwan ̯t ̯anam in1aŋ ‘person tangle-tangled you’ 
ow onpeʀiy ergaɲergan ̯ inaŋ 
[this is apparently an idiom meaning ‘too twisted to follow your own nose’] 
t ̯arawal inaŋ ‘frog (sp.) you’   
[Oykangand mythology depicts the frog as irresponsible in its sexual 
demands; hence also:] 
owoʀoŋgol inaŋ ‘tadpole you’ 
olwoγ at ̯an ambanam ‘head tie caused’  
[apparently another idiom; glossed as ‘cross-head’] 
Another idea, expressed by the last phrase, and also by eg agulγ above, is that of the 
head being wrong or distorted. 
Even where the alleged offence does not involve a sexual misdemeanor, it is still 
appropriate to pass abusive comment on a person’s supposed impotence or deviant sexual 
behaviour: 
idn udngudng ‘vagina raw-raw’  
[This idiom means ‘promiscuous woman’; see Thomson (1955:476) for a 
similar Koko Ya’o term.] 
od ̯ednb idnban-aŋ ‘penis itch big-POSS’  
[male equivalent of the above:   ‘promiscuous man’] 
arŋg aŋal-γ uŋki-n od̯n ̯d ̯ 
[of a woman; lit. ‘child shade-for bears only’] ‘bears children only to have 
them die’  
idn/od̯ of aŋkar ‘vagina/penis’ + [IDIOM; aŋkar means ‘pain, ache’. The 
sense is ‘sex without pleasure.’] 
A person who swears unnecessarily is regarded as crude, and receives the approbrium 
algŋ abuʀ (lit. ‘teeth unsated, obsessed with teeth’; idiomatically rendered ‘swearing 
mad’). The use of obscenities and insults — as was suggested in the previous chapter — 
requires sensitivity and finesse; there is an etiquette to be observed in their use, since both 
joking and abuse serve important social functions.  
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Traditionally a grievance was not aired immediately on discovery, and one recourse 
open to the offended party was to have women persuaded by the cause to draw the 
attention of the camp to an alleged injustice by ritual abuse.  The din raised by just half-a-
dozen women hurling imprecatory abuse and throwing dust into the air at daybreak or just 
after, served — along with yelling children and barking dogs — to awake the camp and 
alert it to the alleged misdemeanour. Since redress was effected as much by the pressure of 
camp opinion generated by such disturbances as by anything else, and because ritual 
obscenity was necessary to the function of kinship, the use of obscenities had to be nicely 
governed. Only a bully or loud-mouth, abm.et ̯alerɲeŋand, could afford to ignore these 
linguistic niceties, and even then might alienate too many of his/her kinsmen to oppose 
antagonists successfully in personal combat. Insults appear to be nicely graded to goad and 
infuriate, without necessarily inciting to blows unless it is believed a strong position can be 
held.  If one is determined on a fight, abuse of the name/s of the dead can effect the desired 
result promptly — but death and the dead deserve separate consideration in the next 
chapter. 
The function of swearing in jural redress 
The Oykangand differentiate verbal abuse for which there is inadequate social 
justification (the verb is oʀɲe-) from goading, taunting and insulting (aybmoγ.amba-) 
and argument (elbe-, also meaning ‘tell’, but used with reciprocal erbe- to mean ‘argue, 
nag’). There is also a verb aiya- ‘stir up’, translated by native speakers as ‘force’ in social 
contexts, but meaning more precisely ‘to socially obligate by requests to take a course of 
action (frequently taking part in a fight) against the hearer’s personal inclination or better 
judgment’. There are certain confrontations into which even close kin cannot be forced to 
‘take the part’ of a protagonist, although as a rule a person does not fight his own battles 
but allows close kin to represent him. 
No kin intervened in the following case:  Two women were seen to begin a terrible fight 
over a man in which resounding round-arm-punches landed after barely one exchange of 
insults. The fight progressed through the village without either combatant successfully 
calling kin to her support, while each took a severe beating from the other. By the time 
they had reached the other end of the village, they were both in a dreadful state and in need 
of medical treatment, having suffered terrible punishment from each other. As a quarrel 
between competing lovers, no one was wanting to interfere. 
A better recorded incident, and one which illustrates advantageously the jural process, 
involved the man R who returned from a year’s contract of employment on a cattle station 
to find his wife E pregnant (popularly believed to be) by his close classificatory brother, H. 
His unfaithful wife welcomed him back, and they appeared to settle down amicably 
together with his well-endowed bank book. Various versions were offered as accounts of 
why the couple fell out, but all agreed that, within three days, E had decided to return to 
her lover, and they argued (elben erbe-). Confrontation between R and H was inevitable, 
and it took the form of a ‘fight’, which was beautifully timed and placed to capture the 
attention of 120–150 people en route to the cinema one evening. The confrontation was 
more theatre than pugilism, and it was more intended to resolve the issue by eliciting 
public support for one or other of the contenders than it was to exact retribution and 
revenge, or defend a status quo. 
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Movie-goers who were irritated to be delayed by the confrontation — but too fearful of 
personal injury to push past it — swore (oʀɲe-) at the participants impartially. Others, 
living closer to the situation, relaxed and laughed or joked — no doubt relieved that a 
potentially disruptive issue was being resolved in an acceptable fashion. The pair of 
combatants insulted (aybmoγ amba-) each other, danced about each other with fists raised, 
struck wildly at the air, rushed in and retreated, all without one solid blow landing on the 
opponent!  The combatants were finally broken up by the local police. During it, H’s 
brother C leaned on a fence enjoying the spectacle and proclaiming to all who would listen 
that his brother had seduced another man’s wife and he, C, could not be ‘forced’ (aiya-) 
to take H’s part (oyelm uw ed ̯n ̯d ̯a-n amba-). 
It was in the interests of neither participant to effect any serious physical damage on the 
other in the onslaught. The confrontation was aimed at generating favourable public 
opinion and at gauging how positive support was for each of the antagonists. (More 
traditional confrontations have also been witnessed, with spears being rattled or fighting 
sticks raising dust as a protagonist shouted some claim or issued some insult and thumped 
the ground.  The aim of these displays was no different — to canvass public support.)  Had 
injury been caused, especially a blood-letting, the above issue would have ended 
otherwise.  If R had seriously hurt H, then C and his other brother P would have abandoned 
their spectator roles, if not to break up the fight then — and more probably — to join in. 
Because R had the general support of E’s brothers — who disapproved of her infidelity — 
the fight would have quickly escalated.  Not only so but E’s reaction to H’s injury might 
have been to denounce R as cruel and vicious, and her brothers as unreasonable intruders 
into her affairs of the heart. Recompense for physical injury could be claimed by H, whose 
wounds would then be interpreted as securing permanent rights to E. (See extensive 
discussion in Hiatt [1965 Chapters 5 and 6] for similar practices in Arnhem Land.)  On the 
other hand, H could not wound R too badly for fear of precipitating a similar general 
fracas, which could take weeks to resolve if supporting kinsmen were wounded or paired 
off with antagonists, too.  H would also risk the loss of E’s affection, realising the tenuous 
nature of his relationship with her, the opposition of her brothers, and the attraction of her 
husband, who was more personable, had legal claim to her, and was able to support her in 
considerably better style.  After some week’s separation from both R and H, E returned to 
live with R — not a surprising outcome, as R had always been loving and careful of E, 
while H had a reputation of tiring quickly of his lovers and then of physically abusing 
them. 
This incident contrasts with another, in which the husband relinquished rights to his 
promiscuous wife and there were several clans aligned against the runaway lovers on their 
return. Described in part of a narrative text of more traditional life, it shows that a 
consensus on jural decisions could be reached by entire clans. Fighting sticks had been 
soaked in preparation for the encounter, to render them heavier and less likely to break, 
and yamsticks had been sharpened too.  The man was given a shield and yamstick to fend 
off the attacks of women intent on piercing the arch of the foot or thigh, or prising away a 
kneecap. The woman submitted to sexual (ab)use by as many men as were so inclined, 
until barely able to walk. Both elopers had apparently so offended society with their blatant 
promiscuity that kinship factors weighed against them by uniting whole families in 
retribution. 
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Joking and avoidance 
Before leaving the subject of obscenity, I return to joking and avoidance in order to 
consider A.R. Radcliffe-Brown’s observations on joking relationships.  During the 1940s 
he contributed articles to the pages of Africa (reproduced in his monograph) in which the 
following claims were put forward: 
Joking relationships ... 
appear where society was regulated by kinship, which imposed 
reciprocal rights and duties (1952:101); 
combine elements of friendliness and antagonism (1952:91); 
develop between members of society related by marriage, or 
separated by two levels of generation (1952:91, 96); 
are frequently associated with an artificial change of 
generation (1952:99) and appear as an ‘alternative’ to 
relationships of extreme respect or avoidance (1952:92–93) 
especially within a man’s wife’s family. 
These generalisations appear to be essentially correct for the Oykangand, and even the 
possible non-reciprocal nature of some joking relationships mentioned by Ratcliffe-Brown 
takes place between ulaŋar/oʀaŋar or ednaŋar/uraŋar pairs. 
In both avoidance relationships and joking relationships appear conflicting elements: of 
‘attachment’ versus ‘social conjunction’, of ‘social disjunction’ versus ‘separation’, and of 
‘friendliness’ versus ‘antagonism’ — to use Radcliffe-Brown’s terms (1952:91). Between 
a man and his WM or WB, for example, exists not only a common interest in the wife, her 
children and their activities, her health, etc., but a conflict of interest in her time, 
affections, energies, economic productivity, etc. In the instance of the WM, the man 
observes avoidance; in that of the WB he enters publicly into a joking relationship, but 
privately observes respect. (Haviland [1979b] remarks on the same tensions among the 
Guugu Yimidhirr.)  Among the Oykangand, I have noted that only members of the same 
biological sex enter into joking relationships; with members of the opposite sex there is 
avoidance.  The two behavioural norms must be seen as analogical opposites. 
Now the kin pair who contributed the dialogue (2.3) to the earlier exposition of joking 
relationships treated one another as males — there was no attribution of female genitalia to 
one by the other. In fact, jokes about changing sex, i.e. becoming a woman by eating 
mussel shells that have the appearance of female pudenda, are dependent on the 
recognition that both participants are males. In the instance cited, the pair stand in the 
relationship grandson/grandfather (FF/SS) and the question arises as to why the joking 
relationship should exist in such instances. Again Radcliffe-Brown (1952:96) offers a 
plausible answer: the two can be in competition for the same women as wives, and he 
documents instances from African cultures where the grandson teases the grandfather over 
sexual access to the latter’s wife.  But Figures 5.2a and 5.2b (in Chapter 5) can in no way 
accommodate competition between EGO and his FF for the same wife, and the Oykangand 
would deny that anyone is correctly married to his grandmother or granddaughter. The 
illicit, ‘wrong head’ (eg agulγ) marriages are few in number and are known by every adult 
in the village. All involve either marriage across only one generational level, or with a 
sibling within the same level. None cross two generational levels. This could mean that 
either these never occur, or alternatively, that those which occur have been rationalised. I 
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tend to the view that they are rationalised, and there is some evidence of that claim, but the 
evidence is not clear — it rests in part on the use of the term uban.ar, as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  A personal anecdote may illuminate the matter: 
I was working in Coen with Coleman River Ulgulu speakers whose dialect is rather like 
Oykangand. The best speaker of the language that I could locate was a very attractive 
woman in her late thirties, who was blessed with a quick mind and ready imagination, as 
well as clear diction. My pleasure at the rapid language progress being made was 
interpreted by one of the older women nearby as a more personal appreciation, and she 
made some improper suggestion at which other onlookers giggled and tittered. Knowing 
the woman concerned had been classified as my grandmother aiŋar (FM) I said ‘Oh!  
uban.ar, ey?’ whereupon I was corrected very sharply with ‘No!  You’re grandson for her, 
not grandfather, boy!’  In other words, a marriage relationship between persons in such 
categories would be illicit, but had I been grandfather to her it would be acceptable. This 
however does not quite accord with Oykangand belief, where one woman said ‘grandson is 
like a husband’, and two marriages came to light between a man and his granddaughter.  
It is probably the case that rationalisation of marriages across two generations has meant 
that these unions are not readily traceable in Oykangand society. 
Practical jokes 
In Oykangand society, joking may extend beyond the verbal, and may include practical 
jokes, such as the following incident, reported just after I collected the data (above) from C 
and B.  The community had several light trucks, and tractors with trailers, used to conduct 
community business during the week, and available for hunting trips at weekends or out-
of-hours. B was working on the ‘maintenance’ crew, driving a small, ride-on lawnmower.  
As C’s grandson he approached the older man with the proposition that he could get 
access to a vehicle and that they should get away hunting for a few hours in the afternoon 
after work.  When the siren sounded at the end of the day, C was waiting with his spears 
and battered shotgun ready, when up drove B — on his ride-on lawnmower! Realising he’d 
been fooled, C joined the general laughter at his rude surprise.  
There was genuine affection between C and B; they would joke briefly just passing each 
other on the street, and from time to time B would send food to C.  While informants could 
not tell me specific instances of practical joking in more traditional times it is unlikely to 
have been introduced with the internal combustion engine, and I would prefer to regard it 
as part of the traditional life of the Oykangand. Thomson (1935:477) documents his 
involvement in a similar incident, suggesting that to embarrass an FF was an acceptable 
feature of such joking relationships. 
While other pairs of kin may indulge in obscene joking, this behaviour is more expected 
of kin related by immediate marriage — as a man’s WB or woman’s HZ — and of 
grandfather/grandson or grandmother/granddaughter pairs. 
The forms of avoidance:  social 
The impression conveyed in much of the literature on avoidance is that only certain kin 
are under constraints on social and sexual interaction, verbal exchange, etc. such that these 
constraints are immutable features of life. (Harris [1970:783] makes the same comment — 
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for a further example see Dixon [1970].)  In the above discussion it has been necessary to 
contrast this behaviour with organised obscenity, in suggesting that the two are in fact 
functional opposites, being sexually and structurally determined.  It has been shown that 
obscenity is accepted in verbal exchanges between certain pairs of friends of the same sex, 
is not reciprocal in the case of an ulaŋar and his oʀaŋar or ednaŋar and her uraŋar, and is 
least restrained in the reciprocal exchanges between a grandparent and a same-sex 
grandchild. Just as there may be said to exist a cline or gradation in these instances of 
obscene joking, so the Oykangand observe shades of difference in avoidance or respect, 
again, according to kinship category.  
For example, the avoidance between ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm kin pairs is normally 
total:  there is no circumstance appropriate to social contact of any sort between them until 
both are grey-headed and old, when a special little ceremony is held at which they weep 
together ‘for joy’ and begin to speak and meet freely. There is still a prohibition on their 
touching, or of overtly viewing the genitals of the other.  One old lady remarked, about two 
brothers who had been her ulaŋar.obm: 
Abm elmon alin ̯, abm alin ̯ erg-erge-n̯ erb 
person  quiet  1du(in).nom  person  1du(in).nom 2x-speak-E  RECIP-PRES 
ugŋal, lulaŋ ad ̯en ul. An uw erg alin ̯, 
now cousin 1sg.poss 3dl.nom  OK  again speak-PRES 1du(in).nom 
lulaŋ. ay erg “uraŋar” ay? aŋaɲ! abm ay 
cousin 1sg.nom speak  husband 1sg.nom NEG  person 1sg.nom 
uw.ilbmban ̯d ̯iy erg. 
[respect vocabulary] speak-PRES 
‘We talk quietly now, when we speak to each other ... my two cousins and I.  
It’s OK to talk now, but I don’t say “husband” to them — oh, no, I use the 
respect talk.’1 
Between these behavioural extremes of obscene joking on the one hand, and total 
avoidance on the other, are instances of social situation, kinship obligation, etc. which 
require less extreme observances. Kinship considerations may prohibit social contact, 
physical contact, verbal exchange outside the special vocabulary of avoidance, viewing of 
genitals, or laughter at others’ joking, or alternatively they may require the gift of food, 
sanction unilateral joking, and so on. An instance from this range of expected behaviour 
was the unacceptable form of my reference to our daughter’s wetting her diaper, recorded 
in the Prologue.  In another case, Lawrence uses the respect form elaʀɲar to speak of our 
close sister, Elizabeth (see Appendix 2: Geese eggs: Version II). 
Appropriate behaviour is therefore a complex matter, governed by reciprocal kinship, 
social demands, economic requirements and — to an extent again — by personal whim. 
Which course of action is taken depends on well-understood rules. Once more, the rules 
may be broken in order to offend, humiliate or gain personal advantage. For example, a 
fight developed over a man whose wife stepped in when he tried to beat her younger sister 
for ‘laziness’ (but possibly really for sexual rejection; she was an attractive girl). The 
                                                                                                                                                    
1  Here is direct evidence that the assertion made in Chapter 5 over the structural parallelism between the 
‘poison cousin’ (ednaŋar.obm) and the wife (uraŋar); the Oykangand themselves appear to recognise 
this. 
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combatants arraigned themselves on behalf of either the man or his wife, and very soon 
some fifty people had become actively involved. Insults were exchanged, along with a 
spear or two, fighting sticks were swung, and heads were cracked.  
In this situation the niceties of avoidance were abandoned, and kin upon whom one or 
other form of avoidance or obscene joking is normally enjoined found themselves trading 
harsh words, jostling one another or in some instances actually striking at one another. On 
the other hand a man and his own WM found themselves side by side in the melee together, 
without embarrassment, while another classificatory WM of the man shouted pointed abuse 
at them both from just a few yards’ distance. In a more ‘normal’ social situation the man 
would almost totally avoid both women, being permitted conversation with them only by 
use of the avoidance vocabulary when no alternative avenue of communication — such as 
an intermediary (perhaps his wife) — was available.  But the personal interest of the man 
in defending his own WB outweighed the observance of ‘normal’ rules. 
In general camp life the Oykangand conform to the social norms of kin behaviour 
described for various Peninsular groups by Thomson (1972). To summarise briefly, this 
means familiarity and ease with same-sex siblings and same-sex members of one’s own, 
and the second ascending and second descending generations, but some reserve towards 
the opposite sex analogues of these.  Reserve and respect marks relations of the opposite 
sex in the first ascending and first descending generations, with a special avoidance of 
those to whom a spouse may be given or from whom such might be received.  Members of 
these generational levels of the same sex are less stringently avoided, but respect and 
restraint is observed. A wife’s sisters are equally marriageable, and behaviour towards 
these is relaxed and easy, but there is ambivalence towards her siblings of the opposite sex 
who could be both defenders of ego’s spouse in disputes, and yet amicable and helpful in 
joint pursuits, such as hunting or fishing.  Verbal conduct parallels social behaviour. 
Regulation of interpersonal distance is the simplest form of avoidance. Rules of 
proxemics between a man and his ednaŋar.obm or iɲaŋar.agun ̯d ̯ are normally such that the 
two should never be close enough to recognise each other.  When a woman in one of these 
categories camps with his family, a man studiously ignores her, turns his back on her, and 
carries on as if she did not exist.  On hunting exploits she turns aside from her course if it 
will bring her face to face with a member of one of these categories.  The woman, as was 
suggested earlier, appears to be more responsible for the strategy of avoidance of social 
contact than the man. 
An interesting aspect of respect not dealt with extensively by Thomson concerns views 
of genitalia by kin.  In late childhood girls wore an an ̯t̯ or pubic skirt, until such time as 
pubic hair (elmoʀ.albman) covered the labia from view.  In both sexes the elmoʀ.albman 
was regarded as adequate to most demands for modesty, as in general gatherings the adults 
were segregated quite strictly according to sex.  Women however usually took care to tuck 
one heel into the crotch to cover exposed genital areas when seated.  There appears to be 
no further requirement of modesty imposed upon members of the same sex, but a man was 
expected to discretely look aside from the exposed private parts of his FZ, Z, D, and of 
course never be close enough to observe his ednaŋar.obm.  Women observed the same 
prohibition in the case of analogous kin: MB, B, S and ulaŋar.obm. Public occurrence of 
physical contact between adults appears to have followed the same rules. Failure to 
observe these rules usually signalled an improper sexual advance.  This could be repulsed 
by use of the word omoŋ, as 
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Abm omoŋ ay inun! 
person  close.kin 1sg.nom 2sg.obj 
‘I am close kin to you!’ 
where it serves to remind the hearer of kinship proprieties, particularly towards a man’s 
mother or brother’s daughter. As Berndt and Berndt (1976:3–15) found, not all such 
advances are repulsed, and temporary illicit ‘sweetheart’ unions between even some of the 
most prohibited of kin pairs were mentioned to me or observed personally. 
Another, lesser form of respect behaviour was imposed on the close kin of any two 
Oykangand people who were indulging in public joking of an obscene nature. In the case 
of two men, such as an oʀaŋar joking with his ulaŋar, certain close kin could not join in 
the general laughter at the exchanges. These included the actual F, S and M of the ulaŋar 
and the obm or agŋun ̯d ̯ kin of either.  Informants could not agree on the extent of negative 
sanctions on laughter when grandparent/grandchild joking was the point of reference; the 
prohibition appears to extend to those same categories.  One speaker told of the additional 
hilarity shared by onlookers as one of these kinsmen (who should not laugh) tried to keep a 
straight face, and became more and more agitated, finally swearing at the pranksters and 
walking off in a huff.  Joking between Oykangand women generates analogous patterns of 
prohibition on open laughter.  To laugh in these circumstances would be regarded as coarse 
or crude, and insulting to one’s own blood kin. 
The forms of avoidance:  linguistic 
The most overt social artefact of avoidance or respect is of course the so-called ‘mother-
in-law language’, Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy.  I have objected to the term ‘mother-in-law language’ 
before (Sommer 1976:233), and regard it as an appalling misnomer in reference to the 
Oykangand for four compelling reasons: 
Firstly, it is not a complete language, with a separate phonology, syntax and 
morphology, but is a simple matter of vocabulary replacement for certain common stems. 
The stems replaced are typically only the more frequently employed nouns and verbs, 
including kin terms and the referents for concepts most likely to occur in camp contexts. In 
this it conforms to a common strategy for marking ‘honour’ or ‘respect’ the world over.  
These vocabulary replacements can occur in structures with terms that are not replaced. 
Secondly, although Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy is often used before a man’s WM, there are social 
events in which it is not used (as in the fight described above).  Conversely, there are other 
kin between whom its use is entirely proper.  I documented earlier (Sommer 1969:44–48) 
the use of the respect vocabulary by a woman to a man who was about the same age, in 
asking that he refrain from dumping his garden refuse on the track to our pig-pens. 
Although of the same approximate age, the man was her arŋg.abmalγ (DS; note this 
correction).  The sentence used was 
Unun abon-iy aʀ uw elfanda-l! 
grass  road-on  NEG  again  throw-IMP 
while the Uw Oykaand equivalent would be 
Ukan awin ̯=d ̯ aʀ uw iki-l! 
grass  road-on  NEG  again  throw-IMP 
108     Chapter 6 
 
Note that constituent order is unchanged, and that morphologically only awin > awin ̯d ̯ 
differs from the Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy locative in -iy. This is simply due to the exceptional 
lexical nature of awin in requiring awin ̯d ̯ as a Locative; the postposition -iy is the 
unmarked locative for all Uw Oykaŋand nominals ending in a consonant. 
Thirdly, there are social situations where the choice of a lexical item proper to the 
occasion is governed by respect or politeness, but without the wholesale replacement of 
lexicon seen in Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy above.  Take for example the verbs meaning ‘die’: 
ulfi-  this is the regular term ‘die’ applied to animals, fish and humans alike 
arme-  lit. ‘finish up’, used in various phrases, often with el ‘eye’ 
awin uw elke-  lit. ‘path again return’ (implying return to the owner’s spirit centre) 
abm orγe-  lit. ‘person lost’ 
al ̯ on̯toγoʀ ambe-  lit. ‘fire ashes become’ 
ugŋal udna-  lit. ‘now lie.down’ 
erk ambe-  lit. ‘ground become’; used only of one long dead 
ukuw albman aʀti-  lit. ‘tree roots coming up’; also used only of one long dead 
ukuw in ̯t ̯ur aʀti-  lit. ‘grass coming up’ again only of one long dead 
in ̯adnde-  lit. ‘animals answer’ used only of one long dead 
iγ ambe-  lit. ‘leaves become’ once more used only of one long dead 
aʀƫar ambe-  lit. ‘morning become’ [very polite] 
ampalγe-  this is the ‘proper’ Uw Ibmban ̯d ̯iy form 
A phrase, abm anen ugŋal igun lit. ‘the person now going’ also means simply a recently 
deceased person, who is, in Oykangand belief, going back to his/her home country. 
These data suggest that Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy is therefore simply the name given to the most 
complete set of vocabulary replacements at the extreme end of a cline of such 
replacements, linguistically reflecting in turn a continuum of increasing social politeness or 
respect. The fact that sentences can be constructed using both respect and profane 
vocabulary in juxtaposition suggests that Oykangand speakers exercise a nice discretion 
over the degree of politeness or respect that a situation demands, and that they respond 
appropriately. 
Finally, it is much more the speech of women than it is of men; ‘mothers’-in-laws’ 
language’ might be a less inaccurate term.  The use of Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy is of course proper 
to polite use between a man and certain female kin: his own D, M, or WM and to his male 
kin: ulaŋar.  But respect vocabulary is required of women much more frequently. A man’s 
D, M or WM would properly reply in Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy, but his ulaŋar would not. In addition, 
his ednaŋar.uw may use the respect forms, but he would never speak to her that way.  
When asked about the contrasting sentences above, the speaker explained that despite the 
enthusiastic gardener being her grandson — and hence technically subordinate to her — 
Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy was appropriately ‘good manners to him’... 
... abm arkan in ̯d ̯ay il, abm ay abeʀ! 
    person male because 3sg.nom person 1sg.nom female 
‘... because he’s a man and I’m a woman!’ 
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Now before his WM, a man must always use the respect vocabulary (even when he 
speaks, to her dog or yamstick, as he ought), but before a D or M or Z he can use Uw 
Oykaŋand unless 
• he is making a polite request, or 
• he is referring to them, especially with respect to body parts or functions. 
in which cases it is mandatory.  The second of the Prologue anecdotes depends on this 
restriction. I referred to my daughter’s urine with the regular word in the hearing of my 
sister — one of the worst of possible linguistic sins because both were entitled to 
adneʀeŋand rather than ebmoŋ. 
These rules are expanded for a woman to require — in certain circumstances — her 
polite adoption of Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy to almost all male kin except her husband.  The proper 
utilisation of the respect vocabulary is again a variable, formally representable as a cline or 
gradient that takes into account social situation — especially topic of conversation — and 
kinship obligations. 
The two gradients of behaviour — obscene joking and respect vocabulary — meet in a 
man’s ulaŋar, his WB.  In public, he may treat his ulaŋar as a woman, and as has been 
shown in the previous chapter, entertains society with outrageous remarks on his WB’s 
imagined female genitalia, sexual prowess, etc. in order — Thomson (1935) claims — to 
allay any doubts of social disharmony or dysphoria. The social status of an ulaŋar as a 
‘male wife’ focuses again on the anomaly of social versus biological sex.  In this instance 
it is social gender rather than biological sex which determines the behaviour.  
On the other hand, in private or polite contexts the same man adopts Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy to 
his ulaŋar as a form of respect behaviour. Haviland (1979a, 1979b) reports the same 
phenomenon among the Guugu Yimidhir. The rules of verbal interaction between a man 
and his ulaŋar must therefore be sensitive to social context in order for appropriate verbal 
behaviour to be generated. By social context is meant the place and company in which they 
meet, the purpose of their gathering, the referential content of communication, etc. This 
situation yields very elegantly to an analysis in terms of frames, the contrasting linguistic 
behaviour correlating with social environment, despite the identity of speaker and 
interlocutor. 
Elements of the respect vocabulary are also found in the obscene jokes passed between 
a grandson and his grandfather.  Its function in this context is not considered to comprise a 
part of its gradient of use in society as an index of avoidance, but rather it is a linguistic 
device, and is appropriate to this usage. There is after all an artificiality in the obscene 
joking of the Oykangand, dependent as it is on relatively limited topics.  We noted that to 
broaden the scope of possible linguistic forms in this restricted domain the participants in 
the recorded obscene joking turned from Oykangand to English and Kok Kaber.  They also 
turned to the relevant avoidance or respect vocabularies Kok Kuɲƫaman ̯t ̯ (KK) and Uw 
Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy (UI), but only for vocabulary relevant to the restricted domain of sex.  
Consider the following. 
Amban.ant agŋga-nm 
vagina seek-PG 
UI  OYK 
‘(You) were scrounging for pussy!’  
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[This example is B’s second utterance from the first ‘round’ of obscene 
joking cited in the first section of this chapter, now glossed more 
appropriately.] 
Manaɲ ŋoŋkor pupaliymaŋk! 
KK  KBR 
penis too swell up(?) 
‘(Your) cock will swell up!’ 
albmul?!? it ̯om urɲal-γ! 
OYK  UI 
mussel.sp. that woman-PRP 
‘Mussel shells?!?  They’re for the birds!’ 
As I have attempted to suggest by the translations, the apparent inappropriateness of the 
respect vocabulary to obscene joking imparts to the latter a biting edge, a colloquial force 
lacked by the ‘standard’ forms, as well as offering some relief from lexical monotony. 
Garde (1996) suggests that the introduction of items from the respect vocabulary into 
Gunwinjgu obscene jokes emphasises irony, and serves to make the obscenities more 
shocking.  Some similar process is obviously involved here. 
The respect vocabulary 
As previously noted (Sommer 1969:44–45) morpheme structure constraints on Uw 
Oykaŋand stems pertain equally to Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy.  Not all stems are replaced; of the 94 
nominal and verbal cues that appear in O’Grady’s 100-item lexicostatistical list (Sommer 
1969:61) informants could recall appropriate Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy forms for all but eleven. Of 
these eleven, three nouns elicited the regular Uw Oykaŋand form followed by ukar. For 
forgetful minds and for concepts/items for which no replacement form was available this 
appears to be the accepted strategy.  Postposing ukar to any Uw Oykaŋand noun phrase 
transforms it into acceptable respect behaviour. The geographically contiguous Kok Kabeʀ 
appear to have made more extensive use of the same device. Kok Kabeʀ is complemented 
by a much more restricted avoidance vocabulary, and the transformation inserting yok.waƫ 
appears to be a sentence phenomenon rather than simply a nominal one. 
There is no doubt that borrowings account for some Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy forms, or rather — 
and more conservatively — that there is cognation between them and the ‘standard’ 
dialects of the Oykangand’s neighbours. It is not always clear, given similarities of 
phonology and morpheme structure constraints, whether the cognation is to be explained in 
terms of profaning a ‘respect’ term or solemnising a ‘standard’ stem.  The Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy 
of the Oykangand shares a number of forms with other Central Paman languages (Sommer 
1969), as below.  (The lexical cues are limited to those in the O’Grady 100-item test list.) 
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Table 6.1:  The source of some respect forms 
Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy Source word  Language  Meaning 
adnduʀɲ anduɲ Olgol ‘tooth' 
in ̯un in ̯d ̯un Olgol   ‘tongue 
ow ilam oγ ilam Aŋkula ‘blood’ 
uway uwaya Olgol  ‘old man’ 
armbil armbil Olem  ‘sun’ 
en ̯d ̯uy en ̯d ̯ay (several)  ‘star’ 
aŋgarin ̯d ̯ aŋgan ̯ Aŋkula ‘up’ 
omeƫ omel  or 
omiŋ 
Olgol 
Kawarangg 
‘tail’ 
oaγ oag Aŋkula ‘one’ 
arbuʀ arbuʀ Olgol  ‘ground’ 
As with Harris’ Gunwinggu, there is also a productive use of the morphology and 
commoner stems in deriving respect forms. For example, the verb amba- (imperative 
amba-l, present amba-n) ‘cause’ is a very frequent Uw Oykaŋand root. It gives rise to 
several Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy forms: 
ak + amba- ‘hit’ 
on + amba- ‘cut’ 
ampal + γe- ‘fall’ (the p suggests borrowing) 
amban + ant ‘vagina’ (but ant ‘offspring’). 
The Proto Paman stem *yuku, reflected in Uw Oykaŋand uku ‘tree’, appears in several 
forms; Kok Kabeʀ speakers make use of a reflex in yok.waƫ. 
uk.arfin ‘hand’ (arfi- ‘to hold’) 
uk.odnd ‘penis’ (odnd ‘calf, shin’) 
There are at least two other linguistic devices which might be appropriately subsumed 
under the rubric of ‘respect’. The first is oŋ, a typically pre-verbal particle, briefly 
mentioned elsewhere (Sommer 1972b:100; 1976:230–231).  Only very old Uw Oykaŋand 
speakers made use of oŋ, and the constraints on it are somewhat obscure. The least 
ambiguous instances of oŋ are found in the speech of an ‘older brother’, long deceased. In 
recalling for the tape recorder his activities during a hunting expedition on which we were 
separated for some hours, he made reference both to my immediate (putative) sister, and to 
his own wife — my ednaŋar.obm — each time inserting the particle oŋ as a mark of 
respect (see Appendix 2, Geese eggs: Version II).  It appears regularly before unsubstituted 
verbs in the Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy register of the language, and its appearance in standard Uw 
Oykaŋand may be interpreted as a move towards the profaning of a respect form. The 
following is typical: 
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Algam ed ̯n̯ ̯d ̯elaγ oŋ el.arme-l 
person.UI altogether UI  died-PD 
‘(Those) people have completely died out.’ 
The second linguistic device is circumlocution. These are not Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy forms, 
strictly speaking, but are preferred to the ‘standard’ forms of Uw Oykaŋand in mixed 
company or slightly difficult social contexts. The domains covered are body parts, 
physiological functions and death. Alternatives to od ̯ ‘penis’ for example would be the 
following; none could consequently be regarded as obscene. 
uk amay/at ̯at ̯ ‘stick big/great’ 
in ̯aƫimb  ‘black wengo lizard’ 
aun  ‘tail’ 
alk  ‘spear’ 
Another phrase, uk.odnd, noted above, appears to have originated as a euphemism, and to 
have been eventually incorporated into the respect vocabulary in competition with ambeɲ. 
If it is inappropriate to pronounce the profane term when the respect form should be 
used, it is equally inappropriate to use the respect form where the regular word would 
serve.  Later in this chapter a woman who stood in the category of wife — marriageable 
cousin — to me used the respect form amban.ant in lieu of idn ‘vagina’. This constituted a 
social lapse important enough for her to insert a quick apology. 
In the respect register of the neighbouring dialect, Oγ Uɲan — its avoidance 
vocabulary also known as Uw Ilbmban ̯d ̯iy — there is an additional feature not found in the 
Uw Oykaŋand style.  Not only are common noun and verb stems replaced, but the first 
person singular pronoun ay has an alternation in aɲ.  The following sentence illustrates the 
phenomenon, which is the only recorded replacement of a grammatical category outside 
common nouns and verbs. 
Ayinaγ en ontu-ŋ, aɲ orγiŋk 
UI.first 2sg.nom UI.go-IMP UI.1sg.nom UI.behind 
‘You go first and I’ll (come) behind.’ 
Obm:  ‘poison’ 
This section deals with the effecting of a public taboo through a curse. 
The use of obm as a curse is widespread, and frequent — though speakers of the 
language suggested to me that it was in rather more common use at the time research was 
being actively pursued than in traditional times. It was implied that the public accessibilty 
of alcohol had loosened tongues somewhat, and created more frequently the needed 
situations productive of its employment. But because its ramifications are so pervasive, and 
its use open to any speaker of the language able to negotiate the kinship system, it deserves 
the not inconsiderable space afforded to it here. Much of the material is reconstruction by a 
competent speaker of known events and life situations for this record — nothing could be 
recorded ‘live’, since speakers might be ashamed or embarrassed if their outbursts were to 
be made public.  
The word obm –— informally translated as ‘poison’ by the Oykangand, but meaning 
something like ‘socially taboo, requiring avoidance, negatively sanctioned, prohibited’ — 
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has already been encountered in connection with sub-classes of kin: iɲaŋar.obm are 
differentiated from iɲaŋar.uw for example, and ednaŋar.obm are a specially avoided 
subset of ednaŋar. The concept of obm extends beyond the confines of avoided kin, 
however, and is in fact one of the great organising themes of Oykangand behaviour.  It 
unites the hunter-gatherer ethos of the society on the one hand with the re-distribution of 
hard-won resources on the other. It is the locus of intersection between social control, 
kinship, complex verbal behaviour, food, sex and death. The concern here is ultimately 
with its role in placing a curse on certain relationships for personal advantage, and how this 
curse can be effectively parried or thwarted.  
The ‘neutral’ meaning of the word is literally ‘poison’, or ‘poisonous’. The bulb of a 
species of plant — egŋ oygŋgorgon, for example — could be described as obm.  Eating it 
might not kill you, but you would be very sick as a result. A brown snake, in̯ amaʀ, could 
also be described as obm. 
Certain kin are under a permanent prohibition of ‘poison’ when it comes to vegetable 
foods, meat or fish, and even water or firewood. A man can never accept these resources 
from an actual daughter, nor from his older sister. They are obm to him. Generally these 
prohibitions are coterminous with categories of kin to whom the sanction against incest 
operates most strongly, though this remark does not apply, of course, to a man’s biological 
mother, from whom he has accepted food since childhood.  The categories of kin under the 
food prohibition nevertheless otherwise mirror those of incest closely enough for one 
Oykangand woman to identify the former with eg agulγ ‘wrong headed’ — a term which is 
technically appropriate only to illicit unions. It is perhaps significant that this restriction on 
food is phrased in the idiom of alliance. An excerpt commenting on this point — from a 
long explanation of the use of obm — follows: 
Ilimb il eg agulγ-iy it ̯om aŋaɲ amb, 
then  3sg.nom head illicit-AG that NEG PRE 
in ̯ elkoy ia-n il it ̯om ad ̯en. 
meat tortoise eat-PRES 3sg.nom that 1sg.poss 
‘Then that wrong-headed person can’t eat that tortoise of mine. 
Eg agulγ-iy aŋaɲ ia-ŋan il ad ̯en. 
head illicit-AG  NEG eat-IFUT 3sg.nom 1sg.poss 
That wrong-head can’t eat my tortoise. 
In̯ it ̯om, egŋ it ̯om abm ay oŋgom afa-nm. 
meat that  food that person 1sg.nom this fetch-PG 
Neither the meat nor the food that I get. 
Eg agulγ-iy aŋaɲ; egŋ elen awiy anen 
head illicit-AG NEG food grass.lily also what 
uɲƫi-nm an ̯d ̯an anaman, uɲƫi-nm egŋ el ̯en 
dive-PG  1pl(ex).nom long.ago dive-PG  food grass.lily 
afa-nm an ̯d ̯an egŋ antun afa-n, ibaŋar, 
fetch-PG  1pl(ex).nom food sweet.lily fetch-PRES father 
alaŋar, iɲaŋar, amaŋar, ad ̯en undam-ar aŋaɲ ia-nm. 
uncle   aunt  mother  1sg.poss E-AG  NEG eat-PG 
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That wrong-headed one can’t eat it; when we used to swim for grass lily  
— when we swam to get grass lily, or to get sweet lily, my father or my  
uncle or my aunty or my mother couldn’t eat it. 
Ibaŋar-iy ad ̯en aŋaɲ ia-nm il.   
father-PRE  1sg.poss NEG eat-PG  3sg.nom 
My father couldn’t eat it. 
Egŋ antun, al ̯ ad ̯en, og ad ̯en, egŋ ad ̯en, 
food sweet.lily fire 1sg.poss water 1sg.poss food 1sg.poss 
aŋaɲ amb ia-nm. 
NEG PRE eat-PG 
Sweet lily, or firewood, or water, or food ― s/he couldn’t have it. 
Ibaŋar ad ̯en undam-ar aŋaɲ ia-nm. 
father 1sg.poss E-AG  NEG eat-PG 
My own father couldn’t eat it. 
Iɲaŋar ad ̯en undam-ar, og, egŋ *damper awiy, anen 
aunty  1sg.poss E-AG water food   damper  also when 
aʀƫe-nm ay, egŋ it ̯om aŋaɲ amb ia-nm, egŋ obm. 
cook-PG  1sg.nom food that NEG PRE  eat-PG food poison 
My aunty, too, couldn’t drink my tea or eat my damper, when I cooked  
them ― they were poison to her. 
Egŋ ay aʀƫe-nm ― ilimb obm! 
food 1sg.nom cook-PG   then  poison 
If I cooked them ― then they were poison to her! 
Uy awiy anen arfi-nm ay, egŋ antun, egŋ eʀed 
fish also when grasp-PG  1sg.nom food sweet.lily food wild.turnip 
awiy, albmul-γ awiy anen uɲƫi-nm ay, albmul 
also mussel.sp.-PR  also when dive-PG 1sg.nom mussel.sp. 
afa-nm ay, iɲaŋar, ibaŋar awiy ad ̯en undam-ar, 
fetch-PG  1sg.nom aunt father also 1sg.poss E-AG father 
aŋaɲ uw ia-nm edn, albmul it ̯om ad ̯en obm; 
NEG  again eat-PG  3pl.nom mussel.sp. that 1sg.poss poison 
ay amb ia-ŋan. 
1sg.nom PRE  eat-IFUT 
Fish, too, when I catch one, or sweet lily, or wild turnip, either, or when  
I dive down for mussel shells, or if I fetch mussel shells, my aunty or my  
own father, they can’t eat them, they can never eat them — my mussel shells  
are poison; I’m the only one that can eat them. 
[The large freshwater bivalve termed albmul by the Oykangand is 
particularly a woman’s meal because of its alleged resemblance to the 
female pudenda. Men eat them usually only after digging them out of the 
mud themselves.] 
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‘Uy oŋgom aŋaɲ amb ia-ŋan inaŋ, uy oŋgom 
 fish this  NEG PRE  eat-IFUT 2sg.nom fish this 
amb ay eloʀ ia-ŋan ay, lalaŋ.’ 
PRE 1sg.nom  alone eat-IFUT  1sg.nom  uncle 
Or I say, “You can’t eat this fish, I alone can eat it, uncle.” 
Aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ erg ay iŋun 
like.this speak 1sg.nom 3sg.obj 
I speak like this to him.’ 
In the following escapade, the taboo against a father enjoying the fruits of his daughter’s 
hunting or gathering (even to firewood or water) are extended — according to funerary 
practice — with strictness to a grieving ‘mother’ who had been living with a woman’s 
father.  The ‘facts’ of the hunt are presented to the grieving ‘widow’ so that she is forced to 
fetch her own firewood and water, and to eat and drink alone, in conformity with the 
convention.  The conspirators get a good laugh out of her discomfort, and at the same time, 
demonstrate that even in the throes of bereavement and in the strictures of funerary 
observation, there is room for both manipulation and personal expression. 
The speaker is again MF: 
# Abm awiy? aʀ *Gina elbe-n ay iŋun. 
# person also  like   Gina tell-PRES 1sg.nom  3sg.obj 
‘... Anybody? — I’ll tell you about Gina.2 
Ibaŋar ad ̯en anen ulfi-r il, ilimb an ̯d ̯an udna-n̯-aγ 
father 1sg.poss when die-PD  3sg.nom then 1pl(ex).nom camp-E-PRP 
igu-r, awaʀ, udna-n̯-aγ igu-r ofoγoʀ-iy an ̯d ̯an 
go-PD eastwards camp-E-PRP go-PD  river-LOC 1pl(ex).nom 
awaʀ ina-n̯-aγ  igu-r, *fence alŋgan.ambar uw, 
eastwards stay-E-PRP go-PD    fence ID=meets.up again 
it ̯od ̯ aŋgan awaʀ igu-r an ̯d ̯an. 
there straight eastwards go-PD  1pl(ex).nom 
After my Dad died, we all went camping, upriver, we went camping up  
at the main river, to stay there a while, where the fence meets the river,  
straight down there we went. 
Ay oyelm alŋgeɲ amboɲƫ igu-nm ay, 
1sg.nom  in.turn young.woman small  go-PG  1sg.nom 
uŋgud-am olon elke-l ay TI-am. 
there-EL hither return-PD  1sg.nom  TI-EL 
I was still a young woman, I’d just come back from Thursday Island.  
(Tuberculosis Hospital).’ 
Ilimb il iŋun erge-l il, *Lita-an iŋun erge-l 
then  3sg.nom 3sg.obj speak-PD  3sg.nom   Lita-DAT 3sg.obj speak-PD 
                                                                                                                                                    
2 The names in the original have been changed for privacy reasons. 
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il og oŋgom an ̯=ul afa-r 
3sg.nom water this  who?=AG  fetch-PD 
Then she [the widow] said to her — to Lita — she said, “Who fetched this water?” 
Il el iy-iya-r il ad ̯un, *Lita *Lita erge-l, 
3sg.nom eye REDUP-do-PD  3sg.nom 1sg.obj   Lita   Lita speak-PD 
“og il in ̯d ̯ay afa-r ay.” 
 water 3sg.nom there  fetch-PD 1sg.nom 
Lita winked at me, and then she said, “That’s the water that she (Mary) fetched.” 
Ilimb egŋ *tea iya-r amb an ̯d ̯an, uwa-l an ̯d ̯an 
then  food   tea  make-PD PRE 1pl(ex).nom give-PD 1pl(ex).nom 
iŋun # uw aʀemar amb ia-nm, aŋaɲ uw elbe-r 
3sg.obj # again without PRE eat-PG  NEG   speech tell-PD 
iŋun og it ̯om anen ia-nm il, egŋ awiy it ̯om. 
3sg.obj water that what eat-PG  3sg.nom food also that 
So then we made the tea, and gave it to her [the widow]. She said nothing  
while she drank her tea, she said nothing and ate her food. 
“Eh! Al ̯ it ̯om an ̯=ul afa-r? ” 
  !   fire that who?=AG  fetch-PD 
“Huh!  Who got this firewood?” 
“Il oγoŋ afa-nm” ad ̯un elbe-nm. 
3sg.nom indeed fetch-PG  1sg.obj tell-PG 
“She got it” (Lita) said about me. 
“Eh?” 
  ! 
“Huh?” 
Il puy igu-nm, aŋki-nm al ̯ iŋaŋ amb-iy afa-n igu-r, 
3sg.nom   ! go-PG  hunt-PG  fire 2sg.poss  PRE-PRE fetch-E go-PD 
eg iŋaŋ amb aʀƫe-r, uŋgud̯, odndoŋg ina-n̯ an ̯d ̯aŋan. 
food 2sg.poss PRE cook-PD there distant stay-PG 1pl(ex).obj 
She went off, searching (for wood), [the widow] went and fetched her own  
firewood, cooked her own food, out there, staying some distance from us.’ 
Ow.alwuʀ od ̯n ̯d ̯ ina-n ̯ il, abm onpoʀ it ̯om, 
nose.anger  merely stay-PG 3sg.nom person  old.woman that 
ID = furious 
aŋaɲ uw erge-n ̯ il an ̯d ̯aŋan 
NEG  speech speak-PG 3sg.nom 1pl(ex).obj 
She just stayed there really angry, that old lady; she didn’t speak to us.  
It̯od ̯ amb eloʀ amb ina-n ̯ il, il ilimb 
there PRE  alone PRE sit-PG 3sg.nom 3sg.nom then 
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*Lita ewa-l  il ad ̯un, el iya-r il ad ̯un.  
  Lita see-PD  3sg.nom 1sg.obj eye  make-PD 3sg.nom 1sg.obj 
She just stayed there alone, and Lita caught my eye and winked at me. 
“Abm onpoʀ  uŋgul alwuʀ aʀti-n il ambuŋan.”  
 person  old.woman   there  anger  rise-PRES  3sg.nom 1pl(in).obj 
“That old lady is getting mad at us.” 
Odndoŋg ina-n ̯ igu-r il oŋgom. 
distant  stay-PG go-PD 3sg.nom  this 
[That widow woman] just stayed her distance from us. 
Aŋaɲ uw erge-l ambuŋan.  
NEG speech speak-PD 1pl(in).obj 
She didn’t speak to us. 
“Ambul oŋgod̯ amb in.” 
 1pl(in).nom  here PRE  stay 
[Lita said,] “We’ll just stay right here.” 
(Il *Lita uw oykaŋand-iy aŋaɲ uw erge-l, 
3sg.nom   Lita speech  Oykangand-INS  NEG again speak-PD 
il uw albmbadnim-iy amb erge-n̯ il ad ̯un #. 
3sg.nom  speech Kok.Kaber-INS PRE speak-PG 3sg.nom  1sg.obj # 
(Lita didn’t speak to me in Kunjen, she spoke in Kok Kaber. 
Aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ erge-n ̯ il ad ̯un; il # uw 
like.this  speak-PG 3sg.nom 1sg.obj 3sg.nom # speech 
oykaŋand-iy aŋaɲ uw erge-l.) Ay iŋun 
Oykangand-INS  NEG again  speak-PD 1sg.nom  3sg.obj 
el iya-nm amb. 
eye make-PG PRE 
She spoke like this to me, but not in Kunjen.)  I winked at her. 
Ilimb erge-l il, abm atoƫen il abm  atoƫen 
then  speak-PD  3sg.nom person  short  3sg.nom  person  short 
uw.oykaŋand-iy erge-l, “ambul oŋgod̯ eloʀ in ̯d ̯ay in? 
Kunjen-INS  speak-PD   1pl(in).nom here alone why? stay 
Then Shorty said — she spoke in Kunjen — “Why are we camped here alone?  
In̯ elkoy it ̯om an ̯=ul afa-r il?” 
meat  tortoise  that  who?=AG  fetch-PD 3sg.nom 
And who caught that tortoise?” 
Il uŋgud-am alka-r il an ̯d ̯aŋan, abm  onpoʀ 
3sg.nom there-EL  shout-PD 3sg.nom 1pl(ex).obj  person old.woman 
it ̯om, “Obm!  
that   poison 
The old lady [ — that widow — ] yelled out to us from up there, “It’s poison! 
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In̯ elkoy *Mary il oγoŋ afa-r ilǃ” 
meat  tortoise    Mary   3sg.nom indeed  fetch-PD 3sg.nom 
It was Mary who caught that tortoise!” 
Aŋg adniy igu-nm an ̯d ̯an ogŋg alŋgab-iy oŋgod̯ 
here  upwards  go-PG 1pl(ex).nom  before  footprint-PRE here 
igu-nm an ̯d ̯an adniy. 
go-PG 1pl(ex).nom upwards 
We had gone up the bank, and we had gone leaving our footprints up there. 
Odn̯̯d ̯ afa-n an ̯d ̯an in ̯ oŋgom. 
merely fetch-PRES 1pl(ex).nom meat this 
We had just gone hunting. 
Il ilimb erge-l “eloʀ amb ur uw ia-n. 
3sg.nom then speak-PD  alone PRE 2pl.nom  again  eat-PRES 
She said, “You just eat it on your own. 
Karey ur ia-n, adn.of=n ̯d ̯ ur  —  
OK  2pl.nom  eat-PRES ID=greedy  2pl.nom   
ur amb ia-n.” 
2pl.nom  PRE  eat-PRES  
You go right ahead and eat it, you greedy lot ― you eat it.” 
Il alwuʀ aʀti-r il an ̯d ̯aŋan.  
3sg.nom  anger rise-PD 3sg.nom  1pl(ex).obj  
She had got mad at us. 
Egŋ=aγal alwuʀ aʀti-n. 
food=CSL anger rise-PRES  
She had got mad over the food. 
In̯ il aŋaɲ ia-ŋan, egŋ awiy il aŋaɲ 
meat  3sg.nom  NEG eat-IFUT  food  also  3sg.nom NEG 
it ̯od ̯ amb ia-ŋan. 
there  PRE  eat-IFUT 
She couldn’t eat our meat, and she couldn’t eat our food. 
Al ̯ it ̯od ̯ amb aŋaɲ # ay og amb uʀun ̯d ̯ 
fire  there  PRE NEG #  1sg.nom  water  PRE  downward  
afa-n  igu-nm ay, il og amb it ̯om aŋaɲ 
fetch-E   go-PG 1sg.nom  3sg.nom  water PRE that NEG 
amb ia-nm il, abm onpoʀ it ̯om.  
PRE  eat-PG  3sg.nom  person  old.woman  that  
She couldn’t use our firewood, and I used to go down and get the water,  
but she couldn’t drink it, that old lady. 
Og il abmban amb afa-n igu-nm il. 
water 3sg.nom  RFLX PRE  fetch-E  go-PG 3sg.nom  
She had to go herself and get her own water. 
Disrespect, respect and the Obm curse     119 
 
Eloʀ amb ia-nm il, og it ̯om awiy, egŋ 
alone  PRE  eat-PG 3sg.nom water that  also food  
*tea eloʀ amb il aʀƫe-nm il. 
  tea alone  PRE  3sg.nom cook-PG 3sg.nom  
She ate on her own, and drank on her own, and cooked her own tea, too. 
Il an ̯d ̯aŋan aŋg alwuʀ aʀti-nm. 
3sg.nom 1pl(ex).obj here  anger rise-PG 
She had got really mad at us. 
An̯da̯n iŋun oyelm oŋgod̯ # il *Lita il  
1pl(ex).nom  3sg.obj  in.turn  here # 3sg.nom    Lita  3sg.nom   
ad ̯un erge-l, “aʀ uw ambul el iya-n erb!” 
1sg.obj speak-PD  not  again  1pl(in).nom  eye  make-E  RECIP 
We just stayed opposite her.  Then Lita said, “We’d (better) not wink at each  
other again!”’ 
The point of the conspiracy between ‘Lita’ and ‘Mary’ was to embarrass ‘Gina’, the 
rather strong-willed and yet often lazy recent partner of the father of ‘Mary’, now 
deceased. The mechanism was the necessary observation of taboo on the food, water, 
firewood and so on gathered by the young girl, who should not share these with her 
bereaved ‘mother’ — her produce was obm to the older woman. 
Description of these two above contexts for the concept of obm are necessary 
preparation for consideration of the use of the word as part of a formula expressing agency 
in effecting taboo after the fashion of a curse for personal gain; this is the next topic: 
Socially, the word obm is applied as a part of a formula in situations where it has the 
force of a taboo placed on an otherwise unconstrained relationship with respect to food, 
drink or other incidentals including water and firewood (and in more recent times bullets, 
cigarettes and alcohol). It is therefore part of a formula by which a social fact is established 
— it is a speech act. The obm malediction is effected solely for securing personal access to 
the resources by wresting them from another. The word is incorporated into a formula 
which requires also a ‘private’ body-part and/or a kin term implying marriage alliance, and 
a bold request for the food/drink or other resources.  
Specifically, the formula involves: 
• The word obm ‘poison’ or phrase obm amba- ‘poison make/cause’ applied to 
the relationship between the parties; alternatively or additionally to … 
• A ‘private’ body-part/excreta such as idn ‘vagina’, od ̯ alal ‘testes’, 
adneʀeŋand ‘(the polite form of) urine’; and/or mention of a relationship 
typically implying control of a marriage alliance or genitor relationship with 
the accursed: iɲaŋar ‘father’s sister’, amaŋar ‘mother’ or the reciprocals of 
such terms. 
• The phrase od ̯n ̯d ̯ uwa- ‘just/merely give’ as an imperative. 
Two other conditions appear to operate:   
• The social reality of a relationship reflected by the appropriate use of the kin 
term above, and  
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• The fact that the amount of food/drink or other resource claimed through the 
curse is only small in quantity. This appears to be important. The possessor 
would doubtless share more or less willingly if the quantity available was 
large enough; for the curse to be appropriate, the quantity must be limited, and 
thereby this speech act will deny the erstwhile holder of that resource 
absolutely. 
The following text was offered by a knowledgable female speaker by way of 
explanation, and is included to support the analysis: 
Aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ “idn” anen elbe-n ay, “obm idn 
like.this  vagina  when  tell-PRES  1sg.nom   poison  vagina 
ad ̯en amb-iy od ̯n ̯d ̯ uw ad ̯un oŋgom ia-n-aγ ay, 
1sg.poss  PRE-PRE  merely  give  1sg.obj  this eat-E-PRP  1sg.nom 
od ̯n ̯d ̯ uw ad ̯un!” 
merely  give  1sg.obj 
‘I say “vagina” like this, “My vagina is poison to you, just give the (food) 
to me, so I can eat, just give it to me!” 
Aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ amb ay erg inun; aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ 
like.this PRE  1sg.nom  speak  2sg.obj like.this 
erge-ŋan: “idn ...”, “od ̯ ...”, obm amba-n; “uwaŋar 
speak-IFUT  vagina   penis poison  cause-PRES  child 
inun, od ̯ uŋgul obm amba-n il,” “idn” obm 
2sg.obj  penis  there poison cause-PRES 3sg.nom  vagina  poison 
amba-n il, aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ ilimb uwa-ŋan il inun. 
cause-PRES 3sg.nom like.this then give-IFUT  3sg.nom 2sg.obj 
I’d say it like this; like this I’d say: “My vagina ...”  or  “My penis I poison ...”  
– “You’re my child, so my penis is poison”  or  “My vagina is poison” like this  
– then s/he must give (it) to you. 
“Obm ay od ̯, alal ad ̯en” 
  poison  1sg.nom  penis  scrotum  1sg.poss  
“idn ad ̯en  obm amba-n ay,” 
  vagina  1sg.poss poison  cause-PRES 1sg.nom 
inaŋ iŋun oyelm, 
2sg.nom  3sg.obj  opposite  
“obm amba-n”, “andaŋar inin”, “uwaŋar  inin” 
  poison  cause-PRES   children 2sg.poss   in-laws 2sg.poss 
aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯. 
like.this 
“My prick and my balls are poison”  or  ‘I poison my vagina” — you  
say against him/her.  “I make it poison” — “I’m your child,”  or  “I’m  
your son/daughter-in-law”. .. like that (you can say). 
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“Uwaŋar idu̯n inaŋ, obm inaŋ”  
  in-laws  1sg.poss  2sg.nom poison  2sg.nom 
‘You’re my son/daughter-in-law, you’re poison to me!’ 
“Egŋ it ̯om inaŋ aʀ uw ia-l, obm  inaŋ!”, 
  food  that  2sg.nom  not again  eat-IMP  poison.kin 2sg.nom 
“in ̯ it ̯om inaŋ aʀ uw ia-l, obm inaŋ!” 
  meat  that  2sg.nom  not  again  eat-IMP poison  2sg.nom 
“You can’t eat that food, it’s poison to you!”  or  “You can’t eat that meat,  
it’s poison to you!”’ 
This economical explanation covers all the conditions established above, with the 
exception of the small quantity of the resource. 
The appropriate usage is best illustrated by another, more specific, example. The 
woman P is R’s wife, who is approached by E, a close ‘father’s sister’, over a small 
amount of fish held by the couple against the next meal.  Here is a reconstructed account of 
the exchanges, and the resulting action; Ronald (R) is the ‘victim’s’ healthy and active 
husband, ‘Shorty’ (E) is the more elderly but successful claimant of the fish: 
Abm atoƫen igu-nm il, uŋgud-am olon igu-n.  
person  short go-PD 3sg.nom  there-EL hither  go-PRES 
‘Shorty used to come, she would come here from down there. 
Erge-yan̯ il iŋun, “ndandaŋ! 
speak-IPST  3sg.nom  3sg.obj   daughter 
She (would have) said to her, “Daughter! 
[MF is here reconstructing the situation being described; she therefore 
resorts to the IPST aspectual marker on the verb erge- because the entire 
event was not witnessed by her.] 
Inaŋ ad ̯un ayin uy uw?” 
2sg.nom  1sg.obj  Q fish  give 
Can you give me any fish?” 
“Aŋaɲ oγoŋ! niɲaŋ! uy aʀem ay.  
 NEG indeed  aunty fish  without  1sg.nom 
“Sorry!  Aunty, I’ve got no fish. 
uy amboƫ orm. 
fish small  only 
Only a little bit. 
*Ronald alin ̯ atuwi-n oγoŋ.” 
  Ronald  1du(ex).nom keep-PRES  indeed 
I’m keeping it for Ronald and myself.” 
“Obm ay! idn ay amb-iy! 
 poison  1sg.nom vagina  1sg.nom  PRE-PRE 
“I’m poison!  My vagina!  
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Odn̯̯d ̯ uw ad ̯un.” 
merely  give  1sg.obj 
Just give it to me!” 
(Obm amba-n il iŋun.) 
poison  cause-PRES  3sg.nom  3sg.obj 
(She makes herself poison for the other.) 
“Egŋ ia-n-aγ ay.” 
  food eat-E-PRP  1sg.nom 
“I want to eat some food.” 
“Karey!” 
  OK! 
“Very well!” 
Ilimb uw amb-iy il iŋun, uy it ̯om. 
then give  PRE-AG 3sg.nom 3sg.obj  fish that 
Then she’ll give it to her, that fish. 
Il aŋaɲ amb ia-ŋan il; uw il iŋun. 
3sg.nom  NEG PRE  eat-IFUT  3sg.nom  give  3sg.nom  3sg.obj 
She doesn’t eat it, she gives it to her. 
Il uŋgud-am elke-ŋan il *Ronald; “uy it ̯om in ̯d ̯ay? 
3sg.nom there-EL return-IFUT  3sg.nom   Ronald  fish that where.at? 
abm uy ay ia-n-aγ!” 
person  fish 1sg.nom eat-E-PRP 
Then Ronald comes back (and says) “Where’s that fish? I want to eat that fish.” 
“Aŋaɲ oγoŋ! 
  NEG indeed! 
“I’m sorry! 
Il uŋgud-am olon igu-r obm amba-r il uw 
3sg.nom  there-EL  hither go-PD poison cause-PD 3sg.nom  give 
uy it ̯om. 
fish that 
She [Shorty] came here and poisoned that fish. 
Ilimb er amb uwa-l ay”. 
then away  PRE  give-PG 1sg.nom 
And I gave it to her.”’ 
Now such a mechanism has great potential to allow the redistribution of limited food 
resources within the hunter/gatherer band, as well as the more sedentary communities of 
post-traditional times. But if unchecked it also has the potential to leave people destitute 
and bereft of necessary nourishment. Consider the successful hunter, who, as well as 
satisfying demands placed upon him by the conventions of marriage/promise contract(s), 
also has a family to feed, and his own ravenous hunger to satisfy. He could face total 
dispossession from his catch and consequent physical distress.  Women are in no less a 
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dilemma than men, with friends and relatives who may be pregnant or breast-feeding 
demanding a share of the gathered nourishment that they cannot themselves easily secure. 
Part of the brake on this process is already evident in the limits on those kinship 
categories that allow the obm imprecation to be effective.  The relationships defined by F, 
FZ, DH and SW — and their reciprocals, of course — are susceptible to claims via the obm 
formula.  If another kinsman wanted to exact food or drink, then it is legitimate for him to 
do so in the name of a third party: a man’s DD, for example, who would possibly qualify as 
a potential W, would claim via the man’s actual D or Z. This third party should be of the 
same sex, and also bear some special relationship to the claimant — perhaps by marriage, 
or earlier inclusion in the same social activity or group. A younger sibling cannot effect a 
curse on an older one, and a classificatory W would typically call on a Z, D or FZ as an 
intermediary.  The effective use of the taboo/curse placed on a desired item is therefore a 
matter of nicely judged social connections as much as it is one of a simple verbal formula. 
A restraint on the scope of cursing effected by the obm formula is in the successful 
hunter/gatherer’s use of yet another verbal formula, involving the phrase arbay ina- 
‘fork/crotch sit/stay’ together with some (usually) repetitive physical activity of the hunt 
(with its obvious parallel to sexual activity). 
The loss of food to a claimant employing the obm formula can be regulated in this way 
by recourse to a verbal response with arbay ina-, which is in fact another speech act. It is 
effective only if the person threatened actually won the resources in question him/herself. 
Those who were given the resource as a gift (or in modern times bought them), or secured 
them by other than direct personal involvement in a repetitive physical act such as sexual 
intercourse, accomplished in a position of arbay ina- ‘legs astride’, stand to lose it to any 
kinsman able to apply the obm formula. 
In this example, another exerpt from a long explanatory text by MF, an old man is 
defending a barramundi he caught against such predation using the counter-claim offered 
by arbay ina-.  Here is his response to the obm curse: 
Uy oŋgom inun aŋaɲ uwa-ŋan, uy oŋgom ay arfi-r, 
fish  this 2sg.obj  NEG give-IFUT fish this 1sg.nom grasp-PD 
arbay aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ ina-l  ay, arfi-r ay. 
fork like.this stay-PD  1sg.nom  grasp-PD  1sg.nom 
‘I’m not going to give this fish to you. I caught it, I remained with legs astride  
while I caught it. 
Uy it ̯om  anen ̯d ̯ igŋgi-nm ay, aʀ od ̯ alal 
fish  that   when pull-PG  1sg.nom  like  penis  scrotum 
igŋg-- igŋgi-nm ay, *line-d ̯ it ̯od ̯ aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ igŋgi-nm. 
REDUP-pull-PG  1sg.nom    line-INST  there like.this pull-PG 
When I pulled that fish in, it was like pulling my penis, I kept pulling it like this. 
*Line it ̯om aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ oγoŋ igŋgi-nm ay, ilimb 
  line that like.this indeed pull-PG 1sg.nom then 
abm inun undam-aγ inun erge-l, “aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ ari-n, 
person  2sg.obj E-AL  2sg.obj speak-PD   like.this kill-PRES 
aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯, aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯, aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯, aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯, aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ 
like.this like.this like.this like.this like.this 
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igŋgi-n.”’ 
pull-PRES 
I kept pulling that line just like this, so I say to you, “Like this I killed it,  
like this, like this, just like this.”’  [Said while acting out the hauling in  
of the fish towards the crotch.] 
The principle here appears to be that the acquisition be attended by some physical 
activity undertaken while the legs are apart (hence arbay ina- or ubman arbay ina-; ubman 
‘thigh’) while the hands or arms simultaneously emulate a thrusting or rhythmic pounding 
not far from the genital area.  This appears to secure the results of that activity from those 
with whom any overt sexual involvement in turn would in fact be socially prohibited.  The 
hand-over-hand hauling in of a fish hooked on a line qualifies as such an activity by being 
located low and in front of the body, and so does the digging associated with removing 
with a yamstick a long-necked tortoise from the security of its nest in the mud of a swamp. 
It is as though there was a symbolic sexual involvement between the successful hunter and 
his/her prey — as though a relationship had been established on a par with that of a sexual 
partner, and that such a relationship took precedence over the kinship obligation being 
expressed by the living kinsman. 
In a similar vein to AM’s barramundi, MF herself discusses her use of the arbay ina- 
formula in protecting her tortoise from loss: 
Aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ awiy anen alka-nm: “t ̯uk, t ̯ukǃ in ̯ elkoy 
like.this also what  shout-PG   ID ID meat tortoise 
aŋg oŋgol!” 
here must.be 
‘Like this, too, when I call out “Tuk, tuk!  There must be a tortoise here!” 
Ilimb afa-n: in ̯ it ̯om anen afa-n ay, abm 
then fetch-PRES meat  that  when  fetch-PRES  1sg.nom person 
in ̯ aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ arbay in oŋgom-iy afa-n  ay 
meat  like.this fork sit this-PRE fetch-PRES 1sg.nom 
afa-n-aγ idu-n ay. 
fetch-PRES-PRP poke-PRES  1sg.nom 
Then I get it: the animal that I get, I get like this, staying legs astride  
to get it by digging. 
Igŋgi-n ay, afa-n ay it ̯om. 
pull-PRES  1sg.nom  fetch-PRES  1sg.nom  that 
I pull it up, I get that (tortoise). 
It̯om arbay in ay. 
that  fork stay  1sg.nom 
I remain crotch open (as I do it). 
Ilimb alaŋar, iɲaŋar, uwaŋar, andaŋar inin, uŋgul 
then mo’s.bro.  aunty in-laws children  2sg.nom  there 
erge-ŋan inaŋ: ‘in̯ elkoy oŋgom aŋaɲ uwa-ŋan 
speak-IFUT 2sg.nom  meat tortoise this NEG give-IFUT 
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ay; oŋgom arbay ina-n̯ ay, in ̯ afa-n-am ay. 
1sg.nom this fork stay-PG 1sg.nom meat fetch-E-EL 1sg.nom 
Then to your aunty, or uncle, or child, or in-law you might say, “I’m not going  
to give you this tortoise; I got this one with my crotch open. 
Aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ arbay inin, amban.ant il it ̯om oyelm 
like.this  fork 2sg.poss  vagina 3sg.nom that  opposite 
udna-n ̯, il uʀun ̯d ̯ aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯. abm ay agulγ 
stay-PG 3sg.nom  downward  like.this person  1sg.nom illicit 
elbe-n ‘amban.ant’. 
tell-PRES    vagina 
Like this I stayed, with crotch open, my vagina stayed opposite it, it was down  
there” — Oops!  I speak crooked to say am ban.ant. ** 
Oŋgom inun aŋaɲ amb ia-ŋan edn,  ilimb uy 
this  2sg.obj NEG PRE eat-IFUT  3pl.nom  then fish 
it ̯om aŋaɲ  amb ia-ŋan edn. 
that NEG  PRE  eat-IFUT 3pl.nom 
They can’t eat this from you, they can’t eat it at all. 
Abm anen aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯.   
person what  like.this 
Not when it’s like this. 
In̯ elkoy afa-n, uy anen igŋgi-n aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯, 
meat  tortoise  fetch-PRES  fish  what  pull-PRES like.this 
it ̯om aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ inin  inaŋ, aʀ arbay in-in 
that  like.this 2sg.poss  2sg.nom like  fork REDUP-stay 
*line it ̯om anen igŋgi-n inaŋ. 
  line that  what  pull-PRES  2sg.nom 
You get a tortoise, or pull in a fish like that, staying [crotch exposed]  
like this while you do it, staying crotch open while you pull that line.’ 
**  Note the point at which double asterisks are placed in the above text. MF was 
in the relationship of uraŋar ‘wife, marriageable cousin’ to me, and at this point 
she realised that she had used the ‘polite’ form amban.ant, when the more usual 
idn ‘vagina’ would have been much more appropriate.  This is one of the few — 
but important — instances of evidence for the inappropriateness of politeness 
formulae where the regular, profane form should be employed. The effect of using 
amban.ant would be to imply an alienation of me or rejection of me as a legitimate 
marriage partner; it could be seen as a denial of our relationship, and of its 
potential for sexual expression. I would have been removed into a distant category 
where our relationship would have been socially more formal and remote, and so 
MF stops to repair the situation with abm ay agulγ elben ‘amban.ant.’ 
The Oykangand have two descriptive phrases: oʀƫeng abuʀ ina- ‘stays home, never 
goes hunting’ and igŋguy igu- ‘be idle, socially excluded (from an activity, especially 
eating/drinking), survey the scene for a handout’. The first of these describes one who 
habitually fails to meet socially determined norms of contributing food resources to the 
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camp; there is shame, if not opprobrium, attached to such a term.  A good hunter, described 
as in̯ obmbay lit. ‘meat champion’ is admired and respected, and even sought after 
sexually.  The second phrase above denotes the individual who for some reason or other is 
destitute, and who is now hoping for someone to notice his/her plight and take pity, or else 
is seeking a victim to whom the obm curse can be applied. 
In modern times the phrase igŋguy igu- is applied most often today to the beer canteen, 
where the object of the exercise for the ‘loafer’ so described is to gain access to some other 
person’s jug of beer. Use of the obm formula in such contexts where the resource is 
jealously guarded and highly valued is therefore the cause of much discontent and vexation 
towards the claimant, often resulting in fights. In the following, MF describes how one 
might claim a drink under such circumstances. 
Igŋguy igu-n inaŋ, erg inaŋ, 
idle go-PRES 2sg.nom speak 2sg.nom 
“og inaŋ ad ̯un od ̯n ̯d ̯ amboƫ uw.” 
  water  2sg.nom  1sg.obj  merely  small give 
‘You’re just loafing along, and you say, “Just give me a little beer.” 
[Note that in this reconstruction it is the claimant that declares the small 
nature of the request, not — as in the above cases — the holder of that 
resource declaiming its quantity.] 
Og oŋgom oγoŋ *jug enoŋgab, inaŋ igŋguy it ̯od ̯
water  this indeed    jug  one 2sg.nom idle there 
amb ern-ern.  
PRE  stand-stand 
He’s just got this one jug of beer, but you’re just standing about there loafing. 
“Obm ay! 
  poison  1sg.nom 
“I’m poison! 
Od ̯ alal ay amb-iy!” 
penis  scrotum  1sg.nom  PRE-PRE 
I’m your balls!” 
(Inaŋ erg aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯, il oyelm uw amb-iy.) 
 2sg.nom  speak  like.this 3sg.nom  opposite  again  PRE-PRE  
(You speak like this; right against him:) 
“Idn ay.” 
  vagina  1sg.nom 
Or  “I’m your vagina.” 
“Uwaŋar inun ay.” 
  in-laws  2sg.nom  1sg.nom 
Or  “I’m your in-law.” 
“Od ̯ alal oŋgom ad ̯en amb-iy obm.” 
  penis scrotum  this 1sg.poss PRE-PRE  poison 
Or  ‘My balls are poison here!”’ 
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[Note that the possessives ‘your’ and ‘my’ have been inserted into the 
translations where it rarely appears in the vernacular. This has been done on 
the basis of the explanation and discussion offered in English by various 
speakers.] 
It is not unusual however for the ‘body-part term’ (alluded to above) in such cases to be 
extended to ebmoŋ ‘urine’ or its ‘polite’ counterpart adneʀeŋand.  In modern times, a 
daughter might demand of her father his jug of beer by calling on their kinship relationship 
and using the formulaic obm with adneʀeŋand.  This is a powerful mechanism that will 
prevent the man enjoying his drink, and has been known to bring the daughter a severe 
thrashing, with the beer angrily dashed onto the ground rather than handed over. 
Another formula, but perhaps the least called upon for repulsing an obm claim involves 
the use of the word oɲat.̯  This is a funerary term, describing the ‘widows’ or partners of 
close brothers as well as sisters of the dead man’s own wife, promised wife-givers 
(iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯) and women who are potential, if not actual, sexual partners of mature age. 
The Oykangand translate the term oɲat ̯ as ‘widows’, since the widow is numbered 
amongst them, and they are all treated more or less the same at a man’s death, as described 
in the next chapter.  The ‘mourning scarf’ worn by the ‘widows’ is also known as oɲat ̯; 
it is worn about the neck, and reference to this practice is sometimes made in the protective 
formula to counter the obm curse. 
Now it would be inappropriate for an andaŋar.obm ‘poison son/daughter (i.e. an in-
law)’ to claim anything by recourse to the obm formula; the mere mention of private parts 
in this context is not countenanced. To a promised wife-giver (iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯) a man is 
expected in any case to make the generous offerings of fish, food and other game.  But he 
cannot speak with her; it is a ‘poisoned’ or taboo relationship already, as Chapter 5 
describes.  Others in the category of oɲat ̯ –– typically classificatory ‘wives’ and their 
brothers — can speak to him openly about private body parts, and so can claim a man’s 
resources.  But if they are ‘close’ enough to be implicated in his funerary taboos, the man 
can respond by declaring the resources to be oɲat ̯, and therefore beyond their reach. In 
doing so, he commits himself to using the resource himself, or sharing it only with his wife 
and/or children — the item cannot be otherwise disposed of, even to a promised wife-
giver.  In oɲat ̯ a second significant theme, death, combines with the obvious sexuality of 
the arbay ina- formula to offer the resource holder protection from the obm curse/taboo.  
In the following reconstruction, an old man secures to himself the barramundi he had 
been given against the claim of a ‘widow’. Note that in repulsing that claim, he himself 
makes recourse to obm also: 
Uy oŋgom obm amba-r ay, er aŋaɲ 
fish  this poison.kin cause-PD  1sg.nom  away NEG 
uwa-ŋan ay. 
give-IFUT  1sg.nom 
‘I make this fish poison, I won’t give it away. 
Oŋgom oɲat ̯ egŋ anen oɲat ̯ afa-n edn 
this widow food  what  widow  fetch-PRES 3pl.nom 
oneg- iy oŋgod̯ anen. 
nape-LOC here what 
‘This is oɲat ̯ — When it’s oɲat ̯ then it’s put on your neck.’ 
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[The reference here is to the fact that the actual widow wears mourning 
apparel also called oɲat ̯ around the neck. On release from funerary 
observations the widow is also held by the neck between two boomerangs. 
The speaker is making the allusion to those practices to remind the hearer 
that this will be his/her lot if the former should die.] 
Describing the essential elements of an appropriate response, a mature Oykangand speaker 
described the following exchange: 
DG: Uk inaŋ ad ̯un od ̯n ̯d ̯ uw amboɲƫ! 
tobacco 2sg.nom 1sg.obj merely give small 
‘Just give me a little of your tobacco!’ 
AM: Uk oŋgom obm, er inun aŋaɲ uwa-ŋan 
tobacco this poison.kin away 2sg.obj NEG  give-IFUT 
ay, uk oŋgom obm. 
1sg.nom tobacco this poison 
‘This tobacco’s poison to you, I can’t give it away to you, it’s poison to you. 
Uk oɲat ̯ ia-ŋan ay. 
tobacco widow eat-IFUT 1sg.nom 
I’ll smoke that oɲat ̯ tobacco.’ 
So, in retaliation, the curser becomes the accursed, relegated to seclusion and misery in 
advance of the would be victim’s funeral arrangements; in both examples the obm 
imprecation has been as it were reversed by a formula based on oɲat ̯ to apply to the item 
sought after by the claimant in the first place.  Obm has come full circle. 
In doing so, note that the ‘poisoning’ has been applied to definable kinship relationships 
— both permanently, in the case of a man and his wife-giver for example, and specifically, 
as when ‘Shorty’ claims the fish from Ronald and his wife.  Obm is applied equally to the 
items sought, to the kinship relationship between the interlocutors, and to their respective 
private parts as well. This verbal mechanism is in constant use to secure personal 
advantage and gain, while at the same time operating as a controlled means of re-
distribution of resources within the community.  Its appropriate use requires understanding 
of certain verbal formulae, and of the delicacy of known kinship relations.  
Summary 
The characteristics of Oykangand verbal behaviour encountered in this chapter depend 
once more on factors of kinship, but at a level more subtle, more complex and more 
involved than that of the previous chapter.  
Obscene joking conforms to the general pattern established for most Australian tribes 
(see Garde [1996]) but differs in invoking the unusual verbal formula [a::yíˀ ].  Men use 
this device; women do not.  Bilateral obscenities, practical jokes on the older partner, and 
snatching of the genitals or pubic hair, with consequent indecent public comment on such 
activities, is sanctioned between certain kin of the same sex in public — but not private — 
behaviour. 
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The avoidance vocabulary is seen not as a simple binary alternative to the ‘profane’ 
terms of the language, but rather as one end of a delicate continuum of expression 
conveying degrees of politeness and respect — especially over sensitive issues such as 
death and body parts/functions. It is part of a range of options expressing respect or 
politeness that is available to Oykangand speakers. Kinship considerations have a 
significant bearing on the use of these vocabulary alternatives. 
Finally, the matters concerning the obm curse/taboo are best schematised in the 
following tables: 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3:  Diagrammatic summary of obm usage 
Kinship condition between 
participants 
Result 
socially tabooed: mother-in-law, 
‘poison cousin’ 
kin term + obm used; no social 
interaction 
usually incestuous relation; e.g.  
a man’s D, Z 
permanent obm taboo on flow  
of resources to him 
funerary ‘widow’ — oɲat ̯  temporary obm taboo on 
resources and sexual relations 
appropriate kinsman to claim 
resource via obm taboo/curse 
obm speech act possible 
inappropriate kinsman to claim 
resource 
obm expressed through third  
party 
 
obm 
taboo/curse applied 
Available  
remedy 
(a)  Resource   
  personally   
  secured 
resort to the  
arbay ina- formula 
(b)  Claimant a  
   ‘widow’ 
resort to the  
oɲat ̯ formula 
(c)  Neither (a) nor  
    (b) above 
no remedy 
The matter of the obm taboo/curse is a complex one, and how it may be repulsed is no 
less involved. Added to these complexities are the permanent prohibitions on resource flow 
between certain kin, and temporary restrictions dependent on funerary obligations. Not 
only does kinship bear on all of these, but also explicitly on the speech act establishing a 
legitimate  claim to the limited resources. Further, it also enters directly into one of the 
formulae for protecting them.  Imposed on these permissible verbal thrusts and parries are 
implications of two powerful mystical forces: sex and death. Calling on the first of these 
through a metaphor — expressed as another formula — allows the victim to repulse a 
claim if certain conditions are met. The resource — especially fish or game — takes on the 
symbolic role of a sexual partner. Again, in entreaty to the ‘widows’ who will be 
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implicated in his funerary observances, the victim appeals in effect to his own death — 
s/he is figuratively reminding the claimant that loss of the resource could in turn implicate 
them in the socially demanding and physically debilitating role of ‘widow’ if as a result 
s/he were to die. 
The three modes of speech discussed in this chapter are each highly metaphorical or 
figurative.  Personal expression is by no means eliminated from these exchanges, but rather 
the response to an obm claim, or to an obscene suggestion, can be opportunities for highly 
creative verbal rejoinders. The use of the avoidance register and politeness terms is 
governed by a delicacy of linguistic judgment that is beyond the assessment of a non-
native speaker. All three modes of expression call on sophisticated linguistic skills 
moderated by kinship considerations. 
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7 Kinship and language III: 
The language of death 
  
Introduction 
The death of one of the Oykangand is marked by ritual observances of social, dietary 
and linguistic taboos more pervasive than at any other event in the deceased’s lifetime. The 
extent of these observances is an index of the degree to which Oykangand society is itself 
threatened by a death.  Death is a recurring reminder to the Oykangand of the fragility of 
the social fabric on which appropriate behaviour — and hence social security — depends. 
A social being, who yesterday generated a network of reciprocal responsibilities and 
expectations, today threatens the community by joining against society with other, un-
human beings and fearsome powers, while his corpse evokes memories of a personality 
now past. 
At death, three urgent needs appear:  the need to dispose of the offending corpse, the 
need to deal propitiously with the departed shade, and the need to repair in joint ritual the 
rent in the fabric of social order. In meeting these needs the Oykangand respond with 
philosophies and rationalisations no different in essence from those Aborigines of whom 
there are adequate reports in the literature.  Elkin (1938: Chapter XII), Berndt and Berndt 
(1964: Chapter XXIII) and Maddock (1974: Chapter 7) record typical Aboriginal responses 
to death; Meggitt 1962: (Chapter XVII) gives a specific account of the Warlpiri.  No major 
feature of Oykangand funerary practice is unique to them, but their observations are of 
course richer than the summary ethnography presented here.  My purpose is, once more, 
less ambitious than a complete ethnography, being rather to sketch the events that have 
linguistic consequences for certain kin, and to outline the terms for specific practices and 
items that the Oykangand must know to perform appropriately as a member of society.  
The Oykangand have concentrated creative linguistic talents on the mystery of death 
which provides in turn the basis of their richest ritual. 
The connecting theme between this chapter and the previous ones will be those of the 
linguistic correlates of kinship obligation including the proper use of ‘respect’ or 
‘avoidance’ vocabulary.  Death requires the assumption of certain ritual roles according to 
categorial relationship to the deceased, his/her sex, and factors of descent and alliance. 
These roles entail social and dietary taboos as well as positively sanctioned responsibilities 
for ritual, and require certain linguistic correlates. The taboos may operate over months or 
even years of a bereaved person’s life. 
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The Oykangand traditions of grief and separation 
Ceremonies may begin while yet the unfortunate sufferer is still alive — a fact noted by 
Elkin (1938:312). Mourners gather to wail, exhort the sufferer to rally, dance in typical 
funerary style (see later in this section), lie on — or with — him, and begin to enter 
generally appropriate initial funerary behaviour, even to self-laceration or self-incision. It 
is unlikely, as Elkin remarks, that these practices comprise any beneficial curative program 
in the accepted Western medical tradition.  But neither can any serious doubt be 
entertained as to its efficacy in the recuperation of the Aborigine.  One Oykangand 
kinsman volunteered with pride how his relatives rallied to his sick-bed and wailed, even 
cutting themselves in sorrow at his illness. The operative principle appears to be the 
sufferer’s psychosomatic response to the expression of group solidarity in communal care 
being offered by the mourners.  Such a phenomenon would not be out of keeping with 
understandings of Aboriginal beliefs. 
The Oykangand elder described the proceedings in these terms: 
Abm anen ayi-nm edn, aŋaɲ ambe-n ̯ edn 
person  when cry-PG 3pl.nom NEG want-PG 3pl.nom 
ulfi-n-am it ̯ol-γ, umalaŋg it ̯ol-γ iŋun, ayi-nm 
die-E-EL hence-DAT dead.body hence-DAT 3sg.obj cry-PG 
edn ey. 
3pl.nom  ! 
‘When they cry, they don’t want his death, they cry for that person. 
Agar aʀem, ubmban, agar ed ̯n ̯d ̯elaγ eʀa-n̯. 
clothes PRIV naked clothes  altogether  take.off-PG 
They take off their clothes; they’re naked, they take everything off. 
Anaman -iy agar aʀem. 
long.ago-PRE clothes  PRIV 
In the old days, they’d be naked. 
Aŋam amb ay-ayi-nm, amaŋar il aŋam iŋaŋ, oromb 
chant  PRE  REDUP-cry-PG mother  3sg.nom chant 3sg.obj  dance 
egŋ-egŋa-nm. 
REDUP-dance-PG 
They’d keep singing their chant, his mothers would chant, dancing a funerary dance. 
Oromb egŋ-egŋa-nm, erk egŋge-n̯ amba-na-g ayi-nm. 
dance REDUP-dance-PG  place  break-E happen-E-AL  cry-PG 
They’d dance a funerary dance, crying until daybreak.’ 
In this fashion, the appropriate funeral proceedings are enacted before the actual death. 
It is as if the well known Aboriginal fusion of the concepts of ‘actual’ and ‘potential’ (as 
exhibited in, for example, the lexical identity of ‘fire’ and ‘firewood’ — as al ̯ in Uw 
Oykangand) was in force, motivating the same behaviour for the (probably) dying as for 
the factually dead. 
The word ilb ‘scar, cicatrice’ is used also to describe ‘memory cuts’ or ‘sorry cuts’ that 
are often made by or for a special friend in the top of the upper arm — usually as a series 
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of short vertical incisions which heal as obvious scars.  These could be made at such times 
as serious sickness, separation, or times of special affection between friends. Their purpose 
is to remind the patient of that person and time, and are often pointed out to others with 
some pride as evidence of a close association.  Such cuts might be made during this period 
of wailing for the sick. 
The sufferer is of course the subject of great concern among the family; the following 
was recorded as an exchange between a son and his mother over an ailing woman who was 
sister and daughter to them respectively: 
C: Bebaŋ ayin oyol ambe-ŋan? 
 o.sister Q  better  become-IFUT 
 ‘Will my older sister get better?’ 
[Note the use of the vocative as a form of reference to an actual sister; see 
Chapter 5.] 
D: Aŋaɲ, aƫin oŋgod̯ iki-ŋan il. 
NEG yamstick  here throw-IFUT  3sg.nom 
‘No, she’s dying.’ 
The oblique reference to a ‘yamstick’ in the phrase aƫin iki- is appropriate to a woman; 
a man would be referenced by the word for ‘spear’ or — more usually — od ̯aw 
‘woomera’, as will be seen later in the chapter. 
Like all mankind, Aborigines are mortal, and whether preceded by a conspicuous illness 
or not, whether life rallies for a time from relatives’ support or not, death eventually 
ensues. In the discussion that follows, the death of a mature man is taken as a basis, and 
annotation is made of any recorded variation for the cases of women or children. The death 
of a young child is regarded as a great loss by the parents but, apart from a special term of 
reference to the deceased, in ̯ alim (lit. ‘bird sp., galah’), it evokes fewer ritual observances 
often because typically no marriage promise involving him/her had been undertaken. A 
parent might volunteer the statement uyam aŋam ambel ay ‘I am empty-handed’, as 
signifying the death of any offspring, but particularly that of one which was still only a 
child. 
Wailing and shouting announces the event of death to all in the camp. Kin immediately 
converge to wail in grief around the discovered corpse, throw themselves upon it, lie 
embracing it, or dance about it with both idiosyncratic and conventionalised gestures 
expressing bereavement. The most intimate kin of the dead man expend themselves in 
wailing, being cared for and supported — sometimes literally — by their close kin in turn. 
As in any dancing, it is appropriate to hold that body-part indicating the dancer’s 
relationship to the deceased. Some strike themselves with sharp implements, and cause 
blood to flow, crying ad ̯iy! ad ̯iy!.   
Already kin-governed behaviour applies:  a man’s WF, WM and WB cannot lie upon the 
corpse, only beside it at best, and a WB, an ulaŋar, is reckoned to be ‘free’ of any 
observance at all. The direction for all the ritual to follow passes to a man or men in the 
category of WB or — failing them — to a grandson. He is the ‘caretaker’ or ‘boss’ referred 
to as abm uyam aʀtinam (lit. ‘person hand raised [hence, ‘waved’]’) or abm uwur lit. 
‘person shroud’, who deals with the umalaŋg ‘dead body’ personally. In the event of no 
able bodied ulaŋar being available, a grandson arŋg.abmalγ or arŋg.aƫalγ can fulfil the 
role.  Sometimes this role is shared by two or even three men, who can look forward to 
company in their solemn responsibilities: washing the body, either tying it into a shroud of 
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cabbage-tree leaves and effecting interment or beginning the more formal process of 
evisceration and dehydration by smoke, managing the adherence to protocol by the 
mourners, supervising the process of divination to find the agent responsible for the death, 
taking revenge, and distributing the deceased’s chattels. 
Just as a dead man’s WB is relieved of strict observances, and may assume the role of 
uyam aʀtinam as a result, a dead woman’s analogous kin, her HZ, is excluded from public 
mourning too.  Now as the HZ can never serve as uyam aʀtinam, since this is distinctively 
a male role, it is not immediately obvious why this exclusion should obtain. But 
asymmetry is clearly apparent in the ulaŋar/ednaŋar relationship (see Chapter 5, where the 
perpetuation of avoidance is discussed). This asymmetry recurs here: On the one hand, a 
dead woman’s ulaŋar.obm is the prime candidate for selection as uyam aʀtinam at her 
death, so must be reckoned as ‘free’ of public mourning responsibilities. On the other 
hand, if she as a woman were to lose an ulaŋar.obm in her lifetime she would be 
implicated as a ‘widow’ in the fullest observances and could even lie on top of the body, 
embracing it. 
A further category exhibiting asymmetry of mourning obligation is that of elaŋar, Z-. 
The precise parameters of the restriction in this case are still unclear, but at least some 
close classificatory Z- are ‘free’ from public funerary observances. A case in point was 
provided at the death of N, a very elderly Kok Kaber woman: The lot of uyam.aʀtinam fell 
to a man T, an Oykangand ‘grandson’, who was married to a close classificatory sister of 
N, whom we can refer to as V. The appointment of T to these funerary tasks upset V 
greatly. As a Z- of the deceased she could not join in the acts of public mourning ‘for 
shame’ of her sister.  The involvement of T with the body came too close to her, and she 
would not be able to associate with him for some days after the body was interred lest she 
‘hurt the feelings of that dead body’ — as one Oykangand remarked. The very ruffled V 
made it clear that T’s place was at the hearth and in the bed with her, and that she objected 
to the arrangements over N that would interfere with their connubial and family life.  On 
the other hand, some Oykangand observers of the event claimed that this was more Kok 
Kaber practice than their own.  It would appear that such adjustments were often made by 
one group for the sake of another — this particular adaptation in the Kunjen community 
perhaps being based on the hegemony of the Kok Kaber that was established by attachment 
to the land on which the Kowanyama community was built. 
Taboos on speech apply, too: the widow and her late husband’s actual and close 
classificatory sisters cannot speak to each other, and should keep a respectable distance 
until the widow is released from mourning. 
Returning to the typical sequence of events later in the day of the death, the active 
hunters and gatherers who have been absent become acquainted with the bad news, and the 
camp at large collects for concerted wailing and for the conventionalised expressions of 
sorrow mentioned earlier. The body is soon taken away and the old camp abandoned — 
usually by being burned out. There is a semi-technical verb udndu- ‘shift away’, which 
describes this move. The verb iri- with the same basic meaning, but implying haste, can 
also be used. In the old camp may be left the meat, vegetable food, and personal 
possessions that the deceased may have been associated with, although a grandson may be 
offered the deceased’s food, and certain significant personal effects are sometimes 
preserved. The regular forms in ̯ ‘meat’, egŋ ‘food’ and irmb ‘chattels, possessions’ acquire 
in this reference the qualifier irŋgay — a term glossed as ‘ritually tabooed by  
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death’ for which further use will appear later. The Oykangand translate the term irmb 
irŋgay as ‘rubbish’. The deceased’s name is also referred to as ukal irŋgay ‘name 
tabooed’; it cannot be used for some years. 
In the new camp, no fire is lit; the phrase al ̯ owel aʀem (lit. ‘fire smell without’) 
encapsulates the principle of not attracting the dead shade to the surviving family. 
In their outbursts during these initial phases, mourners may continue to seriously injure 
themselves in outbursts of grief and self-inflicted pain.  Women in particular may need to 
be forcibly restrained by kin from seriously damaging themselves, typically by splitting 
open their heads with an axe or yamstick.  It is not at all clear whether bloodshed at this 
point has any structural function or not. The importance accorded to bloodletting by 
informants would suggest that again it had some sort of propitiatory function. And of 
course the conventional cry of ad ̯iy! ad ̯iy! or its variant ad ̯iw! ad ̯iw! is again heard. 
In the wailing, oŋkaŋ ayi- (lit. ‘wail crying’) now resumed each day at dusk, soon after 
dawn, and to greet the arrival of kin recalled from distant estates to pay their respects, it is 
the women who have the most active roles — dancing, chanting and wailing. Up to a 
dozen women — usually of maturer years — preside over the assembled mourners, as they 
sit together on the ground.  The dancing is not sophisticated: knees apart and posture bent, 
the body is moved jerkily up and down as in a simple jig as the dancer gives her attention 
to various men and women seated around, one after the other reminding them of kinship 
obligations due to the deceased, or of his benevolence and care. In this oromb ‘funerary 
dance’, the leader ‘kicks the ground’, erk ifu-, to raise dust and secure attention. She 
invokes her own relationship with the deceased by grasping the appropriate body-part and 
chanting the ‘deceased kin’ term (described later in this chapter). Men and women 
mourners sit closely together, but according to avoidance obligations to others present, a 
mourner may face towards or away from the centre of proceedings where the closer 
consanguineal kin of the bereaved sit. 
Women in the category of amaŋar ‘mother’ to the deceased, and who are closely 
related, are expected to lie naked, with their legs apart, exposing their crotch to the 
mourners. As already noted, partial or complete nudity has been regarded as appropriate to 
funerary behaviour, and still is.  Comment was passed by several Oykangand women at the 
gross indignity of this extreme of exposure, and how they objected to certain men failing to 
respect this tradition by violating their privacy and staring at them. In the case of G’s 
death, M, who was the sole close classificatory mother, but also a still very attractive 
widow, accepted this traditional role, but was humiliated by the stares of J, a senior man 
who was a marriagable cousin for her.  She had little redress in this situation. 
The wailing chant, aŋam, can also be a means of communication between groups of 
mourners, after the style of a choral dialogue. Women in particular may develop a fine 
reputation for their style and originality of eromb and aŋam, and others will then 
compliment them with a phrase such as otel udnam ilg ‘throat good with’. Oykangand 
people still spoke appreciatively of the skills in these verbal arts of Emily, a woman now 
long deceased herself.  In such chants, attempts may be made to attach the blame — or the 
shame — of the death to other parties.  
For example L’s close classificatory younger sister, A, had died. L employed aŋam to 
complain that even closer kin of A had rebuffed both L and the deceased A recently in 
their requests for food, tobacco and money.  In reply, again by aŋam, one of the women 
closely related to A justified her omission of aid by invoking her own straitened  
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circumstances.  The implication is that her eight or nine grandchildren exhausted both her 
physical and her personal resources, and that, without such responsibilities, L (and by 
implication, A) could sit outside doing nothing but watching the passers-by.  She sang: 
Udarf uw igu-nm ay. Eʀembeʀemb udna-n̯ ay  — abm 
past again  go-PG 1sg.nom ID=work.hard-PG 1sg.nom  person 
ay ewa-n̯ inun igu-n-am-iy. 
1sg.nom see-PG 2sg.obj go-E-EL-PRE 
‘I used to go past (your place). I was working hard ― I used to see you as I went.’ 
These chants or complaint songs, aŋam, could goad people to fighting and even 
bloodshed.  One Oykangand remarked: 
Ef.on ̯d ̯n ̯ erg-erg, alwuʀ-iy amba-n. 
ID=just.talking temper-PRE happen-PRES 
‘(They’d) be just sounding off in a hot temper.’ 
indicating that aŋam could be a grief-driven expression of frustration and anguish directed 
without serious intent at someone else.  It could nevertheless be taken up literally, and then 
fights would ensue. 
In more recent practice this chanting appears to be still an outlet for frustration, anger 
and grief, but only arguments ensue, without many physical confrontations. Less radical 
than the above is the following recording of a reconstructed aŋam at the death of a man, 
whose close — but not actual — marriageable cousin sang in the presence of the deceased 
man’s older sister: 
Ugŋal an uw.od ̯oγ inun ew-ew ay, ugŋal an 
now finish at.last  2sg.nom  see-REDUP  1sg.nom now finish 
uw.od ̯oγ inun ew-ew ay, onbaʀ oŋgod̯ ulgal id ̯n ̯an 
at.last  2sg.nom see-REDUP  1sg.nom face here close truly 
igu-r inaŋ ey  — Ogŋg inaŋ arin igu-nm inaŋ, 
go-PD 2sg.nom  before 2sg.nom which.way go-PG 2sg.nom 
ogŋg inaŋ arin igu-nm inaŋ? Ugŋal egŋg 
before 2sg.nom which.way  go-PG 2sg.nom now families  
uw.od ̯oγ inaŋ arki-n, oŋgod̯ ayi-n amba-r aliy 
at.last 2sg.nom follow-PRES here cry-E  cause-PD  1du(in).nom  
‘Now I see you at last again, now I see you at last again, your face has come close 
(to us) here.  Before, which way did you used to go?  Which way did you used to  
go before?  Now at last you observe family custom and we cry here together.’ 
To which the sister replied contritely 
Karey inaŋ ad ̯un elbe-l, karey inaŋ ad ̯un elbe-l, 
very.well  2sg.nom 1sg.obj tell-IMP  well 2sg.nom me tell-IMP 
abm ay  amb aand amb igu-nm, ay inun 
person 1sg.nom PR proud PR go-PG  1sg.nom 2sg.obj 
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aŋaɲ ulgal ede-n amba-r. 
not close arrive-E  cause-PD 
‘Very well, you can tell me off, very well, you can tell me off,  
I went about self contented, and I didn’t come near you.’ 
Another woman sang, in response to criticism of a similar sort: 
Karey elbe-l  ad̯un,  ay aŋaɲ uwa-n̯. in ̯ aŋaɲ elke-n̯ 
well tell-IMP 1sg.obj 1sg.nom not give-PG meat  not return-E  
amba-nm ay, egŋ aŋaɲ elke-n̯ amba-nm ay. 
cause-PG 1sg.nom food  not return-E  cause-PG 1sg.nom 
‘Very well, tell me off; I didn’t give (him) meat, I didn’t bring back meat  
or food (for him).’ 
The wailing is stylised according to linguistic origin — each tribe having its own 
conventions.  I was unaware of this fact until, at the mourning for A above, observers were 
delighted that I wailed with the mourners in ‘Kunjen style’.  All I had attempted was a 
conscious modelling on the style of my imputed MB, the Oykangand man CR who had 
long been my friend, guide and beloved mentor.  It was apparently more successful than I 
had imagined, and was spoken of in the village with some elation and even pride. One old 
lady remarked 
Arŋg.aƫalγ ad ̯en, *Morris's wife, aiŋar inun, 
grand.daughter  1sg.poss   g’mother  2sg.obj 
uŋgul elbe-nm edn inun. Inaŋ oŋkaŋ.ayi-n, ye-----, 
there tell-PG 3pl.nom 2sg.obj 2sg.nom  ID=wail-PG  
Lalaŋ ayin ew iŋun, aɲiy il elfal.ayi-nm? 
uncle.MB  Q  see  3sg.obj o.man 3sg.nom  weep-PG 
Algal id ̯n̯an! ye -----. Oŋgom edn uw.albmbadnim 
straight indeed! those  3pl.nom  Kok Kaber 
edn uw.adnokon, edn ayi-n ye -----  
3pl.nom  Yir Yoront 3pl.nom cry-PRES 
‘My grand-daughter, Morris’s wife, she was your grandmother — well,  
they told me about you.  You were crying “Ye–––”  [on a level pitch].  
Did you watch your uncle, that old man, as he was crying? “Ye–––”   
It was really straight [Oykangand style]!!  Those others, those Kok Kaber  
and Yir Yoront, they cry “Ye ---- --”  [with rapidly falling pitch].’ 
Just as gratifying was the news that my wife was even more respected for her imitative 
performance at that wake, too. 
Two shelters may at this stage be constructed under the direction of the uyam aʀtinam:  
If evisceration and dehydration is chosen as the means of disposal, then a raised platform, 
uk.ad ̯oʀiy, is built to receive the body.  This requires that two or three men share the role 
as uyam aʀtinam so that at all times the body is protected by one of them from wild dogs, 
hawks and crows. In traditional times, the man’s wife would later camp under this platform 
while the body greases dropped on her (one of my closest friends had this cultural 
experience as her personal name: uwur-am adnunaγ ‘coffin-from drip-PRP’; her dreaming 
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[or ‘story’; see Chapter 8] was ‘devil’). The other is a more specialised structure for 
occupation by kin described by the Oykangand as the ‘widows’:  oɲat ̯. 
Even as the initial formal wailing begins, these ‘widows’ are hustled off to the specially 
constructed house, ankuyan (from ank ‘scrub’ with LOC and AL suffixes) but usually 
translated as ‘crab hole’ [because of its highly restrictive space] for confinement at the 
direction of the uyam aʀtinam.  Of broad-leaved bushes, bark, and fronds of the corypha 
palm, its shape is not unlike an igloo, with a low entrance and roof; it is not possible to 
stand up inside, and entrance can only be effected on all fours. A simple door is provided.  
It is sited some short distance from the camp.  These uncomfortable quarters are occupied 
by a deceased man’s own W, her own sisters, his own BWs, his WM, iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯, his 
‘poison cousin’, ednaŋar.obm and the D of the latter (who in turn would have referred to 
him as ibaŋar.obm).  His M and MB would also be incarcerated. All are believed to have 
some strong affinity for the shade of the dead man.  For instance, the widow (now termed 
olod ̯iy) may not sleep lying face up in case the shade, oʀol.eb, returns to make sexual use 
of her; she must lie always on her side.  She is regarded as a ‘guide’ to the shade, and must 
avoid being seen by it in daylight, for fear that it will remain to wreak caprice and trickery 
about the camp, and deny its members success in the hunt.  She must not engage in sexual 
relations with others, either, since the shade may learn of it and become jealous.  (When at 
last the taboos are lifted the widow can be claimed for a time by a brother of her dead H.  
This ensures a continuing sexual career for the woman, but suggests that if the shade gains 
cognisance of this activity, it cannot be offended because of his relationship to the co-
respondent.) 
The events were described for me in these terms: 
Iri-n, erk enoŋg- aγ iri-n, oɲidndaγ oren 
shift-PRES  place  another-AL  shift-PRES widow  behind 
ig- igu-n abm onpoʀ uw, oren. Abm a, 
REDUP-go-PRES person  o.women  again  behind  person  mud 
algal ina-ŋan iŋun, ilimb igu-n ey----- 
straight  sit-IFUT  3sg.obj then go-PRES 
Ankuy ade-n̯ ol il uʀun ̯d ̯, abm arkan, 
crabhole  arrive-E  travel-PRES  3sg.nom  into person  male 
igŋgi-n an ̯d ̯ay-ar. 
pull-PRES  wrist-INST 
‘They shift, they shift away to another place, the widow comes behind with  
the old women, the abm a (mourners) come behind.  They stay with her...  
they go straight to the crabhole and one of the men pulls her in by the wrist.’   
One Oykangand volunteered that the ‘widows’ in the ankuyan had to hide, and that the 
dead body would come and kill them if they appeared too soon — perhaps to bring them 
into his new world. They ‘have to be starved’ she insisted, referring no doubt to the 
immediate enforcement of strict dietary taboos (described later). 
When the deceased is a woman, the ‘crab hole’ receives her H, HB, ZH and those men to 
whom she was iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯, WM or ‘mother-in-law’. This is the sub-category of iɲaŋar 
or FZs, defined by actual or anticipated affinal ties.  In Chapter 5 it is seen that if an iɲaŋar 
undertakes to bestow a daughter on a man or his immediate male parallel cousins, she 
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becomes an iɲaŋar.agŋun̯d,̯ whether or not she fulfills the contractual obligation. 
Consequently, at the death of a woman, J, three men were incarcerated in the ankuyan — 
to each of whom J was iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯ ̯though she had provided a wife to none of them. To 
two of the men an unfulfilled bestowal had been made, and the third was a close parallel 
cousin of one of these. J’s only daughter had married elsewhere. 
There is therefore further apparent asymmetry between men and women insofar as 
kinship obligations in mourning may be assessed: we noted that a woman enters the 
ankuyan for an ulaŋar.obm, but he can never reciprocate for an ednaŋar.obm; he is ‘free’, 
and is expected to fill the role of uyam aʀtinam. In addition, while he observes 
incarceration for an iɲaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯ (WM or ‘mother-in-law’) it is not for the category  
of alaŋar.obm (HF or ‘father-in-law’) that a woman enters the ankuyan, but for an 
ibaŋar.obm (or ‘poison father’) who is the ulaŋar.obm opposite to her mother’s 
ednaŋar.obm.  
At this point in the funerary proceedings the role of the uyam.aʀtinam becomes 
paramount.  He must oversee the care of the ‘widows’ confined to the ankuyan, attend to 
the disposal of the body, and launch the shade on its journey back to some sort of 
underworld. The care of the ‘widows’ entails both responding to their needs and 
supervising their observances for the three or four days — up to a week — that most of 
them are there.  During the heat of the day water may be brought to them, but no food.  
Usually some sort of signal, such as the sound made by striking a boomerang or, in recent 
times, an empty can, is agreed upon, lest the shade identify the upraised voice of one of his 
‘wives’ and come looking for her.  As soon as darkness falls the inmates of the ankuyan 
can quietly join family groups at their fires, talk, laugh and even partake — though 
surreptitiously — of certain foods, even prohibited ones, if no-one is watching in the 
darkness.  But by daybreak they must have returned to the ankuyan. 
These practices suggest that a compromise has been reached by the Oykangand, so that 
conflicting fears have been accommodated. On the one hand is the fear of the capricious 
malice associated with the shade of the dead man. Considerable effort is expended in 
dissuading it from returning to endanger the camp through its attraction to the company of 
wives and close kinsmen.  On the other hand there is the recognised fear for the safety of a 
small group of kinsmen confined without means away from the camp in the dread hours of 
night.  At the death of an aged man who had outlived his contemporaries, perhaps only one 
or two persons would be confined to the ankuyan — doubtless well advanced in years, too. 
Where the ‘widows’ are numerous, however, elderly ones are often excused, or declared to 
be ‘free’.  There would be very real fears for the safety of small numbers even in daytime, 
so that some amelioration of their trying observances is almost mandatory at night.  
There is comfort to the wife of the deceased man in the fact that while the eligible 
company in the ankuyan may include many kinsmen, typically those who are still young 
and have active partners are exempt. This brings to her aid those who have most likely 
experienced the passing of their respective partners, and whose sympathy and support at 
this time can therefore be most empathetic. All eligible kinsmen are however expected to 
wear the mud that is the outward sign of funerary observance. The actual W of the dead 
man may be confined for some weeks this way, well after others have been released — 
usually without ceremony — from obligations. Occasionally a friend will volunteer to join 
her, but the rigors of this observance are demanding, and so attract few volunteers. 
During this confinement, food taboos are enforced.  Again the term obm is recruited to 
refer to these prohibitions. No meat or fish can be eaten, and Oykangand elders found it 
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easier to list the foods that could be consumed, rather than to compile an inventory of 
proscribed foods.  The prohibitions do not apply to 
• fruit of any kind 
• vegetables of any kind, including lily roots 
• freshwater mussels and crabs 
The release from food taboos comes in several stages.  
Just as certain foods are prohibited, so a certain appearance must be maintained. In 
particular, women in the categories of actual W, WZ, BW, M and also the MB of the 
deceased are confined to the ankuyan specially adorned. They cover their hair, face and 
most of the body with a  ‘mud’. The hair appears to be the most important, being a 
personal characteristic easily recognised.  So significant is this that these ‘widows’ are also 
known as abm a (lit. ‘persons mud’). The W also wears three sets of mourning apparel 
made in various ways from the corypha palm’s immature fronds and from beeswax. All but 
one of these is also mud-covered.  The MBs and others each wear only one, but again each 
is also covered in mud.  
The man’s widow, mother and MB wear the oɲuŋg.  Note the following explanation: 
Abm umalaŋg anen ulfi-n il, umalaŋg ulfi-n 
person  dead.body  when  die-PRES  3sg.nom  dead.body  die-PRES 
il, abm il it ̯om uraŋar iŋin il ‘oɲ.in ̯d ̯aγ'. 
3sg.nom  person  3sg.nom that  wife 3sg.poss  3sg.nom   widow 
‘Oɲ.in ̯d ̯aγ' it ̯om il it ̯od ̯ aŋaɲ udna-n̯ kuŋaʀ-iy, 
  widow that  3sg.nom there  NEG lie-PG  house-LOC 
uyiʀɲim iŋin undam-ar-iy, uyiʀɲim-iy anaman-iy. 
house 3sg.poss E-LOC-PRE house-LOC long.ago-PRE 
Uyiʀɲim iŋin undam-ar aŋaɲ uw udna-n̯ il 
house 3sg.poss  E-LOC NEG again camp-PG 3sg.nom 
abm eray=an ̯d ̯, er aʀti-n amba-nm, igu-nm edn erk 
person  other=AG away rise-E  cause-PG  go-PG   3pl.nom place 
abm=aŋ enoŋg-iy udna-n̯ amba-nm. 
person=GEN another-LOC  camp-E cause-PG 
‘When someone dies, when he’s dead, the wife is oɲ.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ.  The oɲ.id ̯n ̯da̯γ  
doesn’t stop in the humpy, she doesn’t stay in her humpy, in her old house. She 
never stays in that humpy again, but others take her away to someone else’s place. 
[Typically it would be her Z and M who took care of her this way.] 
Uraŋar iŋin il, ‘oɲ.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ' it ̯om-iy, atuwi-nm, atuwi-nm it ̯om. 
wife 3sg.poss 3sg.nom  widow that-PRE keep-PG keep-PG that 
His wife keeps it, she keeps that widow custom. 
On̯de̯ʀ amb, oʀt enoŋg, anaman atuwi-nm, oʀt erab-aγ 
tomorrow  PRE moon  another  long.ago keep-PG moon  few-PRP 
Tomorrow, a month — for several months she used to keep it in the old days.’ 
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The term oɲ.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ applies to three concepts: the actual widow, the ‘customs’ she 
keeps, and the distinctive ‘mourning scarf’ that she wears.  (This translation of the term is 
doubtless motivated by the name of the local Anglican priest’s vestments, with their 
seasonal variations.)  It is described as ubmbiʀumbiɲ  ‘patterned, pretty, striped’, and is 
worn on the front of the body, being tied above the breasts.  Another item is known also as 
oɲ.ulbmul, or oɲ.uŋg; these terms are all compounds of oɲo ‘string’, since the raw 
material for each is string made from the inner tissue of the budding corypha frond. The 
description continues, in effect differentiating the oɲ.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ from the oɲ.uŋg: 
‘Oɲ.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ' it ̯olγ-iy, oɲat ̯ at ̯a-nm il amaŋar-iy, 
 mourning.collar  thence-PRE widows  tie.up-PG  3sg.nom mother-AG 
amaŋar it ̯ol-γ iŋun, oɲuŋg algŋa-nm il, 
mother  hence-AL 3sg.obj  mourning.collar carry-PG 3sg.nom 
a ilg. Oɲ.uŋg  it ̯om a ilg amb, oneg=aman̯d ̯ uiʀ. 
mud COM widows that  mud COM PRE  nape=LOC two 
‘Her mother will tie a “mourning collar” onto that widow, and she’ll wear  
that mourning collar, with mud on it.  She’ll wear two of those mourning  
collars on her neck, with mud on them. 
Abm il it ̯om, abm ulaŋar anen ulfi-n, ul it ̯om 
person  3sg.nom that   person  cousin when  die-PRES 3dl.nom that 
amaŋar il efaʀ igu-n, alaŋar il  efaʀ uw  
mother  3sg.nom widow go-PRES  uncle.MB  3sg.nom widow again  
il, oɲuŋg algŋa-n oneg=aman̯d,̯ uiʀ a ilg. 
3sg.nom mourning.collar carry-PRES  nape=LOC two mud COM 
When a cousin dies, his mother and her brother become widows, they wear  
two mourning collars around their necks, with mud on them. 
A=aman ̯d ̯ it ̯om uni-n erb ul. 
mud=INS that rub.self-E RECIP-PRES 3dl.nom 
They rub mud on themselves. 
A ilg amb ul. Ow onponpoʀi awiy. 
mud  COM  PRE  3dl.nom ID=nose old.women also 
They have mud on them.  The old women, too.’ 
As noted, the wider group of implicated mourners or ‘widows’ are known as abm a, 
‘mud people’; the terms oɲat ̯ (and its variant, oɲant) and oɲ.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ are 
synonymous, with abm efaʀ ‘mother’s side’ a sub-set of these, including the deceased’s M, 
MB and ZD, ZS. 
Another compound of oɲ describes the ‘arm band’ or ‘bandage’ as the Oykangand 
gloss the term oɲ.ubmbal.an ̯d ̯okoʀ.  It is worn by the deceased person’s menfolk:  B+, B- 
and F.  It is covered in mud, too. Note however that not all of these abm a kinsmen are 
confined to the ankuyan; the mourning apparel here is public. 
The agundam is a dilly bag worn over the shoulder, ‘like a school bag’ one Oykangand 
offered.  Covered with mud once more, only the wife wears this. 
Finally, there is the oɲat ̯/oɲant or oɲ.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ worn on the back by the W, WZ, 
BW, WM and so on.  Its more general use also describes the wearers and also those items of 
food or other resources held outside the obm curse, as in Chapter 6. The abm efaʀ or 
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‘mother’s side widows’ must be particularly careful to wear this item, again covered with 
mud. 
A specialised role is recognised by the term ow.at ̯ang (lit. ‘nose tied’) which typically 
passes to granddaughters of the deceased, or to women who referred to the deceased as 
ibaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯.  Again, string made from the corypha palm is tied about the ears and across 
the bridge of the nose (hence the term). These women pretend to be men, dancing in men’s 
style, and in modern times will even dress in men’s clothes. They sing and dance, and try 
to creep up on the unwary, to claim by means of a similarly string-tied spear or woomera (a 
typically male artefact) some of the food or meat in the camp.  Their takings are then 
shared with other disadvantaged ‘widows’ or the family of the bereaved. These women 
grab anything of value — in modern times also money, especially at gambling games — 
and make off with it.  
These women pretend to be the deceased himself, and make special visitations on his 
close kinsmen, addressing them with the kin terms appropriate to the deceased.  It is not 
acceptable to object to any of their predations, or to their representations of the deceased. 
No matter how unreasonable the exaction, if an ow.at ̯ang can pick up the item on the 
woomera or spear it, then it is hers.  Fights can result if offense is given, and no doubt this 
factor, together with the limitation effected by the implements involved, keep reasonable 
bounds on such excise. 
The uyam.aʀtinam has the chief role, however, in discharge of his responsibility for 
disposal of the body. The general technique was to assemble close classificatory brothers 
and with them secure suitable fronds of the corypha palm (around which an important 
Oykangand technology subsists) for a shroud, uwur.  The classificatory brothers of the 
uyam.aʀtinam also assist in the preparation of a relatively shallow grave, ugunb, which 
receives the enshrouded body. It is customary to sing as the grave is being dug; this is 
known as the oɲen umalaŋg (lit. ‘song corpse’). 
Grave sites are remembered, if only for the fact that people would not camp close by 
them at night for fear of the shade of the dead man.  One site, on Baby Creek, is marked by 
a tree which we could never drive past without someone remarking on the last resting place 
of the ancestor buried there. 
In the alternative to burial normally reserved for mature men, the body may be 
eviscerated and placed on a crude platform, or perhaps in the fork of a tree, crotch to 
crotch.  The latter option would invoke the word aɲan ‘fork’.  The viscera of the dead is 
replaced by a ‘nest’ of a species of grass, ukan.ibmbin. After some time the body will be 
taken down, the skin peeled off, and decorated to make the shrunken corpse attractive.  In 
this condition the body is referred to as andam.  Relatives then visit with the corpse, 
treating it as though still alive, and paying it constant attention. During this time the 
‘widows’ (mainly marriageable cousins) of the dead man enter, quite naked, and with 
switches cut from a tree try to knock over the decorated corpse.  The skin is buried in its 
container of ti-tree bark while the body, in whatever state, is buried with the deceased 
person’s closest possessions.  Alternatively, the corpse may finally be dried out completely 
and carried by loved ones, especially the deceased’s wife, and eventually be interred 
without ceremony along with the deceased man’s beads and shell ornaments. 
Disposal of weapons and other possessions is occasionally by fire, but more usually by 
being thrown into deep water — a practice suggested by one Oykangand as the cause of 
food taboos on water related species — the goanna and duck, for examples — being the  
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most protracted.  In more modern instances, when material possessions of some monetary 
value may be involved, a distribution by the uyam aʀtinam to interested relatives may  
take place quite early after the formal burial. This is a formal little ceremony, and takes 
place at the conclusion of most of the food taboos and funerary observations. It is 
sometimes sought after to relieve hardships, since the deceased’s estate is these days of 
some value, both financially and materially. Items passed on in this way are highly valued 
as keepsakes, as are gifts received from the deceased in his lifetime.  The phrases 
al ̯ oren uɲa-  lit. ‘fire behind hold’ 
and  
ak ulin ̯ uɲa-  lit. ‘let ??? hold’ 
refer to such items, which can never be given away, out of respect for the dead. 
Another of the important functions of the uyam aʀtinam is to exhort the spirit to leave 
the living and return to its source.  This is usually by means of a monologue such as the 
following: 
Elk inaŋ erk.elgoʀ-aγ!  Algal amb elk inaŋ ad ̯un 
return 2sg.nom ID=home-AL  straight  PR return  2sg.nom 1sg.obj 
(un)dam(am) ey! Ud elgor-iy it ̯od ̯! Oŋgod̯ aʀ uw igu-l! 
E-from   dog  many-PRE there here not again  come-IMP 
Igu-l! Erk.elampuŋk-aγ elk inaŋ, algal! 
go-IMP  conception.site-AL  return  2sg.nom  straight 
‘Go home!  Go straight home from me!  There are lots of dogs there!   
Don’t come here again!  Go straight back to your conception-site!’ 
The reference to dogs is an interesting one.  The place to which the departed shade goes 
is seen as one where dogs — for hunting, and probably for company — are available in 
abundance. Yet the shade has a reputation for taking with him any attractive dogs. My own 
beloved dog, named ‘Monty’, was much admired, and was being cared for in one of my 
absences by a woman reckoned to be a close sister. Monty disappeared, and on my return 
the woman was deeply upset that she could not return the animal to me. Twelve years later 
a widow confided to me that her late husband, my B+, who had died at about the same 
time, had probably taken it, saying 
Ud inin en ̯ algŋa-r il, lolaŋ-an. bebaŋ-an agŋga-nm 
dog  2sg.poss might take-PD 3sg.nom B+-AG   Z+-AG   search-PG 
il, elaŋar *Elizabeth ... aŋaɲ. Ud ulfi-ŋan, agŋga-nm  
3sg.nom  Z-   nothing  dog  die-IFUT search-PG  
il iŋun, aŋaɲ. Uɲƫiʀ it ̯om-iy, oʀol.eb. 
3sg.nom 3sg.obj nothing  night  that-PRE  shade 
‘Your older brother must have taken your dog. Your older sister ... younger  
sister, Elizabeth, looked for it in vain.  The dog might have died, but she  
looked for it and found nothing. It was that same night, so the shade (must  
have taken it).’ 
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Two metaphysical entities are named: the oʀol.eb (referred to above) and the 
oʀol.enkaʀ.  It is to the latter that monologues are addressed, urging the spirit to leave, and 
it is believed that this spirit will travel by known waterholes and creeks or rivers to the site 
of its conception in human flesh.  It is regarded as unreliable, even malevolent, and it 
appears to be responsible for the stratagems so carefully observed by the Oykangand to 
ensure order and quiet.  The oʀol.enkaʀ is much feared; it is believed to resemble a huge 
bird and the neighbouring Kok Kaber classify it as an animal with the prefix miN, hence 
mim.mal. It appears only in the deceased person’s home country, and is called upon in 
determining the guilty party for punishment over the death. 
In certain ceremonial killing ventures which were imperfectly and incompletely 
described by the Oykangand, the oʀol.eb was believed to be capable of restoring to life 
and revenging the intended victim, unless certain ceremonial measures were carried out.  
In hunting and fishing ventures undertaken by close kin or immediate associates of the 
deceased, especially in his/her clan lands, the oʀol.eb is believed to cause spears to miss, 
or to pull fish off the hook unless the hunter somehow disguises his connection with the 
shade, usually by ‘smoking’ him/herself over an ironwood fire. 
Like ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’ in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Oykangand are not always 
able to distinguish clearly the functions of the oʀol.eb and the oʀol.eŋkaʀ for the naive 
enquirer. 
The oʀol.eb is usually termed the ‘ghost’ or ‘shade’ of the dead man, for which the 
terms agŋaʀ and ɲuwiɲuw are also used.  The Oykangand will insist that although the dead 
man’s shade is sent back to his country and secured to the country from which he came by 
a short ritual (see later in the chapter) at night the agŋaʀ or ɲuwiɲuw can be seen as a little 
blue light about the grave of the deceased long after his decease, and so they fear to 
approach grave sites after dark. 
There is certainly fear of the supernatural attached to a death by the Oykangand, and 
some dissociation from it must be available to those officiating, especially to the uyam 
aʀtinam.  Whenever his duties take him into physical contact with the corpse, or the dead 
man’s belongings, or his customary haunts, the uyam.aʀtinam takes care to cleanse 
himself by recourse to the smoke from ironwood leaves.  
The ritual cleansing:  smell, smoke and fire 
Around these three related features of Oykangand life centre the techniques for 
purification from defilement by death. Too hasty a cessation from observances and a 
concomitant return to normalcy will bring the plea 
Ak erk owel aʀem ambe-y! 
let  place  smell without  become-PRES 
[usually translated:] ‘Let the smell settle there’. 
The places frequented by the deceased, including his home country and in particular his 
conception site, are left desolate.  Kin are not to stir up the smell left by the departed in 
those places, in case his oʀol.eb should sense it and return. 
On the evening after the death is made public, no fires are lit in the new camp to attract 
the wandering spirit; it is encouraged to leave the surviving kinsmen in peace.  The policy 
is: 
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al ̯ owel aʀem! 
fire  smell  without 
‘without lighting a fire’ 
for both the new site and the deceased person’s home estate. 
Despite this, wherever possible, smoke is employed to cleanse and purify. The bereaved 
submit to being stood in the smoke of an ironwood fire, while a bunch of ironwood leaves 
is used to lightly slap them and so bring the cleansing smoke to every part of the body.  
The uyam.aʀtinam himself requires constant cleansing and usually sees to the cleansing of 
others.  The action of slapping with the leaves no doubt gives rise to the term of reference 
uyam.aʀtinam (lit. ‘hand raised’ [hence ‘waved’]) because, seen from any distance, this 
participant would seem to be waving at his charges, hands raised again and again with the 
cleansing leaves in them. 
It may be some weeks before a duck or goose is killed and offered to these close kin of 
the deceased, to bring their food taboos to a close.  The inventory of tabooed foods up to 
this point is extensive; the list included duck, geese, brolga, freshwater tortoise, and 
goanna.  The bustard and agile wallaby were listed too.  These represent a significant part 
of the protein resources available to the Oykangand, and are therefore a major dietary 
restriction.  At the best documented instance of release from food taboos a duck was shot 
by the deceased’s close classificatory B and given to the actual MB of the dead man, who 
was reckoned at this point to be ‘free’ to release other kin, his own wife included.  
The same routine is followed with water. One elderly Oykangand likened this 
performance to that of the local Anglican Priest at Mass.  In modern variations, bread and 
tea, or even the sole use of beer, appear to have displaced the waterfowl of traditional 
practice. In each instance the kinsman releasing the others is required to lead in the 
expectorations.  
The widow is retained under food taboos for much longer, and release is secured by the 
offering of fish, rather than waterfowl.  Wallaby, plain turkey and duck appear to be early 
on the list of unrestricted foods for her, but fish is long prohibited.  One Oykangand widow 
of some twenty years standing remarked: 
Anaman, uy igŋgi-n, uy  igŋgi-n; in ̯ oyboy ay 
before fish  leave-PRES  fish  leave-PRES  meat  wallaby  1sg.nom 
ia-n, in ̯ atawaŋg ay ia-n, in ̯ araɲ ia-n   ... orm 
eat-PRES meat  bustard  1sg.nom eat-PRES  meat  b.duck  eat-PRES  only  
uy, ilimb iya:::n ̯d ̯ ia-n. 
fish then   bye.and.bye  eat-PRES. 
‘From the old days, I would leave fish, I would leave it; I would eat wallaby and  
plain turkey and black duck ... but fish I would only eat after a lo-o-ong time.’ 
[In the low condition that she reached some weeks before her own death, 
she accepted the gift of barramundi from me and ate it gratefully without 
regard to the old prohibition.] 
To effect this final discharge of taboo, a close kinsman of either sex — a sibling, or 
offspring — of the dead man prepares fish and places some in each ‘widow’s’ mouth after 
grasping her neck with a pair of boomerangs and passing the fish before her throat and 
about her head.  The morsel of fish is chewed but not swallowed.  The mourner sits with 
146     Chapter 7 
 
her back to the setting sun and spits the masticated fish over her shoulder.  The fish’s blood 
will be rubbed over the actual widow’s body. 
After these restrictions have been lifted, there remains the necessity of restoring to clan 
use, and to access by affines of the clan, the country of the deceased.  This usually means 
only that tract of the clan estates immediate to the imputed ‘conception site’ of the dead. 
This erk.elampuŋk, by which place name the dead may have been known in his/her 
lifetime (see Chapter 6) will have been referred to as erk.alγar ‘place no-good’ or 
erk.irŋgay ‘place motherless, rubbish’.  It is, of course, obm. 
It happens from time to time that the deceased is the last of his clan, and this occasions 
particular comment. The discontinuity of clan occupation, of the close affinity between 
man, land and myth has been expressed by the Oykangand in phrases such as the following 
(note the use of the respect vocabulary, UI, appropriate to such a delicate issue): 
Erk ambaŋand! 
place  destitute 
Alγam an ̯t ̯oʀ! Edn̯̯de̯laγ el oŋ armel! 
UI:person  without altogether UI:ID=finished 
Iɲaʀ-aγ    on adnde-n̯ arbuʀ.ifiman ̯ 
UI:animals-DAT  UI:possess-PG  UI:place.conception-site 
aɲar-aγ aba uw uɲi-l 
UI:plants-DAT  UI:root  again  UI:hold-PD 
‘His place is destitute!  The people are gone!  They are all finished up!   
The animals have taken over his conception site, and the roots of plants  
have overgrown it.’ 
In such cases the clan lands may be divided up by the sole survivor before death ensues, 
as is the case for Diver Bird lands about the middle reaches of Magnificent Creek, assumed 
by Devil and Water clan people when the last Diver Bird member, a woman, was quite 
elderly. 
If however the deceased’s clan retains control of the estate, a party will essay onto the 
hitherto forbidden erk.irngay to ‘open’ it to the clan.  This is usually the responsibility of 
male kin who are of other clans:  ulaŋar, aiŋar and alaŋar.etelm.  The last is a sub-class 
of alaŋar — classificatory MBs — who are ‘not really full’, i.e. cannot be traced to the 
deceased through less than two or perhaps three affinal links.  Up to this point no fires have 
been allowed in the area, and even bushfires there are avoided if possible. Now however a 
smoking fire is lit, and the party joins in wailing.  A ‘whip’ is made of pandanus leaves and 
this is brought down onto the surface of water in the area. Since spirits are believed to have 
a special affinity for living in and moving by water, a lagoon or creek is usually central to 
any erk.elampunk.  The loud noise of the pandanus-leaf ‘whip’ on the surface of this water 
‘frightens’ the spirit back into it and secures it there forever. In particular the malicious 
mischief of the spirit in depriving kinsmen of success in hunting or fishing is thereby 
forever terminated. Kin can expect to hunt or fish without fear of the spirit’s reprisal, and 
in fact can expect its cooperation (see next section for further details). 
In more modern times a rifle or shotgun, discharged into the waters, is believed to be 
equally efficacious in securing the spirit to its conception site.  Because the country may 
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not have been visited for two or three years, the grass will probably be long and dank, and 
in need of the burning off that now takes place. 
Because it is obm, the witting or flagrant violation of territory regarded as erk. irngay 
was punishable by a swift death at the hands of the deceased person’s kin. 
Well before the estate of the deceased can be restored to use, mourners must be able to 
gather food and hunt game over other lands — estates that are accessible to them 
otherwise.  In order to ensure success, the smell of the dead must be eliminated from the 
persons, clothes and implements of the hunters.  Ironwood smoke is again called for. In a 
well attested instance, an informant volunteered the following anecdote: 
J1 had died, a member of the household of J2 who had the same (English) name. C and 
his wife G were heavily implicated in the mourning, C being confined to the ankuyan.  
Because J1 was a very old woman, mourning was not protracted, and about a week later G 
took her grandchildren, J2 and an amiable friend E to look for freshwater tortoise in the 
swamp.  C accompanied them with his rifle. 
The hunt was very successful:  C shot 3 wallabies, the grandchildren found 3 tortoises 
and ran down a young goose, and G herself found one tortoise. The total lack of success on 
the part of J2 and E was attributed (by G) to the fact that they had neglected to ‘smoke’ 
themselves in an ironwood fire — an especially important procedure in this case because J2 
shared both hearth and name with J1, and the oʀol.eb would be strongly attracted to follow 
her, and to mock her efforts.  The claim made by C was that the spirit had accompanied J2 
and spoiled her hunting. 
G claimed that the following imprecation to the oʀol.eb added to her means of securing 
success in the hunt: 
In̯ ubmban amba-l  ad̯un!! In ̯  aʀ odnge-l ad ̯un! 
meat  naked cause-IMP   1sg.obj meat NEG cover-IMP 1sg.obj 
In̯ ubmban ugŋgi-l!! Eleγ.amba-l ad ̯un!! 
meat naked leave-IMP show-IMP 1sg.obj 
‘Make the game exposed for me! Don’t cover it for me!  Leave it visible!   
Show it to me!’ 
A modern adaptation of cleansing by fire is seen in the restoration of housing to human 
habitation. At death the house is now ‘smoked’ rather than burnt to the ground, and then 
left abandoned.  The kin confined to the ankuyan — now merely a darkened room in 
another house — can, after release, not even pass before the house until it is repainted, the 
grounds set in order, the interior ‘smoked’ again, and formally ‘opened’.  The repainting is 
deemed necessary to ensure that the oʀol.eb cannot recognise its earlier home, and so that 
its smell cannot be detected there.  From aŋam that are still sung, it would seem that some 
of the bereaved prolong the mourning and delay the restoration of the house in order to 
establish status for themselves and for their dead.  The inconvenience inflicted on other 
kin, and the stresses caused by deprivation of housing are probably counter productive of 
that goal, judging by the remarks made in the community. 
Of recent years the Oykangand have imported from the Torres Strait Islanders the 
tradition of a headstone, the ‘opening’ of which completes their funerary observations.  
The headstone has even been given a lexical label: eg.ulgŋgul-γ-am (lit. ‘head heavy-AL-
EL’) or eg.ulm. 
It should be noted that for less serious contamination by the dead, alternatives to 
ironwood smoke are available.  These include: 
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ukan umpaʀ / alfalg ‘stink weed charcoal’ 
uk iɲiγan ‘charcoal (source not known)’ 
The more usual purification is by ironwood smoke, however, and several phrases are 
used to imply purification by this means without overt mention of ‘ironwood’. These 
include: 
or aʀe-n erb 
cold  cook  REFLEX 
ID=warm, singe  
where the mourners are not actually burned (but in ̯ or aʀe-n il ‘he singes the meat’ means 
to actually burn off hair or loose fat and flesh) and 
al ̯ aɲƫiʀ-iy ern 
fire  smoke-in  stand. 
Before complete purification from the defilement of death is effected in the social 
domain, revenge for the death must be satisfied.  The uyam.aʀtinam may also initiate the 
process of divination or search for the person held responsible for the death, since the 
Oykangand maintain that only the obviously senile die of natural causes.  Note the use of 
the respect vocabulary in this enquiry of the widow: 
Uyam Artinam: 
Alinaŋ uƫarɲeʀ ayin el oŋ aŋger en ̯ inun? 
1dl(in).poss  UI:H Q eye UI  UI:speak  indeed  2sg.obj 
‘Did our husband say anything to you?’ 
Widow: 
On̯t ̯oʀ ambeɲ uɲi-n ad ̯un 
UI:NEG UI:penis  UI:throw 1sg.obj 
ID = mention pain 
‘He didn’t mention any pain to me.’ 
The entire exchange is a doubly difficult one; a senior Oykangand woman later insisted 
that these were ‘big words’ and that she wasn’t sure of them; usage is usually more 
transparent than this, even in the use of Uw Ibmban ̯d ̯iy.  
The divination may follow the pattern described by Sharp (1937) for the nearby  
Yir-Yoront, or alternatively the uyam.aʀtinam may travel to the dead man’s country and 
meet the oʀol.eŋkaʀ.  This is believed to be like a huge bird that must be accommodated 
on the questioner’s spear while it tells its life-story. The investigator must be patient to 
hear out the tale and catch the relevant clues.  Whether from this source or from divination 
or even from common knowledge of camp events, a culprit will be confronted: he is the 
abm.oʀomoʀiy, or ‘killer’ (quite different from ‘murderer’; perhaps better ‘culpable 
antagonist’). This person may deny the charge and hope to convince the bereaved of his 
innocence, aided by his kin, or he may accept the judgment. In one case cited, the 
abm.oʀomoʀiy replied 
‘Karey idu-l ad ̯un! Ew.et ̯arɲ alin ̯ elbe-n erb-en ̯.’ 
 well spear-IMP  1sg.obj ID=fierce argument  1dl(ex).nom tell-E  RECIP-PG 
‘Very well, spear me.  We used to have fierce arguments.’ 
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In commentary it should be noted that negative interpersonal relations were reckoned as 
entirely justifiable grounds for assigning jural responsibility for the death.  These were not 
such as to demand retribution by revenge killing (abm oyelm arinaγ) but propitiation was 
effected by spearing the guilty party in the thigh.  One Oykangand adviser remarked: 
Abm oʀomoʀiy anen ewa-n̯-aγ igu-nm, 
person  killer when look-E-PRP go-PG 
ubman idu-n erbe-n̯ edn 
thigh  spear-E  REFLEX-PG  3pl.nom 
alka=n ̯d ̯ abm anta-nm edn. 
spear=INST  person  put.on-PG  3pl.nom 
‘When they went to find the killer, his thigh would be speared;  
they would hold him on it.’ 
Spearing the thigh is a very general form of punishment in Australia and many writers 
have recorded it without comment on its effect. Yet the persistence of cognate forms for 
‘thigh’ (such as *kuman reconstructed for the proto-language of the Cape York Peninsula 
dialects by Hale [1964, 1976]) and the generality of the practice suggests that some as yet 
undiscovered principle is in operation.1 
One adviser mentioned that leaves of a species of tree (uk alfaʀ) were chewed by the 
parties concerned once a death had been satisfactorily accounted for. 
Release and remarriage 
The processes of release from the taboos on food have already been outlined; the 
deceased man’s wife — held longest in the ankuyan — is released in a very early morning 
ceremony where she is covered with bark while it is still dark, and male relatives assemble 
to tear it off with the hooks of their woomeras, take her by the wrist, hold her neck between 
two woomeras, and bring her back to the camp. If she has already attracted the attention of 
another man, he will be the one who announces his intention, and takes her by the wrist. If 
his suit is accepted, they will have a spear and a yamstick which are stuck head down into 
the ground while the couple stand alongside these and become the victims of a mock spear 
fight. 
The new couple are then free to lead their own lives. 
                                                                                                                                                    
1  It is difficult to propose a safer part of the body for performing such a punitive operation; the thigh has 
enough muscular bulk without its function being greatly impaired by mechanical damage, and is relatively 
free of veins and delicate organs, damage to which could threaten life. Given that a tetanus or similar 
infection could be avoided, the victim of a spear in the thigh could be expected to live out his allotted 
span with perhaps only a slight limp to show for his punishment.  Is this the principle then?  Perhaps, but 
consider this additional factor: Beside the pain involved, of what does a spear in the thigh deprive the 
victim?  Of movement over long distances, and hunting activities, but these are rarely any great loss.  Nor 
would there be any loss of sustenance, since there is ample evidence that women supply the basic food 
input to Aboriginal society.  Probably the most serious loss would be to the victim’s sexual career, where 
the thigh muscles are much in demand (O’Relly 1967:87–104).  If this is the case (and none of the 
Oykangand ever explicitly volunteered that it is) then this would provide additional explanation for the 
persistence of the practice throughout Aboriginal Australia, and elucidate yet again the emphasis placed 
on sexual access in the Oykangand culture. Spearing in the thigh would be moderately painful, and would 
deny the victim any personal freedom perhaps for months. 
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The derivation and use of kin terms III 
Because death deeply affects the usual patterns of Oykangand behaviour, and because 
kinship is the normative regulatory mechanism for social interaction, the intersection of 
death with kin terms is predictably productive of pervasive changes in linguistic behaviour, 
as well as social action.  In this section we return to the labels for kin categories and pursue 
how these come to be derived in various social circumstances, including bereavement: 
Reference to the deceased is naturally a matter of respect, and these forms can be 
regarded as further derivations from the ‘respect’ terms discussed above (Chapter 5). The 
final ar of the ‘respect’ form becomes eʀ in the equivalent ‘respect for deceased’ term. 
Hence ebaʀɲar is rendered ebaʀɲeʀ ‘the/your/my dead older sister’. Given the stems 
necessary to derivation of ‘respect’ terms, as in Chapter 5, The derivation of kin terms II, 
the same stems apply for the ‘respect for deceased’ forms.  It is interesting to be reminded 
that the classes are not only morphological but semantic: The -ndar/-ndeʀ endings apply 
generally to kin in higher generational levels than EGO, the -ɲar/-ɲeʀ ones apply  
equally to kin in EGO’s own generation.  ‘Respect for deceased’ kin terms apply to all three 
persons:  first, second and third.  If I were to say, for example: 
ebaʀɲeʀ il on ̯t ̯oʀ 
Z+ 3sg.nom  UI:dead 
it would normally be read as ‘My older sister is dead’, but it could also be ‘your’ or ‘his’ 
kinsman.  If a man’s wife dies he may express the fact by saying 
uƫaʀɲaʀ on ̯t ̯oʀ aliŋ 
UI:wife UI:dead  1dl(in).poss 
or with the equivalent 
iyaŋan on ̯t ̯oʀ aliŋ 
UI:spouse 
But here the possessive pronoun establishes the referent. 
For certain very close male kin, a special transformation operates, especially if the 
speaker is a woman, or the context is mixed company. Instead of the appropriate (male) 
‘respect for deceased’ term, the ‘unmarked’ or ‘neutral’ term for the deceased man’s 
female sibling is used. This transformation applies only to immediate male kin: 
B+ => Z+ 
MB => M 
F => FZ 
The surprising instance of this rule is 
H  => W 
in which case the UI form is used: uƫaʀɲeʀ. 
The most permanent linguistic evidence for this transformation is in a beautiful song, 
composed in the Island tradition by a young man to celebrate the setting of a headstone at 
his father’s grave. The song begins by addressing the deceased, not with iaŋ.ar or ibaŋar 
(the neutral reference term) as in his lifetime, but with iɲaŋ (from iɲaŋar ‘FZ’). The first 
line is 
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Iɲaŋ! Iɲaŋ! Oŋgom anen erne-n̯ amba-r alo-l 
Father Father  this that  stand-E  cause-PD  come-PD 
an ̯d ̯an inun, ... 
1pl(ex).nom  2sg.obj 
‘Father!  Father!  This that we have come to erect for you …]’ 
The transformation results in only a defective set of terms, since those categories of 
other generation levels do not enter into the process at all. The resultant terms can be 
referential, or — as above, with iɲaŋ — vocative. 
As well as ‘respect of deceased’ kin terms there are ‘bereaved of kin’ forms. The latter 
appear as phrases, in which the appropriate root is inserted in the frame 
ew ______  + d ̯aʀem. 
Hence ew ebad ̯ aʀem ‘bereaved of an older sister’, ew alad ̯ aʀem ‘bereaved of a 
mother’s brother’, and so on.  The word ew is derived from the stem ewa ‘mouth’, and 
aʀem is the regular Privative clitic meaning ‘without’.  A crude translation that would 
perhaps help to illuminate this phrase would be ‘Don’t say “older sister” to him/her’; 
‘Don’t mention “mother’s brother” to him/her.’ 
The pattern of ‘bereaved of kin’ terms comprises a complete paradigm, but is 
supplemented by another, partial set preferred when the bereaved is within hearing of the 
speaker. These might well be described as the ‘bereaved kinsman’ terms.  A special term, 
otel/otil enoŋg: (lit. ‘throat another’) is used of a sole remaining sibling from a family. 
Among the texts of Appendix 2 can be found a lament by the late Minnie Highbury, who, 
as the last of her family, describes herself in another section of the text by this term. 
Table 7.1:  ‘Bereaved kinsman’ terms 
Oykangand term Referent 
olod ̯iy  or  iyaŋan widow 
oɲid ̯n ̯d ̯aγ widower 
oʀɲeʀ F or FZ has died 
irŋgam M or MB has died 
odnd aʀem B- loses older sibling 
akolmb  B+ loses younger sibling 
aƫin onoŋg Z loses sibling 
oran ̯ woman loses ZH 
olbmolm F, FZ loses S, D 
efaʀ M, MB loses S, D 
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Summary 
This chapter provides context for the exposition of the remaining kin term paradigms, 
and also an insight into the rich linguistic system invoked by the death of a kinsman, 
particularly a close kinsman. There are clearly very extensive linguistic and behavioural 
consequences to a death in the camp, the forms of which for any one individual turn on 
his/her specific relationship to the deceased.  The selection of an alternative appropriate kin 
term in substitution for the neutral reference form is only one of these linguistic 
consequences. The resort to Uw Ibmban ̯d ̯iy, the engagement in aŋam, the oɲen 
umalaŋg, and funerary dancing, the avoidance of the personal name of the dead, the name 
of his/her country, and the name of his/her totemic story figure affect all members of 
Oykangand society to a greater or lesser degree. There is special vocabulary attached to the 
disposal of the dead, to the categories of kin subject to certain restrictions or observances, 
to apparel worn by the mourners and what classes of mourners are recognised. 
The technical terms abm efaʀ and oɲat ̯ are not limited to funerary observation, but 
penetrate wider usage, describing one’s ‘mother’s side’ in a general sense, and effecting 
protection against the obm curse by reference to one’s own ‘widows’, respectively.  
Death is therefore a factor which, entering any explanatory frame, immediately 
dominates the other parameters affecting language use. It cannot be ignored; it will 
immediately affect the speaker, and it will affect his interlocutors, insofar as it determines 
for them all the form of acceptable utterances — if indeed custom allows them to speak at 
all.  In fact, its very pervasiveness becomes a descriptive problem, which the final chapter 
addresses. 
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8 Names and naming 
  
It is a mistake to suppose that we can understand the institutions of 
society by studying them in isolation without regard to other institutions 
with which they coexist and with which they may be correlated ...  
(A.R. Radcliffe-Brown 1952:17) 
Introduction 
The traditional method of language teaching among the Oykangand — and for that 
matter among most traditional Aboriginal peoples of my experience — was to name item 
after item in the target language in lists too long for the newcomer to memorise at first 
exposure, but serving the learner as some sort of cognitive framework for later experience. 
Most field workers have been exposed to this method.  Naming items was seen as teaching 
or explaining the whole of the language. The Oykangand model of language is therefore 
not very remote from the Biblical view, where naming the natural species is Adam’s first 
exercise in linguistics (Genesis 2:19–20).  
There were among the Oykangand also other naming traditions: the assignment of 
personal names, the use of conception site names as personal names, the use of nicknames, 
the sharing of a name, and — for the names of natural species — onomatopoea.  The high 
value placed on naming as a meaningful activity within Oykangand traditional life will 
lead us to three observations in this chapter. 
The first task however is to deal with a difficulty of names and naming raised by the 
literature: 
Inheritance:  myths, and the problem of named sections 
In the central western sector of the Peninsula, Aborigines generally maintained certain 
conventions of inheritance. At birth a child of either sex had a cluster of interrelated 
inheritances settled upon him/her. These were principally derived from the father’s clan 
totem, or — more properly — his story figures (for there is usually more than one). These 
figures each had their identities and (mis)deeds preserved in myths or ‘stories’ owned by 
the clan of which one’s father was a member.  Most Oykangand would own more than one 
such set of myth figures, but one of these would be criterial to identity, and would be often 
definitive of the clan. This myth determines the child’s most significant spiritual 
relationships, which may require a part in increase or other rituals, responsibility for songs 
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in ceremonial cycles, and so on. The story figures are regarded as somehow quasi-
genetically ancestral to the child’s clan, and the actions and proclivities of the story figures 
as men in the past account for idiosyncratic features or behaviour of the figures as species 
or phenomena now. In addition, the child is sometimes given a name reflecting the 
species’ behaviour or aspects of the phenomenon, or possibly an encounter with one of 
these, as a durable link with the mythological past.  
Significant events in these myths are often held to result in unique features of the 
landscape, and so these myths become both charter and title to the land for those who hold 
‘ownership’ of the creation myth.  Access to the lands so defined means independence and 
security, since over these estates the child, as an adult hunter-gatherer, will have 
unquestioned rights of economic management.  Among the tracts to which he/she has title 
there will be places named according to an event related in the myth — a fire, a theft, a 
camp or a killing, for example. To the owners, these myths are very real; there is a 
powerful sense of personal immediacy and relevance to them that becomes the most 
evident to a participant-observer when visiting or hunting over such clan lands with the 
owners.  Other places may be named according to some event or observation in the more 
recent past, such as its association with a flying-fox camp, or its profusion of fish in a 
certain season. 
These facts of land tenure are also reflected in beliefs about conception.  As is the case 
in much of Aboriginal Australia, the spirit of a child is thought to enter the mother’s womb 
from one or other of the conception or spirit centres which are left in the area by the 
founding ancestors. According to the signs that denote impregnation by the spirit, the 
mother or father of a child will normally claim that one of the centres on the father’s clan 
lands is the conception site of her infant.  Siblings normally share conception sites in close 
geographic proximity — and these within the bounds of the clan estate claimed by their 
father.  In its turn, then, the child grows up to accept not only security in the tenure of these 
hunting preserves, but responsibility in maintaining the songs, stories, rituals and taboos 
connected with the land and his/her story-figures.  Stark re-enactments in song and ritual 
dance remind a boy of the dire penalties in store for him who would ignore the land rights 
of another.  The ‘speared man’ dance, which was performed in connection with initiation, 
was a dramatic and graphic cultural statement designed to remain forever in the child’s 
mind. 
The child was also assigned to a moiety, and to a section, or marriage class. 
While there is general agreement by Sharp (1939), and Taylor (1984, and pers. comm.) 
with this description of land and myth in the general area, there is a problem over the 
distribution of sections. In his fine pioneering study of local social organisation, Sharp 
(1937:442) assigns two moieties to the Oykangand.  To Moiety I (embracing his sections A 
and D) he assigns the species named Akapoakap and Ningka, while sections B and C are 
subsumed under Elar in Moiety II.  These moiety names, Sharp notes, are totems — both 
birds, and both important to myths that regulate social behaviour.  In contemporary terms 
these totems are: 
in̯ iŋk ‘tree-creeper’ (onomat. in ̯ akopakop)  
in ̯ elaʀ ‘owlet nightjar’? 
These birds are not now recognised by Oykangand as moiety totems.  Neither species is 
eaten, though the nightjar’s eggs are edible. I will return to the significance of these 
moieties and their totemic representation later.  
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By contrast, attempts to replicate Sharp’s section names proved fruitless over many 
years. This was considered to mean one of several things: 
• Misidentification on Sharp’s part. This was felt to be an uncomfortable 
contention; contemporary work by Alpher (1976), Taylor (1984) and Black 
(pers. comm.) have confirmed his findings in surrounding tribes. 
• The disappearance of sections from among the Oykangand since the early 
1930s — the date of Sharp’s fieldwork. While this was deemed possible, it 
was disturbing that not even the most elderly Oykangand who were 
interviewed had any recollection of such sections — people who would have 
been in their prime in the 1930s or 40s. 
• Inadequacy of my field work technique. The possibility of even the most 
intensive eliciting failing to bring to light social realities could not be 
ignored. Yet it was regarded as surprising if, during seven years of living in 
the Kunjen community, something as socially significant as sections did not 
surface even in casual discussions. 
The issue is the more significant because Alpher has claimed that sections extend over 
the Peninsula co-terminously with the phonological innovation of ‘initial dropping’ — the 
loss of earlier stem-initial consonants (Alpher 1976). This historical linguistic development 
accounts for languages with vowel-initial stems, so that, for example, the reconstructed 
form *ƫamal is reflected in Oykangand as ebmal ‘foot’. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the issue of sections carefully.  If the boundaries of the linguistic development of 
initial dropping (hence, following Alpher, ID) and those of the social system of four 
sections in fact coincide, then Alpher has made a significant claim. He implies that the 
close correlation implies that there were two simultaneous developments in the Peninsula: 
one social, the other, linguistic.  For this to be true, he assumes that ID and sections were 
features of a prestige group or groups that the others emulated. 
Relying on Stanner’s (1936–37) claim that Murinbata society conferred prestige on 
those able to adjudicate in matters pertaining to the newly introduced sub-section system 
there, Alpher claims that the innovators were able to influence the introduction of a parallel 
linguistic novelty: ID. This linguistic innovation, following closely on the heels of a 
sociocultural innovation, reached only as far as the inland languages of the group to which 
Oykangand belongs. Alpher (1976:90) describes the situation in these terms: 
It is apparent from a consideration of the section-terms cited above that the 
correlation of ID and the four-section system holds best for the northernmost subarea 
identified. 
Alpher’s ordering of events is at least plausible: The four-section system became 
established among southern groups who already spoke ID languages. The four-section 
system subsequently became associated with ID in the minds of people to the north, who 
then adopted both together.  
Alpher then went on to examine other innovations — both linguistic and sociocultural 
— in the Peninsula, but none are as well documented, nor as relevant to the Oykangand, as 
the ID thesis expounded above. 
But Alpher’s claim deserved at least some scepticism. Can it be shown that both 
developments entered the area from the south?  Why then is ID a feature of languages 
which are north of the conservative non-ID bloc (reaching across the Peninsula to embrace 
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both the Wik-type languages and the Umpila-Kaantju ones) at the top of the Peninsula?  
The ‘northern Paman’ groups have no section system at all. And to the south, where the 
Kunggara/Kurtjar maintained a four-section system, only a partial ID occurred.  If we are 
looking at a northward spread of sections, and commensurately, a northward progress of 
ID, why is this language — closer to the source of the innovations — not regular in its loss 
of *C1?  It is one of those languages Alpher describes as ‘initial softening’.  While there 
may be evidence for this failure, Alpher does not present it, and draws only on the 
Murinbata for evidence of prestige in the sociocultural development. This is not quite a 
valid inference either, since a sub-section system — particularly one with sixteen sex 
differentiated sub-section names — is much more complex, and so more difficult to learn. 
The prestige, after all, is not given to the system per se but to the members of the in-group 
able to offer judgment on its operation. 
Perhaps the reverse is the case: the ID languages may represent linguistic innovation, 
but social conservatism, originating in a later wave of invading occupiers of the land rather 
than the non-ID languages to the north.  This later immigration shares sections with the 
vast bulk of Aboriginal societies reaching south into New South Wales and Victoria and 
west into Western Australia.  Regrettably, Alpher does not explore this possibility.  
The argument relies also on Sharp’s section names.  Despite lengthly residence in the 
Kowanyama area, Alpher offered no confirmatory contemporary evidence for Oykangand 
sections; a set of more precise phonetic forms of Sharp’s section names is not offered. 
Instead he cites only Hale’s terms for the Aghu Tharrnggala, an ID language on the eastern 
slopes of the Great Divide.  These clearly accord well with Sharp’s (1937:442) names for 
the related languages of Agu Laia and Agu Rarmul (Sharp’s spellings; see Table 8.1).   
Table 8.1:  Aghu Tharrnggala sections 
Hale’s  Sharp’s 
pa:renanga A aparina 
adyurenana B edjurina 
mangelng C manggel 
ara:renanga D ararar 
 
In the face of these data, the cognates that Sharp cites for Oykangand appeared to be 
positive prima facie evidence for a four section system of social organisation.  Cognates of 
the set as listed extend right across the Central Paman subgroup of languages occupying 
the central hinterland of the Peninsula south of Princess Charlotte Bay. But this 
extensiveness is actually an argument against the correctness of the data. The Aghu 
Tharrnggala group, with its related Aghu dialects, is different in its morpheme structure 
conditions from those common to the Central Paman subgroup. Given the low cognate 
density between Oykangand and Aghu Tharrnggala (32% of basic vocabulary; Sommer 
[1970]) the close cognation of all four putative section names is dubious, even given some 
measure of prestige for the construct, and the likelihood of borrowing an appropriate label 
for it. 
The terms given by Sharp for the Oykangand are as follows: 
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A    aparinang 
B    edjirinang 
C    amanggel 
D    ararinang 
Pressed hard to respond to these terms, native speakers of Oykangand could see no 
connection between them, and commented as follows: 
Table 8.2:  Interpretation of Sharp’s section names 
Phonetic form Meaning given 
aparin ̯ ‘lightning’ in Ogh Undjan* 
aʀdjel inaŋ ‘you stay here!’ (Imperative) 
amaŋgel WB in Olgol 
arar inaŋ HZ in Olgol (?) + ‘you’ 
N.B.:  Ogh Undjan and Olgol are related Kunjen dialects. 
*Alternatively: ibaŋar inaŋ ‘father you’. The repetition of inaŋ — 
Oykangand ‘you (sg)’ — in the forms that Sharp elicited suggested to me 
that there had been misunderstanding by his informants.  
Sharp’s terms do not therefore represent anything coherent to the modern Oykangand. 
The best that can be claimed is the second alternative above:  loss of the system since the 
1930s. That such a major artefact of Oykangand social reality should disappear is 
surprising indeed, and the temptation was strong to reject Sharp’s data as erroneous (as in 
the first alternative above), after such failures to confirm the names of the Kunjen sections. 
However, a chance reading of R.H. Mathews revealed that he had recorded (1900:135) a 
set of section names for the ‘Koonjan’ community that could be accommodated to Sharp’s; 
re-ordered, these read: 
Perrynung 
Ajeereena 
Mahngale 
Arenynung 
The coincidence is enough to confirm the earlier existence of sections among the 
Oykangand. 
It is highly likely, therefore, that the system recorded by Mathews and Sharp was extant, 
but perhaps only marginally functional, up into the 1930s. The possibility of ID being 
coterminous with sections is therefore not as weak as was first thought. But the problem is 
now a different one: Why did such a significant system fall into disuse and its terms 
forgotten?  
That it has been forgotten was established by a striking personal experience: I had 
contracted with a Kunggara man, from about Normanton, some 250km to the south, and to 
whom I related as his rather close WB, to assist me with a word list of his language. After 
beginning the interview with questions about personal details, family connections and his 
traditional estates, I progressed to the first linguistic cue, ‘head’.  My interlocutor seemed 
distracted, but finally he made a pronouncement that seemed important; dutifully I wrote it: 
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yu:panpari ‘head’ 
Attempting to confirm it, I got nowhere fast — we seemed to be on different wavelengths.  
Then the light dawned; the Kunggara man was still in the mental set of kin and social 
obligations, and knowing our putative relationship had in fact declared 
‘You (are of/a) Banbarri (Section).’ 
In the discussion that followed, it became evident that he, as a Kunggara, knew that 
‘we’ Oykangand had no active section system, and, so that I should be aware of where I 
stood in his social realm, he had reckoned my section from his own by way of our known 
‘kinship’ standing. In other words, I already held a place in his kinship scheme, and that 
this implied also a certain necessary section placement that he was now reckoning for me.  
I was neither wanting nor expecting such a placement, and have found use for it neither 
before nor since.  But what is significant was his judgment of the situation: the Oykangand 
(and in the 1970s he had married one) had no evident section system by which marriages 
were regulated.  While neither Sharp nor Matthews make mention of the fact, it must have 
been the case that even in their respective times, the Oykangand were already making little 
use of the four-section system for which these ethnographers had recorded names. 
We conclude, then, that the facts of social organisation accessible since the early 1960s 
do not support the persistence of sections among the Oykangand.  There is no recollection 
of section names either by them, or by their neighbours.  Further, any use of a section term 
as a naming strategy — commonly encountered with subsection terms in North East 
Arnhemland — is absent from Oykangand usage, if still observed among the Kurtjar just to 
the south. 
Not only section names, but the moiety totem names have also been lost.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, no Oykangand would ever remark — as North-East 
Arhemlanders have to me — that s/he is (of) one moiety or the other; in̯ elaʀ and in ̯ iŋk do 
not parallel the Yuulŋu use of Dhuwa (d ̯uwa) and Yirritja (yiriƫa). It took specific enquiry 
of the older men in the mid-1970s to disclose these Oykangand moiety names.  The in ̯ elaʀ 
myth was still well-known, and it taught significant social behaviour, but the status of this 
figure as a moiety symbol was rapidly fading.  The name of the species in opposition to it, 
in ̯ iŋk, was not identified by even middle-aged Oykangand.    
Personal names and story-figures 
Dousset begins his paper (published as late as 1997) with the observation that 
Personal names seem not to be of major interest to Australian Aboriginal 
anthropology, and studies on this topic ... are relatively sparse. And yet they are of 
major concern to the researcher, especially if his or her main topic is kinship and hence 
the tracing of genealogical trees  (p.50). 
Dousset deals with alternate names, nicknames, substitute names at death, and English 
names.  Some of these possibilities are examined in this chapter. 
Because there is typically more than one myth owned by any one Oykangand, it often 
happens that the same central figure appears in stories claimed by distinct patrilines.  From 
the data available, there exists no possibility of marriage between partners sharing the same 
primary story figure within the linguistic group. The same is not true for secondary or non-
definitive myths. The data include a licit marriage between partners who shared a 
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secondary myth in the yam story. The primary story-figure is unique to the moiety — 
though from limited observations it would appear that further afield in remoter Peninsular 
groups the same figure may turn up associated with a group of the opposite moiety.  
Typical clusters of myths — referenced by their principal figures — have been recorded 
as follows: 
MOIETY I: 
flying fox (red) in̯ inpay (?); willy-wagtail in̯ anen (?); agile wallaby in ̯ oyboy;  
yam egŋ oow; sand shark (?); baby arŋg; lightning in ̯ oɲ; file snake  
in ̯ igŋgun; catfish uy ermbal; rain eeʀ; water og; taipan in̯ albmbir; black eagle in̯ 
orbolŋg; woomera od ̯aw; jabiru in̯ oykonb. 
MOIETY II: 
emu in ̯ aamb; devil/ghost agŋaʀ; frog ednbal; black cockatoo in̯ ulγ; brolga in̯ 
kot ̯akot ̯; plains (‘pretty face?’) wallaby in ̯ aykur; diver bird in ̯ ulm; penis/lover 
od ̯/abm.el; dog ud. 
The principal story of a cluster can be the basis of a person’s private name, though 
sometimes a close kinsman from another clan claims the right to name a child, and the 
name then reflects something of traditional importance to the donor.  A special relationship 
between the two then persists while they both live. It is suggested that the child is 
informally adopted or under the protectiom of the name-giving party, or somehow obliged 
to him/her. Typically however the practice is for the child to take a name from the 
character, behaviour or environmental correlates of the principal figure of its father’s story. 
Note the following names held by owners of the emu story: 
Table 8.3:  Personal names attached to the emu totem 
Initials Oykangand name Meaning 
HH in ̯ erk uɲuʀiy  ‘animal place cool’ 
LS onmon ugŋgubiy erganaγ ‘eggs with chest covered’  
VH in ̯ al ̯ambul ‘emu egg’ 
RH egŋ eweʀ ianaγ  ‘grass (sp.) must-eat’ 
PH egŋ ogŋgamaγ elken ̯aγ ‘food earlier-from returns’ 
DC in ̯ aʀaiy udnan ̯aγ ‘animal camps on nest’ 
CR in ̯ erk aʀaʀuw iɲinaγ ‘animal dust from running’ 
RS in ̯ erk ubun ̯d ̯iy ‘animal place dark-in’ 
RN uy oren aʀtinaγ ‘fish rise-up behind (emu’s visit)’ 
Oykangand people take pains to explain that these names relate to the story figure as a 
natural species, and not as a human ancestor.  For example, RS’s name reflects the fact that 
the emu is difficult to approach closely in hunting — its senses are so sharp that it is 
usually seen only at a distance away from its darker habitations.  The names of PH and HH 
represent keen observations of emu behaviour: it returns to the same places for its food, 
and it prefers cooler places in the bush. There are also beliefs about the emu, as in RN’s 
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name: fishing is always good following an emu’s visit; CR’s name on the other hand 
derives from a simple observation. 
As noted above, irregularities of naming appear to result from the choice of a name by 
some kinsman, with connections that s/he wishes to perpetuate.  Hence BL, whose story is 
‘yam’, has a ‘flying-fox’ name: in ̯ uk otel of ugŋginaγ ‘animal tree butt only leave’.  This 
is a whimsical observation of the damage that a huge colony of this species alighting on the 
branches can inflict on trees.  In the same family, PL has a Kok Kabeʀ name: yok wanaŋ 
‘tree sp. [linen tree?]’, and three siblings have names from the ‘water’ story: og oroman ̯d ̯ 
aran ambanaγ (PL) ‘water cold-in shiver cause’, og owayfel ad ̯en ambanaγ (WL) ‘water 
turning to froth’ and og umaγ olon ̯aγ (GL) ‘(flood)water inside (the house) runs’. The 
father of that family has a personal name attributed to the kangaroo myth: in̯ eyeʀ arkinaγ 
‘animal bumping-sound follow’ [from the way this species is hunted] (LD), but this does 
not alter his totemic attachment to ‘yam’  mythology and ritual. 
Some names are simply lexical labels: in̯ albeʀ ‘native cat’, uy irfuŋ ‘fish sp. yellow 
jewfish’.  Others are less species related than they are ‘perdurable elements of the physical 
or psychological world’ (Sharp 1937), such as og ilbmb (JB and MLS) ‘bitter/sea-water’. 
Other names are much more complex: in̯ ulgŋgulŋandiy erbemaγ (SM: red flying-fox) 
‘animals fall from the fighting-stick fall’, in ̯ oʀoŋ id ̯n ̯d ̯anaγ, (FB: black [= wedge-tail] 
eagle) ‘animal from above seizes’, ukan otelγ aʀtin ambanaγ (P: water) ‘bush-fire for 
throat rises up (and hence makes you thirsty)’. The name uyam uk ilg inan ̯aγ (HG) ‘hand 
stick with sit’ was first translated ‘sitting with a gun in your hand’ and depicts the action to 
which recourse would be taken if a devil or ghost were believed to be in the offing, 
especially at night. The name applies to a member of the clan owning the devil story, of 
course. 
In many cases, such connections between the name and the story figure depend on a 
rich complex of experiences and associations that are deeply embedded in the culture, and 
the highly developed cognitive skills of observation, comparison and contrasting. The 
system is opaque to the outsider without these experiences and associations. What this 
means is that Oykangand names perpetuate not only the story affiliation(s) of their owners, 
but real-life experiences of the owners’ story-figures by other Oykangand speakers who 
can identify with the shrewd — and often whimsical — observation so enshrined. The 
public nature — but not unrestricted use — of these names, and the way in which they are 
sometimes touted, is almost reminiscent of a carnival huckster in the American tradition; 
the attitude held by the owner of the name is one of pride and self-aggrandisement. It is 
almost as if the owners were — in the last cases, above — trying to say ‘Get your flying 
fox too, by knocking it down with a fighting stick!’ or ‘When the smoke from the fire 
burns your throat, it’s a good drink of water that you want!’ or ‘You better stay on the 
watch for my story figure — it’s the devil himself!’. 
Personal names that are derived from story affiliations in this fashion are therefore one 
of the devices whereby the Oykangand continually reconstruct social and sacred realities 
about them. Personal names publicly declare totemic affiliations in a formal — but 
certainly not grave — fashion. 
But in the day-to-day course of events it is not the personal name so derived that is 
used, much less any secret name of ritual or religious origin, but the name of the 
individual’s conception site.  The impression given by Oykangand advisers is that the use 
of a personal name is ill-mannered — perhaps because it gives access to the persona so 
named.   
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But the sharing of conception-site names is much more common in the data than the 
sharing of personal totemic or ‘story’ names.  Amongst the site names is however a far 
greater uniformity, in that almost all refer to the patrilineal estate of the owner.  In fact, it is 
possible to map clan estates quite well by reference to conception sites alone, and even in 
the re-alignment of estates after migration there is a good deal of consistency.  The names 
of such conception-sites — erk elampuŋk — need not have any connection with the 
charter myth — the site may fall between or to one side of mythically important centres, or 
may be a site relevant to non-personally ‘owned’ myths of a public sort. For example, 
while VH claims uriw ampuŋk ‘emu spirit-centre’ as a member of the ‘emu’ totem 
owners, and NG claims in ̯ ot ̯eʀɲ ‘meat in throat’ (‘devil’ story; it is popularly believed 
that the devil doesn’t allow its victim to finish a meal), while on the other hand RL claims 
arfan ̯iy ‘tree sp. freshwater mangrove’ (‘devil’ story) with no obvious connection to his 
story.  Sites of this latter sort appear to be named after events recalled for their pleasure or 
humour, and the event is later lost to clan history, while the name remains.  Such would be 
the case for adn iduʀaγ ‘excrement speared once’; no living Oykangand can recall who 
might have been responsible or the hilarity that such an event would trigger.  The site of  
og elγay egaman̯d ̯‘water bone in head’ derives its name from the fact that a longish reach 
of the Mitchell River has, where the water flows into it (the ‘head’), a large and unusual 
group of rocks (‘bones’); og elγay aʀem [arem ‘without’] describes the lower end of the 
same reach, where there are no rocks. Others also appear to be named for their topography, 
as og adndaʀiy ‘water in sand’, or useful features, as uy ewaman ̯d ̯ ‘fish in hole’. 
Lacking personal names legitimate to public use, the Oykangand are quick to bestow 
nicknames — usually descriptive of some physical feature or oddity.  For example, I never 
heard JC, who was born deaf and dumb, called anything but (abm) oŋoŋ ‘person dumb’.  A 
close friend who seriously chopped his foot one Christmas while preparing a stack of 
firewood for his pregnant wife, had become udnbaʀ ‘lame’ for a while from an accident in 
childhood, and residents quickly recalled the name to currency with some relish until long 
after the later wound had healed. A lady with an irregularly shaped head was eg ufufal 
‘head swollen’, and her close sister, who had suffered damage to her arm in a fight (she 
had a fierce temper and fought often) was ubmbal ed ̯aɲ ‘upper.arm bent’ or eg albman 
amay ‘head hair big’ for her very wild and wire-like hair. Two exceptionally small statured 
siblings were each known as ‘Stumpy George’ and ‘Shorty’, but (abm) atoʀƫen ‘(person) 
short’ was the more usual camp name for them both (one is mentioned by this name in the 
section on Obm in Chapter 6).  The term was used consistently of EB, a sister to the latter, 
also. 
In one case, the history of a nickname was recounted to me with some glee:  
It appears that B was accustomed to wait behind a tree at one end of the village for 
assignations with his many lovers, and as they came past he would then whistle to them or 
otherwise attract their attention and divert their progress without appearing in the open 
himself.  One evening he was at his station behind a large bloodwood tree, uk igay, when 
he was noticed by one of two other young ladies walking out of the village — no doubt on 
amorous pursuits of their own. One decided that she would play a trick on the unsuspecting 
B, and as she drew alongside the tree she screamed and ran towards the camp in mock fear, 
yelling that there was a ghost behind the tree. Her companion, thoroughly alarmed and 
upset, took up the flight and did likewise. B was able to slip away during the commotion, 
but the incident ruined any opportunity to meet with his current sweetheart, as the area was 
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soon occupied by a dozen or more other men, armed with fighting sticks and ready to 
protect the camp. B later met up with the miscreants and swore at them roundly, but they 
countered by calling him Igay as a nickname, and the term stuck.  It was never a name that 
B relished. 
In another case, an old man died just as a serious cyclone was upon the community, and 
the funeral had to be hastened incongruously to ensure interment before the storm broke. 
He was known thereafter as elfal orfoʀoŋgol ‘tears cyclone’. 
Naming the species 
The part serious, part whimsical Oykangand approach to naming extends most 
obviously to natural species, where one of two strategies can provide an alternative 
reference term. The first is onomatopoeia, which is an attempt to replicate, given 
Oykangand phonological segments — and sometimes non-systematic speech sounds or 
patterns, too — the typical call or cry of a bird or animal. The final form is typically 
reduplicated, as the cases in Table 8.4 show. 
Table 8.4:  Onomatopoeic names for species 
Usual Oykangand reference English gloss Onomatopoeic form 
in ̯ ewid ̯n ̯d ̯uy hawk sp. kaŋkaŋ 
in ̯ al ̯oy jabiru ´ʀtok´ʀtok 
in ̯ obmb flying fox (black) uʀdnuʀdn 
in ̯ agŋgoy flying fox (red) gigŋgigŋ 
ednbal frog (gen.) bokQbok 
in ̯ oʀolmb blue-wing kookaburra kurukuruk 
The second strategy — exemplified in Table 8.5 –— is to use a nickname, usually 
related to physical features but sometimes to behavioural ones. The list here is long, and 
includes some of the personal names already met, e.g. in ̯ erk uɲuʀiy (lit. ‘animal place 
cool’) for ‘emu’. Most of the nicknames of Table 8.5 will be transparent to the reader 
familiar with Australian wildlife. 
It should not be surprising that there are instances of both onomatopoeia and nicknames 
applied to some species, giving multiple referential alternatives. The terms of Table 8.6 
apply to birds. 
Nor should it be surprising that relatively minor species — economically and ritually — 
have only an onomatopoeic name or a descriptive nickname still remembered.  The red-
eyed mullet for example is known as uy el (el)bmbelbmel (lit. ‘fish eye red’; in 
accordance with haplology rules, the bracketed el is usually deleted), the fork-tail and 
whistling kites have only onomatapoeic names. 
These two strategies — onomatopoeia and distinctive nicknames — are more obvious, 
but probably less important than the regular lexical alternatives created by other processes, 
such as borrowing and semantic shift.  Regular alternates are called into use by death, as 
previously noted.  Table 8.7 shows some of these. 
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Table 8.5:  The nicknames of various species 
Usual Oykangand  
reference 
Gloss Nick-name Explanation 
uy od ̯ol saw-fish uy ow enoŋg ‘fish with a different nose’ 
uy adndalγun archer fish uy eweɲ abuʀ ‘fish obsessed with spitting’ 
(this fish ‘shoots down’ 
insects with a squirt of water) 
in ̯ igŋgun file snake ew obayobay ‘mouth soft-REDUP’ 
in ̯ ukuy black headed 
python 
in ̯ eg olbon ‘animal head black’ 
in ̯ at ̯uʀ pelican otel abmbidnban >abmbin idnban:  ‘throat 
dilly-bag too-big’ 
uy aloŋgol saratoga  
(fish sp.) 
el aʀdan  
and 
uy embeʀ idnban 
‘eye-deep’  
  also  
‘fish scale too-big’ 
in ̯ owin ̯ay   and 
 et ̯ambuw 
crocodile,  
estuarine 
ebmal aʀoy ‘foot stop one place’,  
i.e. isn’t nomadic 
in ̯ alγon snake sp.  
yellow-belly 
og abuʀ ‘obsessed by water’ – this 
snake lives off small fish 
in ̯ irbiʀ kangaroo aun aʀdndal  
and 
ubman ebmborŋ 
‘tail heavy’ 
 
‘thigh long’ 
in ̯ awaʀel crow ew aɲan ‘mouth apart’ from the way  
a crow behaves when hot 
in ̯ argel hawk sp. otel idaʀ ilg ‘throat with stripe’ 
 
Table 8.6:  Regular names, nicknames and onomatopoeic names of two birds 
Species: Burdekin duck Brolga 
Usual Oykangand reference: in ̯ erken ̯al in ̯ oykonb 
Onomatopoeic form: ŋeriŋer kot ̯Qkot ̯ 
Nick-name: in ̯ adndaʀ abuʀ in ̯ arŋgan abuʀ 
Explanation: ‘animal obsessed with sand’ ‘animal obsessed with grass 
species’ 
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Table 8.7:  Alternative names of six species 
Alternations Species 
albmul/ut̯in mussel sp. 
owin ̯ay/et ̯ambuw crocodile, estuarine 
ifan/ebman ̯d ̯ antbed, termite mound 
igay/o/edndoʀɲ bloodwood tree 
irƫal/elkoy long-neck tortoise 
arƫiriy/akondel sand goanna 
 
On the other hand, alternate lexicalisations appear to have been derived in some 
instances from earlier nicknames (Table 8.8). 
Table 8.8:  Probable lexical innovations from species’ nicknames 
Usual Oykangand form Probable innovation Explanation 
ermbal ilmbilg catfish sp. (ilg ‘with’; ilmb now 
lost as a separate word – spike?) 
it ̯al alkoloʀ tortoise sp. (alk ‘spear’; oloʀ 
‘girl’; perhaps from the ease of 
catching these amphibians?) 
elkoy iral tortoise sp. (iral ‘hungry for 
meat’?) 
akondel arƫiriy goanna sp. (<arƫiʀ ‘mouse’; both 
species make heaps of finely 
crumbed earth from their holes) 
 
There are also two significant developments from onomatopoeia. An Oykangand 
speaker controls a highly specific subset of the lexicon as interjections, which fall outside 
the regular morpheme structure constraints of the language. For example ƫur! is 
monosyllabic, of atypical CVC structure, and means ‘he/she/it fell down’, or perhaps, 
‘crash!’.  Because of the highly specific association of sound with meaning in these cases, 
it is possible to reconstruct the source and derivation of two regular lexical items: 
Descriptive of the sound made by a wallaby or kangaroo bounding off into the bush is 
the sequence boyǃ — usually giving verve and life to a narrative at the point of a hunting 
episode when the quarry escapes, where boy is repeated several times. Similarly, when 
chasing a newly sighted quarry, men crash through the underbrush urging dogs after the 
animal with shouts of b´rr! b´rr! b´rr!   Now the simply reduplicated forms *boyboy and 
*pirpir fail to conform to Oykangand morpheme structure constraints in one respect only; 
each has an initial consonant, loss of which renders the form regular to canonical stem 
shapes.  In addition, an historically recent rule changes the character of final trill r to the 
corresponding glide, ʀ. The resulting forms oyboy and irbiʀ are now the shapes of the 
lexical entries for ‘agile wallaby’ and ‘kangaroo’ respectively.  There is even a reason for 
this, and not the reverse application: it is the agile wallaby, rather than the kangaroo, that 
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one gets close enough to in the bush to hear its distinctive departure; kangaroos are seen 
more often at some distance on more open country, and hence require a chase by dogs if 
they are to be brought down. 
Shared names 
The word used for ‘name’ by the Oykangand is usually ukal — though uŋkal has also 
been recorded. A question such as ‘What do you call him/her/it?’ is usually effected by 
simply asking ukal/uŋkal arin? — literally ‘name which-way?’ This would serve to 
enquire about a person’s name, or what a given artefact, natural species, pet dog or place 
might be properly called. 
The phrase ukal ilgaγ — literally ‘name together’ — is used to describe that situation 
where two people, dogs, etc. have the same name.  Between two people, such a condition 
implies a special relationship.  The older may take a particular interest in the growth and 
development of the younger, may seek out his/her company, and give gifts of food, etc.  In 
old age, it would be expected that such gifts would be reciprocated.  Such coincidences of 
naming may be deliberate, where some close relative demands the right to name a child, or 
claims the right through the parents having been at the elder’s conception site or on his/her 
country or in his/her company when the child is believed to have been conceived. The 
elder may in this way bestow his/her name on the child. 
In this way our daughter (see Prologue) was assigned not only a name but a conception 
site, too. The former was bestowed by an imputed aunt, a close FZ who had, as her primary 
totem, water — which was reckoned as being secondary to mine as the child’s father. So 
the child became og ilbmb ‘brackish, bitter water’ to the Oykangand community, and was 
even informally assigned a ‘promise’ — a husband. Her conception site, erk igow, 
happened to be one that we had visited at about the time of her conception, which fell not 
only on the border of clan estates claimed by my imputed clan, but also among those of her 
mother’s mother.  That assignment was regarded as particularly appropriate. 
Between two people that share the same name can be observed two other behavioural 
consequences.  The first, most obviously, is that on the death of one, the other is not only 
implicated in deep mourning appropriate to the kinship category obtaining between them, 
but must for a few years find another name. This applies both to given names and 
conception site names.  Name taboo at death (explored in the next section of this chapter) 
is very carefully observed, and any offensive behaviour can be taken very seriously indeed. 
The other consequence is that under no circumstances can the two people sharing the 
one name ever be seen to even approach conflict or disagreement.  It is as if the one name 
designates but one personality or psyche, such that even tension between the two is viewed 
as a spiritual breakdown or threat to the personality of both.  In situations where even 
divergent opinions have become obvious, the coincidence of English names has been 
enough for others to speak warningly about the differences, and for them to try and usher 
one of the parties away from the scene of conflict. 
We gather from evidence such as this that personal names give some sort of direct 
access to the personality or spiritual essence of the individual, and that this explains 
something of the reluctance to use such names publicly, so that conception site names, 
nicknames and kinship terms are preferred as the means of referencing another 
Oykangand, according to the demands placed on verbal behaviour by the kinship system. 
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The name of the dead 
There is an immediate taboo placed on the use of the name of the newly deceased, 
his/her primary totem, and the name of his/her conception site.  A formula, ar ambal amay, 
is applied in lieu of these names, and speakers commented that its use paralleled English 
‘so-and-so’, where the pronunciation of the name is for one reason or another being 
avoided. The phrase ar ambal amay (lit. ‘wasted cause big’) is employed as a complex 
noun, but is also shortened to ar ambal where convenient, or when a grammatical affix is 
required. The phrase ad ̯n ̯d ̯uʀam amay was also recorded as an alternative, although its 
conditions of use remain unknown; one speaker claimed that it was Uw Ibmban ̯d ̯iy.  With 
these linguistic devices available, speakers are expected to avoid the use of a dead person’s 
name as a matter of courtesy, especially to the bereaved. 
The phrase ar ambal amay can however be used in a more profane and prosaic fashion 
when the speaker momentarily forgets the name of someone or something, and so it has the 
force of ‘what-do-you-call-it’ in English. An example of this usage appears in the text 
material of Appendix 2.  The speaker has temporarily forgotten the word orer ‘large bag’, 
in boasting about the abundance of geese eggs we had gathered: 
Elkon ̯d ̯elkon ̯d ̯ edn erab. 
billy-can  3pl.nom  several 
‘There were several billycans. 
Ar amba-l oŋgon-oŋgon ito̯m-iy. 
wasted happen-PD REDUP-big.one that-PRE 
Big what-do-you-call-thems (bags) there, too.’  
In the next case, again drawn from the text material of Appendix 2, Lawrence employs 
ar ambal to avoid mentioning even the totem of a recently deceased person. Because this 
totem was the agile wallaby, Lawrence resorts to ‘kangaroo’ in a locale where no kangaroo 
would be found — along the banks of the main River. I even heard the English word 
‘rabbit’ as a pseudonym for wallaby in this period, despite the fact that most Oykangand 
would never see one alive.  
Il enoŋg- iy,  in ̯  ari-n alo-l in ̯ ar.ambal, 
3sg.nom another-PRE    animal   hit-E  go.along-PD  animal so-and-so 
in ̯ irbiʀ ari-n alo-l uk  *line ilg aroda-n-aγ 
animal k’roo  hit-E  go.along-PD  tree   *line COM  suspend-E-PRP  
an ̯d ̯an. 
1pl(ex).nom 
‘That other chap, he went along shooting, shooting so-and-so, he went along 
shooting [wallabies] (for bait), so we could hang our line off a tree.’ 
People with the same name — ukal ilgaγ — must find some substitute at least 
temporarily; the change of name is sometimes permanent. 
Even English names have been subjected to taboo.  Names such as ‘Annie’ and ‘Pansy’, 
‘Tim’ and ‘Leonard’ were taboo for the first four or five years of our time with the 
Oykangand, because people who had been given those names had died just before the time 
of our arrival. The death of Pansy made matters especially awkward, and in fact most 
confusing, because the surviving namesake took her own sister’s name, ‘Molly’, in the 
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interim. Two ‘Molly’s in the one family made ambiguity difficult to avoid.  The traditional 
sociolinguistic pattern of name taboo has been successfully adapted to embrace English 
names and species.  
To fail to observe this courtesy brings the charge that the speaker is intent on ‘digging 
his/her bones’: elγay iŋin ibmbibmbunaγ. [This phrase also strongly suggests that  
the ultimate mode of disposal of the dead was generally interment.] Depending on 
relationships, the intensity of personal antagonisms, or the personalities involved, such an 
exchange might already be enough to provoke a physical confrontation. The association of 
the name of the dead with a swear word, such as elbmbenan ̯d ̯ or eg.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ (both loosely 
translated ‘bastard’) or with alleged sexual misconduct, especially that which ignores 
kinship proprieties, can be guaranteed to precipitate a fight.  Typically the combatants form 
up in two rows and hurl insults, wave fighting sticks and yamsticks, beat the ground with 
them, hurl spears, and attempt to damage one another, while the women dance a form of 
‘shake-a-leg’ and generally goad the opposition or encourage their heros with reminders of 
kinship responsibilities. An exchange, reconstructed for the tape recorder, which brought 
about a fight, comprised the following: 
A: Eg.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ inin, od ̯n ̯d ̯oʀ adn=aŋan ̯d ̯ǃ 
bastard 2sg.poss dead excrement-EL 
‘Your dead relative was a bastard; [s/he came] from excrement!’ 
B: elγay ayin ibmbu-n? eg.id ̯n ̯d ̯aγ inin awiyǃ 
bones Q dig-PRES bastard 2sg.poss too 
‘Are you digging up his bones?  Yours was a bastard, too!’ 
The use of the name of the dead, added to the insult of A, above, would exacerbate the 
matter by an order of magnitude, and the result would be not just a fight between A and B, 
but an inter-family, or even inter-clan, battle.  
Paradoxically, the name of the dead appears in the obscene joking reported between the 
two men B and C, in Chapter 6, and in another case a raconteur is frightened by a 
capricious apparition which he claims to be his deceased younger brother that he almost 
affectionately calls elbmbenan ̯d ̯ ‘bastard’. 
In more modern times, the name is retrieved for use again after a headstone is raised 
over the grave of the deceased, but this is believed to be an adaptation of Islanders’ 
custom, complete with ‘party’ and ‘feast’.  One speaker commented 
Eg ulgŋgulam anen erne-n̯ amba-n, ukal afa-n, 
ID=headstone  when  stand-E  cause-PRES name  fetch-PRES 
egŋ *party ia-n —  anaman aŋaɲ. 
food  eat-PRES old.times nothing 
‘When they set up the headstone, they fetch the name, and have a party  
— but [we] didn’t do that in the old days.’ 
There was however a point at which the name was retrieved for public use, and this 
appears to be simultaneous with the lifting of the general food taboos. That this was a 
signficant event is quite clear, but contemporary Oykangand practice has overshadowed 
tradition, and the details of previous practice have become blurred. 
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Summary:  names, naming and kinship 
In Chapter 5 there were examples of discourse strategies that speakers of Oykangand 
adopted to hold the floor so that uncertainties about the identity of dramatis personnae 
were established without direct reference to their names, and without inviting interruption 
of the flow of narrative.  Names, it was inferred, were very private devices, and the public 
invocation of one person’s name by another — although names were usually public 
enough — was regarded as tantamount to the possession of some spiritual ascendancy or 
even power over them.  The question then arises, why so much as have a name if it can’t 
be used?   
The answer to this lies in some perhaps universal need for identity and individuality. 
The Oykangand as a community of speakers name themselves from the ecology of their 
environment: ‘the people from the outside lagoons.’  They will say ‘The floodwaters bin 
bring us’ in support of that orientation.  But equally, when I first interviewed an old man 
who was later to assume the role of WF in the kinship system that fictively embraced us, I 
was told the language name was ew aŋkaʀ lit. ‘mouth ache’.  Because of its vowel-initial 
words, voiced/voiceless stop contrasts, and complex consonant sequences such as /lbmb/, 
/ʀdnd/ and /lgŋg/, Oykangand presents learning difficulties to speakers of nearby 
languages which lack those complexities.  Roth (1910: Plate XXX) had met the same term, 
and the bureaucrats designing the suburb of Aranda in our national capital had doubtless 
scoured the literature — including his — for the names of indigenous tribes to attach to its 
streets.  ‘Ewankar’ on a beautifully stencilled National Capital Development Commission 
street sign cracked me up the first time I saw it.  It seems that the Oykangand peoples’ self-
deprecation of their resources and their country (Sommer 1978) also runs to their self-
identification as a group.  But whether self-deprecating or not (and I tend to the view that 
the name is rather more sly whimsy again on their part) it comprises a unique identifying 
label — a linguistic rallying point for group cohesion and identity. 
If then a name establishes group identity and enhances its cohesion, it might be argued 
that a personal name fulfils the same function at the level of the individual.  Sharp (1937: 
Chapter 4) commented on the relationship between totemically derived names and identity 
among the Yir Yoront, and this must be seen as a powerful connection, especially if his 
analysis of totemism and its social function is accepted.  The Oykangand, we have seen, 
observe similar conventions. 
So then, at the level of the individual, the needs for self expression and for declaration 
of identity in acknowledging a name, on the one hand, are kept in check on the other hand 
by the convention of respect or dread that no-one wants to leave him/herself open to 
possible spiritual domination or ascendancy by others through allowing the public use of 
his/her name. Hostile spiritual forces and enemies might take advantage of such 
knowledge. Usage of personal names is therefore curtailed. At the level of the speech 
community, the convention of naming the world about them (in what I argue again is the 
coin of sly whimsy, based on acute observation, which is also the mechanism generating 
nicknames) bears on personal names through the medium of totemic affiliations, and this 
shapes the form of personal names. 
Naming thus remains a significant social activity, and performs important functions 
within society by identifying the named entities through terms that are recognisable only in 
the history or ecology or lifestyle of the society.  At the same time, kinship terms and other 
circumlocutions are preferred over personal names to avoid the possibility that in the event 
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of a death, blame will fall on the name user for having power or ascendancy over the 
deceased such that the event is attributed to him/her. 
This chapter has examined the most obvious alternative to kin term usage as a strategy 
for referencing others. The hypothesis that kinship categories are pivotally critical to 
Oykangand discourse gains credance from the limitations placed on the use of personal 
names. It is clear that names and naming have been developed to a high level by the 
Oykangand, applying to persons, social groups and species in a creative and innovative 
fashion. But however important this socially significant activity might be to the 
Oykangand, it is evident that, in discourse, personal names are carefully controlled so as to 
avoid the implication that the speaker has a spiritual advantage over the person named.  
The spectre of powers from the spirit world intruding on society through names becomes 
most evident in behaviour over shared names.  Shared names, significant enough to invoke 
a specific lexical label in ukal ilgaγ, were deemed to represent a point at which the psychic 
or spiritual forces involved came to the social surface and had to be publicly recognised. 
To avoid possible misinterpretation, the Oykangand turn to the names of conception sites, 
nicknames, and of course the categories of kinship, to refer to another of their number.  
The not unreasonable conclusion is that, despite the sophistication of naming in 
Oykangand society, personal names are called upon by speakers much less frequently and 
less freely than are kin categories — requiring of the hearer in turn an intimate knowledge 
of descent and alliance in that society to identify discourse referents. 
 
170  
9 Conclusions 
  
Like many others, I think that linguistics is an interesting place to look for 
parallels to doing ethnography.  (Agar 1980:189) 
Overview 
The frame, as a theoretical construct, attempts to model human knowledge of 
behavioural norms. In this role it is perceived as providing the members of a culture with a 
coherent set of parameters or conditions on the basis of which to compose reasoned 
expectations. These expectations apply both to the course, and to the outcomes, of social 
interactions (that are in this study essentially verbal ones). From the consequent mental 
‘set’, or expectations derived from such a body of social and linguistic conditions, speakers 
are able to project onto a situation just how it might be properly interpreted.  They can then 
settle on an appropriate course of action: how to respond, to enter the discussion, to 
manipulate the discourse in their favour, and so on. The frame determines the general style 
or tenor of the discourse, while the actual exchanges of the discourse are very much at the 
discretion of each participant. 
Interpretation is, in turn, necessary because very few, if any, situations are imbued with 
what Bauman (1977:10) termed ‘naked literalness’. It was a social error, for example, for 
MF to use a ‘respect’ vocabulary term to me, as a ‘marriageable cousin’ where the usual 
‘profane’ one was called for. I would interpret this as placing me outside the circle of kin 
with whom she could be familiar and at ease. Consequently she felt the need to apologise, 
in case I had been offended by her use of the wrong expression (Chapter 6). The two terms 
involved are literally equivalent, and hence have literally equivalent meanings, but they are 
not appropriate to the same frames — they have discrete social meanings. The same point 
is made in Scenario Two of the Prologue — ebmoŋ and adneʀeŋand are not socially 
equivalent terms, despite their referential equivalence. When I in turn used the wrong one, 
it was interpreted by my fictive sister, Elizabeth, as an insult both to my daughter and to 
her. 
The claim is that cues in the verbal context, in the person and role of the interlocutor(s), 
and in the other elements of the social environment, are ‘read into’ some sort of register in 
the memory, where an appropriate set of such conditions then invokes a frame already 
familiar to the speaker. Presumably a match is made between those contemporaneous 
conditions, and a set which has been stored as a result of prior experiences — the latter 
being attached to known outcomes. Consequently, the verbal exchanges that then occur can 
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be processed appropriately, and the speaker can then enter into them as a contributor  
according to his/her personality, mental state, personal goals, volition, and so on. The 
recognition of a frame allows the speaker to ‘set the scene’ in which the consequent 
behavioural ‘drama’ or ‘script’ is followed through. It is the miscuing of frames — 
mistakes in reading them — that Goffman (1977) exemplifies in drawing our attention to 
the reality of the frame as a theoretical construct in accounting for human behaviour.  
Because the frame relates directly to context — social and linguistic — it suffers from 
the same uncertainty of definiton (and usage) that ‘context’ does. In editing a recent 
anthology aimed at Rethinking context, Durani and Goodman (1992:2) remark in their 
introduction on the problems of adequately defining context, with the words 
... it does not seem possible at the present time to give a single, precise technical 
definition of context ... 
since less than a page later they state that  
context is thus a frame (Goffman 1974) that surrounds the event being examined and 
provides resources for its appropriate interpretation: 
context 
 
focal event (italics mine – BAS) 
and thereby equate the concepts of context and frame.  It would not appear unwarranted to 
conclude that the frame is still equally ‘defined more by situated practice’ (p.2) than by 
formal criteria.  Equally, too, if  
... lack of a single formal definiton, or even a general agreement about what is meant 
by context, is not a situation that necessarily requires a remedy  (p.2) 
then the frame can also have a useful descriptive role without being forced prematurely 
into an uncomfortable theoretical mould. In this study I have quite deliberately taken a 
conservative stance over the frame, defining it simply as an aggregate of social and 
linguistic conditions that is recognised — in this instance — by Oykangand, and so creates 
expectations of the sort of ‘focal event’ that can occur among them. 
So then the frame might be reckoned as a sort of musical score, while the ‘script’ or 
‘drama’ that follows is its performance. In fact, an analogy from music illuminates the 
above concepts well: The knowing listener can anticipate what J.S. Bach’s Toccata and 
Fugue in D minor will sound like; it has a recognised form and a shape based on his/her 
past experience and his/her appreciation as a music lover. He/she has an anticipation of it 
on that basis.  But the performance itself might leave him/her disappointed over its tempo, 
or uplifted by its grandeur, or frustrated at its weak bass, or impressed by its power, or 
whatever. The performance is a variable, dependent for its form on the interpretation of the 
player, the instrument he has available to him, his skill, the acoustics, and so on. In the 
same way, a given frame might be ‘played out’ in any number of different ways, according 
to the whim of the interacting parties, and each speaker’s social adroitness, verbal skills, 
and personality.  
In ethnographic coin, the performance is however all that the researcher has available as 
data when it comes to analysing or describing the frames that underly human behaviour. 
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‘Strips’ of language performance are therefore the points of research entry to the 
underlying patterns of social behaviour that are accounted for by frames. 
Appropriate social behaviour, including verbal behaviour, in the Australian Aboriginal 
context, is clearly governed primarily by the formal categories of kinship.  While that 
generalisation may often be unstated, such a view is at least implied in almost every paper 
or article reviewed in Chapter 2.  Indeed, the literature discussed in Chapters 2 and 4 
cannot be accommodated within any alternative hypothesis.  Kinship is in turn therefore 
reflected in some significant way in the frames that provide a descriptive account of 
Oykangand behaviour. 
The Oykangand — popularly called the Kunjen both in the local community of 
Kowanyama and in the literature — are the formal subject of this study.  As seen in the 
maps of Chapter 2, their tribal domain is along the Mitchell River in Cape York Peninsula, 
just above the limits of tidal influence. Something of their social environment is also 
reviewed in Chapter 2. 
The kinship system of the Oykangand is described by the term ‘Kariera’, and this 
denotes a pattern of behavioural correlates associated with each of the named categories of 
kin in the system as described in Chapter 3. There are a number of essentially Kariera 
kinship systems in Cape York Peninsula, many of which have interesting variations on a 
central, typical structure.  The Oykangand, as is evident from Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7, have 
yet another variation on this pattern, on which further comment will be made later. 
But beside kinship, there are other recurrent themes that appear as conspicuously 
relevant patterns of behaviour in the Oykangand community. As such, they are represented 
in one way or another in the frames that define acceptable verbal behaviour. These are 
worthy of at least brief comment, having been exposed in the previous chapters: 
Some general themes 
Certain general themes appear throughout the course of analysis of Oykangand verbal 
behaviour. 
One of the foremost of these is human sexuality, with its associated physiology and 
behaviour. This theme manifests itself in many ways. The use of language terms for the 
genitals, idiomatic and circumlocutory terms for these, and words/phrases implying coital 
interaction enter Oykangand conversation with high frequency. While there is a more 
honest acknowledgement of human sexuality and other bodily functions in Oykangand 
society than in the contemporary European Australian one, there nevertheless remains also 
the possibility of salacious and suggestive use of these terms, as seen in the dialogue 
between ‘Patsy’ and ‘Carolyn’ in Appendix 2. 
The same terms are invoked during provocative swearing leading to confrontations and 
dispute resolutions, or in the taboo/curse of the obm formula — along with labels for 
human ordure. They are introduced — even as their ‘respect’ form counterparts — into 
both unilateral and bilateral obscene joking (Chapters 5 and 6). Respect forms, it was noted 
(in Chapter 6), should be employed before, and in reference to, certain kin – typically of 
the opposite sex — but must not be used before certain others in case these imply an 
unwarranted social remoteness from that other person. 
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The gender reversal evident in the unilateral obscenities expressed towards an 
immediate same-sex in-law of the same generation (Chapter 5) represents a unique use of 
this lexical domain. 
The theme of gender reaches into the ‘promise system’ whereby a female child is 
assigned to an adult male as a marriage partner. The impact of this ritual event is felt in 
successive generations that have to cope with its consequences — whether the couple 
consummate that marriage or not. Structurally, the betrothal functions as a marriage. So 
also, it would seem, does the ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm avoidance relationship (a man with 
his actual MBD, and conversely) remote as that likelihood would at first appear. These 
issues are all explored in Chapter 5. 
A second major theme is that of the redirection in the flow of resources, and limitations 
on that flow, imposed by the obm taboo/curse (Chapter 6).  This Oykangand word labels 
the unavailability of a resource to someone who might otherwise expect access to it. 
Because of its unusual characteristics, the phrase ‘taboo/curse’ has been employed to 
describe it.  
Some relationships place a permanent sanction on the flow of such resources. There 
appears to be no á priori reason why a father should never have access to the food or water 
or firewood won from the field by his daughter, but such resources are always obm to him 
at least until he is too aged or incapacitated to fend for himself.  (Most — though not all — 
of the pairs of kin to whom this restriction applies would also be subject to prohibitions 
against incest, suggesting the invasive theme of sexuality yet again.  It does not apply in 
the instance of a mother and son, or a man and his younger sister, however.)  In the period 
immediately after a death an obm taboo on foods and sexual interaction for the mourners  
is at its strictest, and its applications are to the widest sector of that community. These 
restrictions are withdrawn successively as time goes by, but some remain in place  
for considerable periods for the spouse of the deceased (Chapter 7). When the obm 
prohibition is temporary like this, it can be manipulated to disadvantage the wayward, and 
effect some form of social control, as in the instance of Gertie during funerary observations 
(Chapter 6). 
The obm prescription, when applied through the speech act as formulated in Chapter 6, 
is very specific, and only bears on the item stipulated. This must of necessity be only a 
small quantity, because otherwise the principles of generosity and exchange through 
sharing would apply, and the formula would be unnecessary. The obm taboo/curse works 
to altogether deny the holder this small quantity of the resource available to him/her. An 
obm restriction on the availability of a resource to its possessor can be applied even to the 
one who might have procured it in the first place. This is therefore a speech act of 
considerable social force in the Oykangand community. One counter measure that can be 
called upon is the arbay ina- remedy.  Use of this formula implies that the procurer had in 
person engaged in a pseudo-sexual involvement with the prey or materiel in question.  
Another possibility for protecting the resource is to call where appropriate on the 
procurer’s own projected funerary arrangements. If the person applying the obm 
taboo/curse is one of those who can expect to be implicated in the possessor’s mourning, 
then the oɲat ̯ formula — implying this time a sexual abstinence, rather than 
involvement, as Chapter 6 explains — can protect the valued resource against the 
appellant. Mourning rituals involving the class of kinsmen declared to be oɲat ̯ (wider 
than the English term ‘widow’ implies) are complex, but death is itself another of the 
major themes affecting Oykangand behaviour. 
174     Chapter 9 
 
Practices at death (Chapter 7) include a formal observation of temporary limits on 
sexual access to the ‘widows’ — the oɲat ̯ of the protection formula mentioned above.  
As noted above, food taboos of varying durations for several categories of kin — the label 
obm applies again — are invoked at death.  These remain in place for a long period for the 
actual spouse, centring on certain species, and on the totemic connections of the deceased.  
The personal effects of the deceased, the name of his/her totem, the country immediate to 
his/her conception site, and the last camp occupied during lifetime are declared to be 
irNgay ― destitute, or abandoned ― and hence obm.  There is a complex intersection of 
themes here that are not totally expounded within the brief ethnography that is offered. 
The final in this series of organising themes is the egNg — the family. Chapter 5 
contains much of the data on this. The principal uniting factor of the family is of course the 
patriline, through which totemic attachments, ritual responsibilities and land tenure are 
both inherited and shared. But affinal links, especially historical ones among earlier 
generations of ancestors, can weigh heavily too, often than more contemporary ones might 
— even with those of one’s own spouse’s family.  The family imposes certain expectations 
of behaviour, rather like the old British traditions surrounding the ‘family name’. Sexual 
misdemeanours or other misconduct invariably call forth insults about the egNg of the 
miscreant.  Loyalty to one’s egNg is expected as a matter of course, as is its support for you 
in any confrontation. 
The principles of patriliny — evident in most behaviour and values, such as land  
tenure and totem — and matriliny (particularly evident in the perpetuation of avoidance, 
Chapter 5) emerge from the concept of egNg, too. While the former is unremarkable, the 
latter surfaces also in the funerary behaviour of the abm.efaʀ ― the ‘mother’s side’ of the 
dead person, and in the asymmetry of ednaNar.obm/ulaNar.obm mourning requirements 
(Chapter 7). 
In structural terms the Oykangand manifest the usual ‘bilateral cross cousin marriage’ 
of a typical Kariera system, but while a man’s actual FZD is an acceptable marriage partner 
his actual MBD is not.  This imparts some asymmetry to the system.  Atypically, this MBD 
is instead a man’s most avoided of all kin – not his WM.  This feature imparts to the system 
a unique character, and establishes Oykangand as a significant, if not unique, Kariera 
variant.  Just to what extent the other unusual characteristics of the system depend on FZD 
marriage is not clear. These include unilateral H/WB and W/HZ obscene joking, and the 
skewing effect of the ‘artificial change of generation’ that follows recognition of an 
ednaŋar.obm/ulaŋar.obm pair (i.e., a man and his actual MBD).  The unusual ‘triangular’ 
kinship terms that apply in precisely those conditions where those of the Gurindji (see 
McConvell 1982; Laughren 1982) — for example — cannot, are probably a function of the 
extent to which marriages are seen to be irregular because of the ‘artificial change of 
generation’ and ‘great grandson’ adjustments, discussed in Chapter 5, and because of 
actual deviances from the marriage norms.  
As a postscript to these themes, the matter of naming should be mentioned. It is possible 
to claim that the Oykangand have a rich and active tradition of naming, through which is 
expressed creative intellectual talents and sharp observation.  As Chapter 8 discloses, the 
Oykangand have a wry and whimsical sense of humour that permeates these practices both 
for humans and for natural species. Yet personal names are subject to the same sort of 
restrictions and limitations that are general to most of Aboriginal Australia.  
The nett effect of the Oykangand practice concerning names is to require of each of its 
speakers a detailed knowledge both of the kinship system as a system, and of the actualities 
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of an interlocutor’s affinal and lineal connections, before appropriate utterances in the 
language can be produced. Knowledge of kinship is therefore relied upon, and hence 
revealed, in almost every sociolinguistic interaction among the Oykangand. 
Methodological and practical limitations 
In the above, and in the previous five chapters, I have attempted to describe in plain 
prose both the conditions that determine a range of kin based verbal behaviour in 
Oykangand society, and the relevant linguistic evidence. What has been exposed as data 
are the scripts, the ‘strips’ (in Agar’s terms), or the dramas as acted out in Oykangand 
verbal exchanges — sometimes reconstructed for me by willing helpers.  These I have 
attempted to reduce to some sort of order by imposing upon them an analysis based on 
considerations of kinship and other social conditions.  
There are some caveats to this process.  It should be noted, first of all, that not all the 
issues affecting verbal behaviour have been described here.  In the final scene of the 
Prologue the reader encountered the Oykangand belief about fat in fish, animals and birds, 
but this is only the tip of that cultural iceberg — part of a system of belief that extends, 
through mythology, into practice in the field to protect the highly valued fat in game from 
being destroyed by spiritual forces.  It is an area of belief and language use that this study 
has not attempted. Nor has this discussion approached the subject of deixis, briefly 
explored by me (1991) in a summary paper published in an obscure journal, but deserving 
of far richer treatment because of the requirement that every verb of motion or implied 
motion or direction in the language (even the verb ewa- ‘look’) requires deictic orientation.  
It is therefore another significant feature of Oykangand verbal communication.  There are 
other important factors in Oykangand speech patterns, too. 
What I have had to settle for here is consideration of the one principal factor that might 
challenge the primacy of kinship as the most significant social determinant of Oykangand 
frames, and hence language use: the allied matter of personal names. Personal names have 
typically been pursued in connection with kinship research, as is evident from a reading of 
Chapter 2.  As Chapter 8 shows, although naming is an important intellectual and social 
activity in Oykangand society, elevating names above kinship categories as a mode of 
reference cannot be accepted as a serious hypothesis.  Appendix 2 affirms this conclusion. 
Another caveat that must be recognised is that I am not a native speaker of Oykangand 
(although my fluency, especially during the late 1970s and early 1980s, was fairly good) 
and that, because the language was even then fading fast, aspects of its more arcane use 
may have escaped me or been misinterpreted.  Against this observation stands the inclusion 
of a mass of data attesting each of the significant speech patterns that are described. Where 
data are thin, tentative, or uncertain, the text indicates this. But in general each of the 
claims made here is observationally secure, and only minor or peripheral issues of 
interpretation may be in doubt. 
Frames 
The question now begging to be addressed is how the concept of the frame, understood 
in terms of Chapter 4, might elucidate the data presented in Chapters 5 through 8, and 
Appendix 2. It is quite evident that such a construct has a good measure of descriptive 
adequacy to it. Consider the man, A, in the following scenario (summarised from real life): 
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The man, A, is returning from a tiring day’s fishing with just one uy ad ̯al ‘black bream’ 
of just under three quarters of a kilo strung from his belt. It represents just enough to 
satisfy a hungry hunter at the end of a long day. But he can see in the distance a small 
group of men sitting under a shady tree just a little off the usual path, relaxing and, it 
would seem, telling stories.  Among them is Z, his close classificatory BDH, who is oʀƫenk 
abuʀ ‘lazy (about hunting/fishing responsibilities)’. Almost certainly this man, Z, will seek 
to get A’s fish by resort to the obm taboo/curse (Chapter 6).  The problem for A is that he 
didn’t catch the fish himself (which would have allowed him some defence by virtue of the 
arbay ina- counter-claim formula) but rather it was given him by his younger brother. 
Consequently, because he fears the loss of his much needed meal to one so undeserving, A 
turns off the track early and makes for his camp by a longer alternative route to that past 
the tree. 
From the descriptive account of Chapter 6 and the concept of the frame developed in 
Chapter 4 it is possible to come to an understanding of his actions and describe them in 
meaningful terms; A has identified the following conditions: 
• There is only a relatively small amount of the needed resource; not enough for 
the usual acts of sharing to leave anything over for A if he shares it with Z. 
• Z is qualified by kinship to challenge A’s possession of the fish. 
• Z is remote enough not to be implicated in A’s mourning as a ‘widow’ — the 
oɲat ̯ rebuttal is not therefore appropriate. 
• A did not secure the fish by his own efforts, and so the arbay ina- formula to 
rescue the fish from an obm taboo/curse is not available to him. 
A’s subsequent behaviour shows that he has a conscious cognisance of the fact that 
these parameters (expanded a little above for explanatory effect) comprise a set of 
conditions under which he will most likely lose control of the fish he hopes to eat. 
Allowing the conditions to develop and the frame to actualise would therefore probably 
deprive him of a meal.  So he activates a plan which prevents those conditions from being 
met: he bypasses the encounter with Z by turning off the path on which they would meet. 
The coherent set of conditions or parameters that A is aware of, and that in a unified 
fashion contribute to his decision, constitute, in theoretical terms, a frame. The constituents 
of that frame are variables, so that, for example, if the last were altered to read 
• A secured the fish by his own efforts, and so the arbay ina- formula is 
available to him to rescue the fish from the obm taboo/curse. 
then A could boldly continue on his way, knowing that he could bluff his antagonist, Z, out 
of a successful predation attempt on his fish. Alternatively, if the second last of these 
conditions were instead 
• A is mindful that Z is close enough a kinsman to be implicated in A’s 
mourning as a ‘widow’: oɲat ̯. 
then on quite other grounds A could brazen out the encounter with Z, and perhaps even get 
some vengeful satisfaction out of doing so.  
In either of these cases, A would show that he is aware that there are now other 
expectations attached to these now slightly different conditions. There would be, in fact, a 
different frame in place for A for each of these three cases, generating different 
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expectations and outcomes.  (In the following pages of this chapter the above analysis will 
be made more precise through a discussion of ‘embedded’ frames.) 
The frame is seen in these instances as the device by which A assembles for recognition 
a set of socially relevant parameters on which he can anticipate or predict general social 
and linguistic outcomes, and act accordingly. In the first case, he cannot brazen out the 
almost inevitable challenge to his meagre resource, so he must avoid that challenge 
altogether. His action is seen thus as a ‘plan’ to be followed or ‘game’ to be played out. 
These depend in this instance on the prior recognition of a known frame.  
If the frame comprises a coherent set of identifiable conditions, then the actual resultant 
discourse is a script or drama that follows on each of the participants responding to the 
expectations flowing from identification of the appropriate frame. While the script or 
drama itself, revealed as a discourse — the content of the ‘strip’ — is not important to this 
study, the distinction is entirely relevant. The data of Chapters 5 to 8 are essentially 
recorded ‘strips’ or parts of ‘strips’, but while these are entirely necessary to identifying 
the underlying frames, they are not the frames themselves, but rather the realisation of 
frames in actual discourse. 
In certain cases — and again the obm formula and its counter-formulae provide the best 
examples — the frame is conditioned by earlier speech events. It could be said that the 
frame is not realised — though it might be anticipated — until the actual verbal formula 
employing obm is uttered. Then, and only then — provided that the other conditions of the 
frame are met — is the frame actualised through a script or drama between the participants. 
This might include one of the counter-formulae, again depending on specific conditions. 
This implies the possibility of ‘frames within frames’ or embedded frames. The arbay 
ina- and oɲat ̯ counter-formulae each require certain conditions for realisation, but one 
that both of these require is prior actualisation of the ‘obm taboo/curse’ frame (to give the 
frame a name). The former frames, involving the counter-formulae, are only possible 
within the frame of the obm taboo/curse. Outside of it, either of these speech acts, which 
operate to free the claimed resource, would be meaningless.  The only realistic conclusion 
from these data is that these former frames reside only within the obm frame, and that the 
latter must be actualised before either of them can be invoked. 
This evidence of frames-within-frames is distinct from those cases where an utterance 
becomes the trigger to a frame, or enters into the conditions of a frame by identifying it as 
a discourse of a specific sort.  The opening sally of Agar’s Schmäh ‘What you got in there, 
gold bars?’ is of this sort, as is C’s pa ke kale-y pat ̯ kambaʀiy it ̯om ibaʀǃ ak udnǃǃ (‘Don’t 
go there!  That place down south is no good! Leave off!’) in the second round of bilateral 
obscene joking (Chapter 6).  Conversely, the formulaic [ ayi:ˀ ] of the latter marks the point 
at which a given round of obscene sparring is finished — the participants might want to 
start again on some other preposterous question or proposition, or may alternatively choose 
to terminate the discourse.  
Tannen and Wallat’s 1993 analysis of a medical interview shows that frames can vary 
even within the one social setting, depending on whether the interviewer is addressing the 
mother, or the child.  Each is addressed in a different fashion; the interviewer ‘talks down’ 
to the child, but addresses the mother as an adult.  Such a ‘switching’ of frames appears in 
the textual data of Lawrence’s new gun in Appendix 2. Although he agreed to re-tell the 
tale of their joint venture to his wife, and much of the text is in fact directed to her, he also 
wanted to communicate with me. I had warned him of lending his rifle to careless kinsmen, 
and he wanted to reassure me that he had made every attempt to defend it from abuse. 
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Consequently although he begins by addressing the narrative to his wife, as requested, 
there is another section early in this long textual ‘strip’ in which he addresss me. This is 
indexed by his use of the respect form aka{¯ar ‘younger brother’.  Following this 
passage, in which he has clearly switched frame, he returns to the one in which he was 
addressing his wife, whose classificatory father is Lawrence’s MB.  This MB is referenced 
by the ‘triangular’ term alandar because of his wife’s presence; it would not be called for 
in addressing me as his younger brother.  These data are nicely explained by the same 
mechanism — frame switching — as Tannen and Wallat call upon. 
The applicability of the frame as an explanatory device to the data presented here means 
that there is an elegant and adequate means of expressing a description of Oykangand 
verbal behaviour. 
Kinship and the frame 
It is apparent from the discussion so far that there is no such thing as an entirely 
‘unmarked’ or ‘neutral’ frame in Oykangand discourses. There are social situations which 
impose minimal constraints on interaction, as between consanguineal brothers, for 
example, but even then one must of necessity be older than the other, and therefore (in 
Sharp’s terms) superordinate, or senior in the hierarchy. This might nevertheless be the 
point from which the otherwise confused researcher might attempt, as Agar (1994:242) 
suggests, with his ‘mistake, analysis, repair’ strategy, to explore a given ‘rich point’ in the 
languaculture.  But one parameter that must be specified as a component of virtually every 
frame accounting for Oykangand discourse is the ‘kinship category of principal 
interlocutor’. Since every person in the Oykangand domain is located within the kinship 
matrix there is a kinship category for every interlocutor, and this category is primary in 
determining subsequent verbal interaction (albeit, as Chapter 5 showed, any category is 
subject to some manipulation). 
In many cases other conditions or parameters bear on the frame too.  For example, the 
presence or absence of an appreciative audience will determine whether a man will 
converse with restraint (using the respect vocabulary) with his wife’s brother, or will 
instead resort to obscene remarks about his brother-in-law’s behaviour as a female, perhaps 
urging him not to get pregnant from the bad company he keeps. (This behaviour was 
accounted for in Chapter 5.) In a similar fashion, the conditions on triggering the obm 
taboo/curse include the necessary requirement of the subject holding a small quantity of a 
desirable resource — a physical fact, socially relevant only to this sort of exchange. 
On the other hand, some kinship categories absolutely determine the frame. That is to 
say, there is no other contributing condition at all.  A man’s MBD, it was shown (Chapter 5) 
must never be seen or heard — much less spoken to.  Her appearance (if that word can be 
employed at all!) in a frame overrides all other conditions, and precludes any discourse 
occurring at all. His contractual WM, on the other hand, would normally never be 
approached, and ignored in all but exceptional social exchanges.  When information must 
be passed to her and there is no other option, he might call out to her dog, or address her 
yamstick. These two kinship categories are such that the frame that pertains to them 
references little if anything more — if indeed appropriate behaviour is to be followed. 
In other cases, it is the social context that determines behaviour, sometimes when no 
one immediate interlocutor is referenced.  Consider the case of D, who is the ZS of the man 
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C who is in the midst of a round of bilateral obscene joking with the man B, as in Chapter 
6. Because D is in a category that cannot join in the general laughter or share his 
appreciation of the performance with the group gathered to enjoy these exchanges, C 
makes a special effort to refer to matters that are especially obscene, funny or outlandish, 
just to embarrass D. So D wants to laugh, or add his own riposte, but can’t because it 
would be ‘bad manners’ to his MB, as the Oykangand say. So after spluttering and 
suffering the humour of B and C a little while, but unable to maintain a straight face, D 
finally curses the pair for being silly, and walks off in a huff, only adding to the general 
laughter. 
From D’s perspective, his response is conditioned by the frame in which B and C are 
exchanging obscenities. Quite apart from any interlocutor — because strictly speaking 
there isn’t one, since D would be constrained not to interrupt such a discourse — D’s 
response is determined solely by the social context of the obscene exchanges and by the 
prohibition on his taking part ‘for shame’ (as the Oykangand also say) of his MB. D must 
successfully ‘read’ a matrix frame containing another frame (the obscene joking of B and 
C).  That matrix frame however lacks any significant single interlocutor for him; when he 
loudly condemns the pair for being ‘silly’ and struts off, his frustrated remarks are 
addressed to the entire assembly. The mode of his departure might trigger another but 
heightened round of obscenity beteen C and B. 
The presence of C as a MB is however in itself a very significant feature of the matrix 
frame for D.  This is one of those kinship categories in a ‘non-harmonic’ generation before 
whom respectful behaviour is required. 
The social situation involving B and C would be totally transformed, however, if B’s 
sister were to appear.  The ‘social environment’ parameter would now contain a kinship 
category before whom it would be improper for B to continue.  If his sister were to remain 
unobtrusively behind the scenes, and listen surreptitiously to the proceedings, then B might 
continue in his obscene verbal duet with C.  But if she had to become apparent — by 
asking a bystander to pass to her a yamstick she needed for hunting tortoises, for example 
— then B must recognise her presence and desist in his role.  From B’s perspective, the 
frame for obscene joking is no longer a valid one — it references a person before whom 
such behaviour is inappropriate.  And C would need to recognise that fact. 
The unilateral obscenities expressed to a WB by the woman’s H, or to a woman’s HZ by 
her, and the controls on this type of discourse, have already been discussed. What each of 
these appear to require, however, is a transformation that encompasses a temporary gender 
reversal of the spouse’s sibling in this discourse.  What is not clear is whether frame theory 
should specify a simple transformation of the sort  
gender [X] ==> gender [-X] 
that applies in the context of the ‘unilateral joking’ frame, or whether the transformation is 
effected more coherently through a frame condition that changes value.  Another 
possibility is the embedding of a frame which has ‘gender’ as a dependent variable as part 
of its structure, which is called upon according to conditions in the matrix frame involving 
H/WB or W/HZ interaction.  This alternative is probably the most appealing, but it resides at 
the ‘fuzzy borders’ of frame theory. 
A brief mention was also made in Chapter 5 of the possibility of ignoring a frame, as in 
the case of a ‘bully’, algŋ abuʀ, using obscenities in an unrestrained way, or in trading on 
personal limitations, such as Q with her blindness.  Deviant behaviour such as these cases, 
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and miscues or misidentifications of frames (such as Goffman amply illustrates in his 
Frame analysis) have been generally beyond the scope of this ethnography. The mistake 
made by MF, and referred to in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, is a rare — if 
significant — exception. There is however recognition of the concept of deviance or 
miscueing in Oykangand society, manifest in the lexical label for ‘child’. 
The term is arNg.aNgu¯an, derived from the regular word for ‘offspring’, arNg, 
compounded with a second noun, aŋguɲan. This latter word has been chosen by the 
Oykangand to translate ‘sin’ in their hymns and choruses for church.  It has the force of 
‘socially or spiritually inept; not accountable for social or ritual lapses; untutored in 
“proper” behaviour.’  From this it is inferred that the Oykangand anticipate that children 
will make social blunders because they have not yet been able to correctly assess frames 
and their relevant parameters.  Consequently children cannot be punished for such lapses.  
The acquisition of frames, the construction of new ones, or the process of amending or 
revising frames to deal with new situations (such as might be encountered in learning 
shared rituals or interacting with other tribes) is well beyond the scope of this ethnography, 
and yet the frame, as a construct, must be flexible enough to allow such cognitive 
developments and realignments to occur. 
The frame must also, it is maintained, be able to manage the motivating issue of a 
discourse, even when this topic is never discussed openly. A formal meeting that I 
attended, for example, had to do ostensibly with childrens’ attendance at school. Great 
oratory was expended on the benefits of education and how important it was that children 
should learn and grow to responsible adulthood. In fact, the issue was the number of young 
people who were establishing connubial relationships that according to customary law 
were illicit. This topic surfaced only once, and incidentally, at perhaps the most tense point 
in the gathering. The meeting was in fact a charade, requiring sophisticated interpretation. 
Social facts such as these, where a highly potent emotional condition is generated, have 
not entered into the analysis of discourse in this study.  
Summary 
Wherever there are two or more Oykangand, a frame is in place determining the sort of 
discourse that can be engaged in.  That frame references, amongst other conditions when 
necessary, the kinship relations that obtain among them.  There is no activity which is 
carried on socially without implicating kin-governed behaviour, and this is particularly true 
of verbal behaviour.  Discourses are shaped — apart from personal whim and expression 
— by conventions of language use learned by the Oykangand, and on their anticipations of 
outcomes that the frame indicates on the basis of past experiences.  The principle on which 
this study has depended is that the strategies evident in recorded ‘strips’ of interaction 
generally reflect those determinants of discourse in a more or less direct fashion.  From an 
examination of those ‘strips’, and from direct interviews of Oykangand speakers about 
them, the relevant parameters or conditions that define the frame can be identified. 
It should be evident that no attempt has been made to list or classify the frames, nor for 
that matter to exhaustively catalogue the conditions on them.  Frames and their constituents 
have not been defined in a formal and precise fashion either. These essentials are only 
informally described, and this will remain the case until some formal metalanguage or 
algorithm emerges by which to effect a more precise account. In an earlier treatise, Agar 
remarked 
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Some recent research suggests words like schemata and frame as labels for the 
background knowledge that group members bring to events.  These schemata are then 
used as guides to interpretation, and may themselves be modified as a result of that 
interpretation.  But no one knows how to formally specify the structure of such 
background knowledge or the process of applying it in different situations.  What is 
apparent is that it involves a rich collection of different kinds of information and 
sentiment and relations among them.  (1980:143 — italics mine — BAS) 
Rather than attempting to specify these cognitive structures, it is to be hoped that the 
theory has been pursued as far as is conservatively practicable in this present study, 
without drowning the data in unnecessary constructs and mechanisms, or obliterating the 
realities of Oykangand behaviour with abstractions. 
The frames governing Oykangand discourses respond more immediately to kinship 
relations than to the activity of the moment, whether asking for a drink, entering a house, 
or arguing genealogies. In this way, the Oykangand differ markedly from the classical 
cases of ‘ethnography of communication’ reported in the early literature of the 1970s and 
1980s. The implicit assumption made on reading these research reports — reviewed in 
Chapter 4 — is that these activities represent ‘rich points’ in the languacultures for which 
they are described (Frake 1964, 1975; Blount 1975a). These activities would be undertaken 
by the Oykangand, too, but far from being ‘neutral’ or ‘unmarked’ they would be governed 
by kinship considerations, and have frames that reflect this fact. A comparative paradigm 
for assessing frame differences would of course illuminate not only the theory of the 
frame, but the real differences between languacultures, too. Such a comparison would be 
highly instructive of how human behaviour was actually organised. 
But not even when the Oykangand is alone can there be a strictly ‘neutral’ frame option; 
s/he is surrounded by spiritual beings and ancestors who can or should be addressed to 
ensure hunting success, safety or security.  Engaging on a venture solely on one’s own is a 
reprehensible course of action among the Oykangand. The phrases abm al ̯uγ a{em ‘person 
mate without’ and abm el ̯o{ ‘person alone’ describe these situations, but they imply fear, 
dread and an exceptional circumstance, or else probably reprehensible social behaviour, 
including adultery and sorcery.  I have even been roundly abused for fetching firewood on 
my own, without others knowing my whereabouts (see also Sommer 1991:273–274). The 
implication is that the Oykangand expect to live in a social environment where kinsmen are 
constantly present, and where these constantly determine the expectations of appropriate 
behaviour.  
Discourses can be mundane and banal, as well as ranging to highly figurative  
and conventionalised ‘rich points’ requiring sometimes sophisticated interpretation. 
Interpretations are necessary to an understanding of the social meaning of a discourse, and 
these derive from experiences that allow the speaker to make the necessary generalisations 
from contemporary circumstances. 
The frame, despite its relative immaturity as a theoretical construct, provides the 
researcher with a measure of elegance and economy in dealing with data such as 
Oykangand discourse, and allows observations — such as that about the impact of kinship 
— to emerge as significant generalisations concerning Oykangand behaviour. 
What a consideration of Oykangand frames leads to are inescapable conclusions over 
features of their social organisation. The most salient of these features is of course the 
pervasive effect of kinship categories on behaviour, and especially on verbal behaviour. 
But other aspects of patterned behaviour emerge also.  The strangest of these, within their 
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Kariera kinship system, is a prohibition against marriage between a man and his actual 
MBD.  Not only is this category one of the preferred partners in a typical Kariera marriage 
regime, but the preference for a FZD is rare enough (note, for example, the language of 
Parkin 1997:181) to warrant comment. 
While obscene joking in a bilateral form is now recognised as a general phenomenon in 
Aboriginal society (Garde 1996), its manifestation as a unilateral mode in which a spouse’s 
opposite sex sibling is the butt of the humour, treated as the same sex as the spouse, is an 
unexpected deviation from the norm.  Gender switching in discourse is not unknown, but 
the Oykangand have introduced it into the domain of obscene joking. The form of 
obscenities can include terms from the respect vocabulary, normally reserved for situations 
requiring politeness.  It can also extend to phrases which in other contexts could be read as 
insulting, while some such obscenities are uniquely either humorous or abusive.  
The rather frank use of a term for bodily functions or excreta, combined with an 
appropiate kin term and the word obm are each required in the formula by which a small 
quantity of a desirable resource can be wrested from its owner. The transfer of certain 
foods and materials between certain kin is under a permanent obm sanction — as from a 
daughter to her father, for example.  The same word can apply to incestuous relationships, 
too. The death of a person imposes temporary sanctions on mourners receiving certain 
foods or supplies — even from otherwise acceptable kinsmen, or engaging in sexual 
activity. A man’s wife’s parents are obm, as is his ‘poison cousin’, his ednaNar.obm, to 
whom he is her ulaNar.obm. So that the scope of obm is very broad.  Its unique character is 
in this breadth, and in the formulae that establish or revoke its taboo. 
The application of the same word through the speech act described above that declares 
food, or firewood, or water, or a yamstick or spear haft ‘poisoned’ to the erstwhile owner 
has the effect of redistribuing such resources in the community.  To protect his/her limited 
resource, two interesting avenues of response — each again significant speech acts — are 
available if the necessary conditions apply. These are of course the arbay ina- and o¯at ̯ 
formulae, each of which require specific conditions on their use. 
Memories of the language described in this study will not survive far into the twenty 
first century.  Many of the more unusual uses of it have already disappeared. This small 
sample preserves something of the unique character of the Oykangand language, and of the 
verbal behaviour of its speakers. 
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Appendix 1:  Conventions for  
representing the Oykangand  
language and kinship 
  
Language  
The phonology of Oykangand depends on the following independent segments; they are 
formally attested in Sommer (1969): 
Consonants: 
p t ̯ t ƫ  k 
b d ̯ d   g 
∏/f     γ 
m n ̯ n ¯  N 
 l ̯* l 
 r   { 
w   y 
 
Vowels: 
i  u 
e  o 
 a 
Fig A.1:  The significant speech sounds of Kunjen (Oykangand) 
* I had discounted l̯ in my earlier work (1969), and owe to Barry Alpher convincing 
evidence that this segment is properly a part of the language; it nevertheless provides an 
unexpected asymmetry in the laterals though it carries minimal functional load. 
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The shape of Oykangand syllables and words has been a matter of debate; the reader is 
referred to Sommer (1969) for the initial analysis, and to the reply from Sommer (1981) to 
the various criticisms of that analysis.  It is maintained that the phonological syllables that 
determine word shapes has been established by this last discussion as VC14. 
The language is of typical SOV structure; a fuller statement of the grammar can be 
found in Sommer (1972).  Its ergative/absolutive subject marking reflects rather directly 
the underlying cases attributable to the construction of its propositions. 
Morphology 
The conventions for indicating Oykangand morphology — typically beneath the 
vernacular forms — are slightly different from those of Sommer (1972); they are: 
On nouns and noun phrases: 
AG Agent case suffix 
AL Allative (‘to’, ‘into’) suffix 
COM Comitative (‘with’ or ‘having’) particle 
DAT Dative case suffix 
EL Ellative (‘from’, ‘out of’) suffix 
GEN Genitive or possessive suffix 
INS Instrumental (‘with’) suffix 
LOC Locative (‘at’) suffix 
PRIV Privative (‘without’ or ‘lacking’) particle 
On verbs: 
IFUT Future Irrealis (‘will perhaps ––’) 
IMP Imperative 
IPST Irrealis Past (‘would have ––ed ’) 
IRR Irrealis (‘should be ––’) 
PG Past General (‘used to ––’ or ‘would ––’ ) 
PD Past Definite; typically Aorist (as ‘––ed’) 
POT Potential Irrealis (‘might ––’) 
PRES Present 
REDUP, 2x Reduplication 
RFLX Reflexive (‘self’) 
On both nouns and verbs: 
CSL Causal (‘because of’) suffix 
E ‘Empty’ morph (a ‘carrier’ without meaning) 
PRP Purposive (‘for’) suffix 
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On pronouns: 
obj direct and indirect object 
pl plural 
sg singular 
dl  dual 
poss possessive 
nom nominative 
in inclusive 
ex exclusive 
1,2,3 first, second, third person 
On other parts of speech: 
EMPH Emphatic 
ID Idiom 
NEG Negative 
Q Question marker 
PRE  pre-referent /amb-/; has the function similar to a definite article. 
Other conventions 
Two markers are used to indicate morpheme boundaries: a hyphen ‘-’ indicates a 
juncture where no morphophonemic change is invoked, while an equals sign ‘=’ is 
employed when there is a case of alternation between the stem in isolation and its 
appearance when suffixed. In general, stems lose their final vowel in isolation, but  
retain them when suffixed, and the ‘=’ sign recognises this fact while allowing the reader 
to more easily identify the stem concerned.  Hence /ega-man ̯d ̯/ ‘head-on’ is represented 
eg=aman ̯d ̯ because the form in isolation would be eg ‘head’; awin ‘road, footpad’ 
becomes awin ̯=d ̯in Locative use, with the final n assimilating to the suffixed d ̯. 
In addition, # marks uncertainty in the recorded utterance, and * a word or phrase 
introduced from English. 
Kinship 
The kinship diagrams and some explanation of basic terms is repeated here for 
convenience; discussion of the details can be found in Chapter 5. 
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aiŋar 
 abmiŋar 
 ο =  Δ   ο =  Δ 
 
 
 
 ο = Δ ο = Δ 
iɲaŋar alaŋar amaŋar ibaŋar 
 
 
 
 ο = Δ Δ   ̵akaŋar ̵elaŋar    ο = Δ 
uraŋar EGO    Δ +olaŋar  +ebaŋar   ο  ulaŋar 
 
 
 
 andaŋar uwaŋar 
ο =  Δ ο = Δ 
arŋg.aƫalγ 
 
  arŋg.abmalγ 
 ο =  Δ  ο =  Δ 
 
Figure A5.2a:  Oykangand kinship from the perspective of a male EGO 
Key: 
abmiŋar FF, FFB, MM, MMZ, FMH, MFW 
aiŋar FM, FMZ, MF, MFB, FFW, MMH 
iɲaŋar FZ, MBW 
alaŋar MB, FZH 
ulaŋar WB, ZH 
andaŋar man’s female child, his sister’s male child 
uwaŋar woman’s female child, her brother’s male child 
arŋg.at ̯alγ man’s D’s child 
arŋg.abmalγ man’s S’s child 
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aiŋar 
abmiŋar 
Δ =  ο  Δ =  ο 
 
 
 
 Δ =  ο Δ =  ο 
alaŋar iɲaŋar ibaŋar amaŋar 
 
 
 
 Δ =  ο  ο   ̵elaŋar  ̵akaŋar     Δ =  ο 
oʀaŋar EGO   ο +ebaŋar +olaŋar   Δ ednaŋar 
 
 
 
 uwaŋar  andaŋar 
Δ =  ο Δ =  ο 
 
arŋg.aƫalγ 
  arŋg.abmalγ 
 Δ =  ο Δ = ο 
 
Figure A5.2b:  Oykangand kinship from the perspective of a female EGO 
Key: 
As above, but 
oʀaŋar H, ZH 
ednaŋar HZ, BW 
arŋg.at ̯alγ woman’s S’s child 
arŋg.abmalγ woman’s D’s child 
In addition: 
iɲaŋar.obm/.agŋun ̯d ̯ ♂WM 
alaŋar.obm/.agŋun ̯d ̯ ♂WF 
 ... etelm  ... not close, somewhat remote. 
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Introduction 
This appendix contains text material — one complete anecdotal narrative and excerpts 
from other narratives and conversations. The purpose of this text material is to show how 
the kinship terms and observations on their use made in the previous chapters are actually 
evident in the discourse of competent Oykangand speakers.  Each of the authors of these 
segments of discourse is identified and relevant kin relationships obtaining between 
him/her and other relevant Oykangand speakers are described either at the beginning, or as 
annotations in the discourses themselves. The annotations also describe other significant 
social or linguistic parameters.   
Lawrence’s new gun 
This story from Lawrence Dunbar about his new gun dates from early 1965, when — 
just before decimal currency was introduced — a paltry ten pounds would buy a good but 
used SMLE military issue rifle in calibre .303 British, which was highly prized for 
shooting crocodiles.  It is one of these that Lawrence had secured through me, and which is 
mentioned in the story.  Although the trade in crocodile skins was declared illegal in 1967, 
it provided until then a supplementary source of income to Aboriginal hunters, a group of 
whom we meet in this anecdote. 
Lawrence Dunbar was asked to address this story to his wife, Doris, who was in any 
case also a participant in the events, while the tape recorded his anecdotal narrative. The 
kinship terms he employs are largely those appropriate to her as interlocutor, but Lawrence 
is somewhat uncomfortable about ignoring me, and consequently changes his frame of 
reference in at least one section in order to address me.   
There is another reason for this: Lawrence wants to justify loaning to some of his less 
careful relatives the rifle that I had got for him.  I had warned him about doing this, as the 
rifle was in pristine condition, and wouldn’t stay that way for long unless he cared for it.  
Lawrence is at pains to expose the social pressure he was under to lend the arm, and so 
have my understanding. 
Note that the classifier in ̯, used of animals, substitutes for ‘crocodile’ throughout, and 
the specific noun forms owinay or et ̯ambuw nowhere appear. It is simply a matter that is 
taken for granted. 
The text is much longer than the extract presented here; Lawrence is a fluent and 
accomplished story teller, with impeccable syntax and vocabulary — one of those who 
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spoke ayaral, ‘hard’ or ‘strong’. I very much enjoyed his company as a hunter and friend, 
despite the age difference between us. Lawrence was knowledgeable about all matters 
traditional, and in one of the following texts his wife ponders what he might know of a 
traditional ritual involving wrestling between brothers. He managed to keep his garrulous 
and independent wife under control most of the time, but she was an active and 
knowledgeable lady. 
CR — uncle, MB, to both Lawrence and myself — is a particpant in the events, as is 
abm oŋoŋ (lit. ‘person deaf’), who — despite being from another tribe — enjoyed the 
experience of camping and hunting with these older men. While Doris is Lawrence’s 
legitimate wife, she is my ednaŋar.obm, but since even in 1965 she was grey-headed, my 
fictive brothers and I had begun to relate to her again as an ednaŋar.uw but of course 
without touching, and always behaving circumspectly. 
This excerpt begins at the start of the narrative; annotations drawing attention to the 
features of the text follow the relevant cited sentence, so that details can be readily 
assimilated. 
Erk iŋkum oŋgom uʀun ̯d ̯, iŋkum oŋgom ambul 
place  new this downward  new this 1pl(in).nom 
aen.ar anen udna-l. 
uncle what lie-PD 
‘There was this new place down here, a new place where uncle and  
the rest of us camped. 
[aen.ar MB is used by Lawrence in preference to ibaŋar  ‘father’ out  
of respect for Doris. CR — the referent in this case — is Lawrence’s  
wife’s close classificatory father, and Lawrence’s alaŋar, MB. As noted in 
Chapter 5; The derivation of kin terms I and II, such a situation normally 
requires this ‘respect’ or ‘polite’ form.] 
Oŋgom uwand-iy, igu-r alin ̯ aland.ar oŋgom 
this westwards-PRE go-PD 1dl(ex).nom uncle.MB this 
uʀun ̯d ̯ er iŋkum oŋgom, ay er awaʀ aŋki-r. 
downward  place knew this 1sg.nom  away eastwards hunt-PD 
So we went down here, westward, uncle and I, to this new place, and I went  
hunting up to the east. 
[aland.ar is the respectful or polite term from Lawrence’s own standpoint, 
without necessarily referring to his wife. To an akaŋar, a ‘younger brother’, 
this form is entirely appropriate. Lawrence has therefore already made a 
switch in his governing frame of reference, hence alandar rather than 
aen.ar. Other instances of switching reference will be noted, but he also 
cites conversation as it was spoken, without the politeness formulae. See 
also The derivation of kin terms I and II in Chapter 5.] 
Aŋki-r ay, abm *line iki-n-aγ igu-r ay awaʀ, 
hunt-PD 1sg.nom person   line throw-E-PRP go-PD 1sg.nom eastwards 
uk ad ̯en uŋgul algŋa-r aγ, ugŋal oŋgom amb algŋa-nm 
tree  1sg.poss there  carry-PD once  now this PRE take-PG 
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ay, uk ay algŋa-n amb ad ̯en. 
1sg.nom  tree 1sg.nom carry-PRES PRE 1sg.poss 
I went hunting, fishing with a line upriver, carrying my rifle — that  
same rifle I carry now I was carrying. 
In̯ ulγal ad ̯un aʀti-ŋan *line ik-iki-n-am-aγ. 
animal close  1sg.obj  rise-IFUT   line  2x-throw-E-EL-PRP 
A crocodile came up close to me, to where I had been fishing. 
Ulγal ari-n-aγ ay iŋun. 
close  hit-E-PRP  1sg.nom  3sg.obj 
I shot at him, close up to me. 
Igu-r ay awaʀ, *line iki-r ay iki-r 
go-PD 1sg.nom  eastwards    line  throw-PD 1sg.nom  throw-PD 
ay, iki-r ay, il aland.ar oŋgol awand 
1sg.nom  throw-PD 1sg.nom  3sg.nom uncle.MB must.be east.end 
elke-l, oŋgol awaʀ aŋki-nm il. 
return-PD  must.be eastwards  hunt-PG  3sg.nom 
I went further upriver, and fished, and fished, and fished, but I didn’t  
know uncle was coming back from there; he must have hunted eastwards  
(of camp) too. 
[By aland.ar Lawrence indicates that he is still in the mode of address that 
encompasses me, rather than speaking to his wife.] 
Il enoŋg-iy, in ̯ ari-n alo-l in ̯ ar.ambal, 
3sg.nom another-PRE animal hit-E go.along-PD animal so-and-so 
in ̯ irbiʀ ari-n alo-l uk *line ilg aroda-n-aγ 
animal  k’roo hit-E  go.along-PD tree    line  COM  suspend-E-PRP 
an ̯d ̯an. 
1pl(ex).nom 
That other chap, he went along shooting, shooting so-and-so, he went  
along shooting kangaroos (for bait), so we could hang our line off a tree. 
[Lawrence engages in circumlocution here; there aren’t any kangaroos 
along the main River, only wallabies. But someone of the wallaby totem 
had died not long since, indicated by ar.ambal, and so Lawrence observes 
the necessary linguistic etiquette and avoids the usual in̯.oyboy. See also 
Chapter 8: The names of the dead.] 
Uk *rope ilg it ̯om uk.it ̯uγal amay ilg inaŋ aland-aγ 
tree    rope  COM that hook big COM 2sg.nom uncle-DAT 
anen afa-r, it ̯od ̯. 
what  fetch-PD there 
(We) had tied up a rope with the big hook that you had got for uncle, there. 
[The term aland.ar is shorn of its final /ar/ in order to take the Dative suffix /-aγ/.] 
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Ari-n-aγ, ilimb il # in ̯ ari-n-aγ ambe-l il, uk 
hit-E-PRP  then 3sg.nom # animal  hit-E-PRP become-PD 3sg.nom bullet 
ID=tried hard to ... 
il aŋaɲ ede-l ilimb il,  ul amb elke-l awand. 
3sg.nom NEG burst-PD then 3sg.nom du.nom  PRE return-PD east.end 
(He) must shoot one, then ...  He tried hard to shoot it, but the bullet wouldn’t go 
off, and they came back to camp (without it). 
[The verb ambe- has several senses; an embedded sentence carrying a verb 
with the PRP suffix gives the reading ‘try hard to ...’ or ‘want to ...’.] 
Il iŋun enoŋg erge-n̯ ubman.abmalγar, “aŋaɲ, 
3sg.nom 3sg.obj another speak-PG grandson   NEG 
aland-aγ amb elk aliy. 
uncle-AL PRE  return 1dl(in).nom 
Then grandson was saying to that other one there, “Nothing (here),  
let’s go back to uncle. 
[This reference to ubman.abmalγar is to the same person introduced early 
in Chapter 5, What kinship means to verbal behaviour — A beginning.  The 
exact conditions for applying this term appropriately are not understood — 
it is believed that usage requires an ibaŋar.agŋun ̯d ̯ in the linking kin; see 
The derivation of kin terms II.] 
Uk uŋgul, uk udnam iŋkum aŋki-n amba-n-aγ aliy.” 
tree there tree good new hunt-E  cause-E-PRP 1dl(in).nom 
That new rifle is a good one we must take hunting.” 
Ida-l  edn ad ̯un, ay awand ƫip ede-l. 
wait-PD  3pl.nom 1sg.obj 1sg.nom east.end  ! arrive-PD 
They waited for me; I came back from the east. 
“Uk inin it ̯om aen.ar oŋgom in ̯d ̯al.erge-l uk 
  tree 2sg.poss that uncle this ask-PD tree 
algŋa-n-aγ ugŋal.” 
take-E-PRP now 
“Uncle here wants to ask you to take your rifle now.” 
[It isn’t clear who has made this statement, unless it was Lawrence’s wife, 
Doris, who also used to accompany them on their trips. If so, aen.ar is 
used correctly in this case.] 
“Aʀemaγ, aʀemaγ uwa-l ay! uk ad ̯en oŋgom!” 
  but.not but.not  share-PD  1sg.nom tree  1sg.poss  this 
“Never!  I won’t ever share (it).  This is MY rifle!” 
Akaŋar ad ̯en undam-ar elbe-r il, “uk er inaŋ 
y.brother 1sg.poss E-AG tell-PD 3sg.nom   tree  away 2sg.nom 
aʀ-uw uw, uk inin oŋgom.” 
not-again  give  tree  2sg.poss  this 
My younger brother warned me, “Don’t you ever give away this rifle of yours.” 
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“Il aen.ar uk iŋaŋ in ̯d ̯ay? 
  3sg.nom uncle tree 3sg.poss where.at? 
“Where’s uncle’s gun? 
[Lawrence is attempting to use my warning as leverage on keeping the rifle 
for his own use, and at the same time, explaining why it wasn’t ultimately 
possible.  His use of aen.ar confirms that it was with his wife Doris that he 
was arguing.] 
Enoŋg-iy uw alŋg-algŋa-n il it ̯om olom.ar-ay, oŋoŋ-al. 
another-AG again 2x-carry-PRES 3sg.nom that  nephew-AG deaf-AG 
The other one, that deaf nephew of ours, can carry it. 
[Note the use of olom.ar in AG function as subject of the sentence. This 
sentence is unusual, not only for its concord, with enoŋg,. olom.ar and 
oŋoŋ all marked as AG, but also for the fact that the /ar/ is not deleted.  This 
is all probably because olom.ar is postposed, and oŋoŋ is appositive to it.  
The term olom.ar is of course relevant to a wife’s child; abm.oŋoŋ cannot 
therefore be the ubman.abmalγar referred to earlier. This person cannot 
now be historically traced.] 
Uk ad ̯en ilimb oŋgom aneγal uw algŋa-γ?  
tree  1sg.poss then this for.what? again take-IRR 
What do you want to take my rifle for? 
Uk ubma-maγ awiy. Uk il ad ̯un elbe-r. 
tree break-POT also tree 3sg.nom 1sg.obj tell-PD 
You might break it.  He told me about that rifle. 
Il ad ̯un akaŋar uŋgul erge-l ad ̯un “uk 
3sg.nom 1sg.obj y.brother there speak-PD 1sg.obj tree 
inaŋ er aʀ-uw uw ey! 
2sg.nom away not-again give   ! 
My younger brother there said to me, “Don’t give that rifle away! 
Uk inin.” 
tree 2sg.poss 
That rifle of yours.” 
[As part of a direct quote of his words, akaŋar is entirely acceptable; I was 
not present there to require any specific respect or politeness. Then 
Lawrence finally gives in ...] 
“Karey, ukel ayin ulaŋ, ukel it ̯om olon uw eray 
  OK bullet  Q 3dl.poss bullet that hither give other 
it ̯om amb olon.” 
that PRE hither 
“Very well then, are there any bullets?  Give them some of those others  
(we brought) along here.” 
“Aŋaɲ. Aŋaɲ. Uk oŋgom ukel ad ̯en” 
  NEG NEG tree this bullet 1sg.poss 
“No.  Nothing.  These are my bullets.”  
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Uk ilimb ukel eray ad ̯en algŋa-r awaʀ, uk 
tree then bullet different 1sg.poss take-PD eastwards tree 
*shoot.em it ̯om amb uk ad ̯en algŋa-r awaʀ, 
  shoot that PRE tree 1sg.poss take-PD eastwards 
il alanday-iy. 
3sg.nom uncle.AG-PRE 
Uncle took some of my bullets up there, and shot them off with my rifle,  
up there eastwards. 
[The author here returns to respectful language and the use of alanday.  
Lawrence indicates to me, as the akaŋar that warned him about loaning the 
rifle, that kinship obligations finally got the better of him, and despite his 
protestations our alaŋar, CR, secured the use of the gun, and some bullets.  
The moral of the story is of course that such generosity was justified, and 
the kinship obligation unavoidable. Note that the term alanday is another 
contraction of /aland.ar+ay/.] 
Igu-r awaʀ il ey-- erk.okan it ̯ol-γ amb 
go-PD eastwards 3sg.nom  ! end.of.water hence-AL PRE  
igu-r il awaʀ. erne-l il. 
go-PD 3sg.nom eastwards stand-PD 3sg.nom 
He went upriver — he went upriver to the end of the lagoon, and stood there. 
Ilimb il iŋun ewa-l in ̯ il it ̯ur ilg 
then 3sg.nom 3sg.obj see-PD animal 3sg.nom bubble COM 
iɲi-nm iŋun, iɲi-r il. 
run-PG 3sg.obj run-PD 3sg.nom 
Then he saw it — a crocodile going along, with bubbles (coming up) as it went. 
Ilimb il ulgal aŋg aʀti-r iŋun, aland-aγ, uk ermbeʀ. 
then 3sg.nom nearby here rise-PD 3sg.obj uncle-AL tree under.bank 
Then it came up close to him — to uncle — to a log at the bank. 
Eg ofeʀ id ̯n ̯an ari-r il iŋun aland.ay il. 
head crown/head true hit-PD 3sg.nom 3sg.obj uncle 3sg.nom 
Then uncle shot it right in the crown of the head. 
Ob-obe-n̯-aγ. 
2x-spasm-E-PRP 
It kicked in its death throes. 
[obe- is an interesting verb, and appears to mean ‘to writhe or kick in  
death throes, or in pain; to ache uncontrollably’] 
Uw uk awiy il ed ̯n ̯d ̯elaγ amu-nm. 
again tree also 3sg.nom altogether push-PG 
It pushed hard against the log, too. 
Iɲi-n-iy, id ̯n ̯an aɲ-iy. Obe-l il. 
run-E-AG true pain-PR spasm-PD 3sg.nom 
It (tried to) run because of the pain.  It kicked in its (death) throes. 
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Obe-l il, obe-l il, it ̯ur uŋgul amb il  
spasm-PD 3sg.nom spasm-PD 3sg.nom bubble there PRE 3sg.nom  
iŋun alanday ewa-n ̯ amb. 
3sg.obj  uncle see-PG PRE 
It kicked in pain, it kicked, and uncle watched the bubbles from it. 
Obe-l il, obe-l il, obe-l il, obe-l  
spasm-PD 3sg.nom spasm-PD 3sg.nom spasm-PD 3sg.nom spasm-PD 
il, ah! 
3sg.nom  ! 
It kicked and kicked and kicked and kicked to the end. 
Uŋgul arme-l il ulfi-r amba-n il. 
there finish-PD 3sg.nom die-PD happen-PRES 3sg.nom 
It finished up dying there. 
Ugŋub id ̯n ̯an ey-- erk uɲƫiʀ. 
sunset true  ! place night 
It was really night — after sunset. 
Elke-l il ubman.abmalγar ilg awand, il alandar-iy. 
return-PD 3sg.nom grandson COM east.end 3sg.nom uncle MB-PRE 
Uncle came back (to camp) with that grandson from upriver. 
[On the last four occasions Lawrence has continued with the use of aland.ar 
in reference to CR, as is appropriate to respectful observance of our 
relations from his own perspective.] 
“In̯ uŋgul enoŋgab.in ̯d ̯ay ari-r ay iŋun. 
 animal there one.of.them hit-PD 1sg.nom 3sg.obj 
“I shot one of them up there. 
uŋgul ugŋgi-r ay iŋun. 
there leave-PD 1sg.nom 3sg.obj 
I left it there. 
Ewa-l iŋun it ̯ur it ̯od ̯ amb il. 
see-PD 3sg.obj bubble there PRE 3sg.nom 
I saw its bubbles there. 
Ulfi-r il.”’ 
die-PD 3sg.nom 
It’s dead.”’ 
The Bowman story 
Luise Hercus and Peter Sutton finally produced in 1986 the volume of papers for which 
its contributors had waited so patiently, entitled This is what happened.  In it I published an 
account of Aboriginal understandings of a revenge killing of a white man current at the 
time of the recording from the viewpoint of Tommy Little — a man close to the event.  
From a contemporary of his, who was also immediate to those events as a young woman 
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working at the Rutland Plains Station just before the death, a parallel account was 
recorded.  This text is part of that account.  
Frank McArthur Bowman died on Friday, 2 September 1910 as the result of a spear 
wound to the right temple. He had been speared on the Sunday, five days earlier, and 
tetanus had set in, leaving a grieving wife and family. James McIntyre had been in his 
company at the time of the spearing, and had attempted to give aid, as well as shooting the 
spearman. But neither McIntyre nor the Bowmans had reputations for anything but gross 
cruelty, murder, and sexual abuse of Aboriginal women, as that paper shows. This present 
account was recorded quite separately from that published in the Hercus and Sutton 
volume; it was told by Bully Mitchell. 
Two excerpts are taken from the text; the first from near the beginning, to establish the 
sort of person Mrs Bowman was to the Aborigines, and then another from later, giving the 
speaker’s own opinion. 
In̯=aγal, *nannygoat-aγal ari-nm alin ̯an. 
meat=CSL   nannygoat-CSL hit-PG 1dl(ex).obj 
‘They were beating us because of the animals, because of the nannygoats. 
In̯ *nannygoat irbi-r alin ̯. 
meat   nannygoat miss-PD 1dl(ex).nom 
We’d let the goats out. 
Il uk.el=en ̯d ̯ ari-nm alin ̯an il. 
3sg.nom peg=INST hit-PG 1dl(ex).obj 3sg.nom 
She was beating us with a thick stick. 
Ari-nm alin ̯an il. 
hit-PG 1dl(ex)obj 3sg.nom 
She was beating us. 
Al alin̯an, agŋaʀ enoŋg erge-l il “abm 
go 1dl(ex).obj white.man another speak-PD 3sg.nom   person  
ubal er igu-l *Mission-g uʀun ̯d ̯, *Old.mission-g. 
2dl.nom away go-IMP   Mission-AL downward   Old.Mission-AL 
Then another white man came to us and said “You two go back down  
to the Mission, to Old Mission. 
Igu-l ubal uʀun ̯d ̯. 
go-IMP 2dl.nom downward 
You go down there. 
Abm ari-n-aγ erge-l ubaŋan it ̯om.” 
person hit-E-PRP speak-PD 2dl.obj that 
She says she’s going to kill you two.” 
Al alin̯ puy uʀun ̯d ̯, igu-r agar at ̯-at ̯a-r 
go 1dl(ex).nom  ! downward go-PD bedroll REDUP-tie.up-PD 
alin ̯ ii-n aʀti-r amb-iy. 
1dl(ex).nom run-E rise-PD PRE-AG 
We went; we went inside, tied up our swags, and cleared out. 
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********************** 
Ilimb it ̯odam ay ede-l amb-iy adniy, 
then thence 1sg.nom arrive-PD PRE-LOC upwards 
*Mr Matthew-an iŋun. 
  Mr Matthew-DAT 3sg.obj 
Then I came from there up here to Mr Matthew (Mission Superintendent). 
*Mr Roy # ina-n̯ ul, ina-n̯ ul it ̯od ̯ amb. 
  Mr Roy # stay-PG 3dl.nom stay-PG 3dl.nom there PRE 
Mr Roy used to stay together with him, they stayed there. 
Adu̯n *tub-iy odnge-r, pop! 
1sg.obj   tub-INS cover-PD plop 
They covered me with a tub, plop! 
********************** 
Anewaγ. Ari-r iŋun! Eg=aman ̯d ̯!  
that’s.all kill-PD 3sg.obj head=LOC 
That’s all.  Killed him!  In the head! 
Eg oŋgod̯ uʀun ̯d ̯ iŋun alk aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ oŋgod̯ atuwi-r! 
head here downward 3sg.obj spear like.this here keep-PD 
His head was down, the spear was like this stuck in it! 
Alk ituγal amay-ar! 
spear spear.barb big-INS 
With a big spear barb! 
Aŋg erne-n̯ amba-nm il iŋun. 
here stand-E cause-PG 3sg.nom 3sg.obj 
He (McIntyre) stood him (Bowman) up. 
Aʀ in ̯ *bull erne-n̯ il uʀun ̯d ̯. 
like meat   bull stand-PG 3sg.nom downward 
He was standing like a bull there. 
Il uraŋar al-alo-l oŋgom ede-n̯ alk=an ̯d ̯ 
3sg.nom wife REDUP-go.along-PD this arrive-PG spear=INST 
oŋgol idu-r. 
must.be spear-PD 
His wife travelled along to come to the place where the spear must have  
pierced him. 
[Bully has no truck for Mrs Bowman, and has therefore no need to honour 
her with any more than the neutral referent term for ‘wife’, neither here nor 
in the second sentence following this.] 
Ak iŋun! 
let 3sg.obj 
Let her do that! 
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Abm ari-nm igu-n-aγ uraŋar ay-ayi-nm amb-iy il. 
person kill-PG go-E-PRP wife REDUP-cry-PG PRE-AG 3sg.nom 
His wife was crying now for the man who used to kill as he went along. 
Onpoʀ it ̯om andaŋar ak elataŋ.ayi-lm-ayi-nm edn. 
old.woman that children let mourn.deeply-E-weep-PG 3pl.nom 
That old woman and her children can mourn deeply. 
[Despite Bully’s indifference to Mrs Bowman, she here calls her ‘old 
woman’, which has a mark of respect about it. By the time this story was 
told, Mrs Bowman would have been long dead, so it is not a literal term, 
but the respect one which is called upon here, perhaps because Mrs 
Bowman had been her boss. The children are dismissed with the neutral 
term andaŋar.] 
Ituγal amay-ar idu-r iŋun. 
spear.barb big-INS spear-PD 3sg.obj 
He speared him with a big barb. 
*Wire ... 
   wire 
A wire one ... 
# Alk iyaʀɲaʀ-iy idu-r iŋun uʀun ̯d ̯. [laughs.] 
#  spear lance.wood-INS spear-PD 3sg.obj downward [laughs] 
He speared him there with a lancewood spear.   [Laughs.] 
Abm it ̯om il it ̯om aŋgan in ̯d ̯ay il *Bella? 
person that 3sg.nom that straight where.at? 3sg.nom   Bella 
I wonder where she is now, that Bella? 
Aŋaɲ amb elke-l il! 
NEG PRE return-PD 3sg.nom 
She (Mrs Bowman) didn’t come back! 
Abm oren-g an ede-l ednaŋan!  
person behind-AL done arrive-PD 3pl.obj 
She (their daughter) came here after them! 
Abm oŋgol onpoʀ arin en ̯ ukal il! 
person must.be  old.woman  whither?  indeed  name  3sg.nom 
She must be an old woman now, what’s-her-name! 
*Mrs Bowman. alγar! uraŋar awiy. uraŋar awiy! 
  Mrs Bowman bad wife also wife also 
Mrs Bowman.  No good!  His wife, too.  His wife as well!  
[The usual term uraŋar is used again here, and I’m sure that only the vague 
chance that I might be offended kept the speaker from worse opprobrium.] 
Iyaŋ, alγar awiy il! 
yes bad also  3sg.nom 
Yes, she was evil too. 
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Il *work aŋaɲ aʀti-nm il. 
3sg.nom   work  NEG rise-PG 3sg.nom 
She never did any work. 
Uk argŋ algŋa-nm il, ari-n tak!! 
tree titree carry-PG 3sg.nom hit-PRES whack 
She used to carry a ti-tree waddy, and hit you, Whack! 
Alo-l il. 
go.along-PD 3sg.nom 
Just as she went along. 
# Anewaγ ilimb il *Bowman alγar ah! 
#  that’s.all then 3sg.nom   Bowman bad  ! 
That’s all.  That Bowman was bad news!’ 
Patsy and Carolyn:  sex and booze 
This excerpt is from a longish discussion between two women who had heard the 
recording of the obscene joking between two men, and who were challenged to present the 
sort of conversation that was representative of their own style of obscenity/humour. The 
result was not an analogue of the men’s obscene joking — although there is such a style, 
and I have witnessed it — but rather a furious dialogue between intimates about amatory 
adventures.  Patsy and Carolyn are age-grade mates with a long history of sharing private 
matters. 
The names of the participants and the referents in the text have all been changed.  
‘Patsy’ is the more cerebral and careful of the two — despite assurances from both myself 
and ‘Carolyn’, she is a little hesitant before the tape recorder — even though I had left 
them in seclusion to record their dialogue. ‘Carolyn’ on the other hand had been used to 
the recorder and had used it often herself. ‘Carolyn’s’ performance is the less inhibited, 
and she asks ‘Patsy’ at one point why she is so reticent. 
The discussion is linguistically unusual for the use of the ‘historic present’ nowhere else 
attested in Oykangand speech styles.  Otherwise, it attests nicely the analysis offered in the 
previous chapters. The excerpt is taken from early in the session, which was spoilt by loud 
music entertaining children nearby.  The symbol # marks unclear sections of the recording. 
P: Idn eleγ-eleγ.amba-n. ### Ew.eʀɲeʀɲelaŋ! 
vagina ID=keep.show-PRES  humbug 
‘I kept showing my vagina — I was a humbug!’ 
C: Ew.eʀɲeʀɲelaŋ ambe-y! 
humbug become-PRES 
‘(You) mustn’t humbug about! 
Abm # edn  uwam it ̯om igu-n ad ̯un amb 
person # 3pl.nom  west.side that go-PRES 1sg.obj PRE 
algal aʀti-n ad ̯un awaʀ it ̯od ̯ 
straight rise-PRES 1sg.obj eastwards there 
They were coming up from the west, they came right up to me in the east there. 
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Ay ednaŋan  oyel ‘abm ad ̯un ur  aneγ eŋkaʀ.aʀti-n? 
1sg.nom 3pl.obj  in.turn person 1sg.obj 2pl.obj what.for? ID=worry-PRES 
I said to them ‘Why are you all bothering me? 
Abm ay uraŋan elŋgelŋg 
person 1sg.nom 2pl.obj young.men 
oŋgolmeʀan̯d ̯ ogŋon.amba-n-aγ onder.” 
together assemble.‘selves-E-PRP again 
I gathered you young men together again here. 
# Id ̯n ̯an algal ina-n ̯ abm igu-nm edn ### 
#  body straight sit-PG person go-PG 3pl.nom  
ID=tumescent 
They were going about with their penises tumescent. 
Enoŋg  awiy *Nellie-iŋ 
another  also   Nellie-GEN  
One of them was Nellie’s (man).’ 
P: Ew.eʀɲel amb-ambe-y idn elad ̯n ̯araŋ! 
humbug REDUP-become-PRES vagina poor.thing 
‘Don’t humbug about your vagina, the poor thing! 
Onbaʀ alγar ilg il! 
face bad COM 3sg.nom 
He’s ugly!’ 
C: Mamaŋ-iŋ. 
mother-GEN 
‘He (has his) mother’s (face)!’ 
Amamaŋ-iŋ *Gertie. 
mother-GEN   Gertie 
‘(He has) Mum Gertie’s (face). 
“Lelaŋ ey aŋg uwand!  ## 
  y.sister   ! here westwards  ## 
“Little sister!  Come here! 
It̯om amb!” 
that PRE 
Here you are!” 
Agŋaʀ uŋgul *RL udn-udna-n̯ il uʀun ̯d ̯ 
white.man there   RL REDUP-camp-PG 3sg.nom downward 
oŋgoŋgoy ia-n aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ amb 
rum drink-PRES like.this PRE 
‘That white man, RL (personal name), is camped down there,  
drinking rum, you know ...’ 
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P: Erab ... 
several 
‘Several ...’ 
C: Elgoʀ igu-nm an ̯d ̯an egŋ ia-n og ia-n elgoʀ 
many go-PG 1pl(ex).nom food eat-PRES water eat-PRES many 
abm onpoʀ-amb it ̯om-iy # arme-n̯ ugŋal. 
person old.woman-PL that-PRE # finish-PG now 
‘A whole lot of us went down, eating tucker and drinking booze— that old  
lady who’s dead now, too. 
[I never learned who this onpoʀ was — she may not have been literally an 
old lady. P and C had a close age-grade mate to whom C would have 
extended the term for mother. See The derivation of kin terms I in Chapter 5 
for the usage of onpoʀ. Note that C uses the circumlocution armel 
‘finished’ rather than ‘died’. See Chapter 6; The forms of avoidance: social 
and linguistic.] 
Ew adniy igu-n enenolγ ambe-y. 
mouth upwards go-PRES once.only become-PRES 
Drinking — mouth upwards, and not just once! 
Onpoʀ abmabmiN amaNar ad ̯en. 
old.woman g’parent mother 1sg.poss 
And your granny, my mother, too. 
[This is another case of the vocative form — abmabmiN — being used 
referentially. It is immediately followed by the referential term necessary 
with ad ̯en ‘my’; possessive and vocative together would be tautology.] 
Il amand.ar ad ̯un amb uyam-iy erga-nm. 
3sg.nom mother 1sg.obj PRE hand-LOC trample-PG 
Your mother grabbed me by the hand. 
[C uses amandar to refer to P’s mother, who in turn calls C elaŋar ‘younger 
sister’ as the next sentence shows.] 
“Lelaŋ! 
  y.sister 
“Little sister! 
##  Ednde-maγ oŋgom ednaNan od ̯n ̯d ̯ ambeɲ.uɲiy.” 
##  take.part-POT this 3pl.obj merely UI=please 
Would you mind offering them some sex?” 
[An older sister is suggesting that C ‘take part’ in a sexual encounter with 
the providers of the booze as a measure of appreciation. Since this is a 
physical activity, she couches the request in circumlocution, ending with 
the Uw Ibmban ̯d ̯iy politeness forms ambeɲ.uɲiy. See Chapter 6; The 
forms of avoidance: linguistic.] 
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“ak.udnaγ! idn olbon ewa-ŋan ad ̯un.” 
 ID=why not? vagina black see-IFUT 1sg.obj 
“Why don’t I?!  They can see my black vagina!” 
P: abm eleγ.amba-n erbe-n̯am inaŋ. 
person show-PRES RECIP-E-EL 2sg.nom 
‘They can be shown your (vagina).’ 
C: “ak.udna-γ! 
 ID=why not? 
“Why don’t I?! 
adn ew olbon ad ̯ŋun iyan ̯d ̯ ew-ewa-yan ̯.” 
excrement mouth black 1sg.obj later REDUP-know-IPST 
They can know my black bum later.” 
It̯om anaman igu-nm abm alŋgeɲ-aγ ugŋal aŋaɲ! 
that long.ago go-PG person young.women-PRP now NEG 
He used to go for young women long ago, but not now!’ 
P: Ugŋal aŋaɲ! 
now NEG 
‘Not now! 
Eg aɲiy ilg. 
head grey COM 
He’s grey (headed).’ 
C: ugŋal aŋaɲ ar ambe-l. 
now NEG wasted become-PD 
‘Not now, he’s no good. 
“Ak.udna-γ.” 
  ID=why not? 
“Why don’t I?!” 
Ugŋal ew urad ̯e-y ## idn amb-iy! 
now mouth ashamed-PRES ## vagina PRE-PRE 
Now he’s ashamed to talk about vagina!’ 
P: Erɲerɲaʀ! 
 humbug 
‘(You’re a) humbug!’ 
C: On ̯d ̯eʀ ewa-ŋan ad ̯un onbaʀ “oŋgom amb-iy 
 tomorrow see-IFUT 1sg.obj face   this PRE-PRE 
olbon oŋgom aƫumaƫ!” 
 black this UI=no.good 
‘Tomorrow he’ll see my face and think “This black one’s no good!” 
[The use of the UI aƫumaƫ in lieu of the regular alγar here is inexplicable.] 
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Oŋgom anen en ̯ *Patsy? 
this what? indeed   Patsy 
What then, Patsy?’ 
P: An ̯=uŋ en ̯?! agul!! 
who?=GEN indeed wrong 
‘Whose (face) indeed?!  A wrong one!!’ 
C: Aneγ amb-iy aŋande-y? 
what.for? PRE-PRE be.lost-PRES 
‘Why aren’t you saying anything?’  (lit. ‘what for are you lost?’) 
P: Abm aneγ ew eʀɲel amba-n ad ̯un inaŋ? 
person what.for? mouth humbug cause-PRES 1sg.obj 2sg.nom 
‘Why are you telling me lies?’ 
[This accusation — that the narrative is untrue — appears to be a feature of 
women’s talk, as it recurs later in the recording also.  In this instance it 
appears to be a defence against P’s unwillingness to talk of her own sexual 
escapades for the tape.] 
C: Abm oŋgom ay aŋaɲ igu-n ay 
person this 1sg.nom NEG go-PRES 1sg.nom 
iŋun od ̯n ̯d ̯ igu-n. 
3sg.obj vainly go-PRES 
‘I didn’t really go to him, I just pretended to.’ 
Oŋgom ad ̯un arƫar olon el ̯a-lγ-el̯a-n ad ̯un. 
this 1sg.obj morning hither send-E-send-PRES 1sg.obj 
When morning came, he kept sending me away. 
P: Ay inun it ̯om el ̯a-yan ̯ karey idn uwa-n̯-aγ. ### 
1sg.nom 2sg.obj that send-IPST OK vagina give-E-PRP  ### 
‘I would have sent you away, too, after sex.’ 
C: ### Idn uwa-n̯-aγ igu-l inaŋ! 
### vagina give-E-PRP go-IMP 2sg.nom 
‘You go and have sex with him!’ 
P: ### 
C: Ay it ̯om iŋun ## edngedng ina-yan ̯ ew.elad ̯n ̯ad ̯n ̯araŋg. 
1sg.nom that 3sg.obj ## unmoving stay-IPST  poor man 
‘I would have just sat tight for him, poor thing!’ 
P: Elad ̯n ̯araŋ eʀdnd-eʀdnde-l-iy! 
poor.thing REDUP-slide-PD-PRE 
‘Poor man, you’re a slippery one!’ 
C: Il *Mary elelaŋ il inun 
3sg.nom   Mary y.sister 3sg.nom 2sg.obj 
*Mary alwuʀ aʀti-r; il on ̯d ̯eʀ inaŋ 
  Mary anger rise-PD 3sg.nom tomorrow 2sg.nom 
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“Anen abm onpoʀ oŋgom ina-n ̯? ## 
  what? person old.woman this sit-PG ## 
og aʀemar ia-ŋan ad ̯un aγ? ## 
water without drink-IFUT 1sg.obj once  ## 
Elof aneγ id ̯n ̯d ̯a-γ ad ̯un inaŋ?” 
eyeball what.for? poke-IRR 1sg.obj 2sg.nom 
Your young sister, Mary, was furious; the next day [she asked]  
“Why did you let this old woman sit without booze again?  Why  
did you want to offend me? [lit. poke me in the eye]?” 
Abm aliy oŋgod̯ in. Ay adniy oŋgod̯ in. 
person 1dl(in).nom here sit 1sg.nom upwards here sit 
We were sitting here. I was sitting here. 
Ul ak igu-n abm onpoʀ oŋgom. 
3du.nom let go-PRES person old.woman this 
That old woman and the one with her, can do what they like.’ 
P: Abm inun ew.eʀɲel amba-n oŋgol. 
person 2sg.obj humbug happen-PRES must.be 
‘They must have been humbugging with you.’ 
C: “Agŋaʀ-aγ aneγ el ̯a-n inaŋ amaŋar ad ̯en?” 
  white.man-AL what.for? send-PRES 2sg.nom mother 1sg.poss 
‘“Why did you send my mother to that white man?” 
Il *Mary alwuʀ aʀti-r. 
3sg.nom   Mary anger rise-PD 
Mary was furious. 
Odn̯̯d ̯ ak amand.ar erg-erg il og ia-n-am. 
merely let mother REDUP-speak 3sg.nom water eat-E-EL 
Mother was just talking off the top of her head from drink.’ 
[Note the respect form in the final sentence that contrasts with the neutral, 
referential form two sentences above it in quotation.] 
Minnie’s Lament 
When I first met her in the mid-1960s, Minnie Highbury was a gracious but tired, even 
drained, old lady.  She was born in the bush before the Mission was established in 1905.  
By the time I recorded this, she was lonely and sad, missing the somewhat vigorous, not to 
say wild, companions of her youth, and her own siblings.  Minnie herself had had a large 
family, but as she became frail they deserted her for their own pursuits; she was poorly 
cared for, finally dying quietly without great notice in the community at large. 
This excerpt from her memoirs — a long text that I have called Minnie’s lament — is 
from the beginning of the recording, and is rather less depressing and pitiful than the last of 
it.  She begins by telling her name, mentions something about the use of personal names, 
and illustrates certain kin term usage. 
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The entire text is worthy of analysis, but this section is particularly rich.  It at no point 
invokes her relationship with me or with her children or nearby friends, but dwells on the 
past, and the times she had with long dead kinsmen — most of whom are fortunately still 
identifiable. 
“Uwamiy.erganaγ” ad ̯en il. 
  (personal name) 1sg.poss 3sg.nom 
‘My name’s “Uwamiy Errgenhagh.” 
[Minnie can use her own name; she is not showing any ascendancy or 
spiritual authority or control over another, and so use of a personal name is 
entirely acceptable. In fact, it is her name that becomes the theme of this 
narrative, re-introduced at its close to provide a counterpoint to its use at the 
beginning here. See Chapter 8, and Chapter 5, What kinship means to 
verbal behaviour — A beginning.] 
Abm an ̯d ̯an oŋgod̯ alo-n̯ oŋgod̯ alo-l 
person 1pl(ex).nom here go.along-PG here go.along-PD 
an ̯d ̯an awaʀ. 
1pl(ex).nom eastwards 
We all used to walk along here, we went upriver. 
Oŋgod̯ igu-r an ̯d ̯an eŋkoʀ oŋgodam *mango 
here walk-PD 1pl(ex).nom shade  hence   mango 
igu-r an ̯d ̯an awaʀ “karey ambul ah?” 
go-PD 1pl(ex).nom eastwards   OK 1pl(in).nom   ! 
We used to walk in the shade of the mangos from here, we’d go up  
— “OK there?” 
“Igu-l ambul bebaŋ! 
  go-IMP 1pl(in).nom o.sister 
“We’ll go, sister! 
Bebaŋ!” 
o.sister 
Sister!” 
[The usual form of the vocative is bebaŋ, and Minnie’s usage is quite normal.] 
“*Bully ambul igu-n.” 
    Bully 1pl(in).nom go-PRES 
‘We’re going with Bully.’ 
“Uwamiy.erganaγ?” 
  (personal name) 
‘“Uwamiy Errganhagh”, too?’ 
[This use of a personal name is unusual, but because it is a self reference 
again, it is apparently acceptable.] 
“Ehheˀ ” 
  OK 
“OK” 
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Inaŋ ebaʀɲar ukal igŋgi-l ilimb “inaŋ *Emily?” 
2sg.nom o.sister name pull-IMP then   2sg.nom   Emily  
You didn’t say your older sister’s name then; “You, Emily?” 
[This is a most interesting observation; apparently there was a total sanction 
on the use of one’s older sister’s name — at least by a younger sister, and 
perhaps younger siblings generally. Note the use of the polite form 
ebaʀɲar here, even though there was no older sister present; note also the 
use of ukal igŋgi- to describe the process of ‘calling’ a name.] 
“Ehˀhe abm an ambul.” 
  OK person done 1pl(in).nom 
“OK, we’re ready.” 
Il uband.ar-ay-an uw elbe-r oŋgod̯ ugŋgaɲ ow! 
3sg.nom spouse-RESP-AG speech tell-PD here from.north   ! 
She called out to me from the top side there. 
[Here’s uban.ar in AG (agentive) function; who it was she is referring to 
can no longer be traced.] 
Arŋg oŋgom il *Nelson il. 
child this 3sg.nom   Nelson 3sg.nom 
Nelson was a child. 
“Ilfuɲ ah!” 
  (P name)   ! 
“Ilfuny!” 
[Everyone called Dinah, Nelson’s mother, Ilfuɲ, but as far as I can tell it 
was her erk.elampuŋk (conception site) not her personal name.] 
“Ambul puy ambul eh.” 
  1pl(in).nom   ! 1pl(in).nom   ! 
“We’ll go, eh?!” 
“# Egŋ in ̯d ̯od ̯ ia-n ambul?” 
 #  food where.at? eat-PRES 1pl(in).nom 
“Where can we get food?” 
“Aŋg awi=n ̯d ̯ ia-l.” “Ambul eh.” 
  here  road=LOC eat-IMP  1pl(in).nom   ! 
‘We’ll have to eat on the way.”  “Yeah?” 
“Abm in ̯d ̯od ̯ udn ambul?” 
  person  where.at?  lie  1pl(in).nom 
“Where will we camp?” 
“Erk uŋgul amb udn ambul eh?” 
  place there PRE lie 1pl(in).nom  ! 
“We’ll camp up there, eh?” 
“Uy.ewaman ̯d ̯ it ̯od ̯ udna-n̯-aγ ambul.” “Ehheˀ ” 
  Fish Hole there lie-E-PRP 1pl(in).nom   OK 
“We’ll camp there at Fish Hole.”  “OK” 
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“Arin ambe-y ambul?” 
  whither? become-PRES 1pl(in).nom 
“What will we do?” 
“Abm # awin arki-n ambul # awin arki-n ambul!” 
  person # road follow-PRES 1pl(in).nom # road  follow-PRES 1pl(in).nom 
“We’ll follow the road, just follow the road!” 
“Mamaŋ ewa-n̯-aγ ambul?” 
  mother see-E-PRP 1pl(in).nom 
“Will we see my Mum?” 
[The vocative here is once more in use to refer to an actual mother.  See The 
derivation of kin terms I.] 
(Mamaŋ *Doris ednaŋan.) “Ehheˀ mamaŋ ewa-n̯-aγ ambul.” 
 mother   Doris 3pl.obj   OK mother see-E-PRP 1pl(in).nom  
(Doris is mother to them.)  “Yes, we’ll see Mum.” 
[Doris was a contemporary of Minnie’s, if only a little older.  Both Minnie 
and Emily called her ‘mother’, it seems, and this is quite consonant with the 
way their progeny in turn addressed her.] 
“Karey ambul!” 
  OK 1pl(in).nom 
“Let’s go!” 
“Ilimb arin igu-n?” 
  then whither? go-PRES 
“Then which way do we go?” 
“Abm # awin amb arki-n ambul  ... 
  person  # road PRE follow-PRES 1pl(in).nom 
“We’ll follow the road ... 
# awin amb ark-arki-n.” 
# road PRE REDUP-follow-PRES 
... keep following the road.” 
“Abm agŋaʀ-ɲ uki-ŋan ambuŋan!” 
  person white.man-AG meet-IFUT 1pl(in).obj 
“A white man might meet us!” 
“Aŋaɲ agŋaʀ-ɲ uki-ŋan.” 
  NEG white.man-AG meet-IFUT 
“No white man’ll meet us.” 
“Odn̯̯d ̯ amb igu-n ambul.” “Mamaŋ-an ambul!” 
  merely PRE go-PRES 1pl(in).nom   mother-AL 1pl(in).nom 
“We’re just going.”   “To my Mum!” 
“Abm in ̯d ̯od ̯ udna-ŋan ambul?” 
  person where.at? lie-IFUT 1pl(in).nom 
“Where will we camp?” 
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“Abm *Fourteen.Mile udn ambul.” 
  person   Fourteen.Mile lie 1pl(in).nom 
“We’ll camp at Fourteen Mile (Yards).” 
“Ehheˀ ” 
    ! 
“Yeah!” 
“Ilimb arin ambe-y ambul?” 
  then whither? become-PRES 1pl(in).nom 
“Then what will we do?” 
“ # Egŋ ia-n-aγ awiy.” “Uŋgul urgurgiy in.” 
   # food eat-E-PRP also   there (P name) stay 
“(We’ll) have food there too.”   “(We’ll) stay there at Urrgurrgiy.” 
“Ambul urgurgiy in ambul, 
  1pl(in).nom (P name) stay 1pl(in).nom 
“Yeah, we’ll stay at Urrgurrgiy, 
*line iki-n-aγ ambul.” 
  line throw-E-PRP 1pl(in).nom 
and we’ll go fishing.” 
“Ehheˀ ” 
  OK 
“OK” 
“Anewaγ ambul.” 
  that’s.all 1pl(in).nom 
ID 
“That’s all we’ll do.” 
“Ugŋ uŋgul uʀun ̯d ̯ ede-n̯-aγ ambul.” 
  sun there downward arrive-E-PRP 1pl(in).nom 
“We’ll arrive about sundown.” 
“Ugŋ uŋgul uʀun ̯d ̯ ede-n̯-aγ ambul.” 
  sun there downward arrive-E-PRP 1pl(in).nom 
“Yeah, we’ll get there about sundown!” 
“*Supper-aγ.” 
    supper-PRP 
“For supper.” 
“Egŋ aŋg ia-n-aγ. 
  food here eat-E-PRP 
“We’ll eat there. 
Egŋ ia-n-aγ ambul.” “Ehheˀ ” “Abm ololaŋ-an 
food eat-E-PRP 1pl(in).nom   OK   person  o.brother-AL 
igu-n-aγ awey adniy ambul egŋ=aγ.” 
go-E-PRP hither upwards 1pl(in).nom food=PRP 
We’ll eat there.”  “OK”  “We’ll go up to our/my brother for some food.” 
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[ololaŋ is the vocative in referential use once more because it is an actual or 
very close older brother; refer to the usage of vocatives in The derivation of 
kin terms I] 
“Ehhe” Ewa-l an ̯d ̯an amaŋar. 
  OK see-PD 1pl(ex).nom mother 
“OK”  Then we saw Mum. 
Edn el ̯aŋ uwand udna-n ̯ 
3pl.nom end.w.hole westwards lie-PG 
parkupark udna-n ̯ edn. 
(P name) lie-PG 3pl.nom 
They were camped at the bottom end of a waterhole, at Parrkuparrk. 
“Eh!” 
   ! 
“Hey!” 
“Lelaŋ!” 
  y.sister 
“Little sister!” 
“Parkupark udna-n ̯ ur?” 
  (P name) lie-PG 2pl.nom 
“Are you camping at Parrkuparrk?” 
“Ehheˀ mamaŋ uŋgul ambuŋ!” 
  OK mother there 1pl(in).poss 
“Yeah, our Mum’s there!” 
“Aƫo!” 
 (glad) 
“Great! 
“Amamaŋ ambuŋ.” 
  mother 1pl(in).poss 
“Our Mum!” 
[In the previous two instances, the tautology is present: the vocative 
amamaŋ with the plural inclusive possessive ambuŋ.] 
Ayi-r, ayi-r alin ̯. 
weep-PD weep-PD 1du(ex).nom 
We wept and wept! 
Elelaŋ alin ̯. 
y.sister 1dl(ex).nom 
Me and my little sister. 
Ayi-r, ayi-r alin ̯. 
weep-PD weep-PD 1dl(ex).nom 
We wept and wept. 
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Oyel il mamaŋ ayi-r ayi-r. 
in.turn 3sg.nom mother weep-PD weep-PD 
My Mum too, she wept and wept. 
“Amamaŋ, ololaŋ in ̯d ̯ay?” 
  mother o.brother where.at? 
‘Mum, where’s our older brother?’ 
[Here are the two uses of the vocative form in contrast, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, The derivation of kin terms I.  Amamaŋ is in true vocative use, 
while ololaŋ is referential.] 
“Lolaŋ *work aʀt-aʀti-n.” 
  o.brother   work REDUP-climb-PRES 
“Your older brother’s working.” 
“Kah” “Ehˀhe” 
  all right   OK 
“All right.”  “OK” 
Ilimb adniy igu-r an ̯d ̯an. 
then upwards go-PD 1pl(ex).nom 
Then we went up. 
“Awey! 
  hither 
“Come here! 
Awey ubal!” 
hither 2dl.nom 
Come here, you two!” 
Mamaŋ-an alin ̯aŋ erge-l, amaŋ-an alin ̯aŋ erge-l, 
mother-AG 1dl(ex).poss speak-PD mother-AG 1dl(ex).poss speak-PD 
Our Mum said to us, she said, 
“Ehheˀ awey ubal. 
  OK hither 2dl.nom 
“OK Come here you two. 
Egŋ ia-n-aγ in ̯ ia-n-aγ.” 
food eat-E-PRP meat eat-E-PRP 
Eat some tucker; eat some meat, too.” 
“Ehheˀ ” “Elk ubal ina-n̯-aγ oγoŋ amaŋar.” 
  OK   return 2dl.nom stay-E-PRP indeed mother 
“OK”  “You two come back and stay with me, your Mother.” 
[oγoŋ, glossed here ‘indeed’, is one of the particles older Oykangand 
speakers insert into situations requiring the recognition of relationships that 
involve intimacy and yet respect. The use of this word had largely 
disappeared when the research commenced, and the precise parameters of 
its use cannot be stated.] 
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Ig-igu-nm an ̯d ̯an it ̯om-iy. 
REDUP-go-PG 1pl(ex).nom that-PRE 
We went with her. 
Alo-l alin ̯ amaŋar-aγ amaŋar alin ̯aŋ ina-n̯. 
go.along-PD 1dl(ex).nom mother-AL mother 1dl(ex).poss stay-PG 
We went over to Mum; we stayed with our Mum. 
An ̯d ̯aŋ-iy ugŋal ugŋgi-n erbe-l an ̯d ̯an ugŋal 
1pl(ex).poss-PRE now leave-E RECIP-PD 1pl(ex).nom now 
ugŋgi-n erbe-l. 
leave-E  RECIP-PD 
We all went; now our mother has left us, she’s left. 
Eloʀ ugŋal el ar ambe-n̯-am ay ebaŋar. 
alone now eye spoiled become-E-EL 1sg.nom o.sister 
Now I’m alone, my eyes weak, your older sister. 
Ormolf erk oŋgod̯-iy alo-n̯ an ̯d ̯an awaʀ. 
true.enough place here-PRE go.along-PG 1pl(ex).nom eastwards 
That’s true.  We used to travel up there. 
Erk amaŋ undam-aγ oŋgom igu-r. 
place mother E-AL this go-PD 
We went to my Mum’s place. 
Arme-l an ̯d ̯an. 
finish-PD 1pl(ex).nom 
But we’re finished now.’ 
.... 
Abmbandhang 
We were sitting at the table over morning tea. I had been asking Cecil and Gracie 
Rutland about a comment made in Sharp’s (1939:443) description of Tribes and totemism 
in north-east Australia:  
The formal wrestling between distant siblings of the same moiety, often an annual 
ceremony, is found among the western tribes [of his Olkol Type of social 
organisation – BAS] and is reported for some of the eastern (74, 75, 76) [ones]. 
Since his prototype, Olkol, is one of the Kunjen group, and Oykangand (as Oikand No. 
64) manifests the same type of social organisation, it seemed likely that something might 
still be known of the practice, but neither Gracie nor Cecil knew anything about it.  Earlier, 
Jimmy Koolatah said that he recalled seeing striped red-and-white posts ‘like barber’s 
poles’ upright in the earth on a dancing ground near Dunbar Station on the ‘main’ Mitchell 
River, and remarked on how pretty they were, being ancillary to a ritual where men went to 
‘humbug fight’.  But Jimmy had been an Olgol man, who had escaped from the Mission to 
join still traditional tribesmen in the Koolatah area, while Gracie and Cecil had been born 
to people closer to the influence of the Mission.  Consequently, they had only heard about 
such a ritual.   
Texts     211 
 
Into our discussion stepped Doris Lawrence, from the upriver area near the dancing 
ground at which Jimmy had seen the ‘pretty’ poles.  After a few pleasantries Gracie asked 
about this ritual, and the conversation then turns on what is still recalled, and who knew 
about it all.  The participants are identified by their initials, G, C and D; their relationships 
are those defined in Figure 5.7 of Chapter 5.  I also make a minor contribution as ‘B’. 
C: Aʀƫe-r ay, al ̯=ul *make.em ataγaʀ, 
cook-PD 1sg.nom fire=AG   make them dry 
ogŋgom at ̯a-r ay. iŋun araʀaŋ-iy. 
fish.damper tie.up-PD 1sg.nom 3sg.obj cabbage-tree-INS 
‘I cooked it on the fire, I dried out the fish-damper and tied it up in  
cabbage tree leaf.’ 
G: Ifa-r inaŋ. 
roast-PD 2sg.nom 
‘You roasted it.’ 
C: Al ̯=ul ifa-r ay, on ̯t ̯oγoʀ-iy ifa-r. 
fire=INS roast-PD 1sg.nom ashes-LOC roast-PD 
‘Yes, I roasted it on the fire, in the hot ashes.’ 
G: Elke-n̯ amba-r ad ̯un il, lalaŋ-al! 
return-E cause-PD 1sg.obj 3sg.nom uncle-AG 
‘Uncle brought it back to me!’ 
[This last exclamation is for my benefit.  Note the vocative once more;  
we were fictively very close.] 
C: In ̯ oyboy ari-r alin ̯; 
meat wallaby kill-PD 1dl(ex).nom 
oyboy il amb ari-r. 
wallaby 3sg.nom PRE kill-PD 
‘We killed a wallaby; he shot it. 
Algŋa-r ay, alγ.amba-r. 
carry-PD 1sg.nom pit.roast-PD 
I carried it, and roasted it in an earth oven.’ 
D: (at the doorway) oŋgom ay  egŋ aʀƫe-n. 
 this 1sg.nom food cook-PRES 
‘I’m cooking food too.’ 
G: Ah! 
 ! 
‘Aha!’ 
B: Awey! 
hither 
‘Come in!!’ 
D: Egŋ aʀƫe-n-aγ igu-n ay. 
food cook-E-PRP go-PRES 1sg.nom 
‘I’m going to cook tucker.’ 
212     Appendix 2 
 
C: Alγ.amba-r ay. 
 pit.roast-PD 1sg.nom 
‘I roasted it in an earth oven.’ 
[C is pointedly ignoring the interruption by D.] 
D: In̯ aʀƫe-n-aγ awiy. 
meat cook-E-PRP also 
‘I cooked meat too.’ 
G: egŋ aʀƫe-n inaŋ? 
food cook-PRES 2sg.nom 
‘Are you cooking food?’ 
D: iyaŋ, ad ̯en! 
yes 1sg.poss 
‘Yes, of course!’ 
Abm abmalγ-an al-alo-n̯ 
person  g’child-AL REDUP-go.along-PG 
ay iŋun adniy, *Gordon-an. 
1sg.nom 3sg.obj upwards   Gordon-AL 
‘I was going up to my grandson, to Gordon.’ 
[Gordon is D’s BSS; she leaves off the arŋg of arŋg.abmalγ in order to 
shorten the term with its AL affix.] 
C: abm in ̯d ̯ay ugŋal? 
person where.at? now 
‘Where is he now?’ 
G: abmalγ-an ugŋal in ̯d ̯ay? 
g’child-AL now where.at? 
‘Where’s your grandson now?’ 
[I cannot explain why G has repeated D’s form complete with AL affix; the 
latter is not only unnecessary, it is ungrammatical.  Although fluent, G is 
not a native speaker of Oykangand, and there are occasional solecisms in 
her speech.] 
D: Abm uŋgul amb-iy iɲi-n il. 
person there PRE-PRE run-PRES 3sg.nom 
‘He’s gone now.’ 
C: t ̯epa! 
Quiet! 
‘Don’t say! 
Abm ilimb ogŋg aʀ erge-n̯! 
person then before not speak-PG 
‘No one told me earlier! 
Abm ay ... 
person 1sg.nom 
But I ...’ 
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D: Abm elemaγ ay. 
person recognise 1sg.nom 
Arƫar erge-l il ad ̯un. 
morning speak-PD 3sg.nom 1sg.obj  
‘I understand.  He only told me this morning.’ 
G: *Poor.boy! 
  poor.boy 
‘Poor boy!’ 
C: Ow! 
 ! 
‘True!’ 
D: *He *come *back *again ...! 
  he   come   back   again 
‘He’ll be back.  Hey!’ 
C: Ow! 
 ! 
‘Hey!’ 
Abm aŋaɲ amb ewa-l *old.man igu-n-am. 
person NEG PRE see-PD   old.man go-E-EL 
‘I didn’t see that old man going.’ 
[C is D’s close ‘father’; this makes Gordon C’s ‘father’ also, as explained 
in Chapter 5: the ‘great grandson’ rule.] 
D: abm ay uŋgul uwand, ed ̯n ̯d ̯-edn̯̯da̯-r 
person 1sg.nom there westwards REDUP-scatter-PD 
*Harris-al ad ̯un il al-alo-n̯-am. 
  Harris-AG 1sg.obj 3sg.nom REDUP-go.along-E-EL 
‘I went down there and Harris hunted me away from there as he came.’ 
C: ow! 
  ! 
‘Hey! 
Abm ad ̯un aʀ erge-n̯ ...? 
person 1sg.obj why.not speak-PG 
Why didn’t you tell me?’ 
G: *Always *hunt *you *away! 
  always   hunt   you   away!  
‘He always hunts you away!’ 
B: An̯=ul? 
who?=AG 
‘Who?’ 
G: *Harris il ed ̯n ̯d ̯-ed ̯n ̯d ̯a-n il. 
  Harris 3sg.nom REDUP-scatter-E 3sg.nom 
‘Harris hunts you away.’ 
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C: *Iyeah abm aʀ ... 
  iyeah person why.not 
‘Yes, Why doesn’t ...’ 
D: Abm *half.way ebma=ʀɲ al-alo-n̯-am 
person   half.way foot=INS REDUP-go.along-E-EL 
amb ed ̯n ̯d ̯-ed ̯n ̯d ̯a-r ad ̯un, 
PRE REDUP-scatter-PD 1sg.obj 
*he *bin *sorry *la *me! 
  he   bin   sorry   la    me  
‘He met me half way while I was walking, he felt sorry for me  
after he hunted me away!’ 
C: Abm aneγ ed ̯n ̯d ̯-ed ̯n ̯d ̯a-n 
person what.for? REDUP-scatter-PRES 
abmind-ay it ̯om-iy? 
g’child-AG that-PRE 
‘Why does that grandchild hunt you away?’ 
[Harris is Gordon’s older brother, he is therefore another ‘father’ to C, but 
he in turn prefers to use abmind, for which D is the propositus, rather than 
ibaŋar or one of its derivatives.] 
D: Abm ay *too.late 
person 1sg.nom   too.late 
al-alo-n̯ ay 
REDUP-go.along-PG 1sg.nom 
uk uŋgul ugŋal aʀti-n en ̯ il! 
plane there now rise-PRES indeed 3sg.nom 
‘I’m too late now to go and (see) the plane off. 
Abm edn ugŋal *motor.car ilg ... 
person 3pl.nom now   motor.car COM 
They were in a car, now ...’ 
C: abm ad ̯un aʀ erge-l? 
person 1sg.obj why.not speak-PD 
‘Why wasn’t I told? 
*Old.man igu-n il, ow! 
  old.man go-PRES 3sg.nom  ! 
The old man’s going now!’ 
[C continues on about Gordon’s departure because of those present only C 
is subordinate to him; C does not want to appear bad mannered in not 
farewelling a rather close ‘father’.] 
D: Abm uɲinaγ amb erge-l ad ̯un, 
person yesterday PRE speak-PD 1sg.obj 
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ilimb arƫar alo-l ay iŋun uwand 
then morning go.along-PD 1sg.nom 3sg.obj westwards 
erge-l ad ̯un il “*Nanna, abm oŋgol en ̯ ...” 
speak-PD 1sg.obj 3sg.nom      nanna person must.be indeed 
‘It was yesterday he told me, then this morning I went along to him  
down there and he said to me “Nanna, I must be ...” 
[Gordon is quoted as using the English word ‘Nanna’; the Uw Oykangand 
would have been the vocative (ab)mabmiŋ.] 
C: Abm aloɲaγal ... 
person  ID=can’t.get.away 
‘He can’t go like that ...’ 
D: ... on ̯d ̯eʀ en ̯ igu-ŋan ay ... 
  tomorrow indeed go-IFUT 1sg.nom 
‘... going tomorrow ...’ 
abm alo-n̯ en ̯ elk; 
person go.along-PG indeed return 
alo-ŋan il, *job. 
go.along-IFUT 3sg.nom   job 
‘I’m going back; he’s going for a job.’ 
C: Ol.uw.od ̯oγ olon elk ol-iy, od ̯n ̯eʀ  ... 
much later hither return next.time-PRE tomorrow 
‘It’ll be much later next time, tomorrow ...’ 
D: Ol elke-ŋan il. 
next.time return-IFUT 3sg.nom 
‘He’ll come back next time.’ 
C: Erk oŋgolγ? 
place hence 
‘Back here?’ 
D: oŋgolγ *motor.car abmban ilg elk il ... 
hence   motor.car RFLX COM  return  3sg.nom 
‘He’ll be back with his own car.’ 
C: ak amb! 
let  PRE 
‘Good!’ 
D: ... oŋgod̯ awand. 
     here east.end 
‘... here again.’ 
C: Ow.ayke-n̯ amb igu-ŋan il, awand oŋgod̯ elk 
go.around-PG PRE go-IFUT 3sg.nom east.end here return 
‘He’ll go around by the east to return here.’ 
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G: onpoʀ! 
old.woman 
‘Mum!’ 
[This is the classic use of onpoʀ. Like Kathleen’s use of aɲiy in the 
Prologue, it marks respect and yet involves a request. Although G is of 
comparable age to D, it is not relative age that is at issue here, any more 
than it was for Kathleen.  See Chapter 5, The derivation of kin terms II.] 
D: ah?! 
 ! 
‘Ah?!’ 
G: abm abmban ̯d ̯aŋ-iy anen edn? 
person [ritual.name]-PRE what? 3pl.nom 
‘What did they do at an Abmbandhang?’ 
D: Aŋaɲ ay! Ay uraŋan elk oŋgom! 
NEG 1sg.nom 1sg.nom  2pl.obj  return  this 
‘Don’t ask me!!  I’m leaving you!’ 
G: *No! *No! 
  no   no 
‘No!’ ‘No!’ 
D: *If *you *fellah *can't *hold *em *up *la *me ... 
  if   you   fellah   can’t   hold   em   up   la   me 
‘You can’t hold me up ...’ 
G: *No, *I *just *want *to *ask *a *few *questions 
  no   I   just    want    to   ask   a   few    questions 
Abmban ̯d ̯aŋ-iy anen edn, 
[ritual.name]-AG  what?  3pl.nom 
ul abm olaŋar ilg ari-n erbe-n̯, ey? 
3dl.nom  person o.bro COM  hit-E RECIP-PG  ! 
‘No! No! I just want to ask a few questions!  What did they do at  
Abmbandhang?  The two brothers hit each other, did they?’ 
C: *No.more ari-n erbe-n̯, abm adnduŋg uʀɲa-n erbe-n̯! 
  no.more  hit-E RECIP-PG person waist hug-E RECIP-PG 
‘No, they did not hit each other, they wrestled each other.’ 
G: Adnduŋg uʀɲa-n erbe-n̯! 
waist hug-E RECIP-PG 
‘Wrestled each other!’ 
D: Abm aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ en ̯ edn ah! 
person like this indeed 3pl.nom   ! 
‘Like this, maybe [demonstrates]. 
Abm abmban̯da̯ŋ ay aŋaɲ ewa-l. 
person [ritual.name] 1sg.nom NEG see-PD 
I never saw Abmbandhang. 
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Ambul iyalme-n ̯-am ednaŋan. 
1pl(in).nom play-E-EL 3pl.obj 
We [Kunjen] used to play them.’ 
G: Abm il “erk.alondiy' il abmind 
person 3sg.nom  [personal.name] 3sg.nom g’father 
il, iŋin an ̯d ̯aŋan elbe-nm. 
3sg.nom story 1pl(ex).obj tell-PG 
‘Old Errk Alondiy, my grandfather, used to tell us stories about it.’ 
C: iya-nm il?! 
do-PG 3sg.nom 
‘Did he do it?!’ 
G: iya-nm! 
do-PG 
‘He did!’ 
D: Abm ad ̯un awiy iɲand-al aŋalaŋ.uɲin; 
person 1sg.obj also aunt-AG ID:=dead.husband 
‘My father, and my husband, too, (used to do it); 
[D here uses the ‘feminine’ form of ‘father’ — father’s sister — because he 
is dead, much in the same fashion as in the funery song for Lawrence 
already discussed in Chapter 7, The derivation of kin terms III.  D’s aunt, 
her own FZ, would not of course have taken part in a men’s ritual.  
Following this use is aŋalaŋ.uɲin, which has only been recorded here, but 
which was readily recognised by other Oykangand as having the meaning 
‘late husband’. The term aŋalaŋ.uɲin can be added to the inventory of 
Oykangand ‘bereaved kin’ terms.] 
atub uwa-n̯ erbe-n̯. 
back give-PG RECIP-PG 
they [stood] back-to-back.’ 
G: Atub! 
back 
‘Their backs!’ 
C: Atub uwa-n̯ erbe-n̯, ey? 
back give-E RECIP-PG  ! 
‘They [stood] back-to-back, eh? 
Ilimb arke-n̯?! 
then fight-PG 
Then they fought?!’ 
D: Ilimb ... 
then 
‘Then ... 
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Ey! ... 
 ! 
Hey! 
Olaŋar ilg. 
o.brother COM 
Two brothers.’ 
[There is quaint logic here. If the two men were brothers, one of them 
would have to be older than the other. Hence olaŋar ilg implies two 
brothers, in the same fashion as ebaŋar ilg would imply two sisters.  
Socially, there would be very few activities that would involve a brother 
and a sister together.] 
C: Atub uwa-n̯ erbe-n̯, ey? 
back give-PG RECIP-PG  ! 
‘They [stood] back-to-back, eh? 
Ina-n̯? 
sit-PG 
Sitting?’ 
D: Abm oʀand oγoŋ elb-elbe-nm; 
person husband indeed REDUP-tell-PG  
*might *be *he *knows 
  might   be   he   knows  
‘Perhaps my husband might have told (us), maybe he knew.’ 
[The word oγoŋ appears again to index politeness in respect of a familiar 
kinsman.] 
C: Ina-n ̯ ey? 
sit-PG  
‘[They] sat down, eh? 
Erne-n ̯? 
stand-PG 
Or were they standing?’ 
G: *back-to-back? 
  back-to-back 
‘Back-to-back?’ 
C: Atub uwa-n̯ erbe-n̯, erne-n̯, ey? 
back give-E RECIP-PG stand-PG 
‘They stood back-to-back, eh?’ 
D: Iyaŋ, abm aŋgalaŋgan ̯d ̯ amb-aγ en ̯ 
yes person like.this PRE-PRP  indeed 
erne-n̯, abmban ̯d ̯aŋ-an. 
stand-PG [ritual.name]-AL 
‘Yes, they stood like this to one another for Abmbandhang [demonstrates].’ 
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C: Ilimb alŋge-n̯ amb-iy! 
 then startled-PG PRE-PRE 
‘Then they were startled [by one another].’ 
D: Ilimb ul arfi-n erbe-n̯ en ̯ adnduŋg oʀde-n̯ erbe-n̯ 
then 3dl.nom grasp-E RECIP-PG indeed waist hug-E RECIP-PG 
‘Then they grasped one another and wrestled.’ 
G: Oɲen ayin afa-nm? 
song Q fetch-PG 
‘Was there a song sung?’ 
D: abm oŋgol en ̯ ah! 
 person must.be indeed  
‘I suppose so! 
Abm ay  *no.more  *savvy,  *too,  *we  *all  *little  *kids. 
person 1sg.nom   no.more   savvy   too   we    all   little   kids 
I don’t know anything, we were all only little kids.’ 
G: *New *generation ambul! 
  new   generation  1pl(in).nom 
‘We’re the new generation!’ 
D: Iyaŋ! 
yes 
‘Yes! 
Arŋg.amboƫ ambul *get *em *bout *a *story ... 
children 1pl(in).nom   get   em   bout   a   story … 
We were just kids, getting about ... story ...’ 
#### 
“Erk.alondiy-am ay afa-nm abmind-am. 
[personal.name]-EL 1sg.nom fetch-PG g’father-EL 
I got it from Errk Alondiy, from my grandfather.’ 
[The use of Errk Alondiy, which is clearly a place name, as a personal name 
because of the individual’s conception site, is discussed in Chapter 8.] 
D: Ay aŋaɲ amb in ̯d ̯ay! 
1sg.nom NEG PRE  because 
‘I never heard it!’ 
G: *I *used *to *get *a *story *from *him. 
  I   used   to   get   a   story   from   him  
‘I used to get the story from him.’ 
D: Il abmind an.uw.od ̯oγ erge-n̯ ad ̯un 
3sg.nom g’father seem.good speak-PG 1sg.obj 
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il, abm abmban ̯d ̯aŋ uŋgul olon-iy edn. 
3sg.nom person [ritual.name] there hither PRE 3pl.nom 
‘My grandfather spoke to me all right about it, and what they did  
in that Abmbandhang there. 
Adnduŋg en ̯ arfi-n erbe-n̯ edn, abm 
waist indeed grasp-E RECIP-PG 3pl.nom person 
olaŋar ilg! 
o.brother COM 
The two brothers must have wrestled together.’ 
G: adnduŋg, pir! 
waist throw.down 
‘They threw one-another down in wrestling.’ 
Uʀɲa-n erbe-n̯. 
hug-E  RECIP-PG 
‘Wrestling. 
Aʀtin.oyelm il iŋun, eg uʀɲa-n-am. 
ID=take.turns 3sg.nom 3sg.obj head bump-E-EL 
They’d take turns in throwing each other down.’ 
Geese eggs:  Version I 
This is Doris Lawrence’s version of a very successful trip out to the swamps in late 
February or early March 1966 to gather geese eggs.  It is a complete narrative. The pied 
geese lay typically a dozen or so eggs on nests of grass that float in the swamps. The 
problem is that the grass is razor grass, and its sharp serrated edges soon damage the bare 
flesh — especially the knees — of human nest robbers. Doris and her husband Lawrence 
both emerged from the swamp with red raw knees, but also with several sugar bags full of 
eggs, and some billycans full as well. 
After several days on the nest in the hot sun the eggs acquire stains from the grass, as 
the goose turns them over in their natural incubator. Eggs stained like this are eagerly 
sought after because the chicken is already partly developed. My ‘uncle’ Cecil Rutland 
remarked after this occasion on how pleased he was to have such eggs given to him, saying 
‘I like them eggs with chicken, boy.’  We were happy to let him have them, as we used the 
others for cakes. 
Alo-l ad ̯un uʀun ̯d ̯-am, uʀun ̯d ̯-am alo-l 
go.along-PD 1sg.obj downward-EL downward-EL  go.along-PD 
ad ̯un, ugŋub. 
1sg.obj sunset 
‘He came along to me inside, he came along inside about sundown. 
Erge-l ad ̯un “abm ayin en ̯ nednaŋ? 
speak-PD 1sg.obj   person Q indeed cousin 
He said to me, “Are you there, cousin? 
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[D is speaking of me; I should call her ednaŋar.obm, but because of age 
and the mutual advantages of the friendship, she’s ednaŋar.uw, and 
especially with her husband, Lawrence, enjoyable company on hunting 
ventures.  Doris here quotes my use of the vocative, (ed)nednaŋ. This usage 
is in accord with Chapter 5, The derivation of kin terms I.] 
Abm igu-n-aγ aliy aŋg uwand.” 
person go-E-PRP 1dl(in).nom here westwards 
We’re going to go down here.” 
Ay erge-l “abm in ̯d ̯ol-γ igu-n aliy?” 
1sg.nom  speak-PD   person where?-AL go-PRES 1dl(in).nom 
I said, “Where are we going to?” 
“In̯ onmon-g oγoŋ. 
 meat egg-PRP  RESP 
“For geese eggs. 
[This is another instance of the use of oγoŋ, the precise respect function of 
which I noted was still unclear.] 
Abm inaŋ eray aʀ-uw elbe-l! 
person 2sg.nom other not-again tell-IMP 
Don’t tell anyone else! 
Abm orm ay inun erg uw inun 
person only 1sg.nom 2sg.obj speak again 2sg.obj  
ay erg. 
1sg.nom speak 
I’m only telling you, I’m telling you. 
t ̯ep!”  
quiet! 
Shh!” 
“Iyaŋ. 
 yes 
“Yes. 
Aŋaɲ elbe-ŋan ay.” 
NEG tell-IFUT 1sg.nom 
I won’t tell them.” 
“Aliy eloʀ igu-n in ̯ elge-n-aγ aliy  in ̯ alwaŋaʀ. 
 1dl(in).nom alone go-PRES meat gather-E-PRP 1dl(in).nom meat goose 
“We’ll go alone to gather eggs, those goose eggs. 
In̯ onmon uŋgul uwand abm arƫar aʀti-l inaŋ.” 
meat egg there westwards person morning rise-IMP 2sg.nom 
You get up early and we’ll gather geese eggs downstream there.” 
“Iyan ̯d ̯ uk oʀer elg-elge-ŋan ay abm 
  later tree bag REDUP-gather-IFUT 1sg.nom person 
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igu-n-aγ aliy, ulaʀɲ! 
go-E-PRP 1dl(in).nom cousin 
“Later on I’ll gather up some bags to go with tomorrow, cousin! 
[The polite form of ulaŋar is chosen by Doris in this quotation of her 
utterance.] 
In ̯ onmon elge-n-aγ aliy.” 
meat egg gather-E-PRP 1dl(in).nom 
We’ll gather geese eggs.” 
Iɲi-r ad ̯un uʀun ̯d ̯-am *motorcar-iy afa-n 
run-PD 1sg.obj downward-EL   motorcar-INS fetch-E 
alo-l ad ̯un arƫar oŋgod̯. 
go.along-PD 1sg.obj morning here 
He ran down to fetch me on the way next morning here. 
Afa-r ad ̯un. 
fetch-PD 1sg.obj 
He picked me up. 
Iɲi-n amba-r ad ̯un uwand. 
run-E cause-PD 1sg.obj westwards 
He drove up to me in the west. 
Erge-l ad ̯un il “abm in ̯d ̯od ̯ in aliy, nednaŋ?” 
speak-PD 1sg.obj 3sg.nom  person where.at? stay 1dl(in).nom cousin 
He said to me, “Where will we stop, cousin?” 
“Uŋgul uwam in aliy araraŋ-iy uŋgul uʀun ̯d ̯. 
  there west.side stay 1dl(in).nom palm.sp-LOC there downward 
“We’ll stop there on the western edge where the corypha palms go down. 
Onalkal, uwand uŋgul” 
point westwards there 
On the western point of land there.” 
Erk ogŋgam an ̯d ̯aŋ it ̯om. 
place  from.before  1pl(ex).poss  that 
We’d been there before. 
Abm ay amb it ̯od ̯ ina-n ̯, *Claude alin ̯, 
person 1sg.nom PRE there sit-PG   Claude 1dl(ex).nom 
I’d stayed there with Claude, 
in ̯ alwaŋaʀ it ̯om elg-elge-nm. 
meat goose that REDUP-gather-PG 
and we used to gather geese eggs. 
Uʀun ̯d ̯-am it ̯om. 
downward-EL that 
Underneath the bank. 
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“Inaŋ arin en ̯ uɲƫi-n, ednednaŋ?” 
 2sg.nom whither? indeed dive-PRES cousin 
“Where are you going to wade, cousin?” 
[In other than phrase initial position, the reduplication of the first syllable of 
the vocative form is left in place without truncation, hence ednednaŋ, as 
here. This contrasts with the nednaŋ used two sentences later, in phrase 
initial position.] 
“Ay oŋgom uwand uɲƫi-n inaŋ ad ̯un awaʀ 
 1sg.nom this westwards dive-PRES 2sg.nom 1sg.obj eastwards 
uɲƫi-l.” 
dive-IMP 
“I’ll wade downstream here, you go upriver.” 
“Karey, nednaŋ. 
  OK cousin 
“OK, cousin. 
Ay aŋg awaʀ.” 
1sg.nom here eastwards 
I’ll go upriver.” 
Ay uwand alin ̯ ololaŋ aŋg uwand 
1sg.nom westwards 1dl(ex).nom o.brother here westwards 
uɲƫ-uɲƫi-n. 
REDUP-dive-PRES 
I went downstream and your brother and I waded there. 
[D’s husband was my close older brother, my olaŋar. Here however, D uses 
the vocative ololaŋ appropriately as a term of reference in my presence.] 
Uwand elge-r ay iŋun, elge-r ay, 
westwards gather-PD 1sg.nom 3sg.obj gather-PD 1sg.nom 
elge-r ay, elge-r ay, elge-r ay, 
gather-PD 1sg.nom gather-PD 1sg.nom gather-PD 1sg.nom 
uk oʀer ednda-r ad ̯en. 
tree  bag fill.up-PD 1sg.poss 
I went further downstream than him, and I gathered, and gathered and  
gathered and gathered until I filled my bag. 
“In̯ eray arin amba-n aliy, ey?” 
  meat other whither? happen-PRES 1dl(in).nom  ! 
“Where can there be more eggs for us?” 
[The noun phrase in̯ onmon, ‘meat/flesh egg’ has been truncated to in̯, in 
much the same fashion as crocodiles are referred to as in̯ right throughout 
Lawrence’s new gun earlier.] 
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“Oŋgod̯ ugŋgi-l aliy, iyand ̯ elke-n̯ alin ̯ uk oʀer ilg.” 
  here leave-IMP 1dl(in).nom later return-PG 1dl(ex).nom tree bag COM 
“We’ll leave these here, and come back later with a bag.” 
“Iyaŋ.” 
 yes 
“Yes.” 
Aʀt-aʀti-r alin ̯ adniy, adnim ad ̯un ul 
REDUP-rise-PD 1dl(ex).nom upwards above 1sg.obj 3du.nom 
aʀti-r *motorcar-iy erne-l adnim, ewa-l ad ̯un 
rise-PD   motorcar-INS stand-PD above see-PD 1sg.obj 
ednednaŋ-al ayaral elke-n̯ amb-amba-n urun ̯d ̯am. 
cousin-AG powerful return-PG REDUP-cause-PRES underneath 
We came up (out of the swamp) and they’d come up above us by truck; they  
stood up there, and cousin brought it back quickly to me from further down. 
“In̯ eray in ̯d ̯ay inin nednaŋ?” 
  meat other where.at? 2sg.poss cousin 
“Where are your other eggs, cousin?” 
“Uŋgul ugŋgi-r ay, ulaʀɲ, abm elke-n̯-aγ 
  there leave-PD 1sg.nom cousin person return-E-PRP 
aliy. uk oʀer ilg.” 
1dl(in).nom tree bag COM 
“I left them there, cousin, we’ll go back with a bag.” 
“Iyaŋ.” 
  yes 
“OK” 
“Abm aliy ilgaγ amb alŋga-n uʀun ̯d ̯, nednaŋ!” 
  person 1dl(in).nom together PRE cross.over-PRES downward cousin 
“We’ll cross over down there together, cousin.” 
“Ehheˀ, uwaŋ aliy!” 
  EMPH come.on 1dl(in).nom 
“OK, come on!” 
“Eƫ ogŋg egŋ *dinner ia-l inaŋ, nednaŋ!” 
 try.see.if before food   dinner eat-IMP 2sg.nom cousin 
“Let’s see if we can get lunch, cousin!” 
“Iyaŋ!” 
 yes 
“Yes!” 
Egŋ *dinner i-ia-r ey-- “karey aliy, 
food   dinner REDUP-eat-PD  !  OK 1dl(in).nom 
abm igu-n-aγ, alŋga-n-aγ aliy uʀun ̯d ̯. 
person go-E-PRP cross.over-E-PRP 1dl(in).nom downward 
We ate lunch — “OK, let’s go and cross over down there. 
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Inaŋ ad ̯un uk oʀer onoŋg afa-l, uk oʀer 
2sg.nom 1sg.obj tree  bag other fetch-IMP tree  bag 
il ad ̯un ololaŋ-al aŋg onoŋg uw.” 
3sg.nom 1sg.obj o.brother-AG here other give 
You get the bag for me; your older brother will give me the other bag.’ 
Elelaŋ awiy il ilgaγ amb abm.atoƫen igu-n 
y.sister also 3sg.nom together PRE  ID=‘Shorty’ go-PRES 
aliy igu-r uʀun ̯d ̯. 
1dl(in).nom go-PD downward 
With your younger sister, ‘Shorty’ I went down there. 
[Here is another vocative as a referential kin term.  The woman concerned 
was my imputed actual younger sister, ‘Shorty’, not D’s sister at all.  This 
example makes the use as clear as any.  The propositus can be either party.] 
Alŋga-r, alŋga-r, alŋga-r. 
cross.over-PD cross.over-PD cross.over-PD 
We went down, down, down. 
“Awey ubal, awey! 
  hither 2dl.nom hither 
“Come here, you two!  Come here! 
Awey uk oʀer-ilg ad ̯un ubal!” 
hither tree bag-COM 1sg.obj 2dl.nom 
Come here to me with the bag, you two!” 
Abm il elelaŋ uŋgul adniyar igu-n ow! 
person  3sg.nom y.sister there higher go-PRES   ! 
Your little sister was going up there above us! 
Anb andand oŋgom alin ̯ ololaŋ ig-igu-n. 
bank along this 1dl(ex).nom o.brother REDUP-go-PRES 
I went along the bank with your older brother. 
“Abm ubal amb awey ubal!” 
  person 2dl.nom PRE hither 2dl.nom 
“Come here you two!  Come here!” 
“Ow!” 
  ! 
“Hey!” 
Adnubman aŋg arƫar ambe-l ay ulaʀɲ, ah! 
thigh here morning become-PD 1sg.nom cousin 
My thighs were killing me, cousin, true! 
[arƫar ambe- is one of those polite expressions meaning ‘dead’ — see 
Chapter 7.  Note also the respect form of ulaŋar.] 
Awin ubmal ad ̯un. 
road  ? 1sg.obl 
The road was ?? for me. 
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Awaʀ igu-r ay oren ermbe-n ̯ ermb-ermbe-n ̯ uk 
eastwards go-PD 1sg.nom behind fall-PG REDUP-fall-PG tree 
oʀer eg = aman ̯d ̯. 
bag head=LOC 
I went up towards the east — the bag kept falling off my head. 
“Inaŋ ednednaŋ uk oŋgom algŋ-algŋa-l 
  2sg.nom cousin tree this REDUP-carry-IMP 
ad ̯en, ay in ̯ algŋa-n-aγ inin.” 
1sg.poss 1sg.nom meat carry-E-PRP 2sg.poss 
‘Cousin, carry this bag for me!  I’m carrying your eggs.’ 
“Karey ad ̯un, ulaʀɲ.” 
  OK 1sg.obj cousin 
“OK, cousin.” 
[As before, D addresses me directly, and uses not lulaŋ, but the more 
respectful ulaʀɲ. This would be typically expected of a woman in any 
case, but in front of her husband, it is what one speaker said was ‘good 
manners.’] 
Adniy elk-elke-l. 
upwards REDUP-return-PD 
We kept going back. 
“*Dinnercamp-aγ ayin?” 
    dinnercamp-AL Q 
‘To the dinner camp?” 
“Iyaŋ!” 
  yes 
“Yes!” 
“An or-oriki-l ambuŋ agaguwin ad ̯un ulaʀɲ 
 done REDUP-insert-IMP 1pl(in).poss quickly 1sg.obl cousin 
*box  uŋgul awey afa-n al.” 
  box  there hither fetch-PRES go 
“Put ours inside quickly for me, cousin; bring the box here for me.’ 
[ulaʀɲ here is another case of respect or politeness, but three sentences 
later D reverts to the less formal and polite ululaŋ because she is using it as 
a vocative.] 
Afa-n alo-l ad ̯un uwam. 
fetch-E go.along-PD 1sg.obj west.side 
He brought it along to me on the west side. 
“Aŋg inin ednednaŋ.” 
  here 1sg.poss cousin 
“Here’s yours, cousin.” 
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“Karey ad ̯un, ululaŋ! 
  OK 1sg.obj cousin 
“Here you are, cousin! 
Aŋg adniy ugŋgi-n inun o-oe-r *box ewid ̯n ̯dan ̯d ̯!” 
here upwards leave-PRES 2sg.obj REDUP-cover?-PD   box full 
I’m leaving it up here; the box is full!” 
“Abm elke-n̯-aγ amb-iy ambul.” 
 person return-E-PRP PRE-PRE 1pl(in).nom 
“We must go home now.” 
“Abm inaŋ nednaŋ ay inun uŋgul uʀun ̯d ̯ 
 person 2sg.nom cousin 1sg.nom 2sg.obj there  downward 
algŋa-n-aγ iyan ̯d ̯. 
carry-E-PRP later 
‘I’ll bring them to you down there soon, cousin. 
Aŋ-aŋal afa-n-aγ ay inin, in ̯ onmon enoŋab 
REDUP-physique fetch-E-PRP 1sg.nom 2sg.poss meat egg one 
ID=take photo 
uŋgul ugŋgi-r ay,  in ̯ inaŋ uiʀ oŋgod̯am algŋa-l 
there leave-PD 1sg.nom   meat 2sg.poss two hence take-IMP 
uw uʀun ̯d ̯ iyan ̯d ̯-aγ. 
again downward later-PRP 
I’ll take a photo of you; I’ll leave one egg there, you can take a few from here later. 
Aŋ-aŋal afa-n-aγ ay inin in ̯ aʀa adnim.” 
REDUP-physique fetch-E-PRP 1sg.nom 2sg.poss meat nest above 
I’ll take a photo with you at the nest up there.” 
“Ehheˀ ” 
  OK 
“OK” 
“In̯ in ̯d ̯od ̯?” 
 meat where.at? 
“Where’s the eggs?” 
“Odnd aɲ in ̯d ̯ay ulaʀɲ, ey!” 
  leg pain because cousin  ! 
“My leg’s paining, cousin!  [Leave me out of it!]” 
“Ur oŋgod̯ in, *motorcar-iy ad ̯un aŋg 
 2pl.nom here REDUP   motorcar-AG 1sg.obl here 
uʀun ̯d ̯ algŋa-n aŋ-aŋal afa-n-aγ.” 
downward take-PRES REDUP-physique fetch-E-PRP 
“You sit here, I’ll get a photo of you inside the motorcar.” 
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“Arŋg.amboƫ *Ina awey inaŋ! 
child.small   Ina hither 2sg.nom 
“Bring young Ina here! 
Aŋ-aŋal  afa-n aliŋan in ̯ aʀa̯-iy uŋgul uʀun ̯d ̯.” 
REDUP-physique  fetch-PRES 1dl(in).obj meat nest-LOC there downward 
You can get a photo of us at the nest down there.” 
Il *Ina uyam alo-n̯ il  ad ̯un, ay 
3sg.nom   Ina hand go.along-PG 3sg.nom 1sg.obj 1sg.nom 
abmiŋar-iy in ̯  onmon afa-nm uʀun ̯d ̯-am. 
g’parent-AG meat egg fetch-PG downward-EL 
He led Ina by the hand to me, I was the grandmother fetching the egg  
from down there. 
Arŋg uwa-l ay  iŋun. 
child give-PD 1sg.nom 3sg.obj 
I gave it to the child. 
“In̯ arŋg inaŋ aŋg!” 
  meat child 2sg.nom here 
“Here you are, little one!” 
“Afa-l!” 
  fetch-PD 
“Hold this!” 
“Ad ̯en abmiŋ onpoʀ iyokorey” iɲi-n amba-r 
  poss g’parent old.woman whacko! run-E cause-PD 
il iŋun. 
3sg.nom 3sg.obl 
“It’s mine, granny!” she ran over to me. 
[The more usual use of the vocative is evident here in abmiŋ.] 
“Aʀ-uw iɲi-n amba-l! 
  not-again run-E cause-IMP 
‘Don’t drive away yet!! 
In̯ awey elke-n̯ amba-l.” an. 
meat hither return-E cause-IMP done 
Bring the eggs back for me!”  That’s all. 
Geese eggs:  Version II 
Doris’ husband, Lawrence, has a rather different version of this story; they had parted to 
scour different sectors of the huge swamp for eggs, and Lawrence did not at first do so 
well; pigs are effective predators of both the eggs and the young goslings.  This is not the 
entire text, only an excerpt.  It comprises an excellent foil to the first story, and attests that 
the norms of it are general, and not idiosyncratic. 
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Ay, ogŋg ay uŋgul ibaʀ igu-r. 
1sg.nom before 1sg.nom there southward go-PD 
‘As for me, I went down there to the south. 
Ay ifaɲ oŋgom uwand ayke-l, in ̯ oŋgom 
1sg.nom south.side this westwards  circle.about-PD meat this 
ed ̯n ̯d ̯elaγ oŋgol *pigipig-iy ia-nm. 
altogether must.be   pig-AG eat-PG 
I went around the south side by the western end (of the swamp) but the eggs  
must have been all eaten up by the pigs. 
Awin oŋgom udna-γ, *pigipig-iy ubma-r ubm-ubma-n. 
road this stay-IRR   pig-AG  break-PD REDUP-break-PRES 
They’d stay on the track, those pigs, and keep on breaking everything up. 
Ukan aŋg ig-iga-nm, oŋgodam ed ̯n ̯d ̯elaγ 
grass here REDUP-lodge.over-PG hence altogether 
ia-r in ̯ elkal oŋgolmeran ̯d ̯ udna-γ. 
eat-PD meat shell those.here stay-IRR 
The grass here is flattened, and they’ve eaten everything —only the shells  
of those that were here remain. 
*Pigipig-iy oŋgol ed ̯n ̯d ̯elaγ ia-nm. 
  pig-AG  must.be  altogether eat-PG 
The pigs must have eaten everything. 
Uwand igu-r ay ey--, onoŋg 
westwards go-PD 1sg.nom   ! other  
aʀa ewa-n ̯ oŋgom, aʀa ogŋgam. 
nest see-PG this nest from.before 
I went further west — and I saw this other nest, an old one. 
Abm=al afa-n-am, ilimb igu-nm ay ey- - 
person=AG fetch-E-EL then go-PG 1sg.nom  ! 
aʀa onoŋg ewa-n̯, oŋgom abm=al uw 
nest other see-PG this person=AG again 
afa-r, ogŋg amb. 
fetch-PD before PRE 
Someone had fetched them, so then I went further and saw another nest,  
and someone had again fetched the eggs before me. 
Uwand igu-r ey-- “abm akaŋar ad ̯en, 
westwards go-PD  !   person y.brother 1sg.poss 
ela{ar ilg oŋgom oŋ ern-erne-γ ul 
y.sister COM this GEN REDUP-stand-IRR 3dl.nom 
ugŋgaʀ.” Ewa-l ay, ig.aʀti-r ay 
northward see-PD 1sg.nom climb.out-PD 1sg.nom 
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uwand, igu-r  ay ey-- “abm inaŋ kakaŋ 
westwards go-PD  1sg.nom  !  person 2sg.nom y.brother 
oŋgom ubal elaʀɲar oŋ ern-erne-γ ey? 
this 2dl.nom y.sister RESP REDUP-stand-IRR   ! 
I went further westward, (and thought) “There’s my younger brother and  
younger sister standing to the north.”  I looked, then I climbed out and went  
further, “That was you standing there, young brother, with young sister, eh? 
[Talking as it were to himself, Lawrence used the neutral reference terms 
akaŋar and elaŋar, but when he finally catches up with me he asks — using 
the regular vocative kakaŋ to address me — about our younger sister, 
whom he references with the polite term elaʀɲar. To this he then also 
affixes oŋ, which is attested only in a few instances in the corpus, and 
which when used appears to have an implication of politeness, usually in 
regard to the opposite sex. Vocatives and their use are described in Chapter 
5, The derivation of kin terms I and II.] 
Ubal arin oŋ igu-nm?” 
2dl.nom which.way? GEN  go-PG 
Which way did you come?” 
“Oŋgod̯ awand.eg.alkan” 
  here straight.down.from.east  
aŋg igu-nm alin ̯. 
here go-PG  1dl(ex).nom 
‘We came straight down from the eastern end. 
Il ednednaŋ uŋgul uʀun ̯d ̯.” 
3sg.nom cousin there downward 
Cousin’s down there.” 
[Lawrence quotes my use of ednednaŋ for his wife; the usage is an 
appropriate one, again with the vocative meaning ‘my cousin’.] 
Awaʀ uw elke-l il-iy. 
eastwards again return-PD 3sg.nom-PRE 
He went up towards the east again. 
In̯ aʀa ogŋgam-aγ it ̯om uw elke-l il. 
meat nest from.before-PRP that again return-PD 3sg.nom 
He went back for that nest again. 
“Karey! 
  OK 
“OK! 
Aliy iŋun elaʀɲar oŋgod̯ awaʀ el ̯a-l. 
1dl(in).nom 3sg.obl y.sister here eastwards send-PD 
We’ll send our young sister up there. 
[Speaking again to me, Lawrence employs the regular polite form for our 
sister, as a member of the opposite sex.] 
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Ak elk-elk il anb ifaɲ. 
let REDUP-return 3sg.nom bank south.side 
She can go back on the south bank. 
Awaʀ uŋgul el ̯aŋ-iy uŋgul, ak ayke-y 
eastwards there end.w.hole-LOC there let circle.about-PRES 
il, aliy oŋgod̯ uʀun ̯d ̯ alŋga-l. 
3sg.nom 1dl(in).nom here downward cross.over-IMP 
She can go around the eastern end (of the swamp) while we cross over down here. 
Inaŋ ad ̯un akaʀɲ ogŋg igu-l awin ubma-n. 
2sg.nom 1sg.obj y.brother before go-PD road break-PRES 
You go before me, young brother, making a path (for me). 
[Because he is making a request — however reasonable, given the poor 
man’s red raw knees — Lawrence uses the polite form akaʀɲ rather than 
kakaŋ.] 
Ogŋgeg oŋgom ay anoŋ.ambe-l. 
knee this 1sg.nom ID=become.sore-PD 
My knees are sore. 
Ubma-n-am oŋgom adna-n ay. 
break-E-EL this cramp.up-PRES 1sg.nom 
They’re cramped from pushing through (the grass). 
Inaŋ ad ̯un ogŋg igu-l, akaʀɲ.” 
2sg.nom 1sg.obj before go-IMP y.brother 
You go ahead of me, young brother.” 
Aŋaɲ. 
NEG 
Nothing. 
Erk aɲarg-iy it ̯ edn uʀun ̯d ̯-ar igu-r, 
place clear-LOC that  3pl.nom downward-LOC go-PD 
awaʀ, awaʀ igu-r inaŋ ad ̯un. 
eastwards eastwards go-PD 2sg.nom 1sg.obj 
They went down at a clear place (without grass) further to the east,  
but you went up towards the east of me. 
[Again, Lawrence cannot resist speaking directly to me, rather than to his 
wife, or to the tape recorder.] 
“Ogŋg igu-l akaʀɲ, ay oren-oren.” 
  before go-IMP y.brother 1sg.nom REDUP-behind 
“You go first, young brother, I’ll (come) behind.” 
Igu-r inaŋ ad ̯un awaʀ ey-- 
go-PD 2sg.nom 1sg.obj eastwards  !  
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“Ayin ew iŋun-iy awaʀ? 
  Q see 3sg.obj-PRE eastwards 
You went ahead of me eastwards, “Can you see her there in the east? 
Uŋgul awaʀ erne-γ ednednaŋ il.” 
there eastwards stand-IRR cousin 3sg.nom 
There in the east it must be cousin standing.” 
“Puy! 
  ! 
“Let’s go! 
In(aŋ) iŋun ogŋg igu-l awaʀ!” 
2sg.nom 3sg.obj before go-IMP eastwards 
You head towards her in the east!” 
Ay oren-oren!” 
1sg.nom REDUP-behind 
I’ll come right behind you!” 
Igu-r awaʀ ey-- in ̯ il in ̯ it ̯om amb 
go-PD eastwards  ! meat 3sg.nom  meat that  PRE 
ida-n̯ amba-n in ̯  aʀa-iy ugŋgi-r-aγ alin ̯ ogŋg. 
wait-E  cause-PRES  meat  nest-LOC leave-PD-once  1dl(ex).nom before 
We went on eastwards — she had left some eggs waiting for us at a nest where  
we had been. 
“Ah!” 
  ! 
“Aha!” 
ƫip ede-l in(aŋ) iŋun iy. 
! arrive-PD 2sg.nom 3sg.obj PRE 
You arrived back first. 
Ay oren. 
1sg.nom behind 
I was behind. 
Ay oŋgom akaʀɲ aʀemaγ igu-r. 
1sg.nom this y.brother but.not go-PD 
I couldn’t go like my younger brother. 
Ubman adna-n ambe-l ay. 
thigh cramp.up-E become-PD 1sg.nom 
My thighs were cramped up. 
Ogŋgeg awiy adna-n ambe-l. 
knee also cramp.up-E become-PD 
My knees were cramped, too. 
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Ah ... 
 ! 
Aha! 
“Karey!” 
  OK 
“OK!” 
“In̯ ayin?” 
  meat  Q 
“(Did you get) the eggs?” 
In(aŋ) iŋun uk oʀer uiʀ uw iŋun. 
2sg.nom 3sg.obj tree bag two give 3sg.obj 
You gave her two bags full. 
Abmalγar-aγ ay alka-r awaʀ, 
g’child-DAT 1sg.nom shout-PD eastwards  
iŋun alka-r, ednednaŋ-an. 
3sg.obl shout-PD cousin-AG 
I called out to our granddaughter up there, and your cousin called out too. 
[Ina is Lawrence’s DD, then just a young schoolgirl left in her 
grandmother’s keeping.  She is his arŋg.abmalγ, hence abmalγar here.] 
Uk oʀer uiʀ uw iŋun, abmalγar-aγ, 
tree bag two give 3sg.obj g’child-DAT 
ak algŋa-n il aliŋan. 
let carry-PRES 3sg.nom 1dl(in).obj 
We gave the two bags full to our grandson to carry for us. 
Abm aŋal il elŋgelŋg it ̯om. 
person physique 3sg.nom young.man that 
He is just a young man. 
Ay igu-r, “ubal ad ̯un 
1sg.nom go-PD  2dl.nom 1sg.obj 
it ̯od ̯ awaʀ igu-l abmalγar. 
there eastwards go-IMP g’child 
I went on, “You two go up there to the east of me, you and grandson. 
Il ak algŋa-n. 
3sg.nom let carry-PRES 
He can carry them. 
Ay ubaŋan oŋgod̯ ibaʀ aʀti-n. 
1sg.nom 2dl.obj here southward rise-PRES 
I’ll cross over to you down here in the south. 
Erk ulgal oŋgom adniy oŋgom ukan anol uŋgul 
place nearby this upwards this grass where there 
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adnim ern-erne-γ, erk at ̯aγaʀ-iy it ̯om.” 
above REDUP-stand-IRR place dried.up-LOC that 
There’s a shallow place there where the grass is standing, it’s dried up there.” 
ƫir aʀti-r ay awaʀ, ubal ad ̯un awar aʀti-r. 
rise rise-PD 1sg.nom eastwards  2dl.nom 1sg.obj east.end rise-PD 
I climbed out towards the east; you two got out further east of me. 
“Kawun ayin ew iŋin ugŋgi-n-am?” 
  clothes Q see 3sg.poss leave-E-EL 
“Can you see where I left his clothes?” 
“Kawun uŋgul awaʀ uʀdnda-n-aγ ebman ̯d ̯ adnim.” 
  clothes there eastwards  suspend-E-PRP termite.mound above 
“His clothes are hanging there on a termite mound.” 
“It ̯od ̯ aŋgan uw aʀti-l ubal adniy, ogŋg.” 
  there straight again rise-IMP  2d1.nom upwards before 
“Go straight up to where you were before. 
Ay ubaŋan oŋgom uwam ayke-y, onalkal 
1sg.nom 2dl.obj this west.side  circle.about-PRES point 
onoŋg-iy uw awaʀ alŋga-r og enoŋg-iy. 
other-LOC again  eastwards cross.over-PD water  another-LOC 
I went around you two on the western side, at that other point,  
I crossed over that other swamp in the east. 
ƫip ede-l ay. 
 ! arrive-PD 1sg.nom 
I arrived. 
“Karey ambuŋ, abmalγar. 
 OK 1pl(in).poss g’child 
“We’re all OK, grandson too. 
Uk oʀer uirγ-uiʀ , ak algŋa-n il, abmalγar-ay adniy.” 
tree bag REDUP-two let carry-PRES 3sg.nom  g’child-AG upwards 
That grandson can carry the bags up for us.’ 
Erk=iγ amb. Egŋ ia-r-aγ ambul uŋgul adniy. 
place=AL PRE food eat-PD-once 1pl(in).nom there upwards 
Home.  Back to where we’d eaten our lunch. 
“Gaguwin ambuŋ!” 
  quickly 1pl(in).poss 
“Get moving!” 
“Aŋg an ̯=ul uk id ̯n ̯d ̯a-r?” 
  here who?=AG tree seize-PD 
“Who has stolen our bags?” 
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“Agaguwin ambul, in ̯ agaguwin aʀƫe-l! 
  quickly 1pl(in).nom meat quickly cook-IMP 
‘Quick now, let’s quickly cook these eggs! 
Abm elke-n̯-aγal awiy.” 
person return-E-CSL also 
Because we want to go home, too.’ 
Ogŋgeg oŋgom ay an adna-n ambe-l! 
knee this 1sg.nom done cramp.up-E become-PD 
My knees had completely cramped up! 
Abm elke-n̯-aγ,  iyarwiya-r in ̯ anen 
person return-E-PRP  fix-PD meat what 
or-oriki-r adniy ah! 
REDUP-insert-PD upwards   ! 
We had to fix up those eggs we’d put inside first! 
Or-oriki-r adniy. 
REDUP-insert-PD upwards 
We’d left them inside. 
“*Box ad ̯en akaʀɲ uŋgul uwand udna-γ.” 
    box 1sg.poss y.brother there westwards stay-IRR 
“That box of mine must still be there, young brother.” 
[Lawrence is suggesting I should get it, hence again the politer form, akaʀɲ.] 
*Clean.em aʀti-r ay, in ̯ oriki-n-aγ eray. 
  clean.em AUX-PD 1sg.nom  meat insert-E-PRP  other 
I cleaned up the box to put the other eggs into it. 
“Iyaŋ ay al uwand ololaŋ! afa-n-aγ!” 
  yes 1sg.nom go westwards o.brother fetch-E-PRP 
“OK, I’ll go down and get it, big brother!” 
[My reply involves the usual vocative, ololaŋ, without marked respect.] 
Alo-l uwand, afa-r il. 
go.along-PD westwards fetch-PD 3sg.nom 
He went down and fetched it. 
Oŋgom amb uwand — uwam algŋa-n-aγ 
this PRE westwards west.side  carry-E-PRP 
akaŋar-iy ad ̯en undam-ar. 
y.brother-PRE 1sg.poss E-AG 
So he went down — to carry it back from the western end — my own  
younger brother. 
[In reportage mode, Lawrence reverts to the unmarked neutral term akaŋar.] 
In̯ or-oriki-r it ̯om, 
meat REDUP-insert-PD that 
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*box-iy or-oriki-r ey--, an. 
  box-LOC REDUP-insert-PD   ! done 
He put them all into that box, put them all in. 
Ewid ̯n ̯d ̯an ̯d ̯. 
full 
It was full. 
Eray elkon ̯d ̯elkon ̯d ̯ amay-ar. 
other billy-can big-LOC 
(More) in another big billy-can. 
Elkon ̯d ̯elkon ̯d ̯ edn erab. 
billy-can 3pl.nom several 
There were several billycans. 
Ar amba-l oŋgon-oŋgon it ̯om-iy. 
ID=so-and-so’s happen-PD REDUP-big.one that-PRE 
Big what-you-may-call-thems (bags) there, too. 
Ednaŋ ak it ̯om ogŋg. 
3pl.poss let  that before 
Theirs were there first. 
“Karey ambul ey! 
  OK 1pl(in).nom   ! 
“OK then everyone! 
Elaʀɲ!” 
y.sister 
Little sister!” 
[Lawrence respects Shorty by using the respect form of ‘younger sister’, 
even in direct address.] 
Ay iŋun elaʀɲar-aγ oŋ erge-l. 
1sg.nom 3sg.obj y.sister-DAT POLITE speak-PD 
I said to our younger sister. 
“Karey ambul ey! 
  OK 1pl(in).nom  ! 
“OK everyone! 
Abm ambul akaʀɲar 
person 1pl(in).nom y.brother  
abm oŋ elke-n̯-aγ al.” 
person POLITE return-E-PRP go 
We’ll go back now with our younger brother.” 
“In̯ ant oŋgom in ̯ in ̯d ̯odam afa-r 
  meat young this meat whence fetch-PD 
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ur, in ̯ ant oŋgom-iy?” 
2pl.nom meat  young  this-PRE 
“Where did you get this young one from, this little (goose)?” 
“Awar oŋgom uʀun ̯d ̯.” 
  east.end this downward 
“Just down there in the east.” 
Ilimb onpoʀ-an erge-l il iŋun, 
then old.woman-DAT speak-PD 3sg.nom 3sg.obj 
ednaʀɲ, “Inaŋ in ̯ onmon enoŋgab 
cousin  2sg.nom meat egg one 
algŋa-l, in ̯ uŋgul uʀun ̯d ̯ elke-n̯ amba-n-aγ. 
take-IMP meat there downward return-E cause-E-PRP 
Then he said to the old woman, his cousin, “You take one egg, you take it back. 
[Lawrence’s wife is, after all, an ednaŋar.obm to me, and so he uses the 
polite term ednaʀɲ in recognition of this, and of the fact that she is 
opposite in sex to me.] 
Abm aŋ-aŋal afa-n-aγ inun.” 
person REDUP-physique fetch-E-PRP 2sg.obj 
I’ll get a photo of you.” 
Anewaγ. 
that’s.all 
That’s it. 
Ay *motorcar-iy ina-n̯, 
1sg.nom   motorcar-LOC stay-PG 
ay aʀemaγ alŋga-r. 
1sg.nom but.not climb.down-PD 
I stayed in the car — I didn’t get out. 
Ogŋgeg adna-n ambe-l ay. 
knee cramp.up-E become-PD 1sg.nom 
My knees were cramped up. 
Il ad ̯un aŋal abm 
3sg.nom 1sg.obj physique person  
elŋgelŋg it ̯om abmalγar. 
young.man that g’child 
He’s fitter than I am, that grandson. 
[Thirty years have passed since this event, and none of the remaining 
participants can recall just who this particular abmalγar was on this trip.] 
Agŋga-r edn awin, “abm arin igu-r-iy' — 
seek-PD 3pl.nom road  person which.way? go-PD-PRE 
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Agŋga-r edn awaʀ, uŋgul igu-r edn. 
seek-PD 3pl.nom eastwards there go-PD 3pl.nom 
They looked for our track, ‘Which way did we come?’  They sought  
it eastwards, they went up that way. 
“Arin ah?” 
 which.way?   ! 
“Which way is it?” 
Alo-n ̯ uw awand. 
go.along-PG again east.end 
We went along again around the east end. 
“It ̯od ̯ aŋgan awiy it ̯od ̯ aŋgan awiy, ow! 
 there straight also there straight also  ! 
“Straight ahead!  Straight ahead there again! 
El.ud ̯ud ̯umbaγ it ̯om!” 
right.in.middle that 
Right in the middle there!” 
Il elaʀɲar alka-nm. 
3sg.nom y.sister shout-PG 
Younger sister cried out. 
Ay iŋun oŋ erge-l. 
1sg.nom 3sg.obj POLITE speak-PD 
I said to him, 
“Eƫ inaŋ amb oŋ. algŋa-l inaŋ ewa-n̯-aγ, 
 try.see.if 2sg.nom PRE  POLITE  take-IMP 2sg.nom see-E-PRP 
abm ur anen igu-r akaʀɲar!” 
person 2pl.nom what go-PD y.brother 
“If you go first, young brother, you might see where to go!” 
[Lawrence’s oŋ and akaʀɲar make this a politely worded suggestion.] 
Agŋga-r, agŋga-r, agŋga-r, agŋga-r, awin oŋgom arin? 
seek-PD seek-PD seek-PD seek-PD road this which.way? 
They looked and looked and looked and looked; which way is the road? 
Awand olon uw elke-l. 
east.end hither again return-PD 
We came back here around the east end. 
Ay uwand ewa-l. 
1sg.nom westwards see-PD 
I looked out westwards. 
“Abm awar-awar it ̯ en ̯ alŋga-r edn ah!” 
 person east.end-east.end that indeed  cross.over-PD 3pl.nom   ! 
“They crossed over there further east, hey!” 
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Aŋaɲ. 
NEG 
Nothing. 
Anb andand amb edn igu-nm awaʀ. 
bank along PRE 3pl.nom go-PG eastwards 
They went along the bank, eastwards. 
In̯ uʀund ̯-ar uŋgul oɲeʀ oŋgol  udn awaʀ. 
meat downward-LOC there unexplored  must.be  stay eastwards 
No one can have been down there further east for eggs. 
In̯ amaŋar uŋgul aʀti-n-aγ-iy. 
meat mother there rise-E-PRP LOC 
The mother geese are flying up there. 
It̯om edn anb andand adniyar oŋ ig-igu-n. 
that 3pl.nom bank  along higher POLITE REDUP-go-PRES 
They’re flying over the bank there. 
“In̯ ayin ewa-l?” 
 meat Q see-PD 
“Did you see them?” 
Ay iŋun erge-l. 
1sg.nom 3sg.obj speak-PD 
I said to him. 
“Inaŋ ebmal ayin ewa-l?” 
 2sg.nom foot Q see-PD 
“Did you see their track?’ 
Ilimb-iy abm inaŋ anen 
then-PRE person 2sg.nom when  
inun aŋ-aŋal afa-n-aγ igu-r 
2sg.obj REDUP-physique fetch-E-PRP go-PD 
inaŋ uʀun ̯d ̯, aŋ-aŋal  afa-n-aγ inun. 
2sg.nom downward REDUP-physique  fetch-E-PRP 2sg.obj  
Then you went to take a photo of her down there, you took a photo. 
“Ayin inaŋ awin ewa-l-iy abm 
  Q 2sg.nom road see-PD-PRE person  
edn arin alŋga-r uʀun ̯d ̯-iy” 
3pl.nom which.way? cross.over-PD downward-PRE 
“Did you see which way the road went across when you went down? 
Adniyar it ̯om amba-n igu-nm edn awaʀ.” 
higher that happen-E go-PG 3pl.nom eastwards 
On top there at the east we should be going.” 
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An. 
done 
(I’m) done. 
Anewaγ akaʀɲ. 
that’s.all y.brother 
That’s all. 
Abm elke-n̯-aγ al awiy.' 
person return-E-PRP go also 
We came back.’ 
Conclusion 
These data attest, with varying degrees of success, the argument advanced in Chapters 5 
to 8 of this volume. Personal names are rarely mentioned, and even the names of 
conception sites appear infrequently; it is kinship categories which dominate the reference 
of others by each of the speakers represented here, and it is the kinship structure which the 
language directly reflects. 
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